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The Treaty Obligations of the Successor
States of the Former Soviet Union,




The United States consistently asserts that the successor states
emerging from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
and Czechoslovakia are obligated to fulfill the treaty obligations of
their predecessor states. The United States bases this duty on the
international law of state succession with respect to treaties and on
political commitments made during the process of establishing diplo-
matic relations.
The international law of state succession with respect to treaties,
however, indicates that successor states are frequently entitled to a de
novo review of the treaty commitments of the predecessor state, and
they are not immediately obligated to assume all the treaties of the
predecessor state. Similarly, the political assurances received from the
individual successor states are incomplete, unilateral, and unlikely to
be considered binding under international law. Finally, the Depart-
ment of State's own compilation of Treaties in Force indicates that
even the State Department might not consider all successor states
bound by treaty obligations of the predecessor state. For instance,
there are no listings of treaties in force with the states of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia/Montenegro.
The break-up of a state can generally be characterized as a contin-
uation, separation, or a dissolution.' A continuation occurs when one
or more sub-state entities breaks away from the predecessor state and
forms an independent state.2 The remainder of the predecessor state is
referred to as the continuing state (or continuity of the predecessor
state). In general, this state retains the rights and obligations of the
* Fulbright Research Scholar, University of Cambridge, and Executive Direcor
of the Public International Law and Policy Fund; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1990;
BA., University of California, Davis, 1987. Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal
Adviser for European and Canadian Affairs, United States Department of State,
1991-1993.
1. See generally DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION (1956);
ARNOLD D. MCNMR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961); UKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF
NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (1972); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979); P.I MENON, THE SUCCESSION OF STATES
IN RESPECT TO TREATIES, STATE PROPERTY, ARCHIVES AND DEBTS (1991).
2. See CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 400.
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predecessor state.' The break-away states are referred to as successor
states.
Separation refers to the break-up of independent states that previ-
ously joined together voluntarily to form a Union of states. In a sepa-
ration, all the states are considered successor states, and all resume
their respective pre-Union state personalities, rights, and obligations.
In addition, each state may assume some of the rights and obligations
accrued during the life of the Union.
In a dissolution, the predecessor state dissolves into a number of
independent states, and none of these states is considered a continuing
state. All of the emerging states are successor states and are treated
as equal heirs to the rights and obligations of the predecessor state.
Whether successor states inherit the rights and obligations of
their predecessors is a matter of long-standing debate. Under the con-
tinuity theory, "any treaty that was in force for the entire territory of
the predecessor state is presumed to continue in force for each sep-
arating state."4 On the other hand, the "clean slate" theory, which is
typically applied to newly independent former colonies, holds that new
states "wipe their individual slates clean and choose whether or not to
join treaties" brought into force by their predecessor states.5
This article will examine whether the bilateral treaties of the
successor states of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia continue in force with the United States. First, the
article will review the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Yugosla-
via, and Czechoslovakia. It will then further detail the international
law of treaty succession and examine the position of the United States
concerning the continuation of treaties with these successor states.
3. The case of continuation is most frequently associated with the independence
of colonies, where the colonial power maintains its status as the continuing state,
and the ex-colony is granted status as a newly independent state. Newly indepen-
dent states are generally granted a clean slate with regard to the rights and obliga-
tions of the colonizing state. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on State Succession in
Respect to Treaties, contained in the Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly on the Work of its 20th Session, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1 (1974), art. 2(d), at 1490 [hereinafter Vi-
enna Convention].
4. George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, Who Inherited the Former Soviet
Union's Obligations under Arms Control Treaties with the United States?, Memoran-
dum for the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 1992),
at 4-5. See also UDOKANG, supra note 1, at 122-24.
5. Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 4, at 5. See also DANIEL P. O'CoNNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 14-17 (1967).
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II. THE BREAK-UP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
A. The Soviet Union
The definitive stages of the break-up of the former Soviet Union
began with the failed coup by hard-line Communists in August 1991.
The failed coup sparked declarations of independence from all of the
republics of the former Soviet Union except Russia and Kazakhstan."
In the midst of these declarations of independence, the Soviet Govern-
ment formally recognized the independence of the Baltic States of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on September 6, 1991.'
The Soviet Government recognized the independence of the Baltic
States reluctantly, however, and it attempted to keep the other twelve
republics together in a Union of Sovereign States with both the Union
and the individual republics maintaining international personalities. A
Ukranian referendum affirming, by 90% of the vote, its declaration of
independence doomed this Union Treaty at the outset.
On December 8, 1991, the Republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and
Russia formally declared that the Soviet Union had disintegrated and
announced the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
By December 23rd, all of the republics except Georgia had agreed to
membership in the Commonwealth.' On December 25, 1991, the Unit-
ed States formally recognized the independent states of Russia,
Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. With
the recognition of these states, the United States considered the former
Soviet Union to have dissolved.'
6. The Baltic States and Georgia declared independence on April 9, 1991, before
the failed coup attempt. Francis X. Clines, Secession Decreed by Soviet Georgia, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991.
The remaining republics declared their independence on the following dates:
Ukraine on August 24, 1991; Belarus on August 25, 1991; Moldova on August 27,
1991; Azerbaijan on August 30, 1991; Uzbekistan on August 31, 1991; Kyrgyzstan on
August 31, 1991; Tajikistan on September 9, 1991; Armenia on September 23, 1991;
and Turkmenistan on October 27, 1991. See Bill Keller, Soviet Turmoil: Soviets Pre-
pare to Design a New System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at 1; Serge Schemann,
Soviet Turmoil: The Questions Gather Like Falling Leaves And Answers Are as
Scarce as Essentials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at Al; Bill Keller, Armenia Yield-
ing Claim on Enclave, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at Al (Armenia); and Indepen-
dence of Turkmenia Declared After a Referendum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1991, at AS.
7. Fred Hiatt, Soviets Recognize Baltic Independence in First Meeting of New
State Council, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al.
8. Declaration on the Creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States, done
in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991, in COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
DOCUMENTs 5 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, May 8, 1992) [hereinafter
Alma Ata Accords].
9. We Stand . .. Before a New World of Hope and Possibilities for Our Chil.
dren, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1991, at A35 (text of President George Bush's Christmas
1994
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B. Yugoslavia
The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was created on Janu-
ary 31, 1946, following the conclusion of World War II. The Yugoslav
Federation consisted of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. In 1974, the Yugoslav
Federation adopted a new Constitution and reconstituted itself as the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY or Yugoslavia).
On December 23, 1990, the Republic of Slovenia conducted a refer-
endum seeking to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation of the
Republics of Yugoslavia. In that referendum, 88.4% of the population
voted in favor of declaring Slovenia a sovereign and independent
state.1" In February 1991, Croatia joined with Slovenia to issue a
joint statement invalidating Yugoslavian laws on their territories and
demanding the formation of a Confederation of Republics. Yugoslavia
resisted these attempts to transform the relationship of the Yugoslav
republics. Finding no satisfaction from Yugoslavia, Slovenia and
Croatia issued proclamations of independence on June 25, 1991.1 By
December of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia had introduced their own
currencies and had adopted new constitutions. 2 The European Com-
munity recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states on Jan-
uary 15, 1992,"3 and the United States recognized these states on
April 7, 1992.14 The United Nations admitted Slovenia and Croatia as
new members on May 22, 1992.5
On February 29 and March 1, 1992, the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina conducted a referendum in which 63% of the electorate
voted to pursue independence from Yugoslavia. i" The European Com-
Eve Address) [hereinafter Christmas Eve Address].
10. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee Opinion No 7, On Recogni-
tion of Slovenia by the EC and its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1512, 1513 (1992)
[hereinafter Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 7].
11. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Slovenia, Report sub-
mitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Department of State 907 (Feb.
1993); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Croatia, Report submit-
ted to the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Department of State 740 (Feb.
1993).
12. Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 7, supra note 11, at 1512; Conference
on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee Opinion No 5, On Recognition of Croatia by
the EC and its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1503, 1504 (1992).
13. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, 38 RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 38703
(Jan. 1992) [hereinafter KEESING'S].
14. Statement on United States Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republics,
PuB. PAPERS 553 (Apr. 7, 1992).
15. KEESiNG'S, supra note 13, at 39033 (July 1992).
16. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate and the Com-
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munity" and the United States"8 recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on
April 7, 1992, and the United Nations admitted Bosnia-Herzegovina as
a new member on May 22, 1992.1"
On September 8, 1991, the Republic of Macedonia conducted a ref-
erendum on independence'm and, based on this referendum, adopted a
new constitution and declared independence in November 1991.21
Macedonia attained United Nations membership on April 8, 1993'
and is recognized by a number of nations, including Russia, Bulgaria,
Turkey, Albania,23  Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina," ' ten
members of the European Union, and the United States.'m
The remaining Yugoslav Republics, Serbia and Montenegro, de-
clared the formation of a joint state named the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslav (Serbia/Montenegro) on April 27, 1992.2" This joint state is not
recognized by the European Union or the United States.
Serbia/Montenegro claims that the break-up of Yugoslavia follows
the model of continuation and that Serbia/Montenegro is the continuity
of the former Yugoslavia, entitled to all of the rights and obligations of
Yugoslavia." Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina explicitly
mittee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Department of State
719 (Feb. 1993).
17. KEESING'S, supra note 13, at 38848 (Jan. 1992).
18. Statement on United States Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republics,
supra note 14, at 53.
19. KEESING'S, supra note 13, at 39033 (July 1992).
20. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee Opinion No 6, On Recogni-
tion of Macedonia by the EC and its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1507, 1508 (1992).
21. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Macedonia, Report
submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Department of State 839 (Feb.
1993) [hereinafter Macedonia Human Rights Report].
22. For United Nations purposes, Macedonia is required to use the name The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until the controversy between Macedonia
and Greece over the name of the territory is resolved. See infra note 25.
23. KEESING'S, supra note 13, at 390036 (Aug. 1992).
24. KEESING'S, supra note 13, at 38850 (Apr. 1992).
25. Originally, the members states of the European Union had decided that they
would not recognize Macedonia under any title that included the name "Macedonia."
Greece believes that the use of the name Macedonia implies territorial claims by the
northern province of Greece, which is also named Macedonia. The European Union
and the United States honored Greece's request, denying Macedonia recognition for a
substantial period of time despite the fact that Macedonia clearly meet the interna-
tional criteria for statehood. Lisbon Declaration of June 26-27, KEESING'S, supra note
13, at 38943 (June 1992).
26. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Serbia/Montenegro,
Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Department of State
897 (Feb. 1993).
27. Diplomatic Note No. 8/1/92 to the United States Department of State from
the Embassy of the S.F.R. of Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
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contest the claim of Serbia/Montenegro to be the continuity of Yugosla-
via. They assert that Yugoslavia has dissolved, and all of the succes-
sor states should be treated equally.' The United States also rejects
Serbia/Montenegro's claim.2 Similarly, the states of the European
Union take the position that Yugoslavia has dissolved, and Ser-
bia/Montenegro may not claim to be its continuity.
30
In the United Nations, while Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Macedonia have applied for and received new mem-
bership, Serbia/Montenegro refuses to apply for new membership and
insists that it is entitled to assume the membership of the former Yu-
goslavia. In response to Serbia/Montenegro's claim to assume the seat
of Yugoslavia, the United Nations noted in Security Council Resolution
757 that, "the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not
been generally accepted."3' Subsequently, the United Nations Security
Council passed Security Council Resolution 777, which effectively ex-
cluded Serbia/Montenegro from participating in the United Nations as
the continuity of Yugoslavia.32
28. Letter from Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel of the Republic of Slovenia to
Peter Hohenfeliner, President of the United Nations Security Council and Permanent
Representative of Austria to the United Nations, and Note Verbale from Republic of
Croatia to United States Mission to the United Nations (June 30, 1992).
29. United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 36-(92), May 30,
1992, states that "[the U.S. Government] has already informed both the Security
Council and the General Assembly that it does not believe that the authorities in
Belgrade represent the continuation of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. I note that many other countries have reserved their position on the
continuity issue and quite a few have adopted the same view as we have on this
matter."
30. European Community Declaration on Yugoslavia, done at Brussels on June
20, 1992. See also KEESING'S, supra note 13, at 39013 (July 1992).
31. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082nd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/757 (1992).
32. Security Council Resolution 777 declares that the state formerly known as
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has ceased to exist and that the
claim by Serbia/Montenegro to continue automatically the membership of the former
SFRY in the United Nations has not been generally accepted. As a result, Resolu-
tion 777 concludes Serbia/Montenegro cannot continue automatically the membership
of the SFRY in the United Nations, and it recommends that the General Assembly
require Serbia/Montenegro to apply for membership. S.C. Res 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3116th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992).
Although Resolution 777 was designed to exclude Serbia and Montenegro from
participation in the United Nations, it has been subject to substantial criticism
because it also provides that the placecard of Yugoslavia shall remain in the United
Nations, Serbia and Montenegro may continue to occupy the Yugoslav Mission to the
United Nations, and the Security Council will consider the matter of Serbian and
Montenegrin participation at the end of the forty-seventh session of the General
Assembly. Id.; Legal Opinion from Carl-August Fleischhauer, Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs, to Kenneth Dadzie, Under-Secretary-General for the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (Sept. 29, 1992).
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C. Czechoslovakia
The 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon, conceived by the victorious
powers in World War I, created the state of Czechoslovakia out of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.' The Czech and Slovak Republics consti-
tuted the administrative divisions of this new state.'
On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republics adopted a law providing that as of midnight,
January 1, 1993, the state of Czechoslovakia would cease to exist and
would be succeeded by the independent states of the Czech Republic
and the Republic of Slovakia.' The European Community and the
United States immediately recognized the Czech Republic and the
Republic of Slovakia (Slovakia).'
Prior to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia entered into a devolution agreement concerning the allocation
of membership in international organizations. 7 This agreement pro-
vided that the Czech Republic and Slovakia would alternate the con-
tinuity of Czechoslovakia for purposes of membership in international
organizations depending upon the nature of the organization."
Despite the existence of this devolution agreement, neither the
Czech Republic nor Slovakia has continued the membership of Czecho-
slovakia in the United Nations. Rather, both states applied and were
admitted as new members on January 19, 1993."9 The United Nations
did, however, allocate the membership of Czechoslovakia in the United
Nations subsidiary organizations to the Czech Republic and Slovakia
in the manner set out in the devolution agreement."
33. Peace Treaty of Trianon, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols,
and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923,
at 3558 (1923).
34. For an examination of the origins of Czechoslovakia, see W.V. WALLACE,
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA (1976).
35. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Czech and Slovak
Republic, Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Department
of State 753 (Feb. 1993); Constitutional Law on the Termination of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, art. 1 (Nov. 25, 1992).
36. Statement by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on Recognition of the Czech
and Slovak Republics, PuB. PAPERS 2221 (Jan. 1, 1993).
37. Agreement on Membership in International Governmental Organizations,
signed in Prague on December 12, 1992 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republics, the Minister of Foreign Relations the Czech Republic,
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Slovak Republic.
38. Id.
39. Statement of the President on the Special Session of the General Assembly
on the Admission of membership of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
(Jan. 19, 1993).
40. Journal of the United Nations, No. 1993/13 (part 1) (Jan. 20, 1993).
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION CONCERNING THE
CONTINUATION OF BILATERAL TREATIES WITH SUCCESSOR STATES
The international law of state succession concerning the continua-
tion of bilateral treaties with successor states can be derived from a
number of sources of international law. The most relevant sources are
the Vienna Convention on State Succession,41 the Restatement of For-
eign Relations,"' prior state practice with regard to treaty succession,
and the recent meetings of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public
International Law (CAHDI) for the Council of Europe.'
A. The Vienna Convention on State Succession
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties opened for ratification in 1978, but it has not yet received the
necessary number of ratifications to enter into force." Although some
commentators consider the Vienna Convention to represent a codifica-
tion of customary international law, it is generally considered that the
Convention does not reflect customary international law but rather
embodies a number of customary legal rules useful for the determina-
tion of treaty continuity.4" More specifically, the Vienna Convention
reflects the customary trend to continue treaty rights and obligations,
but it does not accurately reflect the divergent practices regarding the
question of whether treaties automatically continue or whether the
successor states must consent to their continuation."
The Vienna Convention declares that all successor states of a
break-up are generally bound by the treaty rights and obligations of
the predecessor state regardless of whether that predecessor state
continues to exist.47 The Convention does not draw a distinction with
41. Vienna Convention, supra note 3.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1987) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
43. Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law for the Council of
Europe, Extraordinary Meeting (Jan. 16, 1992) [hereinafter CAHDI 1]; and Commit-
tee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law for the Council of Europe, 4th
Meeting (Sept. 14-15, 1992) [hereinafter CAHDI II].
44. 25 I.L.M. 1640 (1986).
45. CAHDI I, supra note 44, at 4-5.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on State Succession, entitled "Succession
of States in cases of separation of parts of a State," states as follows:
1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one
or more States, whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of succession of States in re-
spect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in
force in respect of each successor State so formed;
(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in
respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State
which has become a successor State continues in force in respect
VOL. 23:1
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regard to treaty continuance between the cases of continuation, separa-
tion, or dissolution. Instead, the Convention provides that the prede-
cessor state, if one continues to exist, is generally bound by the treaty
rights and obligations in force prior to the break-up of the state."
Under the Convention, treaties in force prior to the break-up of a
state may not continue with regard to the successor states, or the pre-
decessor states, if the successor states so agree, the treaty relates to a
specific territory not included within the territory of a particular suc-
cessor state, or the continuation of a particular treaty would be incon-
sistent with the "object and purpose of the treaty or would radically
change the conditions for its operation."
B. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
The Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, which also does
not generally reflect the norms of customary international law, takes a
substantially different position from the Vienna Convention. Like the
Convention, the Restatement does not draw a distinction between the
continuation, separation, or dissolution of a state.
The Restatement, however, adheres to the clean slate rule and
asserts that none of the successor states are bound by the treaty rights
and obligations of the predecessor state regardless of the particular
circumstances of the break-up of that state.' The treaties of the pre-
of that successor State alone.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; or
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the
application of the treaty in respect of the successor State would
be incompatible with its object and purpose or would radically
change the conditions for the operation of the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 3, at 299.
48. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, entitled Position if a State continues
after separation of part of its territory, states as follows:
1. When, after separation of any part of the territory of a State, the
predecessor State continues to exist, any treaty which at the date of the
succession of States was in force in respect of the predecessor State con-
tinues in force in respect of its remaining territory unless:
(a) it is otherwise agreed;
(b) it is established that the treaty related only to the territory
which has separated from the predecessor State; or
(c) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the
application of the treaty in respect of the predecessor State would
be incompatible with its object and purpose or would radically
change the conditions for the operation of the treaty.
Id.
49. Id., arts. 34, 35, at 260.
50. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 43, § 210, at 108, entitled
"State Succession: International Agreements" states, in part, that
(3) When part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not
succeed to the international agreements to which the predecessor state
1994
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decessor state may continue in force with the successor states if the
successor state and the other party to the agreement expressly or by
implication agree to their continuation. 1 The predecessor state, if one
continues to exist, continues to be bound by the treaty rights and obli-
gations in force prior to the break-up of the state. 2 The Restatement
also provides that treaties concerning boundary or other territorial is-
sues shall continue in force with regard to the appropriate successor
states or predecessor state.53
The failure to draw a distinction between the dissolution and
continuation of a state inhibits the useful application of the Re-
statement. The Restatement accurately reflects state practice with
regard to newly independent states emerging from colonization. It does
not, however, reflect an understanding of the different circumstances
that characterize the dissolution or the continuation of a state where
the successor state is not a colony but rather an integral republic en-
tity of the predecessor state.
The Restatement attempts to justify this lack of precision by argu-
ing that some colonies might have more of a say in treaty obligations
than some republic entities. This argument is unpersuasive, however,
because it does not take into account state practice. Rather, the Re-
statement adopts the view that state practice is too complicated to es-
tablish a clear rule, so the clean slate approach should be adopted.5'
C. State Practice
The practice of states regarding the succession of treaties may be
divided into the three categories of continuation, separation, and disso-
lution. An overview of state practice indicates that although there are
a number of conflicting precedents, some useful principles may be
derived that are applicable to the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugo-
was party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts such agree-
ments and the other party or parties thereto agree or acquiesce.
(4) Preexisting boundary and other territorial agreements continue to be
binding notwithstanding subsections (1)-(3).
In the Comment to section 210, the Restatement specifically rejects the distinction
drawn in the Vienna Convention between newly independent states and states aris-
ing out of a separation from the predecessor state. The Restatement contends that
no distinction is warranted because it rejects the justification provided by the Vienna
Convention that ex-colonies are entitled to a clean slate since they likely did not
participate in negotiating the treaties of the colonizing state. Republic entities, on
the other hand, are more likely to have had the opportunity to comment on the
treaties adopted by the predecessor state. Id. at 113.
51. Id. § 210(3), at 108.
52. Id. § 210(1), (2), at 108.
53. Id. § 210(4), at 108.
54. The Restatement also suffers from its apparently superficial examination of
state practice.
VOL. 23:1
TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF SUCCESSOR STATES
slavia, and Czechoslovakia.
1. Continuation
The cases of continuation can be divided into those occurring as
the result of decolonization and those occurring as the result of the
break-away of a sub-state entity other than a colony. Almost without
exception, ex-colonies are not considered to be automatically bound by
the treaty rights and obligations of the colonial power. Ex-colonies are,
however, frequently granted the opportunity to voluntarily adhere to
certain bilateral agreements with the consent of the other party to the
agreement. The following analysis will examine cases where a sub-
state entity has seceded from the predecessor state.
a. Secession of Panama from Colombia
In 1903, Panama seceded from Colombia and declared itself an
independent state. Panama asserted that it was not obligated by the
treaties of the predecessor state Colombia that continued to exist. The
United States and Great Britain accepted this declaration, but France
insisted that the bilateral agreements between France and Colombia
continued to bind Panama. Columbia, as the continuity, remained
bound by the bilateral agreements.'
b. Secession of Belgium from the Netherlands
In 1830, Belgium seceded from the Netherlands. The United
States, Great Britain, and France did not consider the treaty obliga-
tions of the Netherlands to continue in force with respect to Belgium.
The Netherlands continued to be bound by the bilateral agreements.'
c. Secession of Finland from Russia
After World War I, Finland seceded from Russia. Great Britain
and the United States considered that Finland was not bound by the
treaty obligations of Russia but that Russia was still obligated. Conse-
quently, Great Britain and the United States negotiated new treaties
with Finland, whereas Sweden entered into an exchange of notes indi-
cating that specific treaties between Sweden and Russia would con-
tinue with Finland.57 Great Britain did note, however, that treaty ob-
55. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/9610/Rev.1, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1974 Vol. II,
Part One at 263 (1975) [hereinafter ILC Yearbook 19741.
56. Id.
57. Succession of States in respect of Bilateral Treaties, study prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/229, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1970 Vol. II, at 122 (1972) (citing ARNOLD D. McNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIEs
(1961)) [hereinafter ILC Yearbook 1970].
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ligations that were "in the nature of servitudes" would be considered to
continue in force."
d. Secession of Poland and Czechoslovakia from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire
Upon the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the successor
states of Poland and Czechoslovakia were obligated to fulfill their
duties under certain multilateral treaties as a precondition for recogni-
tion as independent states.59 However, regarding bilateral treaties,
Poland and Czechoslovakia were not considered bound by the treaty
obligations of the Empire, nor did they voluntarily consent to the con-
tinuation of the treaties of the former Empire.'
e. Secession of Ireland from the United Kingdom
In 1922, Ireland seceded from the United Kingdom but remained
a dominion. Great Britain took the position that bilateral treaties
would continue in force with respect to Ireland. Ireland, however, as-
serted that it was not automatically obligated by those treaty obliga-
tions and that the continuance of treaty obligations was a matter for
the seceding state to determine. Ireland could therefore deny the con-
tinuance of treaty obligations or, with the consent of the other party to
the treaty, agree that certain treaties would continue in force."'
Regarding multilateral treaties, Ireland chose to accede as a new
party rather than succeed. It is important to note that Switzerland
considered this act of accession as an indication that Ireland was enti-
tled to a clean slate approach. 2
f. Secession of Pakistan from India
In 1947, Pakistan seceded from British India, despite the exis-
tence of a devolution agreement between Pakistan and British India,
which continued as India, providing that Pakistan would continue to
be obligated by the treaties of British India.' Pakistan later asserted
that it was entitled to a clean slate with respect to the multilateral
treaties of British India, and it proceeded to accede to a number of
these treaties.6" For bilateral agreements, Pakistan asserted a clean
58. Id.
59. Id. at 124.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 108; ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 264.
62. Succession of States & Governments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/200, in Yearbook of
the International Law Commission 1968 Vol. II, at 13 (1970) [hereinafter ILC Year-
book 1968].
63. Succession of States: (a) Succession in respect of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/243, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1971, at 121-22 (1972)
[hereinafter ILC Yearbook 19711.
64. ILC Yearbook 1968, supra note 63, at 16; ILC Yearbook 1970, supra note 58,
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slate but proceeded to confirm with a number of states that specific
treaties of British India continued in force." This approach was not
substantially challenged by any of the states party to bilateral agree-
ments with British India.
Pakistan was required, however, to apply for membership in the
United Nations, whereas India was entitled to assume the membership
of British India. Similarly, India continued to be bound by the treaty
rights and obligations of British India."
g. Secession of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia
In 1965, Singapore seceded from the Federation of Malaysia. De-
spite the existence of a devolution agreement providing for the contin-
uation of bilateral treaties, Singapore later asserted that it was not
obligated by the treaties of the Federation of Malaysia.67 Singapore
asserted that continuation of treaty obligations was a matter requiring
the mutual consent of Singapore and the other party to a particular
bilateral agreement." Some States contested this approach and ar-
gued that Singapore remained obligated to the treaties of the Federa-
tion. Singapore did not yield to these arguments and refused to be
bound by bilateral agreements to which it did not provide independent
consent.69
Regarding multilateral treaties, Singapore took the position that
it was not bound unless it notified the depository of its intention to be
bound. Consistent with this assertion, Singapore selectively notified
the United Nations of a number of treaties that it wished to continue
in force. The United Nations does not consider the treaties about which
it has not been notified by Singapore to continue in force.7"
2. Separation
a. Separation of Greater Colombia
In 1819, the states of New Granada, Venezuela, and Quito (Ecua-
dor) united to form the state of Greater Colombia. Subsequently, be-
tween 1829-1831, these states separated from the Union and resumed
their previous international personalities. During the existence of the
union, Greater Colombia had concluded treaties of amity, navigation,
and commerce with the United States and with Great Britain.
at 71-72.
65. ILC Yearbook 1970, supra note 58, at 109-10.
66. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 211.
67. Id. at 249, 264.
68. ILC Yearbook 1970, supra note 58, at 118.
69. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 264.
70. Id.
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After the separation, the United States considered that these
treaties should continue in force with respect to New Granada. Simi-
larly, Great Britain considered these treaties to continue in force with
respect to Ecuador and Venezuela. The Legal Office of the British
Foreign Ministry, however, considered that the continuance of the
treaty obligations of Greater Colombia required the consent of both
parties and/or that the successor states were entitled to unilaterally
claim the continuance of the treaty obligations.71
b. Separation of the Union of Norway and Sweden
The Union of Norway and Sweden separated in 1905. During the
existence of the Union, both Norway and Sweden had maintained
separate international personalities. For instance, the United States
concluded separate extradition treaties with the Governments of both
Norway and Sweden. In some instances, however, the Government of
the Union concluded treaties on behalf of the Union; in other in-
stances, the Government of the Union concluded treaties on behalf of
one of the particular member states."2
Upon the separation of the Union, Norway and Sweden issued
identical declarations stating that they considered the treaties of the
Union to continue in force with respect to each successor state and
that treaties concluded with the individual states during the time of
union would continue with that state. 73 In response to these declara-
tions, Great Britain asserted that as a result of the separation of the
Union, Great Britain was entitled to review the treaty obligations with
the predecessor Union and determine whether it wished those treaties
to continue in force between Great Britain and the successor states.
The United States and France accepted the declaration of the succes-
sor states and agreed to treat Norway and Sweden as bound by the
treaties concluded with the Union.74
c. The Separation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
Upon the Separation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, after
World War I, Austria asserted that it was not bound by any of the
treaties of the former Empire and that the continuance of specific
treaties with specific states would require an agreement between Aus-
tria and the relevant state. 75 Austria subsequently confirmed the con-
tinuation of specific treaties with neighboring states.7" Hungary, how-
ever, made a general declaration affirming its commitment to be bound
71. Id. at 260.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 260-61.
74. Id. at 261.
75. Id.
76. ILC Yearbook 1971, supra note 64, at 172-73.
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by all of the treaties of the former Empire."
Both Austria and Hungary took similar positions with respect to
multilateral agreements. Austria asserted that it was not obligated by
a particular multilateral agreement unless it had acceded to that
agreement; Hungary considering itself to have succeeded to all of the
multilateral obligations of the Empire.78
d. The Separation of the United Arab Republic
In 1958, Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab Republic.
In 1961, this Union separated. Syria declared that following the sep-
aration, it would continue to be bound by the bilateral and multilateral
treaties concluded by the United Arab Republic and by the treaties
concluded by Syria prior to the formation of the Union.7" The interna-
tional community did not object to this declaration.
Egypt made no declaration, but it retained the use of the name
United Arab Republic for a period of time and considered itself to be
automatically bound by the treaties of the Republic. Egypt also consid-
ered itself obligated by the treaties concluded by Egypt prior to the
formation of the Union. The same practice was applied to multilateral
treaties. 80
e. The Separation of the Union of Iceland and Denmark
The states of Iceland and Denmark joined in the Union of Iceland
and Denmark from 1918-1944. During the course of the Union, treaties
concluded by the Government of the Union were not considered to be
binding upon Iceland absent its explicit consent. In a number of cases,
treaties were made independently with Iceland or Denmark without
the participation of the Government of the Union.8 Upon separation,
regarding the treaties concluded during the Union, Iceland considered
itself bound only by the treaties to which it had explicitly consented, as
77. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 261; ILC Yearbook 1970, supra note
58, at 172. Regarding its extradition treaty with Sweden, Hungary stated that it
considered itself to be the same entity of the Kingdom of Hungary, which had been
joined with Austria in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, so Hungary considered itself
obligated by the treaties of the former Empire. ILC Yearbook 1970, supra note 58,
at 123. Austria, on the other hand, informed Switzerland that a similar extradition
treaty would only continue in force after conclusion of an agreement to that effect.
ILC Yearbook 1971, supra note 64, at 172.
78. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 261; ILC Yearbook 1968, supra note
63, at 28-29.
79. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 262; ILC Yearbook 1968, supra note
63, at 142. Despite this declaration, a number of depositories treated Syria as acced-
ing, rather than succeeding, to the treaties of the UAR. ILC Yearbook 1968, supra
note 63, at 18, 49-50, 67-68.
80. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 262.
81. Id. at 261.
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well as by treaties concluded by Denmark with other states prior to
the formation of the Union. 2 Denmark considered itself bound by the
treaties of the Union and by its treaties concluded prior to the Un-
ion.'
Iceland considered itself a party to any multilateral treaty to
which it had been a party while a member of the Union.' During the
Union, however, Iceland made frequent use of its right to decline to be
bound by a treaty entered into by the Union.'
f. The Separation of the Federation of Mali
From 1959 to 1961, Sudan and Senegal joined to form the Federa-
tion of Mali. During the brief period of its existence, the Federation en-
tered into a number of cooperation agreements with France. Upon the
separation of the Federation, Senegal, which caused the separation by
withdrawing from the Federation, declared that in accordance with
international law, it considered the treaties with France to continue in
force. France accepted this declaration.' Sudan, however, retained
the name of the Federation of Mali but refused to be obligated by the
treaties concluded during the time it was unified with Senegal. 7
3. Dissolution
There are no previous cases where the predecessor state has dis-
solved into a number of independent states, with none of these states
being considered the continuing state and all of the emerging states
considered as equal heirs to the rights and obligations of the predeces-
sor state.
Dissolution lies between continuation and separation. As a result,
the successor states arising from a dissolution of a predecessor state
are more likely to be bound by the treaty rights and obligations of the
predecessor state than in the case of continuation, but they are less
likely to be bound than in the case of separation, where the successor
states maintained some sort of international personality while mem-
bers of the Union.
D. Committee of Legal Advisers for the Council of Europe
With the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Com-
mittee of Ministers for the Council of Europe convened a meeting of
82. Id.; ILC Yearbook 1970, supra note 58, at 122; ILC Yearbook 1968, supra
note 63, at 170-71.
83. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 261.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 261-62.
86. Id. at 262, and ILC Yearbook 1971, supra note 64, at 146, 148.
87. ILC Yearbook 1974, supra note 56, at 263.
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Legal Advisers to exchange views on the "[clurrent questions of State
succession in Europe relating to treaties, State property, archives and
debts."' Although the minutes of the meeting of Legal Advisers does
not constitute a viable source of public international law, it does give
an indication of the contemporary views of the states of the Council of
Europe with regard to the succession of treaty obligation.
Addressing the usefulness of the Vienna Convention, a majority of
the Legal Advisers stated that the Vienna Convention could not be
assumed to represent existing public international law.' Particularly,
the Legal Advisers found the distinction between continuation and
dissolution unhelpful in determining the obligations of successor states
under the treaty rights of the predecessor state.' However, the Legal
Advisers did indicate that the Vienna Convention contained many
"useful elements."9
In particular, the Legal Advisers found the traditional distinction
between continuation and dissolution less important in practice than
in theory because states entitled to be free of treaty obligations of the
predecessor state will wish for a number of those treaty obligations to
continue.' Similarly, many Legal Advisers identified a number of
practical reasons for continuing treaty obligations.93
In summing up the discussion, the Chairman of the conference
stated that bilateral agreements should "be dealt with in a practical
way, irrespective of the theoretical point of departure (clean slate or
succession). States should arrive at a common list containing
agreements which should apply between them.'
The Legal Advisers found it difficult to establish a general rule
concerning multilateral agreements. Some Legal Advisers supported
the clean slate approach, while others were willing to accept the prin-
ciple of succession but felt it necessary to require something more than
a general declaration of succession. Similarly, some Legal Advisers
considered it inappropriate for the depositories to make declarations of
automatic succession on behalf of the states.' A number of Legal Ad-
visers noted that the nature of the treaty was important when consid-
ering continuity and that, in cases such as human rights and naviga-
tion treaties, every successor should be bound by the treaty obligations
88. CAHDI I, supra note 43, at 3.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id.
93. Id. These reasons included the difficulty of new states to acquire a whole
new set of bilateral treaties and the necessity to regulate international administra-
tive matters such as postal, telecommunications, and transportation services. Id.
94. CAHDI II, supra note 43, at 5.
95. Id. at 3.
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of the predecessor."
Switzerland explained that it considered Russia to be the continu-
ity of the former Soviet Union, so it had replaced the designation
"USSR" with "Russia" on all multilateral treaties for which it was a
depository.' Although Serbia/Montenegro had claimed to be the con-
tinuation of the former Yugoslavia, this claim has been rejected by the
international community. As a result, Switzerland has not determined
how to designate the appropriate party to treaties for which it is a
depository.'
The Legal Adviser from the Hague Conference noted that its posi-
tion was not to impose but rather to ensure continuity. The Hague had
requested confirmation from Russia that it continued to be bound by
the treaties deposited by the former Soviet Union. Further, the Hague
took the position that Belarus could succeed unless the other parties to
the agreement objected.9 On this point, some Legal Advisers noted
that parties to a multilateral treaty could oppose a declaration of suc-
cession if such a possibility was provided for in the treaty."8 It was
also noted that the document of succession could be accompanied by
new reservations.101
In summing up the discussion on succession to multilateral trea-
ties, the Chairman of the Conference stated that a "new State should
make a declaration of succession in order to avoid a legal vacuum.
States Parties to such a treaty should be able to oppose a declaration
of succession.""8
In addressing the case of the former Soviet Union, the General
Consul of Russia, attending as an observer, stated that Russia was the
continuity of the former Soviet Union, and the other former Republics
"could be considered to be successor States."03 In support of this
view, a number of states expressed the opinion that it was unnecessary
to recognize Russia "as the international community considered that
96. Id. This approach has no basis in state practice or in the Vienna Conven-
tion. The primary motivation for these statements was the desire to see Ser-
bia/Montenegro abide by the Danube Convention and continue to permit free nav-





101. Id. at 3-4. This would appear to be inconsistent with the notion of succession
as stepping into the shoes of the predecessor state.
102. Id. at 5. This conclusion is antithetical to the views of the United States
that treaty rights and obligations should continue in force and that the rule of law
is important. It basically provides that successor states may pick and choose which
treaties they wish to be obligated by, and, therefore, it is equivalent to a clean
slate.
103. CAHDI I, supra note 43, at 6.
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Russia was the continuity of the Soviet Union.""1 In summing up the
discussion on the former Soviet Union, the Chairman noted "that the
Russian Federation had been considered as the continuing State of the
Soviet Union in the United Nations and the CSCE. With respect to the
other former Soviet republics the question of succession had to be con-
sidered.""°
In discussing the case of Yugoslavia, the Legal Advisers noted
that, unlike Russia, Serbia/Montenegro could not be considered the
continuation of the former Yugoslavia because the historical basis was
absent, and the other successor states had not accepted Ser-
bia/Montenegro's claim to be the continuation. As a result, the Legal
Advisers agreed that all successor states of the former Yugoslavia
should be treated as equal."°
The Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Slovenia
stated that Slovenia would honor the multilateral and bilateral trea-
ties of the former Yugoslavia during the transition period. Consistent
with this approach, Slovenia was requesting confirmation of bilateral
agreements with Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Austria."°
Slovenia did, however, express uncertainty regarding multilateral
treaties as to whether notification of succession to the appropriate
depositary was sufficient or whether Slovenia must ratify the treaties
anew.0" The representative from Croatia noted that Croatia would
respect all the treaties of the former Yugoslavia unless they conflicted
with the Croatian Constitution.'19
Taking into consideration the Vienna Convention, the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations, prior state practice with regard to treaty
succession, and the recent meetings of the Committee of Legal Advis-
ers on Public International Law for the Council of Europe, the
principles of international law governing succession to treaties of a
dissolved state can be stated as follows: 1) A successor state is neither
clearly entitled to deny continuance of the treaty obligations of the
predecessor state nor is it clearly obligated to fulfill all of the treaty
obligations of the predecessor state; 2) There exists a presumption of
continuity of treaty rights and obligations, but this presumption must
be confirmed either by a binding action on behalf of the successor state
or by an agreement between the successor state and the other party to
the treaties.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 7.
106. CAHDI II, supra note 43, at 2.
107. Id. at 4.
108. CAHDI I, supra note 43, at 5.
109. CAHDI II, supra note 43, at 3.
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IV. THE LEGAL OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE
CONTINUATION OF BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE SUCCESSOR STATES
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Recognizing the importance of the break-up of the Soviet Union,
the Legal Adviser for the United States Department of State remarked
that "ilt may well be that international practice in connection with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union will prove to be critical to the future
shape of the law.""0 In developing a legal opinion concerning
whether the treaties of predecessor states continue in force, the De-
partment of State considered the Vienna Convention and the U.S.
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, but it relied primarily upon
state practice."'
The United States concluded that treaty succession could be
viewed along a continuum." 2 Circumstances at one end of the con-
tinuum would warrant a clean slate approach to continuance of treaty
rights and obligations, while circumstances at the other end of the
continuum would warrant the continuation of treaty obligations. '13
Those circumstances that warrant a clean slate include decolonization
and instances of continuation in which a single successor state contin-
ues on as the predecessor state. 14 Those circumstances warranting a
continuance of treaty obligations include instances of dissolution in
which all of the successor states are treated as equal."'
In developing this approach, the Department of State relied upon
four case studies of dissolution and four case studies of continuation.
Cases that followed the model of dissolution include 1) the Greater Co-
lombian Union, formed between 1820 and 1830, which subsequently
dissolved into the states of Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela; 2) the
Union of Norway and Sweden, which dissolved in 1905; 3) the dissolu-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which created the independent
states of Austria and Hungary; and 4) the dissolution of the United
Arab Republic. ' The Department of State determined that in each
of these cases, with some exceptions, the successor states were bound
by the treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor state."7
110. Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the
USSR, Presentation by Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department
of State before the meeting of the American Society of International Law 1 (Apr. 1,
1992) (hereinafter Williamson Speech).





116. Id. at 3. The State Department characterizes these as dissolutions, whereas
this article them considers them separations. See supra section III(CX2). Commen-
tary on this discrepancy follows. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
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Cases that followed the model of continuation include 1) the disas-
sociation of Panama from Colombia in 1903; 2) the disassociation of
Finland from the Soviet Union after World War I; 3) the disassociation
of Poland and Czechoslovakia from the Austro-Hungarian Empire after
World War I; and 4) the disassociation of Pakistan from India in
1947."18 The Department of State determined that, in these cases,
state practice provided that the disassociated state was not bound by
the treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor state."1 '
Based on these eight case studies and on the determination that
"U.S. interests in maintaining the stability of legal rights and obliga-
tions are, on balance, better served by adopting a presumption that
treaty relations remain in force," the Department of State concluded
that the case of the former Soviet Union fell on the dissolution side of
the continuum."m The Department of State supported this conclusion
with the argument that the successor states of the Soviet Union had
agreed in the Alma Ata Declaration to guarantee the "fulfillment of
international obligations stemming from the treaties and agreements
of the former U.S.S.R."
121
Subsequently, the Department of State concluded that the break-
ups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also fell on the dissolution side
of the continuum, and thus the successor states of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia were obligated to fulfill the treaty rights and obliga-
tions of the respective predecessor states.122
Although the Department of State did not develop a set of criteria
for determining where on the continuum a particular break-up would
lie, it did develop a set of criteria for determining when a break-up
should be considered a continuation or dissolution for purposes of
membership in international organizations. The Department of State
argued that the break-up of a state followed the continuation model
and that the continuing state should be entitled to the membership of
the predecessor state in an international organization if a particular
successor state had "inherited the essential legal identity of the prede-
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id.
120. Id. This approach was consistent with the United States emphasis on the
rule of law and its desire to promote the development of international legal princi-
ples that foster stability of legal rights and obligations. Id.
121. Id. at 5.
122. The Department of State identified a number of exceptions to the principle
that successor states bound by the rights and obligations of the predecessor state
after a dissolution. These exceptions are as follows: 1) where the treaty is not rele-
vant to the territory of a particular republic; 2) where it is not feasible to continue
a treaty on its terms; 3) where continuation would be inconsistent with the nature
of the treaty regime or the object and purpose of the treaty; 4) where treaties allo-
cate quotas or rights on the premise that the predecessor state is a single territory
(e.g., bilateral textile agreements); and 5) where treaties are relevant only to those
republics with certain nuclear or military capacity. Id. at 6-7.
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cessor state.""2 Factors to determine whether a successor state inher-
its the legal identity of its predecessor include the retention of "1) sub-
stantial amounts of territory (including the historical territorial hub);
2) the majority of the predecessor state's population, resources, and
armed forces; 3) the seat of the government; [and] 4) the name of the
former member."'24 On the basis of these factors, the United States
supported the assumption by Russia of the seat of the former Soviet
Union in the United Nations Security Council."2
Although the analysis by the Department of State finds support in
state practice for the presumption that treaty relations remain in force
following the dissolution of a state, its analysis suffers four primary
flaws. First, although the Department of State recognizes that the
models of state succession lie upon a continuum, the cases of separa-
tion are identified as cases of dissolution, thus narrowing the range of
the continuum. This generates a presumption that successor states to
a dissolution are more obligated to continue the treaties of the prede-
cessor state than might be the case.
2
,
Second, not all of the case studies relied upon by the Department
of State actually support its accompanying conclusions. 27  Once
again, this generates a presumption that successors to a dissolution
are more obligated than should be the case.
Third, the reliance of the United States upon the Alma-Ata Ac-
cords is overly confident because it fails to take into consideration that
the unconditional commitment to honor treaty obligations was made in
the Minsk Accords of December 8, 1991, and it was signed by only
Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine." The subsequent Alma-Ata Accords
modified the commitment to fulfill treaty obligations to the extent such
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id.
125. The United States reasoned as follows: Russia is clearly the dominant part
of the former Soviet Union in all respects - land area, population, resources, mili-
tary strength, etc. - especially when one excludes Ukraine and Belarus, which have
always been separate members of the U.N. and not part of the "USSR" for this pur-
pose. As a result, Russia could fairly claim to be the continuation of the USSR for
U.N. membership purposes. And regarding its permanent security council seat,
certain Russian attributes are precisely those that warranted "Perm Five" designa-
tion in the first place - in particular, its continued status as a nuclear power and
a preeminent military force in the world. Id. at 10-11.
126. See, e.g., supra notes 73-74 and 80-81 and accompanying text discussing the
separations of the Union of Norway and Sweden and of the United Arab Republic.
127. See, e.g., supra notes 73 and 77 and accompanying text discussing the sep-
aration of Austria and Hungary from the Austro-Hungarian Empire (with Austria
claiming a clean slate) and the separation of Greater Colombia (with Great Britain
recognizing that the treaties continued in force only at the option of the successor
states).
128. Declaration on the Creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States done
in Minsk on December 8, 1991, in Commonwealth of Independent States Documents
31 I.C.M. 138 (May 8, 1992).
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continuation was "in accordance with constitutional procedures" of the
successor state.'2 Although it is unclear what was intended by this
modification, it deliberately changes the unconditional Minsk Accords
and creates the opportunity for successor states to refuse to continue
some or all treaty obligations based on the rationale that doing so
would be incompatible with their constitutional procedures. Additional-
ly, the Minsk and Alma-Ata Accords represent an agreement between
the members of the Commonwealth and not between the United States
and the individual successor states. As a result, it is unclear whether
the Alma-Ata Accords would be useful, aside from political persuasion,
in attempting to bind a successor state to the treaty obligations of the
former Soviet Union.
Finally, since the United States accepted Russia as the successor
of the USSR for membership purposes in the United Nations, it creat-
ed the contradictory presumption that the case of the former Soviet
Union is one of a continuation rather than a dissolution. Although this
characterization does not affect the treaty obligations of Russia, 3 ' it
does substantially reduce the obligation of the other eleven successor
states to be bound by the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union.
V. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO SECURING THE CONTINUATION
OF BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE SUCCESSOR STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Taking into consideration the conclusion of the Legal Adviser that
a presumption exists for the continuation of treaties by the successor
states of a dissolved predecessor state, the Department of State devel-
oped a two-prong approach to ensure that treaties of the former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia would continue in force with
respect to their successor states. First, the United States informed the
successor states that, as a matter of public international law, they
were obligated to continue the treaties of their predecessor state. Sec-
ond, the United States included a commitment to be bound by the
treaties of the predecessor state as one of the conditions for the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations with the United States."'
129. Alma Ata Accords, supra note 8, at 5.
130. In fact, this characterization strengthens the obligation to be bound.
131. During the process of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then-Secretary of
State James Baker announced that the relations between the United States and any
successor states to the Soviet Union would be guided by a number of principles,
including the commitment to follow democratic practices, safeguard human rights,
respect borders of neighboring states, implement a market economy, and adhere to
the international obligations and practices of the Helsinki Final Act and Charter of
Paris. In order to assure a relationship built upon respect for these principles,
Secretary Baker announced that the United States would establish diplomatic rela-
tions with successor states only after the United States had received sufficient
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A. Exchange of Letters With the Successor States of the Former Soviet
Union
On December 24, 1992, President Bush announced that the Unit-
ed States recognized the independent states of Russia, Ukraine, Arme-
nia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. With the recognition
of these states, the United States considered the former Soviet Union
to have dissolved.32
During this announcement, President Bush also disclosed that the
United States intended to establish diplomatic relations with Russia,
Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan based on
special commitments made to the United States. President Bush fur-
ther proclaimed the United States was prepared to establish diplomat-
ic relations with Moldova, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Geor-
gia, and Uzbekistan when the United States received satisfactory as-
surances regarding "commitments to responsible security policies and
democratic principles.""3
1. Recognition and Diplomatic Relations with Russia, Ukraine,
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan
a. Recognition/Diplomatic Relations Letters and Responses
On December 26, 1991, President Bush sent a Presidential Letter
to President Boris Yeltsin of Russia stating in part that he was
"pleased to inform [President Yeltsin] that the United States Govern-
ment recognizes Russia as an independent state.""3 In addition,
President Bush stated that, based on a number of commitments, in-
cluding the commitment "to fulfill the treaty and other obligations of
the former USSR," he was "pleased to propose that our two countries
conduct full diplomatic relations with permanent missions." " Presi-
dent Yeltsin responded to President Bush's recognition of Russia and
offer of diplomatic relations with a letter stating that he was pleased
with the United States' recognition of Russia and accepted the offer to
establish diplomatic relations."3
assurances from the successor states that they were committed to fulfilling these
principles. Although the development of what became known as the Baker Five did
not originally include the commitment to abide by the treaty obligations of the
predecessor state, this commitment was included at the request of the Legal Adviser.
132. Christmas Eve Address, supra note 9.
133. Id.
134. Letter from President George Bush to President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (Dec.
26, 1991).
135. Id.
136. Letter from President Boris Yeltsin of Russia to President Bush (Dec. 28,
1991).
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On December 26, 1991, President Bush sent identical letters to
Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan stating that
the United States recognized them as independent states and offering
to conduct diplomatic relations based upon the assurances regarding a
number of commitments, including the commitment to fulfill the treaty
and other obligations of the Soviet Union. 37 The Governments of
Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan responded to
President Bush's letter with formal letters of reply as follows:
i. President Kravchuk of Ukraine accepted the offer to establish
diplomatic relations and provided a general reference to the assurances
sought by President Bush. Kravchuk stated that he "would also like to
thank you for the expression of respect and trust towards the commit-
ments that Ukraine has taken with full responsibility to implement its
independent domestic and foreign policy.""
ii. Foreign Minister Hovannisian of Armenia accepted the offer to
establish diplomatic relations but made no reference to any assuranc-
es. 139
iii. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan accepted the offer to
establish diplomatic relations and affirmed Kazakhstan's commitment
to a number of the principles enumerated in President Bush's letter.
He did not, however, provide any assurances that Kazakhstan would
continue to fulfill the treaty obligations of the Soviet Union."
iv. President Shushkevich of Belarus accepted the offer of diplo-
matic relations and provided assurances concerning all the commit-
ments outlined by President Bush. Regarding the assurance to fulfill
the treaty obligations of the USSR, President Shushkevich committed
to "fulfill the obligations of the former Union of SSR." 41
v. President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan accepted the offer to establish
diplomatic relations and affirmed Kyrgyzstan's commitment to all of
the principles mentioned in President Bush's letter. However, with
regard to the commitment to fulfill the treaty obligations of the former
Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan limited its assurance to the "commitments
137. Letter from President Bush to President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (Dec.
26, 1991); Letter from President Bush to President Levon Ter-Petrosian of Armenia
(Dec. 26, 1991); Letter from President Bush to President Nursultan Nazarbaev of
Kazakhstan (Dec. 26, 1991); Letter from President Bush to President Stanislav
Shushkevich of Belarus (Dec. 26, 1991), and Letter from President Bush to President
Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan (Dec. 26, 1991).
138. Letter from President Kravchuk of Ukraine to President Bush (Jan. 3, 1992).
139. Letter from Foreign Minister Raffi Hovannisian of Armenia to President
Bush (Jan. 6, 1992).
140. Letter from President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to President Bush (Jan. 7,
1992).
141. Letter from President Shushkevich of Belarus to President Bush (Dec. 26,
1991).
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under the treaties which were signed between the USA and the former
Soviet Union." This formulation appears to exclude a commitment to
fulfill the multilateral treaties of the former USSR."
2. Recognition and Diplomatic Relations with Moldova,
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia
a. Recognition Letters with Offer to Negotiate Relations
On December 26, 1992, President Bush, with identical letters,
notified Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Georgia that the United States Government recognized them as
independent states. In these letters, President Bush indicated that the
United States was not yet in a position to "propose the establishment
of full diplomatic relations or a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in
[respective country], but [it was prepared] to continue [the] dialogue on
the full range of issues of interest to both sides."1"
President Bush further articulated the five principles guiding the
United States in evaluating its relationship with the successor states
of the former Soviet Union. In articulating those principles, President
Bush made a vague reference to "respect for international law and
obligations," but he did not explicitly outline a commitment to fulfill
the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union.'"
b. Response Letters
Only the response letters from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are
available. The Governments of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and
Georgia either responded orally, or their letters are unavailable.
On December 27, 1991 in Moscow, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for Turkmenistan presented a diplomatic note to the United States
Embassy thankfully acknowledging recognition by the United States
but making no reference to its commitment to the five principles."
On January 31, 1992, the Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan provided
a second diplomatic note expressing Turkmenistan's commitment to
142. Letter from President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan to President Bush (Dec. 28,
1991).
143. Letter from President Bush to President Mircea Snegur of Moldova (Dec. 26,
1991); Letter from President Bush to President Rakhman Nabiyev of Tajikistan (Dec.
26, 1991); Letter from President Bush to President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan
(Dec. 26, 1991); Letter from President Bush to President Ayaz Mutalibov of
Azerbaijan (Dec. 26, 1991); Letter from President Bush to President Saparmurad
Niyazov of Turkmenistan (Dec. 26, 1991); and Letter from President Bush to Presi-
dent Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia (Dec. 26, 1991).
144. Id.
145. Diplomatic Note from Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to U.S. Em-
bassy in Moscow (Dec. 27, 1991).
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international principles.14 This diplomatic note made scant reference
to the specific assurances sought by the United States and made no
commitment to be bound by the treaty obligations of the former Soviet
Union.147
On January 2, 1992, President Karimov of Uzbekistan furnished a
letter to President Bush providing assurances that the Republic of
Uzbekistan would abide by commitments sought by the United States.
President Karimov went on to articulate the principles, wherein they
were modified. With regard to treaty obligations, President Karimov
provided that Uzbekistan would "observe international treaties and
commitments," making no distinction between treaties of the former
Soviet Union and treaties to which Uzbekistan might selectively suc-
ceed or accede. 4
c. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
On February 18-19, 1992, the United States offered to establish
diplomatic relations with Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 4" On February 28, 1992, President
Bush sent a formal letter to the Presidents of these states indicating
that, based upon the assurances received regarding commitments
sought by the United States, he was pleased to propose that the Unit-
ed States and the respective countries conduct full diplomatic rela-
tions."w Referring to the commitment to fulfill treaty obligations,
President Bush specifically enumerated that the successor state had
indicated a "commitment to fulfill the treaty and other obligations of
the former USSR."'5 '
B. Exchange of Letters With the Successor States of the Former
Yugoslavia
On April 14, 1992, President Bush announced that the United
States recognized the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
146. Diplomatic Note No. 19 from Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
U.S. Embassy in Moscow. (Jan. 31, 1992).
147. Id.
148. Letter from President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to President Bush (Jan.
2, 1992).
149. White House Press Release (Feb. 19, 1992).
150. Letter from President Bush to President Mircea Snegur of Moldova (Feb. 28,
1992); Letter from President Bush to President Ayaz Mutalibov of Azerbaijan (Feb.
28, 1992); Letter from President Bush to President Rakhman Nabiyev of Tajikistan
(Feb. 28, 1992); Letter from President Bush to President Saparmurad Niyazov of
Turkmenistan (Feb. 28, 1992); Letter from President Bush to President Islam
Karimov of Uzbekistan (Feb. 28, 1992).
151. Id.
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1. Recognition and Diplomatic Relations with Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia
a. Recognition with Offer to Consider Diplomatic Relations
On April 14, 1992, Secretary of State Baker notified President
Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Tudjman of Croatia,
and President Milan Kucan of Slovenia, via identical diplomatic let-
ters, that the United States was prepared to begin a dialogue with the
respective states with a view toward the establishment of full diplo-
matic relations. Secretary Baker noted that the United States would
seek written assurances from the successor states on a number of mat-
ters. Included in this list of assurances was "the readiness of [the re-




The Governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia
responded to President Bush's letters as follows:
i. President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina responded to Secre-
tary Baker's request for assurances via letter, stating in part that
"Bosnia-Herzegovina is ready to fulfill the treaty and other obligations
of the former SFRY.153
ii. President Tudjman of Croatia provided the assurances sought
from Secretary Baker with a letter stating that "[als one of the suc-
cessors to former Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia is prepared to
fulfill treaty and other obligations of the former Yugoslav
state . ,154
iii. President Kucan of Slovenia responded to Secretary Baker's
request for assurances with a letter stating that "[wihen declaring in-
dependence on June 25, 1991, the Parliament of the Republic of
Slovenia decided that international treaties which had been concluded
by the SFRY and which relate to the Republic of Slovenia remain valid
on its territory.""s
On August 10, 1992, the United States announced the establish-
152. Letter from Secretary of State James Baker to President Alija Izetbegovic of
Bosnia Herzegovina (Apr. 14, 1992); Letter from Secretary of State James Baker to
President Franco Tudjman of Croatia (Apr. 14, 1992); Letter from Secretary of State
James Baker to President Milan Kucan of Slovenia (Apr. 14, 1992).
153. Letter from President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Secretary of
State James Baker of the United States of America (Apr. 19, 1992).
154. Letter from President Franco Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia to Secre-
tary of State James Baker of the United States of America (Apr. 16, 1992).
155. Letter from President Milan Kucan of the Republic of Slovenia to Secretary
of State James Baker of the United States of America (Apr. 20, 1992).
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ment of diplomatic relations with the states of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, and Slovenia.
2. Denial of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations with
Serbia/Montenegro and Macedonia
a. Serbia/Montenegro
On April 27, 1992, the Embassy of the former Yugoslavia provided
the United States Department of State with a diplomatic note indi-
cating that
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is transformed into the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of the Republic of Serbia
and the Republic of Montenegro. Strictly respecting the continuity
of the international personality of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia shall continue to fulfill all the rights conferred to and
obligations assumed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in international relations, including its membership in all interna-
tional organizations and participation in international treaties
ratified or acceded to by Yugoslavia.1"
The United States responded to this diplomatic note by refusing to
recognize Serbia/Montenegro as an independent state57 and by deny-
ing that Serbia/Montenegro constituted the continuation of Yugoslavia.
The refusal of the United States to recognize Serbia/Montenegro as a
state precluded the opportunity to seek assurances arising out of rec-
ognition. Similarly, the non-recognition prevented the United States
from seeking commitments as a basis for diplomatic relations because
the United States already maintained diplomatic relations with Ser-
bia/Montenegro through the United States Embassy to the former
Yugoslavia located in Belgrade.
The United States has thus rejected the Serbian/Montenegrin
claim to be the continuation of the former Yugoslavia. Since that claim
is the basis for the assertion by Serbia/Montenegro to continue the
treaty obligations of the former Yugoslavia, the United States was un-
able to seek separate assurances prior to establishing diplomatic re-
lations since diplomatic relations already exist with Ser-
bia/Montenegro.
156. Diplomatic Note No. 8/1.92 from the Embassy of the S.F.R. of Yugoslavia
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) to the United States Department of State (Apr. 27,
1992).
157. Chuck Sudetic, In Disputed Region, Belgrade Foes Reject New Yugoslav State,
N.Y TamS, Apr. 29, 1992, at A1O.
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b. Macedonia
The United States recently recognized Macedonia as an indepen-
dent state. However, the United States has yet to establish diplomatic
relations with Macedonia due to Greece's concerns over the name Mac-
edonia.
The situation with Macedonia is particularly peculiar because the
United States has proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations,
via a letter from President Clinton," upon the receipt of specific as-
surances through a reply letter from President Gligorov 59 These as-
surances included Macedonia's commitment to fulfill treaty and other
obligations of the former SFRY.'"
In all other circumstances such an exchange of letters would con-
stitute the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, the United
States denies that it has established diplomatic relations with Macedo-
nia and has stated that it refuses to do so until Greece approves of an
appropriate name for Macedonia."" Although the United States is in
possession of a letter from President Gligorov providing assurances to
continue treaty obligations, the letter cannot be considered binding; if
it were, it would constitute the establishment of diplomatic relations.
As a result, the United States may not claim that Macedonia has con-
sented to fulfill its treaty obligations.
C. Exchange of Letters With the Successor States of the Former
Czechoslovakia
1. Recognition and Offer of Diplomatic Relations
On January 1, 1993, President Bush sent identical letters to
Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar of the Slovak Republic and Prime
Mister Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic informing them that the
United States Government recognizes the Slovak Republic and the
Czech Republic as independent states. The letters also proposed that
the United States and the respective states "conduct full diplomatic
relations" based on the affirmation of the Republics to fulfill a number
of commitments, including the "commitment to fulfill the treaty and
other obligations of the former Czechoslovakia."'62
158. Letter from President William Clinton to President Kiro Gligorov of Macedo-
nia (Feb. 9, 1994).
159. Letter from President Gligorov of Macedonia to President Clinton (Feb. 8,
1994).
160. Id.
161. Department of State Briefings on Mar. 31, 1994 and Apr. 4, 1994.
162. Letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar of the Slovak
Republic (Jan. 1, 1993); Letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus
of the Czech Republic (Jan. 1, 1993).
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2. Acceptance of Offer of Diplomatic Relations
On January 1, 1993, Vladimir Meciar responded to President
Bush's offer of diplomatic relations with a letter stating in part that
"[tihe Slovak Republic greatly appreciates the United States' formal
recognition of the Slovak Republic as an independent state and wel-
comes the United States offer to establish full diplomatic rela-
tions."1" Meciar further stated that "[the Slovak Republic is a suc-
cessor state to the dissolved Czechoslovak federation, and is committed
to fulfillling the treaty and other obligations of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic."'"
On January 1, 1993, Vaclav Klaus responded to President Bush's
offer of diplomatic relations with a letter stating in part that "[tihe
Czech Republic greatly appreciates the United States' formal recogni-
tion of the Czech Republic as an independent state, and welcomes the
United States offer to establish full diplomatic relations."1 Klaus
further stated that "[tihe Czech Republic is a successor state to the
dissolved Czechoslovak federation, and is committed to fulfilling the
treaty and other obligations of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic."' ,
VI. THE DEFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES
APPROACH TO SECURING CONTINUATION OF BILATERAL TREATIES WITH
SUCCESSOR STATES
The performance of the United States in securing the continuation
of the treaty obligations from the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia should be measured against the standards set forth by
the Legal Adviser in his presentation to the American Society of Inter-
national Law. The Legal Adviser cited the interest in maintaining the
stability of legal rights and obligations as the primary objective behind
United States policy regarding treaty obligations and ensuring that the
treaties of the former states remain in force."6 7 An examination of the
practice of the United States indicates that this goal has at best been
marginally attained.
A. Shift from Legal Assertion to Reliance on Political Commitments
Although the Department of State perceived that it was necessary
to support assertions of a legal obligation by the successor states to
163. Letter from Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar of the Slovak Republic to Presi-
dent Bush (Jan. 1, 1993).
164. Id.
165. Letter from Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic to President
Bush (Jan. 1, 1993).
166. Id.
167. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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continue treaties by seeking assurances from the successor states, it
erred in carrying out its objective. First, the Department of State aban-
doned any assertions of automatic continuation of treaty obligations
and relied entirely on any assurances provided by the successor states.
Second, the Department of State sought to receive unilateral assuranc-
es from the member states as part of a package of recognition, but it
did not follow up these assurances with bilateral agreements confirm-
ing that the treaties would continue in force. By relying solely on as-
surances provided during the process of developing diplomatic rela-
tions, the U.S. is left with a a fragile tool for maintaining the stability
of the legal rights and obligations of treaty obligations.
1. Feigned Commitments
Although the United States asserts that all of the successor states
have committed to fulfill the treaty rights and obligations of their
respective predecessor states, an examination of the commitments
provided indicates that a number of countries failed to provide these
assurances or modified the extent of their commitments.
Where the United States did not receive the specific assurances, it
attempted to create those assurances by responding with a letter pro-
posing to establish diplomatic relations based on assurances received
and restating the commitments it sought." The mere fact of feigning
the receipt of commitments is not sufficient under international law or
international diplomacy to require a state to be bound by those com-
mitments.
2. Unilateral Commitments
Where the United States has received unequivocal commitments
from the successor states, those commitments are purely unilateral,
raising two problems. First, unilateral commitments may be rescinded
by the successor state without requiring the consent of the United
States."M Second, by not providing any commitment itself to be obli-
gated by its treaties with the relevant predecessor state, the United
States has effectively reserved the right to discontinue a treaty at its
option. Although the latter difficulty may appear to be a benefit to the
168. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
169. The United States would likely argue that the establishment of diplomatic
relations was based upon the assurance of continuance of treaty obligations. This
argument may be defeated upon proving that the assurances of a commitment to be
bound by treaty obligations was not central to the establishment of diplomatic
relations. This lack of centrality can be proven by pointing to the fact that the
United States established diplomatic relations with those states that did not provide
assurances or modified the assurances. Further, the United States is unlikely to
withdraw diplomatic relations if a state breaches a commitment to continue treaty
obligations.
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United States under the international law perspective, it will make for
a difficult diplomatic effort if the United States chooses to exercise this
option.
3. Aspirational Assurances
The other assurances sought by the United States in the exchange
of diplomatic letters are of a specifically political nature, including
assurances to develop a market economy, protect the rights of minori-
ties, abide by the principles of the Committee on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe, and adopt responsible security policies. Although the
commitment to continue treaty obligations appears to be a legal com-
mitment, it can be read in the context of the other commitments as a
purely political commitment. Like the other political commitments, it
can be carried out with varying degrees of attainment and still be
considered to be a satisfaction of the successor states' commitment. 70"
Similarly, if a successor state revokes its commitment to continue the
treaties, the United States is restricted to political means of reversing
that revocation and may not seek legal recourse.'7 1
4. Lack of Commitments from Serbia/Montenegro or Macedonia
Since the United States has neither sought nor received commit-
ments from Serbia/Montenegro or from Macedonia, those states may
freely assert that they are not obligated by the treaties of the former.
Yugoslavia. In fact, it appears that the United States does not consider
either Serbia/Montenegro or Macedonia to be obligated to continue
those treaties.'72 This is particularly important in the case of Ser-
bia/Montenegro, given the imposition of United Nations sanctions and
the hostile attitude between it and the United States.
B. Subsequent Practice of the Department of State Detrimental to
Policy of Securing Continuation of Bilateral Treaties with Successor
States
The primary indicator of the treaties that the United States con-
siders to be in force is the Department of State annual publication,
Treaties in Force. This compilation contains all treaties and other
170. For instance, there are many progressive levels of a market economy, and
although some of the successor states are far from developing the level of market
economy sought in the commitments provided to the United States, the United
States does not consider this to be a violation of those commitments. Similarly, a
successor state may continue all of the treaties, only those that are consistent with
its constitution, or only those approved by its Parliament, and it will still be consid-
ered to be in compliance with the political commitment.
171. The U.S. may not even be able to support its political approaches with a
supporting reference to the moral authority deriving from international law.
172. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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agreements "to which the United States has become a party and which
are carried on the records of the Department of State as being in force
as of January 1 of each year."173 A close examination of the most re-
cent issue of Treaties in Force indicates that the United States may in
fact consider that only some of the successor states of the former Sovi-
et Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia remain obligated to the trea-
ties of the predecessor state.
Under the headings of the successor states of the former Soviet
Union, Treaties in Force only lists those treaties that have been con-
cluded with the successor states since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Each heading also includes a reference to see the heading
USSR for treaties concluded prior to December 31, 1991. Under the
heading of the Soviet Union, Treaties in Force states that the United
States is reviewing the continued applicability of the agreements un-
der this heading. Treaties in Force further indicates that the former
Soviet Union has dissolved and cites the Alma Ata declaration stating
that the successor states agreed, in accordance with their constitution-
al procedures, to discharge the international obligations of the former
Soviet Union. Additionally, Treaties in Force quotes the Russian dip-
lomatic note of January 13, 1992 indicating that Russia intended to
fulfill the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union.7
This collection of information is at best inconclusive concerning
the view of the United States on treaty continuation. The position that
the Soviet Union has dissolved and a citation to the Alma Ata accords,
even considering their limitation, as discussed above, indicates that
the United States considers all of the successor states bound by the
treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union. However, the lack of a
clear statement indicating continuation of treaty obligations, coupled
with the statement that the continued applicability is under review
and the fact that only the Russian commitment to continue the treaties
is cited, despite the existence of commitments by several other suc-
cessor states, indicates that the United States may in fact only consid-
er Russia to be obligated to continue the treaties of the former Soviet
Union.
Regarding the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, only
Slovenia and Croatia are listed;'75 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia,
and Serbia/Montenegro are not. Under the headings for Slovenia and
Croatia, Treaties in Force lists those treaties concluded after the dis-
solution of Yugoslavia and refers the reader to the heading for Yugo-
slavia for treaties concluded prior to independence. Under the heading
Yugoslavia, Treaties in Force notes that Yugoslavia has dissolved and
173. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaties in Force, at i
(1993) [hereinafter Treaties in Force].
174. Id. at 252.
175. Id. at 55, 224.
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that the status of agreements concluded prior to the dissolution is
under review. 7 " Treaties in Force makes no reference to any of the
commitments received from the successor states.
Treaties in Force gives no reason why the other three successor
states are not listed. The absence of Macedonia and Serbia/Montenegro
is consistent with the view that since no assurances have been re-
ceived, and since the argument for legal obligation has been aban-
doned, they are not bound to continue the treaties obligations of the
former Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina has, however, provided the
necessary assurances - in a more exact form than the other successor
state - has diplomatic relations with the United States, and is even a
member of the United Nations. As a result, in the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, it appears that the United States has exercised its option
not to be bound by the treaty obligations of the former Yugoslavia with
regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina despite the assurances provided.
Regarding the successor states of the former Czechoslovakia,
Treaties in Force omits any heading for the Czech Republic or the Slo-
yak Republic, listing Czechoslovakia instead. Under Czechoslovakia,
Treaties in Force notes that as of December 31, 1992, Czechoslovakia
ceased to exist and was succeeded by two separate and independent
states. Treaties in Force then indicates that the status of the treaties
concluded with Czechoslovakia were under review, making no refer-
ence to the commitments made by the Czech or Slovak Republics. 77
Treaties in Force offers no explanation for the absence of the Czech
and Slovak Republics. This absence is notably conspicuous since the
Czech and Slovak Republics provided some of the strongest assurances
regarding their intention to be bound by the treaties of the former
Czechoslovakia.
VII. CURRENT STATE PRACTICE EVIDENCING UNCERTAINTY ON THE
PART OF THE SUCCESSOR STATES AS TO WHETHER THE BILATERAL
TREATIES WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE IN FORCE
The practice of successor states subsequent to the provision of
assurances to the United States indicates that a number of successor
states are, at a minimum, unsure of whether the treaty rights and
obligations of their predecessors continue in force. In some cases, the
successor states have indicated that they believe they are obligated
only by those treaties that they choose.
A. Successor States of the Former Soviet Union
Russia has taken the definite position that it is the continuation
of the former Soviet Union and will fulfill the treaty obligations of the
176. Id. at 275.
177. Id. at 58.
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former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in a meeting between representa-
tives of the United States Department of State and the Russian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs shortly after the dissolution of the former Soviet
Union, the Russian representatives stated that Russia will honor the
commitments of the former Soviet Union as long as they do not conflict
with Russian law.
While meeting with the Office of the Legal Adviser for the Depart-
ment of State in October 1992, and again in December 1992, the
Counsel of the Ukrainian Embassy, after being informed of the United
States position regarding treaty succession, noted that the Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ukrainian Parliament intended to
review all of the international agreements of the former Soviet Union
and determine which treaties it considered to continue in force. The
Ukrainian Counsel also expressed a desire to re-sign those agreements
that the Ukrainian Government considered to remain in force. 7 '
In addition, on January 30, 1992, the Ukrainian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs notified the United States Embassy in Moscow that it
wished to conclude a Protocol on Consular Relations Between Ukraine
and the United States of America. This Protocol would provide that
Consular Relations between the United States and Ukraine would be
governed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.'79 This
approach is inconsistent with the United States view of the continuity
of treaty obligations since the United States and the former Soviet
Union concluded a number of bilateral agreements concerning consular
relations that would now govern consular relations with Ukraine.
Consistent with its view on continuity, the United States respond-
ed that it would be inappropriate to conclude a new bilateral agree-
ment. The United States, however, was willing to issue a joint com-
munique confirming that the United States-Ukrainian consular rela-
tions were based on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as
well as on the bilateral agreements between the United States and for-
mer Soviet Union. The communique also took the opportunity to note
that the United States and Ukraine further agree that all notes and
agreements between the Government of the United States and the
Government of the former Soviet Union shall remain in force. This
joint communique was never issued.
The Government of Turkmenistan similarly requested that
Turkmenistan and the United States enter into a Protocol stating that
178. Such intentions on the part of the Ukrainian Government are clearly at odds
with the United States position that all of the agreements continue in force and
raises considerable doubt whether Ukraine considers itself bound by those obliga-
tions, regardless of any assurances that might have been provided while accepting
the United States offer to establish full diplomatic relations.
179. Diplomatic Note No. 45/37-1379 from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the United States Embassy in Moscow (Jan. 30, 1992).
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consular relations between the United States and Turkmenistan would
be governed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The
United States similarly rejected this approach and informed the Gov-
ernment of Turkmenistan that it was prepared to issue a joint commu-
nique acknowledging that consular relations between the two states
would be conducted in accordance with the agreements on this subject
in force between the United States and the former Soviet Union, which
included the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and a 1964 bi-
lateral Consular Convention and Protocol. The suggested communique
conflicted with previous United States practices in two important re-
spects. First, the communique, unlike the Ukrainian communique,
referred only to the continuation of consular agreements and did not
confirm all agreements between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Second,
the communique provided that Turkmenistan would deposit an instru-
ment of accession to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. If
the pre-dissolution multilateral, and bilateral, agreements continue in
force, then Turkmenistan should only be required to deposit a notice of
succession or a notice confirming its intent to be bound.
On July 15, 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Belarus
requested "review of the question of the legalization of successorship in
relation to the agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Former Soviet Union
Concerning Cooperation in the Fields of Basic Scientific Research,
which had been signed in Paris [on January 8, 1989]."'" The United
States responded via diplomatic note confirming that the particular
agreement remains in force."' 1 Notably, this diplomatic note did not
take the opportunity to confirm that all of the agreements continue in
force but rather confirmed only the Scientific Cooperation
Agreement.1
2
The draft resolution submitted by Russia at the Forty-ninth ses-
sion of the Commission on Human Rights is a strong indication that
the successor states of the former Soviet Union do not consider all its
treaties, and especially its multilateral treaty obligations, to continue
in force. This draft resolution called for those successor states that
"have not yet done so to consider without delay the issue of their suc-
cession in respect of international human rights treaties."" If Russia
180. Diplomatic Note from Foreign Ministry of Belarus to the United States
Embassy in Minsk (July 15, 1993).
181. Diplomatic Note from The Embassy of the United States of America to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus (Aug. 7, 1993).
182. Id.
183. The draft resolution stated, in more detail, as follows:
Bearing in mind the considerable changes within the international com-
munity connected with the emergence of new States which are the suc-
cessors of those States that have been responsible for the obligations
under international human rights treaties of the relevant territories be-
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considered the successor states to be bound as a matter of law, then
the resolution would have called upon those states to confirm their
succession to the human rights treaties rather than to consider their
succession to those treaties.'"
B. Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia
In February 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic
of Croatia requested that the Government of Croatia and the Govern-
ment of the United States exchange diplomatic notes formalizing the
status of the treaty obligations between the United States and Croatia.
Croatia proposed that the parties would agree that the treaties of the
former Yugoslavia would remain applicable until such time as new
agreements were concluded. The United States declined the invitation
to exchange diplomatic notes on the grounds that the exchange of
letters between Secretary Baker and President Tudjman constituted
the basis for obligating Croatia to the treaties of the former Yugosla-
via.
Slovenia removed any doubt concerning its intent to fulfill the
obligations of the former Yugoslavia by explicitly stating in Article 3 of
the Constitutional Law of Slovenia that the "[ilnternational agree-
ments concluded by Yugoslavia and relating to the Republic of
Slovenia will be effective in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia."
The Constitution provided further that the Executive Council of
Slovenia would submit to the Assembly of Slovenia a list of interna-
tional agreements relating to Slovenia and that the Assembly shall
adopt an act on notification of other parties to these international
agreements."S
Although the constitutional provision clearly provides for the
fore the date of succession . . . Noting that non-participation of these
States in international human rights treaties impedes their full-scale
cooperation with the United Nations human rights bodies . . . Expresses
its satisfaction that some of the aforementioned States have already be-
come parties to international human rights treaties or have notified
their succession to those treaties . . . Urges those States that have not
yet done so to consider without delay the issue of their succession in
respect of international human rights treaties, as well as to accede to or
ratify those international human rights treaties to which the predecessor
states have not been parties.
Draft Resolution: Succession of States in Respect of International Human Rights
Treaties, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/L.25 (Feb. 22, 1993).
184. The language of the Russian resolution does not challenge the concept that
the break-away states are properly successor states. Rather, it challenges the notion
that all successor states are bound by the treaty obligations of the predecessor
states.
185. Republic of Slovenia Assembly, Constitutional Law on the Enforcement of the
Basic Constitutional Charter on the Autonomy and Independence of the Republic of
Slovenia (June 25, 1991).
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continuance of treaties, it also evidences a view that Slovenia has a
unilateral right to determine whether it will continue to be bound by
the treaty obligations of the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, the require-
ment that the list of treaties be approved by the Assembly and then
notified to the parties to the treaties indicates that Slovenia believed it
could selectively determine which treaties it considered in force.
In accordance with Article 3, the Slovenian Foreign Ministry noti-
fied the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, on May 14, 1992 via diplomatic note,
that "international agreements concluded by Yugoslavia and relating
to the Republic of Slovenia will be effective in the territory of the Re-
public of Slovenia." Slovenia further considered the agreement between
Yugoslavia and the United States on a Reciprocal Issue of Multiple
Entry Visas to continue in force and wished to confirm that Slovenian
Consular officers could issue multiple visas for entry into Slovenia in
American Passports.lw It is important to note here, however, that
this notification occurred before the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States and thus supports the position that
Slovenia presumed a unilateral right to confirm the treaty obligations
of the former Yugoslavia - and presumably could have exercised the
unilateral right not to confirm those treaties.
Regarding multilateral treaties with the former Yugoslavia, a
number of conflicting precedents have been set. First, on June 8, 1992,
Slovenia notified the Netherlands, as depository for the Statute of the
Hague Conference on Public International Law, that it considered
itself a party to the Statute and therefore an automatic member of the
Hague Conference.'87 Both the Netherlands and the Secretariat of
the Hague Conference supported this position."'
On January 30, 1992, the Government of the Republic of Croatia
notified the Department of State, as depository for the ICAO Conven-
tion, that Croatia accedes to the ICAO convention by deposit of the
relevant instrument of accession. 89 This is inconsistent with the ac-
tion taken by the Netherlands and evidences a presumption that
Croatia is not bound by the multilateral treaties of the former Yugosla-
via and must accede anew.
On November 9, 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the
Republic of Croatia notified the Department of State, as depository of
186. Diplomatic Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Slovenia to the United States Embassy in Vienna (May 14, 1992).
187. Letter from Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel of Slovenia to Foreign Minister
Hans van den Broek of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (June 8, 1992).
188. The Secretariat did, however, provide an opportunity for member states to
express divergent opinions. Circular Note From Secretariat of the Hague Conference
on Public International Law to Member States (Sept. 23, 1992).
189. Letter from President Franco Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia to The
Government of the United States of America (Jan. 30, 1992).
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the Charter of United Nations, that as one of the successors to the for-
mer Yugoslavia, Croatia considers itself committed to the international
agreements signed and ratified by the former Yugoslavia and therefore
is a party to the Charter of the United Nations.' The letter left un-
clear whether Croatia wished to succeed, accede, or notify of its adher-
ence. This particular note is especially confusing as Croatia had at-
tained membership in the United Nations, and, therefore, it is auto-
matically considered a party to the Charter of the United Nations.
Finally, as a result of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the
Council of Europe concluded that "for the purposes of the Conventions
and Agreements of the Council of Europe to which it was a Party, the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist." The for-
mer Yugoslavia had been a party to sixteen agreements with the Coun-
cil of Europe.19" ' This determination of the Council of Europe effec-
tively prohibited the successor states of Yugoslavia from succeeding to
any of these treaties.
C. Successor States of the Former Czechoslovakia
On April 24, 1993, Slovakia and Poland concluded the Protocol on
Succession to the Bilateral Treaties Concluded between Czechoslovakia
and Poland between 1918 and 1992." The Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics, after negotiations, informed Hungary that they accepted that the
approximately 100 international agreements concluded between Hun-
gary and the former Czechoslovakia would be binding on them as suc-
cessor states.93 The conclusion of specific Protocols or declarations
evidences substantial doubt regarding the legal automaticity of the
continuation of treaty obligations.
In June 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Czech Re-
public notified the United States Department of State of the U.S.-
Czechoslovakia treaties that it considered to continue in force between
the United States and the Czech Republic. This list exempted a num-
ber of significant treaties that the United States considered to remain
in force.'" The exemptions could be either a lapse on the part of the
190. Diplomatic Note No. 0506127/92 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the
Republic of Croatia to the Department of State of the United States of America
(Nov. 9, 1992).
191. Letter from Deputy Director of Legal Affairs Marie-Odile Wiederkehr of the
Council of Europe to Secretary of State James Baker of the United States of Ameri-
ca (Oct. 6, 1992).
192. Protocol on Succession to the Bilateral Treaties Concluded between Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland Between 1918 and 1992 (Apr. 24, 1993).
193. Czechs, Slovaks Accept Existing Agreements, FIBIS-EEU-93, at 24 (Jan. 14,
1993).
194. The following treaties were omitted from the Czech Republic's list: Arrange-
ment Concerning the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear
Safety Matters (Apr. 14, 1989); Agreement Regarding Settlement for Certain War Ac-
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Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the compilation of bilater-
al treaties, or it could reflect an exercise of Czechoslovakia's perceived
right to select those treaties which it considers to continue in force.
Concerning multilateral treaties, on March 4, 1993, the Czech
Republic deposited an instrument of accession to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) to the United States Gov-
ernment, depository for that Convention."5 At the same time, the
Czech Republic also presented the United States with a Declaration on
the Accession of the Czech Republic to the Convention of International
Civil Aviation, stating that the Czech Republic considered itself a legal
successor to the former Czechoslovakia, "notwithstanding the act of
deposit of the instrument of its accession to the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation... and thus to be an original member of ICAO
since 1944.""'
The deposit of an instrument of accession is clearly inconsistent
with a declaration stating that the Czech Republic is a successor state
of Czechoslovakia and thereby a member of ICAO since 1944. The
confusion is a result of the requirement by ICAO, supported by the
United States a Depository, that the Czech and Slovak Republics ac-
cede to the International Aviation Convention rather than succeed to
the Convection. This approach is inconsistent with the United States
position that the Czech and Slovak Republics are bound by the obliga-
tions of the former Czechoslovakia.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States correctly perceived the need to ensure that the
treaties of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia
continued in force with respect to their successor states. At an early
stage, the United States developed a two-pronged approach designed to
ensure the continuation of those treaties in light of the uncertain legal
precedent requiring continuation.
Unfortunately, the United States has abandoned its legal justifica-
tions for continuation and has relied solely upon political assurances.
counts and Claims incident to the operations of the Untied States Army in Europe
(July 25, 1947); Agreement Relating to Commercial Policy (Nov. 14, 1946); Agree-
ment Relating to the Funding of the Indebtedness of Czechoslovakia to the United
States (Oct. 13, 1925); Agreement Modifying the Debt Funding Agreement of October
13, 1925 (June 10, 1932); Preliminary Agreement Regarding Principles Applying to
Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression (July 11, 1942); Agree-
ment on Settlement for Lend-Lease and Certain claims (Sept. 16, 1948); Internation-
al Express Mail Agreement, with Detailed Regulations (Aug. 17, 1988).
195. Diplomatic Note No. 2616/93 from the Embassy of the Czech Republic to the
Department of State of the United States of America (Mar. 4, 1993).
196. Declaration of the Czech Republic on the Accession of the Czech Republic to
the Convention of International Civil Aviation (Mar. 4, 1993).
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The sole reliance upon these assurances might have proved satisfacto-
ry except that the United States was not particularly successful at
receiving all the necessary assurances.
The failure of the Department of State to carefully preserve its
position with a consistent assertion of the obligation of the successor
states to continue the treaty obligations of the predecessor state has
aggravated the already diminished justification for the United State's
position. Most noteworthy is the inconsistent practice by the Depart-
ment of State in the Treaties in Force compilation, the only represen-
tation of the United States position widely available.
This erosion of the United States position creates the distinct
possibility that a number of successor states could choose to assert
that they will continue to be obligated only by those treaties which
they so choose. As a result, the successor states may choose not to
abide by important treaties regarding commercial relations, privileges
and immunities for diplomatic personnel, trade agreements, arms
control, aviation, fisheries management, extradition, and narcotics
cooperation.
In order to properly secure the continuation of treaties, the United
States should enter into bilateral agreements with the successor states
providing that all of the treaties of the predecessor state shall continue
in force. Until the continuation of treaties is confirmed in uitable
agreements, the continuing validity of treaties between the United
States and the successor states remains in doubt.
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Responsibilities and Jurisdiction
Subsequent to Extraterritorial Apprehension
JIANMING SHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican
national, was forcibly abducted from his medical office in Guadalajara,
Mexico. He was taken on board an airplane and flown to El Paso,
Texas. He was then arrested by officials of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and indicted for allegedly participating in the
torture and murder of DEA field agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar.
Alvarez-Machain allegedly injected Camarena with the stimulant lido-
caine, prolonging his life so that Camarena's capturers could continue
to torture and interrogate him.'
The DEA apparently authorized and sponsored the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain without prior consent of the Mexican Government.
Mexico made several, specific, formal diplomatic protests to the U.S.
Government stating that the abduction violated the Mexico-U.S. Ex-
tradition Treaty as well as general principles of international law.
The Mexican Government repeatedly demanded his immediate release
and return to Mexico and added that it would try, prosecute, and pun-
ish Dr. Alvarez-Machain upon his repatriation. Mexico also demanded
extradition of those U.S. agents responsible for the abduction to be
tried in Mexico.
On August 10, 1990, the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California' found that the kidnapping violated the Treaty of
Extradition between the United States and Mexico3 and, therefore,
that it lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Alvarez-Machain. The Court or-
* S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1994; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania,
1988; M.A., University of Denver, 1984; LL.B., Peking University, 1983. Formerly a
faculty member of the International Law Institute of Peking University, Beijing,
China. The author would like to extend his appreciation to Blake Thompson and his
colleagues of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy for their patient
and helpful editing of this article.
1. See William Branigin, Mexico to Seek Extradition of Alleged Kidnap Leader;
Ex-policeman Living in Los Angeles Named, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1990, at A21; Mi-
chael Isikoff, Extradition of DEA Agent, Informant Sought; Mexico's Request Surpris-
es, Concerns U.S. Officials, WASH. POST, Jul. 21, 1990, at A4; See also Larry Ronter,
Mexico Detains 4 Officers in Abduction of Doctor in U.S., N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 27, 1990,
at A8.
2. United States v. Caro-Quintero, et al., 745 F.Supp. 599, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
3. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-United Mexican States, 31
U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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dered the release and repatriation of Dr. Alvarez back to Mexico.4 On
October 18, 1991, on appeal by the United States, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The
Ninth Circuit believed that there remained "no question about the
adequacy of Mexico's protests . . . or about Mexico's demand for repa-
triation"5 and emphasized that Dr. Alvarez-Machain "must be re-
turned" because his "forcible abduction from Mexico by agents of DEA
violated the 1980 [Extradition] Treaty" between the United States and
Mexico."
On June 15, 1992, upon further appeal by the United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's holding, holding
that the U.S. Government may abduct wanted criminals abroad (in-
cluding foreign nationals) and prosecute them in the courts of the
United States, even if the abduction violates international law. The
Court further stated that the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals
so abducted would be barred only if it was expressly prohibited by an
applicable extradition treaty and if the offended foreign state demand-
ed the return of the abducted individual.7
A State that conducts, authorizes, supports, or sponsors extrater-
ritorial abduction violates a well established principle of international
law. When one State exercises its police power in the territory of an-
other State, it exceeds its sphere of jurisdiction permitted under inter-
national law, and it violates a fundamental tenet of international law,
the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.8 This
article considers whether a State may exercise jurisdiction over an
abducted individual or otherwise continue to take advantage of the ini-
tial illegality of the abduction.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the abducting State does not
divest itself of jurisdiction simply because the abduction violates "gen-
eral international law principles." Instead, jurisdiction is barred only
4. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 614.
5. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Alvarez-Machain].
6. Id.
7. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2196-2197, 119 L.Ed.2d
441, 60 U.S.L.W. 4523 (1992) [hereinafter Alvarez.Machain III.
8. See, e.g., 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 295 (8th ed.,
Hersch Lauterpacht 1955); JOSEPH G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 100-101 (10th ed. 1989); MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 135 (2nd ed.
1986); WESLEY GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (1957);
DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 11 843 et seq. (1986). See also Charter
of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1945 at San Francisco, effective Oct. 24,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 145 B.F.S.P. 805, T.S. 993, art. 2(4); Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, signed Apr. 30 1948 at Bogota, effective Dec. 13, 1951, 2
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 1, 3, 10, 11, 18 and 20; Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (ILC, 1949), art. 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 432(2) (Revised, 1987).
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where "a term prohibiting international abductions" is specifically
included in the applicable treaty of extradition.9 Dissenting Justice
Stevens called this holding "shocking" and "monstrous" and stated that
it would "deeply disturb... most courts throughout the civilized
world."' °
In Alvarez-Machain II, the court seems to have either ignored the
existence of customary international law or denied its binding force.
This article advises that all domestic courts, being a part of the gov-
ernment of the State, should take judicial notice of and give effect to
the rules and principles of both customary and conventional interna-
tional law, and should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over indi-
viduals seized or abducted by means in violation of international law.
Extraterritorial abduction in violation of international law does not
give rise to any right, including the "right" to exercise jurisdiction. In
addition, the offended State is entitled to remedies, and the offending
State is obligated to undo its wrongs, regardless of whether the offend-
ed State protests or demands remedies.
The purpose of this article is not to challenge the existence of
jurisdiction of a State over individuals whom it deems to have violated
its domestic laws. Rather, this article questions the exercise of such ju-
risdiction following an illegal abduction and seeks to nullify both the
initial act of abduction and the subsequent prosecution by arguing as
follows.
A State may exercise its jurisdiction to subject an offender to its
law by means that do not violate international law, but it may not
exercise jurisdiction over an individual by means that infringe upon
the territorial sovereignty of another State. This violates international
law because the offending State lacks jurisdiction to abduct and appre-
hend the individual. As a result, the boundary of jurisdiction of munic-
ipal courts stops where the jurisdiction of the State stops. Since the
abducting State is obligated to return the abducted individual and
otherwise undo its wrong, it would be a further international wrong for
the courts of the abducting State to try and prosecute an individual
who was illegally abducted.
II. THE KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
AND THE ROOTS OF ALVAREZ-MACHAIN II
A. Historical Background
The holding of Alvarez-Machain II is not without precedent. Rath-
er, it is another improper application of the unfounded doctrine that a
9. Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct. at 2196.
10. Id. at 2205, 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor).
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court may try and prosecute a defendant who was abducted by irregu-
lar means, that the court retains jurisdiction despite such irregularity,
and that the decision to repatriate the abducted should be made solely
by the executive branch of the Government.
Several early English and American cases held in favor of exer-
cising jurisdiction over illegally seized persons or things. For example,
in Ex parte Susannnah Scott,11 the illegal arrest by a British police-
man in Brussels was held not to vitiate the jurisdiction of the English
court, though it may be that Belgium had agreed to the arrest. In The
Ship Richmond case, 2 an American warship entered the territorial
waters of East Florida, then under the sovereignty of Spain, and seized
a U.S. private vessel. The vessel was then forfeited to the United
States government for the violation by its owner of the Non-Inter-
course Act of 1809. Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court
wrote that
[tihe seizure of an American vessel within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a foreign power, is certainly an offence against that power,
which must be adjusted between the two governments. This court
can take no cognizance of it; and the majority of the court is of
opinion that the law does not connect that trespass.., with the
subsequent seizure by the civil authority, under the process of the
District Court, so as to annul the proceedings of that court against
the vessel.
Similarly, in The Merino case, 4 U.S. military authorities seized
American vessels in the bay of Pensacola, Florida, still under Spanish
sovereignty, and the vessels were forfeited for the violation of laws pro-
hibiting the trade in slaves. The Court held that the trespass on Span-
ish territory was not so connected with the subsequent seizure as to
defeat the jurisdiction of the District Court."
In State of Vermont v. Brewster," Vermont authorities entered
Canada and forcibly abducted a Canadian and removed him to the
United States to stand indictment and trial. The accused moved for
11. Ex parte Susannnah Scott, 9 B. & C. 446 (1829). See also R. v. Plymouth
Justices, ex parte Driver 1986] Q.B. 95, [19851 All E.R. 611, 77 I.L.R. 351.
12. In re The Ship Richmond, 9 Cr. 102 (1815).
13. Id. at 104.
14. In re The Merino, 9 Wheat 391 (1824).
15. Both The Ship Richmond and The Merino cases were relied on by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2196 n. 15. Dickinson criticized
the court for its decisions in The Ship Richmond and The Merino cases, stating that
Justice Marshall "was clearly wrong, in the light of later authorities, for the courts
have no hesitation in ordering restoration or release against the executive, where the
case has been submitted to the court and a clear violation of accepted international
law is admitted or proved." Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or
Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L. L. 231, 241 (1934).
16. State of Vermont v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835).
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dismissal of the indictment due to the extraterritorial nature of the ab-
duction. The Vermont Supreme Court held that "[it becomes immate-
rial whether the prisoner was brought out of Canada" by means that
violate the sovereignty of Canada. The court further stated that
[tihe illegality, if any, consists in a violation of the sovereignty of
an independent nation. If that nation complain[s], it is a matter
which concerns the political relations of the two countries, and in
that aspect is a subject not within the constitutional powers of this
court. 17
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court decided the well-known
case of Ker v. Illinois.18 Frederick M. Ker, a U.S. citizen, was wanted
in Illinois on charges of larceny and embezzlement, so he fled to Peru.
The Governor of Illinois, in accordance with an extradition treaty be-
tween the U.S. and Peru, dispatched an agent to request Ker's extradi-
tion to stand trial in Illinois. The agent was unable to execute the
request for extradition to the Peruvian government because Chilean
forces occupied Lima at the time. The agent requested assistance from
the military governor appointed by Chile, personally arrested Ker, and
took him back to Illinois, where he was convicted of larceny. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and Ker appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Ker alleged that the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction because he
had been kidnapped in Peru and forcibly brought to Cook County with-
out the proper process of extradition. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the argument that Ker's arrest and conviction violated the extradition
treaty between the United States and Peru. The court held that the
"mere irregularities in the manner in which [Ker was] ... brought into
the custody of the law" did not entitle him to escape prosecution. 9
The court also rejected the argument that the U.S.-Peruvian extradi-
tion treaty protected Ker from being taken out of Peru. Instead, it held
that the treaty merely limited the extent to which a government may
voluntarily grant asylum to a fugitive, and the parties to the treaty
simply agreed that upon proper demand and proceedings the asylum
State had a duty to transfer the fugitive to the demanding party
State.20 The court upheld jurisdiction, stating that the proper remedy
for the breach of international law was at the diplomatic level, and the
physical presence of the accused before the Court, no matter how he
had been brought there, sufficed to validate the proceedings.2'
In 1952, U.S. Supreme Court again applied this principle in
Frisbie v. Collins, which involved the forcible abduction of a criminal
17. Id.
18. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
19. Id. at 440.
20. Id. at 442.
21. Id.
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from one constituent state of the United States to another.' Collins
was indicted in the State of Michigan for murder, and he fled to Chi-
cago, Illinois to escape from justice. Michigan authorities sent police
officers to Chicago, and they "forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked,
and took" Collins back to Michigan where he was convicted of murder
and sentenced to life in prison. Collins filed a federal habeas corpus ac-
tion, claiming that his conviction should be declared null and void be-
cause his trial violated the due process clause and the Federal Kid-
napping Act.' The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stat-
ing that
[tihis Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois... that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by [manner] of a "forcible abduction." No persuasive
reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases.
They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been
fairly apprized [sic] of the charges against him and after a fair trial
in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards."
After Frisbie, the Ker doctrine became known as the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine.' Frisbie, however, was solely a domestic case without any
international significance. It did not involve any issue of international
law at all. It concerned the abduction and removal of an individual
from one internal territorial unit of a federal State and his subjection
to the jurisdiction of another such internal territorial unit. It is diffi-
cult to see any reason why the Frisbie case has frequently been cited
along with Ker in the discussion on the exercise of jurisdiction follow-
ing seizures in violation of international law. Indeed, the so-called Ker-
Frisbie doctrine would be better read simply as the Ker doctrine, as
Frisbie has no bearing upon cases involving forcible or fraudulent
abductions in violation of international law. Reference to the case of
Frisbie should in fact disappear from future international law litera-
ture.
In any event, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has frequently been applied
and cited as authority for the proposition that the manner in which an
individual is physically brought within the reach of a State's authority
is irrelevant to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over him.2" Both Ker
22. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
23. Id. at 519-20.
24. Id. at 522.
25. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 678-
86 (1953); Andrew Campbell, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in
the War on Drugs, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 385 (1990).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (1925), Ann. Dig., 1919-
1942 (Suppl. vol.), Case No. 53; Collier v. Vaccoro, 51 F.2d 17 (1931); United States
v. Insull, 8 F.Supp. 310 (1934), Ann. dig., 1933-1934, Case No. 75; U.S. v.
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and Frisbie, however, implied the condition that the doctrine does not
apply where the irregularity of acquiring a criminal would divest the
court of its jurisdiction, such as where the irregularity amounts to a
violation of international law.
B. Critique of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
In Alvarez-Machain II, the Supreme Court relied on the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, stating that "the court need not inquire as to how [Dr.
Alvarez-Machain] came before it."27 The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, howev-
er, does not apply when the abduction violates international law, so it
should not apply to the Alvarez-Machain II case. The doctrine is lim-
ited to allowing the State to bring an individual before the court by
any means up to the point of violating international law.'
In Ker, the unauthorized seizure of the accused was made by an
Illinois official who acted "without any pretence of authority" from the
government of the United States; the Illinois agent acted outside of his
scope of authority. He was sent to execute a request for Ker's extra-
dition, not to abduct him. The Ker court upheld jurisdiction over Ker
under a necessary assumption that since the agent acted in excess of
his scope of authority, neither the state of Illinois nor the United
States was in breach of international law. As a result, the Ker doctrine
is inapplicable in any abduction case that involves a violation of in-
ternational law.
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is an ironic holding "coming as it does
from the courts of a country where treaties are the supreme law of the
land."' Felice Morgenstern argues that one of the probable reasons
for the doctrine might be that courts "have been misled by the sweep-
ing terms of decisions in cases where the seizure of a fugitive, though
irregular, was not in violation of international law." The courts in
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1952), rehearing denied in no. 22201, April 18,
1952; U.S. v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1957); United States y. Winter, 509
F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423
U.S. 825 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (refusing to "retreat
from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction") citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976); United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463 (1980); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468-U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 (1984) (foreign national summoned to de-
position hearing following illegal arrest); United States v. Evans, 667 F.Supp. 974,
980 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988);
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
27. Alvarez-Machan I, 112 S.Ct., at 2193.
28. The illegality of the means of recovery of a criminal under the domestic law
of the court may also divest the court of its jurisdiction, but that topic is not within
the scope of this article.
29, Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of Interna-
tional Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 265, 269 (1952).
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these cases have "used phraseology of general applicability which is
both misleading and indicative of the lack of awareness on the part of
these tribunals that there are circumstances in which the illegality of
the seizure vitiates the jurisdiction of the court.""
Morgenstern notes an abundance of "cases in which there has
been a seizure of a fugitive by authorized officials of the pursuing state
on the territory of the state of refuge in clear violation of one of the
most fundamental rules of customary international law." She further
comments that the refusal or failure of the courts "to consider the
manner in which an accused individual was brought before them has
sometimes been due to an imperfect appreciation of the implications of
the exercise of jurisdiction after an illegal seizure." In addition,
Morgenstern notes that there have been times in which courts in this
connection have relied
on earlier decisions in which the seizure was not a violation of in-
ternational law ... [Where] courts have occasionally failed in this
sphere to affirm their readiness to enforce international law, they
have done so for reasons unconnected with the merits of the subject
under discussion. Their decisions thus cannot be said to affect the
principle ... that an arrest in violation of international law can
have no legal effect (emphasis added)."'
The so-called Ker-Frisbie doctrine, as Justice Stevens said in
Alvarez-Machain II, is based on a common law principle that "any per-
son may, at his peril, seize property which has become forfeited to, or
forfeitable by, the Government; and that proceedings by the Govern-
ment to enforce a forfeiture ratify a seizure made by one without au-
thority, since ratification is equivalent to antecedent delegation of
authority to seize."32 Under that principle, the assumption is that a
government has the authority under law to authorize the seizure of
forfeitable property. For a government to subsequently ratify private
conduct done without authority, there must be a premise that the gov-
ernment had the actual authority to authorize that conduct in the first
place, no matter whether it actually exercised that authority. If the
government does not have the authority to pre-authorize an act, then
it certainly does not have the subsequent authority to sanction or rati-
fy the act, and such sanction or ratification in that circumstance would
certainly constitute a breach of the law, domestically, internationally,
or both.
In the Ker example, suppose that the United States had reached a
prior agreement with Peru that in the event the extradition of a crimi-
30. Id. at 269, 270.
31. Id. at 273-274.
32. Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gelston
v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 310, 4 L.Ed. 381 (1818); Taylor v. United States, 3 How.
197, 205-206, 11 L.Ed. 559 (1845)).
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nal should become impossible due to war or similar situation, the re-
questing party State might, at its own peril and expenses, send agents
to the territory of the other party State to apprehend and remove an
extraditable criminal. Further suppose that it had been known and ac-
knowledged that the Chilean military occupation of Peru's capital
would be likely to make it impossible to effectuate Ker's extradition. In
that case, the United States would have possessed the power to autho-
rize the Illinois agent to kidnap Ker in Peru and take him back to the
United States. If the United States had the authority to authorize
Ker's abduction, but did not exercise that authority to allow the Illinois
agent to apprehend Ker prior to his dispatch, then it would still have
been able to subsequently ratify Ker's apprehension despite the irregu-
larity of his seizure. In this situation, the doctrine stated in Ker would
be valid and might apply.
The Ker doctrine, however, should not have been applied even to
Ker itself. Neither the state of Illinois nor the United States had the
power under international law, the extradition treaty, or any other
agreements between the United States and Peru to authorize the ab-
duction of Ker in Peru. As a result, neither Illinois nor the United
States had the authority to give subsequent approval or ratification of
the unauthorized apprehension. When the United States failed to re-
turn Ker to Peru and exercised jurisdiction over him, it effectively rati-
fied the unauthorized apprehension. Since the United States ab initio
lacked the power to authorize the abduction, it violated the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Peru, a violation of international law and of
the U.S.-Peruvian extradition treaty then in force. The doctrine stating
that the manner in which a criminal is brought to justice is immaterial
and, therefore, is wrongly applied in Ker and in many subsequent
cases.
In Ker, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to address Ker's alternative
argument that forcible abduction of an individual from a foreign State
violated customary international law and therefore constituted a bar to
the exercise of jurisdiction over such individual by the courts of the ab-
ducting State following the forcible abduction.' Its further failure to
order the return of Ker to Peru constituted a true breach of interna-
tional law.
A unique abduction case in the history of international law is
presented in the famous Eichmann Incident." Former Gestapo Chief
33. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
34. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 219-231 (1963);
Hans W. Baade, Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects, 1961 DUKE L.J. 400 (1961);
J.E.S. Fawcett, The Eichmann Case, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 181 (1962); L.C. Green,
Aspects juridiques du procts Eichmann, 1963 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS 150; L.C. Green,
The Eichmann Case, 23 MODERN L. REv. 507 (1960) [hereinafter Green, Eichmann];
D. Lasok, The Eichmann Trial, 11 I.C.L.Q. 355 (1962); Matthew Lippman, The TriaL
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Adolf Eichmann fled to Argentina after World War II. In May 1960, he
was kidnapped in Argentina by Israeli officials and/or agents - in the
name of "private volunteers" - and was eventually brought to Israel
where he was charged with crimes against the Jewish people, crimes
against humanity, crimes of war, and crimes of membership in hostile
organizations. In December 1961, Eichmann was convicted on all
charges and sentenced to death.' On May 29, 1962, the Supreme
Court of Israel affirmed the decision of the lower court, and Eichmann
was hanged on May 31, 1962.36
While doubt remains, few have challenged the jurisdiction of the
Israeli court to try Eichmann as a war criminal. Indeed, the Eichmann
case "was so extreme, so unique, so horrendous" that a court before
which Eichmann appeared "could not possibly be expected not to exer-
cise [jurisdiction] or even to ask whether it should be exercised."" The
"singular character" of Eichmann's crime rendered "the exercise of
jurisdiction a duty, but at the same time should not in any sense be al-
lowed to supply the standard applicable in other, different cases (em-
phasis added)."'
The uniqueness of the Eichmann case exists in the following facts:
First, Israeli authorities alleged that they were not involved in the
initial kidnapping, and the abduction was planned for and carried out
solely by its private citizens. Second, Israel's apology and Argentina's
renouncement of its claim to Eichmann served to strengthen Israel's
exercise of jurisdiction over him. Third, and most important,
Eichmann's crimes were such that his capture, trial, and death penalty
were overwhelmingly welcomed at the time. There has been no compa-
rable case worldwide. Neither Ker nor the Alvarez-Machain case bears
any resemblance with, nor did the U.S. Supreme Court in Alvarez-
Machain II seem to have relied on, the Eichmann case.
The following section of this article examines the responsibilities
of states under international law when conduting abductions of ac-
of Adolph Eichmann and the Protection of Universal Human Rights under Interna-
tional Law, 5 Hous. J. INT' L. 1 28 (1982) (the Israeli government authorized the
kidnapping); PETER PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964); Helen Silving, In re
Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality, 55 AM. J. INTL. L. 307 (1961).
35. Att.-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, Judgment of Dec. 11, 1961 of the District
Court of Jerusalem, translated and reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 18-276, at 273-276, 56
A.J.I.L. 805 (1962).
36. Att.-Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, Judgment of May 29, 1962 of the Supreme
Court of Israel, translated and reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 277, at 342. A summary of the
judgments of the District Court of Jerusalem and of the Supreme Court of Israel
appears at 36 I.L.R. 5.
37. F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYs IN





cused criminals in other sovereign States.
III. ABDUCTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In terms of the degree of responsibility and international conse-
quence, there is a distinction between a wrongful seizure by a private
citizen or an official acting extra vires and an abduction expressly
authorized or sponsored by the government of a State. 9 Abduction
under the direct authorization or sponsorship of a Government is pre-
sumably subject to more severe international consequences than sei-
zures conducted solely by private citizens or unauthorized State offi-
cials or agents subsequently ratified by the Government. Nevertheless,
whether initially authorized, sponsored, or subsequently adopted or
ratified by the Government, unauthorized extraterritorial abductions
violate the territorial sovereignty of the offended State and should not
have any legal effect under international law - i.e., no jurisdiction
may be based on an act that violates international law.
A. Responsibilities Arising out of State-Sponsored Abduction
After an unauthorized international abduction has occurred, the
first obligation of the abducting State is to undo its wrong by returning
the abducted individual to his country of refuge or residence. Where
the abducted individual comes before the court of the abducting State,
the court must minimize the consequence of the abduction by ordering
the return of the individual to the State where he was abducted.
On the "consequences of violation of territorial limits of law en-
forcement," the official comment to section 423(2) of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States correctly states this rule:
If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the
territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation
from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduc-
tion of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may
demand return of the person, and international law requires that
he be returned (emphasis added).'
The Statute of the International Court of Justice authorizes the
International Court of Justice to issue the equivalent of an injunction
against the abducting State in the form of an Order providing interim
measures of protection. The Court may then order the return of the
abducted individual in order to re-establish the status quo ante.41 Ac-
39. Cf Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
423(2), cmt. c (Revised, 1987).
41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. Article 41(1) of the Statute provides that "Ithe Court
1994
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY
cording to the Permanent Court of International Justice, "[rieparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed."42 The Court may order
reparation by way of damages should the return of the kidnapped
criminal no longer be possible."3
An abducting State committing an international wrong must
make appropriate restitution to the offended State." The law of reme-
dies at international law requires that under no circumstances may
forcible and fraudulent abduction in violation of international law be
forgiven or go unpunished. Remedies to the offended State include
restoration, public apology, a promise not to commit acts of the same
nature again, extradition (upon request) of the abducting officers or
responsible individuals, and damages to the injured State. The most
important remedies, however, are the repatriation of the abducted
individual to the country where the abduction took place and the pun-
ishment or extradition of officials or "private citizens" committing or
responsible for the abduction. As Laurence Preuss stated, "a violation
of foreign territory undoubtedly engages the responsibility of the State
of arrest, which is under a clear duty to restore the prisoner and to
punish or extradite the offending officers."4" In addition,
[elvery state that commits an international tort against another
state is bound by customary international law to make reparation
therefor, [and it is] well established by state practice that the state
on whose territory a purported fugitive from justice has been forc-
ibly abducted by agents of another state can demand of the latter
the return of the person abducted, and the disciplinary or criminal
punishment of the abductors."
Several early examples show such State practice. In 1807, the
British man-of-war Leopard attacked an American frigate, the Ches-
apeake, while searching for and arresting deserters from the Royal
Navy. The British Government subsequently offered to take disciplin-
ary measures against the captain of the Leopard, to pay money dam-
shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of
either party."
42. Chorz6w Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A),
No. 13, at 47.
43. See Georg Schwarzenberger, Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87
RECUEIL DES COORS 195, 353-354 (1955).
44. See, e.g., 1 GEORG DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 250-251 (1958); 1 GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 562-564 (3rd ed., 1957); Chorz6w Factory
(Germany v. Poland), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 9, at 21; Corfu Channel Case (Great
Britain v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 23.
45. Laurence Preuss, Kidnapping Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29
AM. J. INTL L. 502, 505 (1935).
46. Baade, supra note 34, at 406.
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ages to those injured, and to restore to the United States those individ-
uals removed from the Chesapeake.47 In 1841, the British Government
returned to the United States a Grogan who had been seized by Brit-
ish soldiers on the territory of the United States and taken to Cana-
da.
48
The British Law Officers also advised that in cases where foreign
nations seized or arrested individuals or vessels in British territory or
territorial waters without prior consent from Great Britain, the British
Government had the right to claim their restoration.49 In the matter
of Patrick Lawler, ° a fugitive escaped from prison in Gibraltar, Great
Britain and was recaptured by a British prison officer in Algeciras,
Spain. The Law Officers of the Crown advised that an
order ought to be given for setting Lawler at liberty immediate-
ly .... If any doubt exists, as to what the circumstances really
were, inquiry should of course be made; but, for the present, we
assume that M. Isturitz has been correctly informed of the facts. If
so, a violation of Spanish territory was committed by the Warder
Nicholls, in removing Lawler over and out of Spanish ground...
for the purpose of restoring him to a penal custody at Gibraltar,
from which he had escaped into Spain. For we regard the removal,
if effected as alleged by means of drugging or intoxication, as being
a removal clearly without consent, and as involving the same inter-
national consequences, as if it had been accomplished by force. A
plain breach of international law having occurred, we deem it to be
the duty of the state, into whose territory the individual thus
wrongfully deported was conveyed, to restore the aggrieved state,
upon its request to that effect, as far as possible to its original
position.... [Tiherefore,. . . we recommend that notice be given to
the Spanish authorities that, at a given time and place (the place
being a convenient spot on the Spanish confines) Lawler will be set
at liberty, and allowed to choose his own course: and he should be
disposed of accordingly."'
In the 1860 Trent Incident, two commissioners from the then
Confederate States of America and their secretaries, on their way to
Europe, were apprehended and removed from the Royal Mail-Packet
Trent by the United States Federal Navy. A correspondence from a
high-level British official to Lord Lyons, the British ambassador in
Washington, dated November 30, 1860, stated as follows:
47. See Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L. L. 279, 293-294 (1960).
48. See Preuss, supra note 45, at 505-506, citing 1 JOHN BASSET MOORE, TREA-
TISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 282-283 (1891).
49. 1 LoRD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 80-82 (1956).
50. In re Patrick Lawler, 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 78-79.
51. 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 78-79. See also In re McClure, 1 McNAIR,
supra note 49, at 76-77.
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It thus appears that certain individuals have been taken from on
board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral Power, while such
vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage, an act of vio-
lence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of
international law. .. . Her Majesty's Government, therefore,
trust[s] that when this matter [has] been brought under the consid-
eration of the Government of the United States, that Government
will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government such redress
as alone would satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of
the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your Lordship, in order
that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suit-
able apology for the aggression which has been committed.'
In certain cases between the United States and Mexico, in the
latter part of the 19th century,' and in the Vincenti case between the
United States and the United Kingdom in 1920,' "the normal prac-
tice was to terminate the proceedings against the kidnapped offender
and... often to offer to return him to the state from which he had
been brought and to extradite the kidnappers in accordance with the
treaty, if their extradition should be requested.""5 For instance, in the
1887 Nogales Incident, a Mexican officer committed an offense on the
United States side of the international boundary with Mexico and was
arrested by the local police. A Mexican officer and two soldiers crossed
the boundary and rescued him by force. The U.S. Government demand-
ed the return of the offending Mexican officer and stated that "it be-
comes.., the simple international duty of the Mexican Government to
undo the wrong committed by its own soldiery, by restoring the res-
cued prisoners [sic] to the jurisdiction from which they had been
wrongfully taken."'
In 1935, Jacob Salomon, an ex-German Jew then residing in Swit-
zerland, was kidnapped by Nazi agents and taken from Switzerland to
Germany, but the Swiss government subsequently obtained his re-
lease. 7 More recently, in September 1981, two professional bondsmen
kidnapped Sidney L. Jaffe, a bail skipper, from his residence in Cana-
52. Correspondence respecting the Seizure of Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarlland
and Eustis, from on aboard the Royal Mail-Packet "Trent" by the Commander of the
U.S. Ship "San Fancinto," 52 Parl. Pap. 607 (1862). See also H.W. Malkin, The Trent
and the China, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 66 (1924).
53. For such cases, see 2 GREEN HAYWORD HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATION-
AL LAw 309-312 (1941).
54. Id. at 320.
55. Green, Eichmann, supra note 34, at 510.
56. 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (1906). The
demand was subsequently withdrawn when Mexico offered to try the offender.
57. For comments on the kidnapping of Herr Jacob-Salomon by German agents
from Switzerland in 1935 and his release, see Preuss, supra note 45; Laurence
Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany), 30 AM. J.
INT'L L. 123 (1936); Lasok, supra note 34, at 355 n.4.
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da and took him back to Florida.' Jaffe was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to consecutive prison terms totalling 145 years.59 Canada,
which maintained an extradition treaty with the United States, pro-
tested against the abduction and trial and filed an action in the U.S.
District Court in Florida." Following the Canadian protests, U.S. At-
torney General William French Smith and Secretary of State George
M. Shultz petitioned the Florida Probation and Parole Commission for
a hearing to consider granting an early parole release date for Jaffe."'
In 1983, after Jaffe had been jailed for two years, a Florida appeals
court overturned Jaffe's fraud conviction because of procedural errors
and ordered Jaffe's release from prison in September 1983.2 Jaffe
was subsequently paroled in November 1983.
In the Alvarez-Machain trial, the U.S. District Court rightfully
ordered the repatriation of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to Mexico,' and, on
the first appeal, the U.S. Appellate Court properly affirmed that or-
der.6 The trial court stated that "[i]t is axiomatic that the United
States or Mexico violates its contracting partner's sovereignty, and the
extradition treaty, when it unilaterally abducts a person from the
territory of its contracting partner without the participation of or au-
thorization from the contracting partner where the offended state reg-
isters an official protest."' While a protest is not essential to the na-
ture of illegal abduction and its consequences, the court correctly held
that the remedy in that case should have been "the immediate return
of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the territory of Mexico."'
Not only are States precluded from abducting individuals in the
territory of another State, they also may not utilize the territory of
another State to transport a criminal captured in its own territory or
in the territory of a third State. The duty to return the captured indi-
vidual may arise in either situation. For example, in the opinion of the
Law Officers of the British Crown, where British authorities conveyed
a criminal through the territory of the United States without having
obtained prior consent, the British Government could not resist an
American claim for his surrender. 7 In the matter of Martin, a British
subject, who was allegedly a naturalized U.S. citizen, was convicted of
58. See Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. 1371, 1373 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
59. Id. at 1374.
60. Id. at 1374 (referring to In re Application of Canada 83-661-Civ-j-16).
61. Letter from Secretary of State Shultz to Florida Probation and Parole Com-
mission (July 22, 1983). See Return of Land-sales Figure for Florida Jailing is
Assailed, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1983, at A6. See also Fred Barbash, Parole of Convict-
ed Canadian Becomes an International Issue, WASH. POST, July 27, 1983, at A2.
62. See Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. at 1374.
63. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 614.
64. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).
65. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 610.
66. Id. at 614.
67. In re Martin, 2 MOORE, supra note 56, at 371, 373.
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assault and escape from custody at Laketon, British Columbia and was
sentenced to jail in Victoria. As he was conveyed in custody from
Laketon to Victoria, "a portion of the journey [passed] through Alaska."
The United States demanded his return on the ground that his trans-
portation through Alaska was "a violation of the Sovereignty of the
United States which rendered his further detention unjustified." The
opinion of the British Law Officers advised that the United States had
the full right "to demand the liberation of the prisoner even after he
has left those territories in which he was detained and from which he
has been taken without the authority and in violation of the law of the
country," and that such right to request the release of the prisoner
from the foreign power is "not affected by the fact that the prisoner is
a subject of that foreign power.'
The rationale for returning an abducted individual to his country
of refuge is not that his alleged violation of the law of the abducting
State should not be made subject to the criminal proceedings of that
State, but that the abducting State should not have acquired custody
of the accused individual by means in violation of the territorial sover-
eignty of another nation and of international law. The violation of
international law is a much more serious offense than the individual's
violation of the law of the abducting State.
The State whose domestic law had allegedly been violated might
have otherwise been entitled to take custody of and exercise jurisdic-
tion over the alleged individual offender had there been no offense
against another State or violation of international law. For example,
where an extradition treaty applies, the State that wishes to try an in-
dividual abroad may assume jurisdiction by following procedures es-
tablished under the treaty, short of forcible abduction. In the absence
of an extradition treaty, jurisdiction may be exercised only under the
following circumstances: (1) where prior consent and/or cooperation of
the State of refuge or residence had been obtained; or (2) where the
wanted individual, voluntarily and free from force or fraud, happened
to be travelling (a) in the territory of the wanting State, (b) in the
territory of a third State where the arresting State had acquired con-
sent or cooperation, or (c) in international areas, such as on the high
seas, where the abducting State might exercise the right of hot pursuit
or similar rights permitted under international law. Under these cir-
cumstances, there would be no violation of the territorial sovereignty of
the country where the arrested individual had been residing or seeking
refuge. The arresting State could lawfully subject the accused to local
proceedings, and it would not be under any obligation to return the
individual to his country of residence or refuge.
Jurisdiction, however, becomes divested, voided, and nullified
68. 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 79.
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whenever it is acquired, realized, or exercised in violation of interna-
tional law. The justification, however magnificent it might be at do-
mestic law, for acquiring, trying, and punishing a wanted criminal
must yield to the rules of international law. This is particularly so
when the offended State lodges formal protests and demands the re-
turn of the individual abducted in violation of its territorial sovereign-
ty, although the duty to return is not necessarily contingent upon such
demands. J.E.S. Fawcett, though frequently referring to a "right" of
the kidnapping State to try the abductee, acknowledges that "the de-
mand for the reconduction of the offender must prevail over the right
of the State having custody of him, to try him for an offence against its
law, for the practical reason that the State cannot both comply with
the demand and retain him for trial."9 The word "demand" must be
read to include both a "formal demand" by the offended State and the
"implied demand" by the requirement of international law to return.
As Lord McNair pointed out, the remedy under international law "for
the wrongful recapture of an escaped prisoner was the restitutio in
integrum of the aggrieved State, whose territory had been violated, by
releasing the prisoner."70
Abductions might also entail the request by the offended State for
extradition of the kidnappers, and the kidnappers may face criminal or
civil charges in either the kidnapping State or the State where the
kidnapping took place." The Ker v. Illinois court, while sustaining
jurisdiction over the criminal abducted abroad, held that Peru could
seek extradition of the kidnapping Illinois agent on charges of abduc-
tion, and stated that the kidnappers might be prosecuted for illegal
abduction in a foreign country."2
There have been cases in which individuals who had forcefully
abducted criminal fugitives or suspects abroad to the United States
eventually found themselves to be standing trial for such extraterrito-
rial abductions. For example, in the Collier case73 American and Ca-
nadian officials, for the purpose of suppressing narcotics trade, ad-
69. Fawcett, supra note 34, at 199. See also In re Blair, reported in 1 MOORE,
supra note 48, at 285, concerning the release, upon the demand of the United States
for return, of Blair, an offender who had been irregularly taken to England from the
United States. The Blair case is discussed at length in O'Higgins, supra note 47, at
305-307.
70. 1 MCNAIR, supra note 49, at 78.
71. Brandon S. Chabner, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act
of 1986: Prescribing and Enforcing United States Law against Terrorist Violence
Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV. 985, 1020 (1990). See also OscAR SCHACHTER, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 243 nn. 497, 498 (1991); John Quigley,
Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from Kidnapping of
Suspected Terrorists, 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 193, 211 (1988).
72. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
73. Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862 (D.Md. 1930), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931).
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vanced a scheme whereby an American official and his informer would
induce two suspected smugglers to cross the border and sell drugs to
these officials, who would then take the smugglers into custody. The
scheme failed due to the cautiousness of the smugglers. The American
agents killed one of the suspected smugglers and forcibly took the
other into the United States. Despite the prior inducement arrange-
ment, Canada protested that its sovereignty had been violated by the
American agents and requested the extradition of the two American
agents on charges of murder, kidnapping, and larceny. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, reversing the district court's denial
of extradition on kidnapping charges, held that a U.S. federal officer
might be found guilty of kidnapping by a Canadian court.74
In Kear v. Hilton,75 a case connected to the Jaffe incident, the
court affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District
of Florida that Daniel Kear and Timm Johnsen, the two "bounty hunt-
ers" who had kidnapped Jaffe in Canada and brought him back to
Florida, were extraditable to Canada under the U.S.-Canada Extradi-
tion Treaty. On June 9, 1986, Kear and Johnsen were sentenced to 21
months in prison for the abduction of Jaffe.7"
In the Rainbow Warrior incident, a Greenpeace vessel was sunk
in New Zealand internal waters as a result of the acts of French
agents. It was generally held that the French Government, by autho-
rizing such acts, had committed a breach of international law and that,
apart from the responsibility of France itself, the individual agents
could not be exonerated by the so-called "immunity of attribution"
doctrine as committing state-like acts because these acts were commit-
ted in time of peace. Eventually, the individual agents responsible
were duly tried and convicted, and they received sentences imposed by
a New Zealand court.77
In a fourth example, Villareal and Hernandez v. Hammond,"
Mexico requested the extradition of the offenders on a charge of kid-
napping under the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty of 1899. TM In that
case, the offenders sought to avoid extradition on the ground that they
had not removed the victim, Lopez, for an "unlawful end," as described
by the Treaty, but for the purpose of bringing him to the United States
for trial. The Fifth Circuit, affirming the judgment of the District
74. Collier, 51 F.2d, at 19.
75. Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
76. See 2 Men Imprisoned in Abduction Case, WASH. PosT, June 10, 1986, at C5.
77. See STARKE, supra note 8, at 101. On a German abduction case, see Stefan
Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction over Foreign Flag Vessels and the U.S. Courts: Adrift Without
a Compass?, 10 MICH. J. INTL L. 241 n. 46 (1989). See also Matthias Herdegen, Die
Achtung fremder Hoheitsrechte als Schranke nationaler Strafgewalt, 47 Z.A.O.R.V. 221,
239 (1987).
78. Villareal et. al. v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934).
79. Extradition Treaty (1899), U.S.-Mexico, 31 Stat. 1818, art. 2(16).
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Court for the Southern District of Texas, found that these abductors
were motivated more by a desire to collect the reward offered for the
capture of Lopez than by a concern for carrying out justice.'
The duty to repatriate the victim is firm and does not depend on
any treaty obligations, but the duty to punish or extradite the abduc-
tors must be based on the existence of an extradition treaty. As L.C.
Green put it,
[sihould the kidnapping be purely the result of private enterprise,
the state from which the individual had been abducted would have
to seek its remedy by requesting the surrender of the kidnappers
from the state to which they had gone, and at the same time to
request the return of the victim. There would be a legal obligation
to surrender the kidnappers only if there were an extradition trea-
ty, specifying kidnapping as an extraditable crime, between the two
countries concerned."1
Damages for illegal kidnapping on foreign territory have been
awarded in certain cases, including The Chesapeake case' and the
Colunje case. In the Colunje case,' the Arbitration Commission
awarded damages of $500 for the illegal seizure of Colunje and the
unlawful criminal proceedings subsequently brought against him. This
holding indicates that damages may be claimed and awarded for the
illegal exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the abducting State.8 4
In the case of Napper Tandy, the municipal government of Hamburg
agreed to pay France 4,000,000 marks in damages for violating inter-
national law by surrendering two French officers to Great Britain.'
It follows that remedies should cover not only the original viola-
tion of international law - the act of abduction itself - but also any
subsequent violations, including the failure to make reparation and the
assertion of jurisdiction. In Ker, the court held that Ker could have an
action against the abducting Illinois agent for trespass and false im-
prisonment.' Following the Jaffe incident, the kidnapped individual
80. Villareal and Hernandez, 74 F.2d, at 506.
81. Green, Eichmann, supra note 34, at 508. See THE TIMES, July 22, 1960 (con-
cerning the refusal of an Argentine court to extradite Jan Durcansky based on the
lack of an extradition treaty between Argentina and Czechoslovakia).
82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83. Guillermo Colunje (Panama) v. U.S., Claim, June 27, 1933, Ann. Dig. 1933-
34, Case No. 96, 6 R. Intl Arb. Awards 342 (1933).
84. See O Higgins, supra note 47, at 297.
85. 4 KARL MARTENS, CAUSES CPL9BRES DU DROIT DES GENS 106 (2nd ed., 1858-
61). The Napper Tandy case is also discussed in detail in O'Higgins, supra note 47,
at 297-300. Napoleon insisted upon the release of Tandy by Great Britain and in-
structed that the Treaty of Amiens was not to be signed until Tandy was restored
to France. The Crown eventually gave Tandy a pardon, and, in March 1802, Tandy
arrived in France. See O'Higgins, supra note 47, at 300.
86. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
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brought a civil tort action in the state court of New York against the
bonding company and the kidnapping bondsmen who were acting as
the company's agents in their mission to abduct and bring Jaffe from
Canada to Florida for trial."7 These cases further indicate that forcible
or fraudulent abduction may incur civil actions brought by the illegally
abducted individual.
B. Responsibilities Arising out of Non-State-Sponsored Abduction
The remedies available for abductions by private individuals or by
unauthorized initiative may be different than for state-sponsored ab-
ductions. In the Eichmann case, for example, Green argues that be-
cause the kidnappers were "private individuals indulging in private
enterprise, no international responsibility arises"; if they were "state
representatives, [and] should Israel decline to surrender Eichmann or
his captors, any claim by Argentina could be expiated.'
A State is not directly responsible for what its citizens have done,
but it is directly responsible for its own conduct. Abductions ordered,
authorized, or sponsored by the State involve an ab initio violation of
international law. The responsibility of the abducting State starts at
the moment the abducting act occurs, and the offending State, in addi-
tion to returning the abducted individual to the State of refuge or
residence, must apologize or openly admit that it violated the territo-
rial sovereignty of the offended State, and/or it must make other ap-
propriate reparations.
Forcible abductions conducted by purely private individuals with-
out government involvement give rise to no violation of international
law. They do, however, constitute a violation of the internal law of the
offended State by the abducting individuals, and the State whose pri-
vate citizens or unauthorized officials conducted the abduction abroad
does not bear international responsibility for the private or unautho-
rized act of abduction itself unless it subsequently "adopts" or "ratifies"
the act," fails to return or order the return of the abducted individual
to his country of refuge or residence, or fails to comply with a demand
for the extradition of the abducting individuals where an extradition
treaty applies.
As a result, in both Government-sponsored and non-Government-
sponsored abductions, the offending State has the duty to return the
abducted individual or order his return. Where appropriate, and in the
presence of an extradition treaty, the offending State has a duty to
punish or extradite the abductors or others responsible for the abduc-
tion. In non-government-sponsored abductions alone, however, the
87. Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F.Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), at 1371.
88. Green, Eichmann, supra note 34, at 515.
89. Cf. Mann, supra note 37, at 407.
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State whose nationals "privately" captured the abducted individual
abroad has no duty beyond effectuating the return of the abductee and
possibly punishing or extraditing the abductors.
International responsibility on the part of the State starts from
the moment when the State fails to return or order the return of the
abducted individual, and further responsibility would incur only when
the State arrests the abducted individual and subjects him to the local
proceedings upon his "arrival," forced by the "private" captors. Wheth-
er the captors are government officials or private citizens, and whether
the abduction is originally authorized or sponsored by the government,
the State whose unauthorized agents or private citizens engage in
extraterritorial captures assumes its responsibility as soon as it
adopts, sanctions, or takes advantage of the private or unauthorized
kidnapping activities. A State that fails to return the abducted indi-
vidual and then arrests and prosecutes the individual has the same re-
sponsibilities as in a State-sponsored abduction.
IV. WRONGFUL ABDUCTION REQUIRES DIVESTMENT OF JURISDICTION
A. The Duty to Return Requires the Divestment of Jurisdiction
Since an abducting State has a duty to return illegally abducted
individuals to their country of refuge or residence, courts of the ab-
ducting State must refrain from exercising jurisdiction on the merits.
Professor Daniel O'Connell maintains that, although in certain cases
courts of the abducting State have "assert[ed] jurisdiction over a per-
son irregularly seized in foreign territory, the seizing State is in breach
of international law in exercising its jurisdiction, . . . and there is
ground for asserting that, as a corollary, it owes a duty to the ag-
grieved State to return the offender thereto.' ° Further, "[in cases
involving kidnapping of individuals across international boundaries,
the general state practice is either to release the individual,... or to
refuse totally to exercise jurisdiction where individuals were brought
before the courts." Where courts of the United States accept in perso-
nam jurisdiction over defendants apprended in wrongful abductions,
those courts "commit a further internationally wrongful act: the denial
of justice."9 1
The Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime' proposes a duty on a kidnapping State to return
the kidnapped criminal to the place where he was seized and not to
90. 2 DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 833 (1970).
91. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Some Observations concerning External Power of Decen-
tralized Units within the Context of the Treaty Making Powers of Article If and
Corresponding Transnational Implications, 2 FLA. J. INT'L L. 159, 198-199 (1986).
92. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INTL L.
SuPP. 435, art. 16, at 623-632 (1935).
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"prosecute" or "punish" him. Article 16 of the Draft states that
[Un exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall
prosecute or punish any person who has been brought within its
territory or a place subject to its authority by recourse to measures
in violation of international law or international convention without
first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have
been violated by such measures.'
The comment to Article 16 explains that "resort to measures in viola-
tion of international law or international convention" in obtaining cus-
tody of a person charged with crime "entails an international responsi-
bility which must be discharged by the release or restoration of the
person taken, indemnification of the injured state, or otherwise."9'
The requirement to "release or restore the person taken" leads
necessarily to the conclusion that the abducting State and its munic-
ipal courts are precluded from exercising further jurisdiction over the
individual abducted abroad.
B. The Principle ex injuria jus non oritur Requires the Divestment of
Jurisdiction
The late Professor Mann properly pointed out that the question
"courts of the world have ... failed to face . . . is not whether juris-
diction exists, but whether jurisdiction should be exercised." 5 The
illegality of the initial abducting act renders the subsequent exercise of
jurisdiction legally impossible. Illegal seizure of an accused in violation
of the territorial sovereignty of a State deprives the captors of the
power to try him, though their right to do so might not have been in
doubt had there been no abnormal circumstances.
It is a long established legal principle that an illegal act does not
give rise to any right (ex injuria jus non oritur). Since the act of abduc-
tion itself is illegal and invalid under international law, the abducting
State does not have a right to subject the abducted individual to its
laws and proceedings following such illegal abduction. Instead, it must
return the abducted individual to the place of his removal and make
other reparations as appropriate. No matter how much a suspect in a
foreign country is wanted at home, or how "international" an offender's
crime is, the abducting State may not establish and acquire its juris-
diction over such suspect or offender until the time when the abducted
individual is given an opportunity to be orderly and legally
transferred.
The transfer of an accused criminal must follow the procedure es-
93. Id. at 623.
94. Id.
95. Mann, supra note 37, at 414.
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tablished by the applicable extradition treaty or other agreements. The
State obtains jurisdiction when the released abductee voluntarily turns
himself in to the wanting State or when he voluntarily enters into an
area where the abducting State may apprehend him without violating
international law. Where the executive branch of the abducting gov-
ernment has not returned the abducted individual, the judicial branch
is under a duty to divest itself of jurisdiction over the abductee and
return him or order his return to the State where he was abducted.
Several legal theorists have corroborated this view. For instance,
Professor O'Connell convincingly states that where persons and things
are brought within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular State by
means constituting a violation of international law, or by means offen-
sive to an extradition treaty or to the municipal law of another State,
"[a] priori one would suppose that the solution of the problem [of the
court's jurisdiction] would be found in the application of the maxim ex
injuria jus non oritur.'
Another commentator maintains that "abduction... violates in-
ternational law by injuring the sovereignty of a foreign state ... [and]
"should... not bear the fruit of the unlawfully gained advantage"
(emphasis added). 7 If the presence of the abducted individual may be
interpreted as "evidence," the application of an exclusionary rule under
the U.S. law "must reestablish the situation which the defendant was
in before he was kidnapped." In other words, "the criminal prosecution
must be preliminarily dismissed, and the prosecuting country may
then make a request for extradition." 8 The rules of international law
"(a) make removal of persons conditional on the existence of a treaty;
(b) require formal extradition proceedings; and (c) obligate the prose-
cuting country, in cases of abduction, to return the individual to the
country from which he was abducted.'
Regarding Jaffe, Baldwin notes that the abduction and removal by
U.S. citizens "acting under apparent color of state authority" violat-
ed Canadian territorial sovereignty, the United States-Canada Extra-
dition Treaty, and "the personal rights of the fugitive guaranteed un-
der customary and conventional international law and by the domestic
law of Canada,... thereby depriving the violating state of jurisdic-
tion.""°
Morgenstern argued that the logical conclusion would be that
"municipal courts would decline to exercise jurisdiction over persons
96. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 90, at 831-832.
97. Wilfried Bottke, "Rule of Law" or "Due Process" as a Common Feature of
Criminal Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 419, 453
(1990).
98. Id. at 453-454.
99. Id.
100. Baldwin, supra note 91, at 199.
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and things brought before them in violation of international law [be-
cause] in exercising jurisdiction in such circumstances the court fails to
give effect to the rule of international law prohibiting the seizure; it
not only condones but gives effect to the violation of international law"
(emphasis added).' Morgenstern further stated that in "declining
jurisdiction which results directly from the original violation of inter-
national law, courts would merely uphold the fundamental maxim ex
injuria jus non oritur."'2 Morgenstern maintained that a violation of
customary international law "cannot give rise to legal consequences in
relation to any party.""°3 In addition, Morgenstern pointed out that
[pirinciple demands ... [that] municipal courts should decline to
exercise jurisdiction over persons or property which have been
seized in violation of international law. In acting thus, the courts
would enforce the rule of international law prohibiting the seizure,
and give effect to the general jurisprudential maxim ex injuria jus
non oriturc4
State practice also supports the view that jurisdiction does not
follow illegal abductions. There are numerous cases in which courts
have declined jurisdiction following the abduction of persons or the
seizure of things in violation of international law. For instance, it is an
established practice in France that vessels seized in the territorial wa-
ters of a neutral State may not become the object of prize proceed-
ings. 5 In an 1832 case concerning the arrests of a Sardinian vessel
and its crew members in violation of a rule of customary international
law, the French Court of Appeal of Aix held that "the arrests constitut-
ed a violation of the law of nations, that they must, accordingly, be
considered null and void, and that the persons arrested must be re-
leased and conducted to Sardinian territory. "1
Similarly, the German Supreme Prize Court, in the case concern-
ing the capture of the Ambiorix, held that where the capture of an
enemy vessel "took place within the limits of the sovereignty of a neu-
tral State, the act of capture is null and void, and the seizing State can
deprive no rights therefrom."' °7 In addition, in Great Britain, prize
101. Morgenstern, supra note 29, at 265.
102. Id. at 266.
103. Id. at 276.
104. Id. at 279.
105. See, e.g., In re Le Saint Michel (1792), in 1 ALPHONSE DE PISTOYE &
CHARLES DUVERDY, TRAIT9 DES PRISES MARITIMES 123 (1855); In re The Christiana
(1799), id. at 99 (1855); In re Le Frei (1871), in HENRI MARTIN BARBOUX, JURISPRU-
DENCE DU CONSEIL DES PRISES 66 (1872); In re The Heina (1915), in 1 PAUL
FAUCHILLE, JURISPRUDENCE FRANQAISE EN MATI.RE DE PRISES MARITIMES 119 (1916);
and In re The Tinos, id. at 309.
106. Cited in [18321 1 Sirey, Jurisprudence 578; Morgenstern, supra note 29, at.
279.
107. The Ambiorix, in PAUL FAUCHILLE & CHARLES DE VISSCHER, JURISPRUDENCE
ALLEMANDE EN MATI.RE DE PRISES MARITIMES 131 (1924).
VOL. 23:1
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPREHENSION
courts have widely held that the seizure of enemy vessels within the
territorial waters of a neutral State constitutes a violation of interna-
tional law and that such neutral State is entitled to claim the release
of vessels thus seized."°
Courts of the United States have followed these rulings in cases
involving the capture of vessels in violation of a treaty or in the terri-
torial waters of another State in general and in cases involving the
capture of enemy vessels in the territorial waters of a neutral State in
particular." g For example, in United States v. Ferris,"° members of
the crew (consisting of British subjects) of a Panamanian ship were
prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the U.S. Prohibition and Tariff
Acts following seizure of the ship 270 miles off the west coast of the
United States. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to try the
crew members and that a fortiori a vessel seized in violation of an
international treaty and brought by force within reach of the court's
process should be released. The court stated that
as the instant seizure was far outside the limit (laid down by the
Treaty of 1924 between the United States and Panama), it is sheer
aggression and trespass... contrary to the treaty, not to be sanc-
tioned by any court, and cannot be the basis of any proceeding ad-
verse to the defendants .... A decent respect for the opinions of
mankind, national honor, harmonious relations between nations,
and avoidance of war, require that the contracts and law represent-
ed by treaties shall be scrupulously observed, held inviolate, and in
good faith precisely performed - require that treaties shall not be
reduced to mere scraps of paper .... It seems clear that, if one
legally before the court cannot be tried because therein a treaty is
violated, for greater reason one illegally before the court, in vio-
lation of a treaty, likewise cannot be subjected to trial. Equally in
both cases is there absence of jurisdiction."'
Another famous example is Cook v. United States."2 In that
case, officers of the United States Coast Guard boarded and seized a
British vessel, The Mazel Toy, at a point eleven and a half miles off
the Massachusetts coast and charged it with a violation of the U.S.
Tariff Act of 1930. The seizure was found to be in violation of terri-
torial limits fixed by a treaty then in force between the United States
and Great Britain. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the contention
108. See, e.g., The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. 162 (1800); The Anna, 5 C. Rob.
373 (1805); The Pruissima Conception, 6 C. Rob. 45 (1805); The Valeria, [19211 1
A.C. 477; The Pellworm, [19221 1 A.C. 292.
109. See, e.g., The Anne, 3 U.S. (Wheat.) 435 (1818); The Lilla, 2 U.S. (Sprague)
177 (1862); The Sir William Peel, 5 U.S. (Wall.) 517 (1866); The Adela, 6 U.S.
(Wall.) 266 (1867).
110. U.S. v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (1927).
111. Id. See also Dickinson, supra note 15, at 239 n. 23.
112. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
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that the illegality of the seizure was immaterial. The Court held in-
stead that the U.S. Government's subsequent action for forfeiture of
the vessel in the court of the United States was properly dismissed
since under the U.S.-U.K. treaty the forcible seizure was incapable of
giving the U.S. court power to adjudicate title to the vessel, regardless
of the vessel's physical presence within the court's jurisdiction. The
court stated that
the objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely be-
cause made by one upon whom the Government had not conferred
authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made ...
[but] that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by the
Treaty [of 1924 between the United States and Great Britain] it
had imposed a territorial limitation upon its authority .... [The
U.S. Government also] lacked power, because of the Treaty, to
subject the vessel to [U.S.] laws."3
The court held that in the absence of any act done within territorial
waters, or of an intention or attempt to do any act within territorial
waters, there was no basis for a proceeding against the vessel under
the United States Prohibition Act, stating that "[tlo hold that adjudica-
tion may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose
and effect of the Treaty," and that "[t]he ordinary incidents of posses-
sion of the vessel and the cargo [must] yield to the international
agreement." 4
The underlying principle in these cases is the same as that relied
upon in cases involving forcible or fraudulent abduction of individuals:
the principle that persons or things seized in violation of international
law may not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of the seizing
State.
General State practice further supports this proposition. In
Dominguez v. State,"5 a Texas court held against the exercise of ju-
risdiction over an individual wrongly seized in Mexico in violation of a
U.S.-Mexico treaty and of international law. There, a U.S. expedi-
tionary force had been sent into Mexico in "hot pursuit" of bandits.
Having apprehended a Mexican, the force discovered upon its return
that he was not one of the bandits pursued and he was thereupon
surrendered to local Texas authorities who proceeded to prosecute him
for a murder previously committed in Texas. It was contended on be-
half of the accused that the Texas court was without jurisdiction to
prosecute him for the murder until he had been allowed an opportuni-
ty to return to Mexico. The court held that, since the expeditionary
force was acting under instructions from the U.S. Department of War,
113. Id. at 121.
114. Id. at 122.
115. Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92 (Tex.Crim.App 1921).
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it must be presumed that an agreement between Mexico and the Unit-
ed States had been reached, and consequently the rule of the extradi-
tion cases was applicable. The entry of the expeditionary force into
Mexico for the purpose of apprehending bandits would have been "a
violation of Mexican territory contrary to the law of nations in the
absence of consent of the Mexican Government." As a result, the court
held, the accused might resist trial for the murder until such time as
he should voluntarily subject himself to the jurisdiction of the United
States or until the consent of Mexico should be obtained."' The court
concluded that the same obligation that would restrain the United
States Government from breaking the implied limitations placed upon
it under its treaty with Mexico "would necessarily prevail" with refer-
ence to the agreement on the basis of the "comity of nations," and if
the legal obligation was the same, the abducted individual could not be
held for the offense "without the opportunity to return to his country.
. . [in order to] determine whether he shall be surrendered for trial
under the treaty of extradition."1 7
Similarly, in the well-known case of In re Jolis,"8 French offi-
cials had kidnapped a Belgian national in Belgian territory and taken
him to France to face prosecution. The French Tribunal Correctionnel
d'Avesnes held that the accused had a right to be released on the
ground that "the arrest, effected by French officers on foreign territory,
could have no legal effect whatsoever, and was completely null and
void"; that the court must take judicial notice of that "nullity being of
a public nature;" and that, therefore, "[t]he information leading to the
proceedings of arrest. . . , the proceedings themselves, the commit-
ment to prison on the same date, the remand order, and all that fol-
lowed thereon must accordingly be annulled."
19
Another example is the Colunje claim."2 There, a policeman of
the Panama Canal Zone entered the territory of Panama, and by false
pretence induced Colunje, a Panamanian, to go to the Canal Zone.
Colunje was arrested by the police of the Zone and was subsequently
charged with a criminal offense before a Canal Zone court. The U.S.-
Panama commission held that "the police agents of the Zone by induc-
ing Colunje by false pretence to come with them to the Zone with the
intent of arresting him there unduly exercised authority within the
jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama to the prejudice of a Panama-
nian citizen." Because a police agent was acting in the performance of
116. Id. at 97.
117. Id. at 98-99.
118. In re Jolis, Tribunal correctionel d'Avesnes, July 22, 1933, Ann. Dig. 1933-
1934, Case No. 77; [19341 2 Sirey, Jurisprudence 103, 105 (with note by Rousseau).
119. Id.
120. Guillermo Colunje (Panama) v. U.S., Claim, June 27, 1933, Ann. Dig. 1933-
34, Case No. 96, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 342 (1933).
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his functions, the United States of America should be held liable.12'
An especially significant example is the controversial case of Unit-
ed States v. Toscanino12 . Toscanino was an Italian citizen and a resi-
dent of Uruguay. He was lured from his home in Montevideo by a tele-
phone call placed by a local policeman named Hugo Campos Hermedia.
Hermdedia "was acting ultra vires in that he was the paid agent of the
United States government." Toscanino and his wife, seven months
pregnant at the time, were taken to a deserted area where Hermedia
and six other men abducted Toscanino, knocked him unconscious with
a gun, threw him into a car, bound and blindfolded him, and drove
him to the Uruguayan-Brazilian border. Toscanino alleged that the
U.S. agents then tortured and interrogated him for three weeks before
he was transported to the United States. Toscanino alleged that the
agents beat him, kept him awake for prolonged periods of time, inject-
ed fluids into his eyes and nose, and administered electric shocks to
his ears, toes, and private parts. 2'
Toscanino subsequently stood trial before the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York and was sentenced to 20 years in
prison and fined $20,000 on narcotics counts. Toscanino moved to va-
cate the verdict, dismiss the indictment, and order his repatriation to
Uruguay. On November 2, 1973, the district court denied the motion
without a hearing, and, relying on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, held that
the manner in which Toscanino was brought into the territory of the
United States was immaterial to the court's power to proceed, provided
that he was physically present at the time of trial." The Court of
Appeals of the United States for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not apply to situations where crim-
inals were brought into the U.S. court by means of forcible abductions
in violation of an international treaty, and that "abduction by one state
of persons located within the territory of another violate the territorial
sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the re-
turn of the person kidnapped."" The appellate court reasoned that,
although the abduction of Toscanino from Uruguay did not violate the
extradition treaty between Uruguay and the United States, the abduc-
tion violated two other treaties: the U.N. Charter and the Organization
of American States Charter, which require the United States to respect
the territorial sovereignty of Uruguay.121 It also held that a U.S.
court must "divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
where it had been acquired as a result of the government's deliberate,
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional
121. Id. See also R. v. Garrell, 86 L.J. (KB.) 894, 898 (per Lord Reading, 1917).
122. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 269-271.
124. Id. at 267-277.




rights.""' The court noted that
when an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the
jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his person repre-
sents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own miscon-
duct .... [The Government should be barred] from realizing di-
rectly the fruits of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in
bringing the accused to trial (emphasis added)."
Accordingly, courts should "decline to exercise jurisdiction over a de-
fendant whose presence has been secured by force or fraud."" 9 In so
holding, the court upheld the principle that "the government should be
denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct,"3 ' and the princi-
ple of international law that "the territory of a State is inviolable" and
"may not be the object, even temporarily,... [ofi measures of force
taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatev-
er."131
The judicial holdings in other recent abduction cases are also
instructive. In the case of S. v. Ebrahim, involving the abduction by
agents of South Africa of an accused in the territory of another
State, '3 the Court of Appeal of the Republic of South of Africa dis-
missed the prosecution on the ground that "abduction represents a
violation of the applicable rules of international law, that these rules
are part of our law, and that this violation of the law deprives the
Court ... of its competence to hear [the accused's] case.""
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez," the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the forcible abduction of Rene
Martin Verdugo-Urquidez with the authorization or participation of
the United States violated the "purpose" of the Extradition Treaty be-
tween the United States and Mexico. The court said that the violation,
together with Mexico's protest, would give the accused the right to
invoke the Treaty to defeat jurisdiction of the U.S. court." Verdugo-
Urquidez had been indicted for the murder of U.S. DEA Special Agent
Enrique Camarena-Salazar. The Ninth Circuit remanded for an-evi-
dentiary hearing as to whether Verdugo-Urquidez's abduction had
been authorized or participated by U.S. authorities." The court stat-
ed that because the principle of specialty prohibits the trying of an ex-
127. Id. at 275, 281.
128. Id. at 275.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 277, quoting Charter of the Organization of American States, supra
note 8, art. 17.
132. S. v. Ebrahim, S. Ar. L. Rep. (Apr.-June 1991).
133. Id. at 8-9.
134. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. Id. at 1356-57.
136. Id. at 1362.
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tradited person for a crime other than that for which he was extradit-
ed, "if an individual has been kidnapped by a treaty signatory - i.e., if
he has not been extradited for any offense at all - he may not be de-
tained, tried, or punished for any offense without the consent of the
nation from which he was abducted."137 The court noted that the pur-
pose of extradition treaties, in part, is to safeguard the sovereignty of
signatory States and to ensure fair treatment of individuals. The court,
from the individual's enforcement of the specialty doctrine, concluded
that the individual had standing to raise a violation of the treaty as a
whole."s
Indeed, no matter whether the illegally seized subject matter is an
individual or an object, the violation of international law precludes the
delinquent State from proceeding to try and dispose of the subject mat-
ter. The only choice for the delinquent State and/or its courts is to
divest jurisdiction by releasing or ordering the release of the illegally
seized subject matter. As noted by Morgenstern, the rules and princi-
ples arising from the seizure of vessels in foreign territorial waters are
"essentially the same as those arising from the seizure of individuals
in foreign territory" - both kinds of seizure constitute a "violation both
of the sovereignty of the foreign state and of the rule of international
law which prohibits the exercise of acts of authority within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of other states." As a result, the courts of the seizing
State should "decline to give effect to such a seizure and thereby en-
force the rule of international law prohibiting it,"139 and, unless the
seizure is authorized under international law, "the court lacks jurisdic-
tion to deal with the merits of the case."14°
C. The Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts Can Be No Higher than that
of their State
The extent of the jurisdiction of a State limits the competence and
therefore jurisdiction of its municipal courts. Where the State does not
have the authority under international law to exercise its national
jurisdiction over a certain individual or thing, the courts of its subdivi-
sions do not have such jurisdiction either. Under no circumstances, as
far as international law is concerned, can the jurisdiction of municipal
courts be broader than that of their State as a whole. If the State itself
does not have the authority to abduct individuals, then its municipal
courts may not assume and exercise jurisdiction either because the
extent of the courts' jurisdiction can never go higher than that of the
State itself.
Dickinson, on the jurisdiction of municipal courts over illegally
137. Id. at 1351.
138. Id. at 1356-57.
139. Morgenstern, supra note 29, at 274.
140. Id. at 275.
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seized persons or things, stated that
[ilt may be urged that only the injured foreign state is in a position
to protest against the violation of international law and that, in
any case, the alleged violation of international law presents an
issue which should be resolved by international negotiation or in an
international forum. On the other hand .... since the seizure or
arrest was made in excess of the state's proper competence, and in
violation of the rights of a foreign state, there is in consequence no
national competence to invoke local process or to subject the thing
or the person to local law. If there is no national competence, obvi-
ously there can be no competence in the courts, which are only an
arm of the national power. To hold otherwise... would go far to
defeat the purpose and nullify the efficacy of international law
(emphasis added)."'
Dickinson maintained that "[if the original arrest or seizure is illegal
because in violation of treaty, it is logical to conclude that no compe-
tence is acquired thereby ... [and] [ilf the original arrest or seizure is
in violation of treaty, it would be shortsighted policy which permitted
the court to draw a dark curtain before the wrong done by one nation
to another, however desirable it may be to impose a well-merited pen-
alty or forfeiture upon the individual concerned."142 "In terms of
American precedents," Dickinson continued, "this means that the un-
derlying principle of United States v. Rauscher is correct and that the
distinction attempted in Ker v. Illinois is arbitrary, unsound, and
should be repudiated; that the principle of The Mazel Toy is unim-
peachable; and that such cases as The Ship Richmond and The Merino
must be relegated to the category of cases discredited and over-
ruled."143 He concluded that
[tlo hold otherwise would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of
the salutary principle, well established in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. 'International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.'1"
In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, Justice Marshall stated
that "[tihe jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed
by the nation as an independent sovereign power." 4 ' What the ju-
diciary, being merely an arm of the State, is authorized to do is no
more than what the State is permitted to do under international law.
In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Cook case correctly held
141. Dickinson, supra note 15, at 231.
142. Id. at 236.
143. Id. at 244-245.
144. Id. at 245 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
145. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 13 (1812).
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that, since the U.S. "Government itself lacked power to seize," due to a
U.S.-Britain treaty, it "lacked power.., to subject the [illegally seized]
vessel to our laws," and that it would further "nullify the purpose and
effect of the Treaty" should the "wrongful seizure" be followed by "ad-
judication" - that is, the exercise of jurisdiction by the court on the
merits.'" As Dickinson commented on that decision, the objection in
that case "was not to the jurisdiction of the court alone, but to 'the
jurisdiction of the United States' as a whole.147
D. Silence of the Offended State Does Not Authorize Abduction and
Subsequent Proceeding
There are some who suggest that a court should divest itself of
jurisdiction only when there is a protest from the offended State. One
author, for example, states that the "prevailing practice" in interna-
tional law is that "states refrain from trying fugitives illegally brought
within their jurisdiction when there is a protest from the state of ab-
duction demanding return" (emphasis added); such practice in the
United States "seems to be suggested in Lujan, and, to some extent, in
Toscanino."'4 Another author argues that if an injured State objects
to the jurisdiction of the abducting State, "then [its] government could
have explicitly demanded [the kidnapped to be] return."49 As a re-
sult, in the United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,'" since Mexico failed
to demand return, as it also did in the Alvarez-Machain case, the court
could have exercised jurisdiction, and the "striking difference" between
Mexico's responses to the Alvarez-Machain and Verdugo-Urquidez
abductions "lends credence to the U.S. government's view that Mexico
intended its action to lead to a diplomatic resolution of the Verdugo-
Urquidez matter."'
In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,'52 the court acknowl-
edged that no nation enjoys unbridled discretion in obtaining personal
jurisdiction over criminals residing in a foreign country. Nevertheless,
the court held the conduct of U.S. agents must be "of the most outra-
geous and reprehensible kind" to result in the denial of due process,
and only where the offended State protested could the court divest itself
of jurisdiction over illegally abducted criminals.'53 The court, relying
146. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22.
147. Dickinson, supra note 15, at 235.
148. Larry A. McCullough, International and Domestic Criminal Law Issues in the
Achille Lauro Incident: A Functional Analysis, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 53 nn. 371-373
(1986).
149. Mitchell J. Matorin, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial
Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907, 928 (1992).
150. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez II, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
151. Matorin, supra note 149, at 928-29.
152. United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2nd Cir.1975).
153. Id. at 65.
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on the proposition that "consent or acquiescence by the offended State
waives any right it possessed and heals any violation of international
law,""5 found that neither Argentina nor Bolivia, the countries where
the forcible abductions had occurred, had declared that its sovereignty
had been violated, and such failure to protest was "fatal" to the
abductee's attempt to rely on the Charter of the United Nations."M
There are other cases to the same effect. In United States v. Reed,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "absent
protest or objection by the offended sovereign [the accused] had no
standing to raise violation of international law as an issue."56 On
December 19, 1986, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany also held
that international law did not preclude the prosecution of an accused
seized by fraud, but the offended foreign nation had a right of resti-
tution founded on international law that "could preclude the exercise of
German jurisdiction."'57 The defendant involved in that decision had
been induced by a German agent in the Netherlands to enter the terri-
tory of the Federal Republic of Germany, where he was arrested and
sentenced to eleven years in prison. On October 23, 1985, the German
Federal Supreme Court rejected the accused's appeal on the merits. On
January 6, 1986, the Dutch Government demanded "the immediate
restoration" of the accused. On June 3, 1986, the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court initially refused leave to appeal." The defendant
later was able to re-appeal to the German Federal Supreme Court, and
on December 19, 1986 secured an order that stayed the proceedings so
that the Federal government could comply with the demand of the
Netherlands." 9 In essence, the German Supreme Court held that the
court could exercise jurisdiction in the absence of demand from the
Dutch Government for the abductee's return.
In the Re Argoud case, involving the kidnapping of a French rebel
by French agents in Munich, a special French Court of State Security
held similarly."M In February 1963, former French Colonel Antoine
Argoud, who had joined the Secret Army that plotted in the early
1960s to frustrate President de Gaulle's efforts to end the war between
France and Algeria by granting independence to the latter, was abduc-
ted from Munich by French agents and forcibly brought back to France
to stand trial. The special Court of State Security, based on a declara-
154. Id. at 67.
155. Id. at 65.
156. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2nd Cir. 1981).
157. See Mann, supra note 37, at 421, n. 72, citing [19871 NJW 3087.
158. See Mann, supra 37, at 421, n. 72, -citing [1986] NJW 3021.
159. See Mann, supra 37, at 421, n. 72, citing [1987] NJW 3087.
160. 92 JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (CLUNET) 93 (1965); 1964
BULL. CRIM. 420, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cass. Crim. June 4, 1964). See also Mann, supra
note 37, at 413; ANDRE COCATRE-ZILGIEN, L'AFFAIRE ARGOUD: CONSIDgRATIONS SUR
LES ARRESTATIONS INTERNATIONALEMENT IRRIkGULI9RES (1965).
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tion by the French Foreign Ministry that no communication had been
received from the West German Government, rejected Argoud's conten-
tion that he had been abducted in violation of international law. The
special Court convicted and sentenced him to life imprisonment for
insurrection. The court held that Argoud "who claims to be injured...
lacks the right or capacity to plead in judicial proceedings a violation
of international law, a fortiori when the State concerned makes no
claim."16 '
The position that the French court could exercise jurisdiction over
Argoud in the absence of a protest from the German Government was
merely a subterfuge, however, because Argoud's defense was again
rejected even after the German Government had demanded his return.
On November 16, 1963, the German Federal Parliament requested the
German Federal Government to demand Argoud's return, 2 but the
Court of State Security refused to accept Argoud's submission of the
German official representation as evidence. On December 28, 1963,
upon appeal, the French Cour de Cassation, notwithstanding the irreg-
ularity and the express German demand, upheld the jurisdiction to try
Argoud. It held that "even accepting that Argoud had been abducted
on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in violation of the
rights of that country and of its sovereignty, it would be for the Gov-
ernment of the injured State alone to complain and demand repara-
tion." Further, Argoud as an individual "has no capacity to plead a
contravention of the rules of public international law and could not
claim to find in them a personal basis for immunity from judicial pro-
ceedings. " " l
The propositions made by these courts and authors, however, are
dubious. First, a fair reading of the Toscanino case does not lead to the
conclusion that the court intended to divest itself of jurisdiction only
where the offended State had lodged a protest.'
Second, in an abduction case, the abducted individual often could
hardly know whether the offended State had lodged a protest, and the
abducting State must disclose the absence or existence of a protest."
Even if the abducted individual is informed that there is no protest
from the country whose territorial integrity has been impugned, it is
still difficult to infer that the offended country has consented to his ab-
duction and trial. At the least, it must be established that the offended
State had prior knowledge of the plan and the actual operation of the
abduction and failed to either approve or disapprove and such failure
161. 92 CLUNET, supra note 160, at 96; 45 I.L.R. at 94.
162. See Carl Doehring, Restitutionsanspruch, Asylrecht und Auslieferungsrecht im
Fall Argoud, 25 Z.A.O.R.V. 209 (1965).
163. 92 CLUNET, supra note 160, at 100; 45 I.L.R. at 97-98.
164. See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text.
165. See Mann, supra note 37, at 410.
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amounted to acquiescence or consent. The burden of proof, therefore,
should be on the prosecuting State to show acquiescence or consent.
Third, it is extremely difficult for the abducting State to prove
that the mere antecedent and subsequent silence constitutes a form of
consent. The best view would be that only where the arresting State
had acquired prior express and affirmative consent (though not nec-
essarily written) from the State of refuge or residence can it justify its
extraterritorial apprehension and subsequent proceedings. Subsequent
silence (or even approval) does not alter the illegal nature of the ab-
duction and cannot be counted as a basis for the act of abduction itself
and for subsequent proceedings. In a recent comment, Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld notes that "too much is made of the assertion of
protest by the foreign government in abduction cases." Lowenfeld fur-
ther states that "silence on the part of the foreign state should not be
construed as giving consent to an abduction."'6
Fourth, the presence or absence of protest or consent must also
yield to human rights considerations. In his article "U.S. Law Enforce-
ment Abroad," Professor Lowenfeld points out that "acting under au-
thority of the United States on foreign soil contrary to the will of the
foreign state is wrong under international law," and that "silence or
even consent by a foreign state cannot make right what is not right,
either under the international law of human rights or... under the
U.S. Constitution."167
The emphasis ... on the lack of protest by foreign states when
suspects are abducted from their territory is disquieting. For one
thing, the states that do not protest tend to be, if not client states,
at any rate states that have various reasons not to make formal
protests. For another, even when silence can be fairly interpreted
as consent - which ... is often hard to tell - such consent cannot
extend to violation of the rights of the accused."U
As Chabner notes, there are certain municipal cases suggesting that
even in the absence of a formal protest by the asylum country whose
territorial sovereignty was violated, "an abducted individual would
have standing to argue that the United States failure to extradite
according to the terms of an existing treaty should divest a court of its
personal jurisdiction.
" 16 9
166. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Still More on Kidnapping, 85 AM. J. INTL L. 655, 661
(1991).
167. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 451 (1990).
168. Id. at 489.
169. Chabner, supra note 71, at 1020. Cf United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146,
151 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument based on alleged lack of standing); Jaffe
v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, at 307-08 (llth Cir. 1987) (holding that the kidnapping of
the defendant from Canada "constitutes a treaty violation" where government actors
were involved, indicating that Canada's protest was not necessary for the kidnapping
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In a case involving the abduction in Argentina by Uruguayan
security and intelligence forces of a Uruguayan citizen, the U.N. Hu-
man Rights Committee held that the abduction violated Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,170 and, ac-
cordingly, the abducting State had a duty to make effective repara-
tions, including the immediate release of the abducted individual. 1
As a result, from the point of view of the international law of human
rights, whether the offended State keeps silent, whether its silent
amounts to acquiescence, or even whether it has expressly renounced
its right to demand reparations is irrelevant, for the wrongfully abduc-
ted individual is entitled to due process of law and remedies under
relevant and applicable international treaties.
Moreover, the duty of the offender to make reparation to the of-
fended State is also independent of the presence or absence of the of-
fended State's formal protest and demand. The major purpose of repa-
rations is to correct wrongs and to diminish, eliminate, and prevent
further international wrong-doing. Should the wrong-doer be excused
from making reparations simply because the offended party did not
protest, was unable or unwilling to protest, or dared not to do so, inter-
national misconduct would be further encouraged and promoted, and
the international society would be likely to turn into a more and more
lawless and violent anarchy.
For various practical reasons, offended States have often kept
silent after an affront to their sovereignty had occurred, but this si-
lence is not a controlling factor. As Mann said, "acquiescence presup-
poses knowledge of all the relevant facts and cannot be inferred from
mere silence," and even if the offended State "had deliberately and in
knowledge of all relevant facts decided to ignore the incident, this
would not have abolished the breach of customary or conventional
international law."172 For example, Panama's new government, as the
political foe of ousted General Noriega and installed with the armed
assistance of the United States force, naturally did not and would not
protest against the forcible abduction and removal from Panama or the
subsequent conviction and imprisonment of Noriega, who is under-
standably labeled as a "dictator." The lack of "protest" from the new
to constitute a "treaty violation").
170. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). Article 9(1)
of the Covenant provides that "[no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law." Cf.
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), UN
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile").
171. Views of Human Rights Committee on Complaint of L6pez, July 29, 1981, 36
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), at 176-184, UN Doc. A136/40 (1981).
172. Mann, supra note 37, at 410.
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Panamanian government may not be interpreted to suggest that no
violation of the Panamanian sovereignty had ever occurred at all and
that the U.S. federal courts could therefore have lawfully exercised
jurisdiction over General Noriega' 73
Finally, to nullify an illegal extraterritorial apprehension and to
prohibit subsequent prosecution, the form of protest the injured State
adopts is insignificant, and whether the injured State formally protests
at all is immaterial. What is important is that where the nation as a
whole does not have jurisdiction to abduct an individual from abroad
and subject him to its law by such illegal means, its courts do not have
jurisdiction to try the abducted either. It is even more important for all
States to abandon or abstain from the practice of forcible abduction
overseas in the absence of prior and express consent from the country
concerned. Whether the offended State protests or demands the return
of the abducted individual is totally irrelevant to the question whether
the court of the abducting should exercise its jurisdiction. 7 '
Nonetheless, despite the stated objections to the proposition that a
court may divest itself of jurisdiction in an abduction case only where
the offended State protests or demands for the return of the abductee,
it is best advised that an offended State always formally protest
against the abduction and demand the return of the abducted individ-
ual. Where appropriate, the country should also demand the extradi-
tion of the abductors or other responsible individuals. Formal and ex-
press protests and demands may facilitate the offending nation to
better realize the unlawful nature of its conduct and the consequences
under international law and admonish it to refrain from further mis-
conduct.
V. THE DUTY TO OBSERVE AND GIVE EFFECT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
In some of the cases in the Ker line, the courts do not seem to
have completely ignored the illegality of the unauthorized seizures
from foreign soil and the consequences of such illegality. Nevertheless,
they refused to order the return of the illegally seized individuals to
173. For an analysis of the invasion of Panama and the arrest of General
Noriega, see Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama
under International Law, 84 AM. J. INTrL L. 494, 502 (1990) (stating that "the U.S.
action [in Panama] was in disregard of the pertinent norms and principles of inter-
national law on the use of force" and was "evidently dictated by political consider-
ations, in disregard of faithful adherence to the existing norms on the use of force");
Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 503 (1990);
Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84
AM. J. INVL L. 516 (1990).
174. See Mann, supra note 37, at 411 (stating that "[t]here is . . . no justification
for the suggestion which has sometimes been intimated . . . that it is relevant to
the question of the court's jurisdiction whether a demand for the return has been
made.").
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the State of refuge. The courts failed to abstain from exercising juris-
diction over the seized individuals on the ground that any adjustment
to the situation would be made between the governments of the offend-
ing State and the offended State and that questions involving interna-
tional law should be left for the executive department of the govern-
ment.
For instance, in The Ship Richmond case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that an offense against a foreign power in whose territorial wa-
ters the U.S. naval force seized an American vessel "must be adjusted
between the two governments" and that the court "can take no cog-
nizance of it."'75 The Supreme Court of Vermont stated that the vio-
lation of the sovereignty of another State "is a matter which concerns
the political relations of the two countries, and in that aspect is a sub-
ject not within the constitutional powers of [the] court."7 According
to the Ker court, the remedy for the breach of international law is at
the diplomatic level, and the court has nothing to do with it.'77 In
Alvarez-Machain III, the court also held that "the decision of whether
[the abducted individual] should be returned to Mexico, as a matter
outside of the [Extradition] Treaty, is a matter for the Executive
Branch." 7
The division of powers among the administrative, legislative, and
judicial branches of the government does not provide any basis for the
courts of a State, nor for any other branch of its government, to dis-
honor the obligations of the State as a whole under international
law.'79 According to Starke, a State - including its municipal courts,
of course - cannot rely on provisions of its domestic law to avoid its
international obligations, nor can it plead that "its domestic law exon-
erated it from performing obligations imposed by an international trea-
ty"; in fact, a State is required "to pass the necessary legislation to ful-
fill its international obligations.""8
The opinion of the Finnish Ships Arbitration case states that "[a]s
to the manner in which its municipal law is framed, the State has
under international law, a complete liberty of action, and its municipal
law is a domestic matter in which no other State is entitled to concern
itself, provided that the municipal law is such as to give effect to all
the international obligations of the State."8' The Draft Declaration of
175. The Ship Richmond v. The United States, 13 U.S. 102, 104 (1815).
176. Vermont v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 121-22 (1835).
177. Ker, 119 U.S., at 442.
178. Alvarez-Machain II, 112 S.Ct., at 2196. See also Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F.Supp.
342, 344 (1934).
179. See Jianming Shen, Revisiting the Disability of the Non-Recognized in the
Courts of the Non-Recognizing States and Beyond: The Departure of the In re
Guanghua Liay Courts from the Rules, 5 FLA. INTL L.J. 401, 461-462 (1990).
180. STARKE, supra note 8, at 88-89 (1989). See also Advisory Opinion on the
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (1928), P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 15, at 26-27.
181. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1484. See also Advisory Opinion on the Exchange of
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Rights and Duties of States prepared by the International Law Com-
mission in 1949 provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very State has the
duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in
its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this du-
ty."
8 2
In United States v. Rauscher,'" the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the specialty principle incorporated in a treaty of extradition. The
Court stated that the treaty was "the supreme law of the land, which
the courts are bound to take judicial notice of and to enforce in any ap-
propriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of that
treaty."" In Dominguez v. State, the Texas court also stated that an
extradition treaty "is part of the law of the land, binding upon courts
and available to person having rights secured or recognized thereby,
and may be set up as a defense to a criminal prosecution established
in disregard thereof.""
Courts of other nations have held similarly. The Supreme Court of
South Africa recently recognized that rules of international law prohib-
iting international abduction "are part of our law," and the deviation
from such rules would divest the court of its jurisdiction to try an
abducted individual. 8 " In Fiscal v. Samper, the Supreme Court of
Spain maintained that
[tihe extradition treaty between Spain and Portugal... must be
considered... as a constituent part of Spanish legislation and,
consequently, of sufficient force to regulate the matter which it
covers, not only as to the international relations of the contracting
States, but also as to the juridical situation of those extradited from
Portuguese Republic upon a request made by the Spanish
courts .... Article 9 of the treaty provides that individuals deliv-
ered by virtue of the said convention may not be tried for any pre-
vious crime different from that which was the basis of extradi-
tion .... [Tihe crime considered [in the present case] is distinct
from that which underlay the extradition .... Accordingly, the
appellant cannot be condemned.81
Professor Dickinson opined that a court should not avoid giving
effect to an applicable treaty simply because the other signatory State
"is not a party to the litigation" and that the circumstance "that the
Greek and Turkish Populations (1925), P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 10, at 20.
182. Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, Report of the ILC covering
its First Session 12 April-9 June 1949, U.N. G.A.O.R., 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(A/925), at 7 ff., art. 13.
183. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886).
184. Id. at 422.
185. Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 99 (1921).
186. S. v. Ebrahim, S. Afr. L. Rep. (Apr.-June 1991), at 8-9.
187. Fiscal v. Samper, Ann. Dig., 1938-1940, Case No. 152.
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injured nation is not a party to the litigation" should not be heavily
weighed.' Once the issue "has been submitted to the court... [and)
the property or person which the injured nation is entitled to protect is
before the court," the court should not lose "the opportunity to undo
the wrong by restoring the property or releasing the person.""
Dickinson maintained that insisting that the decision to restore the
illegally seized property or to release the wrongly abducted individual
"belongs to a higher forum . . . is to abdicate a function which the
court, particularly the court of a country in which international law
and treaties are regarded as part of the law of the land, ought unhesi-
tatingly to perform .... [since] [tihe question is not political, but is one
clearly within the competence of the national court.""9
Accordingly, the judicial branch of the Government, like its execu-
tive and legislative counterparts, is under an obligation to carry out
the State's duties under international law and enforce that law domes-
tically where applicable. A municipal court may not excuse itself from
observing established rules of international law and applicable treaty
provisions by simply leaving international law issues to the political
branch of the Government. Refusal of municipal courts to take judicial
cognizance of and give effect to rules and principles of international
law would amount to another wrong in addition to the initial breach of
international law committed by the executive branch.
The respect for law, international and domestic, by both the peo-
ple and the Government, is an important element of any modern soci-
ety. The use of illegal means to achieve the "just" end of enforcing the
law constitutes an abuse of power and in the end increases the disre-
spect for the law. It is well-established at common law that the abuse
of power may result in the staying of any criminal proceedings.19 In
R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Mackeson, an English court held
that the institution of criminal proceedings against an individual ille-
gally abducted from Zimbabwe was an abuse of process and that the
proceedings had to be stayed."9 In R. v. Harley,93 the New Zealand
Court of Appeal refused to allow the prosecution to proceed against an
accused who, in violation of an existing extradition treaty, had been
illegally abducted from Australia. The court maintained that "this
must never become an area where it will be sufficient to consider that
the end has justified the means," and that "the means which were
adopted to make a trial possible were 'so much in conflict with one of
the most important principles of the rule of law' that the discharge of
188. Dickinson, supra note 15, at 236.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 236-237.
191. See, e.g., Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, A.C. 1254 (1964); Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions v. Humphreys, 2 All. E.R. 497 (1976).
192. R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Mackeson, 75 Cr.App. R. 24 (1981).
193. R. v. Harley, [19781 2 N.Z.L.R. 199.
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the prisoner was unavoidable."" Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v.
United States, thoughtfully stated that
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct
that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, exis-
tence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously .... If the government becomes a lawbreaker it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means - to declare that the
government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of
a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution.'
The practice of combatting terrorism, drug trafficking, and other
transnational crimes by illegal means "is a great danger" to society
and potentially innocent people, and,
for this reason alone, neither society nor the law must allow a de-
parture from the great principle that no illegality must ever bear
fruit .... It is the underlying moral force, the respect for the law,
that should prevail. Hardly any idea is greater than that of gov-
ernment by law rather than expediency . . . [and] law includes
international law. Consequently, whether or no[t] the injured State
protests or otherwise objects, the abduction of the accused from its
territory, by force or by stealth, should be treated.., as a misuse
of [the] exercise [of jurisdiction]."'
When the accused so abducted is brought before the court, the
court, as an arm of the Government, has an opportunity, and a duty,
to take notice of and give effect to rules and principles of international
law and to undo the nation's wrong by ordering the restoration of the
accused. By refusing to exercise jurisdiction on the merits until the
accused is obtained through due process of law they serve that pur-
pose. In so doing, and only in so doing, may the court better help
achieve the goal of promoting the respect for and observation of the
law, domestic and international.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Alvarez-Machain II court and the courts in similar cases
wrongly applied and interpreted the so-called Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The
initial proposition that the court will not divest itself of jurisdiction
simply because of an irregularity in the mode of the accused's appre-
194. Id. Cf Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C., at 1354 (per
Lord Devlin) (stating the "[tihe courts cannot contemplate for a moment the transfer-
ence to the Executive of the responsibility for seeing that the process of law is not
abused.").
195. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). See also Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951).
196. Mann, supra note 37, at 419.
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hension applies only to the extent that no violation of international
law is involved. The proposition does not apply, and should not have
been applied, to cases of transnational abduction involving a violation
of (1) the territorial sovereignty of another nation; (2) applicable inter-
national treaties, if any; or (3) international law. The Ker-Friesbie
doctrine, therefore, ought to be superseded or abandoned in its entirety
insofar as international abduction cases are concerned.
The municipal courts of a State have a duty to take judicial notice
of and give effect to international law, and this duty requires the
courts to nullify the unauthorized abductions by the State and to order
the return of the abducted individual to his refuge State. The courts'
exercise of jurisdiction over such individual not only amounts to a
failure to give effect to international law but also constitutes an ap-
proval, sanction, and effectuation of the State's original violation of
international law.
When a violation of international law has in fact been committed,
the offending nation (and its courts) must take such measures as ap-
propriate to correct its wrongs, including measures of restitution. If
courts fail to do so, they take advantage of that violation and thereby
commit another wrong under international law. In forcible abduction
cases, the abducting State, particularly through its court system, has
the opportunity to redress its violation by restoring the situation to its
prior status - e.g., by returning the abducted individual to the State
where he was removed. As Mann pointed out, "the return of the abduc-
ted person does not eliminate the initial wrong (as is shown by the fact
that a claim for damages may be pursued by the injured State even
after the return), [but] the failure to comply with a request for the re-
turn of the abducted person is a separate wrong which is quite inde-
pendent of the original one.""9 The word "request," however, should
be understood to include the requirement of international law to re-
turn and to make other reparations, not merely a demand made by the
offended State.
The State whose private citizens or unauthorized officials have
abducted an individual in a foreign country is also under an obligation
possibly to punish or extradite the abductors, even if it is not directly
responsible for the private act of abduction itself unless and until it
adopts, ratifies, or otherwise bears the fruits of such "private" abduc-
tion. When the State takes advantage of an unauthorized private ab-
duction, the difference between a Government-sponsored abduction and
a non-Government-sponsored abduction becomes irrelevant, and in
either case the offending State bears its international responsibilities
virtually at the same level.
While the act of abduction itself is an exercise of the abducting
197. Id. at 411.
VOL. 23:1
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPREHENSION
State's jurisdiction in the territory of another State - an apparently
illegal act under international law - the subjection of the individual
thus abducted to the laws and proceedings of the abducting State con-
stitutes a continuation of this invalid extention of its jurisdiction, as
well as a continuation of its infringement upon the territorial sover-
eignty of the latter State.
The jurisdiction of the courts of the abducting State is no broader
than that of their State itself. Since the abducting State does not have
the competence and jurisdiction necessary to abduct an individual
abroad and to subject him to laws and proceedings through such
means, its municipal courts do not possess the competence and juris-
diction necessary to try the individual following his abduction either.
Finally, and most importantly, no rights flow from an illegal act.
The maxim ex injuria jus non oritur should be the governing principle
such that no illegal act may bear the fruit of advantages gained by
means of illegality. If abduction is ab initio illegal, null, and void un-
der international law, no alleged subsequent "right" deriving from the
act of abduction can be legally established and exercised under inter-
national law. The illegality of the prior act of abduction renders all
subsequent acts of trial and prosecution unlawful, defective, and inval-
id as well.
The duty of a court to order the return of an abducted individual
and to divest itself of jurisdiction is not premised upon the existence of
the offended State's protest or demand for reparation. The proposition
that the court should divest itself of jurisdiction where the injured na-
tion protests or demands is a more rational and progressive one than
the proposition that insists upon the court's "right" to exercise jurisdic-
tion, irrespective of the mode of the accused's apprehension even if the
offended State protests and demands for his release. The first propo-
sition, however, is still a step away from the logical conclusion of the
maxim ex injuria jus non oritur that illegal abduction does not give
rise to the right to exercise jurisdiction irrespective of whether the
offended nation protests against the abduction and/or requests for the
release of the abductee.
The offended State's protests or express demands for the return of
the abducted individual are declaratory of the illegal nature of forcible
or fraudulent abduction and serve to intensify the existing duty of the
courts of the abducting State to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over the abducted individual. While it is advisable that the offended
State should always protest any and all abduction activity in its terri-
tory, such protests or demands are certainly not required for the courts
of the offending State to carry out the duty to divest themselves of
jurisdiction and to order the return of the individual concerned.
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The countries of Eastern Europe are undergoing the nearly impos-
sible task of attempting to right some of the wrongs brought about by
more than forty years of communist rule and domination. Although
"decommunization"1 has taken different forms in the various countries
involved, there are several core issues that will need to be addressed
by each of these newly formed governments: (1) What should be done
about private property that had been confiscated by communist (and/or
Nazi) authorities?; (2) What does the citizenry have a right to know
about the contents of secret government files?; (3) How, and to what
extent, should government institutions and certain occupations "purge"
themselves of communist influence and personnel?; (4) Under what cir-
cumstances should officials and officers of the former communist re-
gimes be brought to trial?; and finally, (5) How should victims of the
various communist regimes be rehabilitated and what means of resti-
tution, if any, should be offered?
To date, the steps to address these questions have been uncertain,
piecemeal, and halting at best.2 In one East European country after
another, it is not clear who or what is driving decommunization, how
far it will go, or what it is seeking to accomplish. Moreover, there is a
rising concern that, rather than seeking to achieve some measure of
justice or to redress some egregious wrongs from the past, much of
what is passed off as decommunization is little more than an attempt
to find a few convenient scapegoats or the carrying out of personal or
political vendettas.
Nevertheless, many Eastern European countries already have
achieved greater success in coming to terms with the wrongs and hor-
rors of the past than other countries that have made similar efforts.
* Professor of Political Science, Purdue University; Ph.D., University of Michi-
gan, 1985; J.D., Villanova University, 1977.
1. The process of attempting to remove the elements of a formerly repressive
regime has gone under different names, depending on the circumstances involved.
For example, following World War II, Italy went through a period of defascistization.
In the 1970s, Greece pursued a policy of dejuntafication, and so on. The current
undertakings in Eastern Europe have been called both decommunization and
debolshevization.
2. Eastern Europe's Past: The Complexities of Justice, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21,
1992, at 21.
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There are several reasons for this. For instance, most people in these
Eastern European countries desperately wanted to see the fall and
dismantling of their communist governments. While this phenomenon
is not much different from what has occurred in a number of other
newly democratized countries, what does distinguish the situation in
Eastern Europe is the fact that the military and secret police have
lacked the power to resist such change even if they had been of the
mind to do so. Because of this, the generalized fear of retaliation that
continues to inhibit some other attempts at democratization, such as in
Nicaragua, has not proven to be a major problem in Eastern Europe.
This does not mean that decommunization will necessarily pro-
ceed smoothly, or that it will even begin to uncover the sins of prior
regimes or make restitution to their victims. For one thing, communist
rule was so complete, and continued for so long, that few, if any, as-
pects of the governing apparatus were not dominated by it, including
the judiciary. As a result, there is a basic problem of finding individu-
als qualified - professionally and, more importantly, politically - to
pass judgment on the actions and policies of communist rule.3
Related to this is the inability to escape the duplicity that marked
communist rule. As decommunization inexorably proceeds, and as the
crimes of the past are uncovered, the distinction between friend and
enemy becomes even more blurred than it had been previously. Almost
daily there are new revelations that many who previously were
thought to be the staunchest foes of communist rule, in some way,
found it necessary or politically expedient to collaborate with it in-
stead.4 Beyond this, scores of individuals have now come to the real-
ization that even those thought to be their closest associates were
really anything but this. What makes decommunization so bizarre and
so unsettling, however, is that it is by no means certain whether such
"revelations" really are what they purport to be. In short, it is politics
as usual - or is it? From a societal point of view, these daily occur-
rences have engendered a cynicism that will make decommunization
difficult if not impossible to achieve. The question truly becomes
whether anyone can be trusted?
Another legacy of communism is the notion that there is only one
"correct way" to go about changing the system, which has always been
orchestrated through the governing apparatus. Despite the ostensible
3. One country that seems to have been able to accommodate those needs has
been Poland, which essentially has been purging the judiciary for nearly a decade.
Stanislaw Frankowski, The Independence of the Judiciary in Poland: Reflections on
Andrzej Rzeplinski's Sadownictwo W Poisce Ludowej (The Judiciary in Peoples' Po-
land (1989)), 8 ARIZ. J. INTL & CoMP. L. 33 (1991); Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, Toward
an Independent Judiciary, REP. E. EUR., Sept. 14, 1990, at 28.
4. John Tagliabue, Eastern German is Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at
A5; John Tagliabue, Eastern German Quits Over Link to War Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1992, at A7.
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rejection of the communist system and its values, the new East Euro-
pean governments will have some difficulty accommodating themselves
to any kind of pluralistic political system. Added to this are the previ-
ously submerged rivalries between different ethnic factions in various
parts of Eastern Europe that threaten to engulf the entire region,
including, most notably, the ongoing genocide in the former Yugosla-
via.
All of the East European countries are poor; some, like Romania,
are desperately poor. This raises the question of whether a country can
pursue both democracy and justice at the same time. Several newly
democratized governments in this similar situation, such as the Latin
American countries, have taken the position that trade-offs have to be
made between the two, and often the pursuit of justice has been made
subservient to the goal of constructing a democratic society.5 Whether
these two ends really are in conflict is open to debate. More important-
ly, perhaps, is the perception that justice is backward-looking, whereas
democracy focuses on creating a better future.
The biggest hurdle of all to decommunization may be the inexora-
ble return of the former communists to power under the banner of
various socialist parties.6  The quintessential question is whether the
decommunization efforts that have taken place will stay, or possibly
continue, when those being investigated for past crimes continue to
hold some levels of power.
Although certainly unique in their own way, the present transfor-
mations in Eastern Europe are not unprecedented.7 Thus, it might be
useful to understand how other societies have undertaken to examine
their own pasts and with what results. Part II of this article uses sev-
eral examples to examine this issue: the treatment of Confederate
officials following the American Civil War; denazification after World
War II and comparable efforts in Japan; the overthrow of dictatorships
in Spain, Portugal, and Greece during the 1970s; democratization in
5. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Mark Gibney, The Imple-
mentation of Human Rights as an International Concern: The Case of Argentine
General Suarez-Mason and Lessons for the World Community, 24 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 165 (1992).
6. A.M. Rosenthal, So Back Come the Appartchiks in Eastern Europe, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 10, 1994 (commenting on the strong electoral showings of former
communists in nearly all of the eastern bloc countries as well as the former Soviet
republics).
7. See generally GUILLERMO A. O'DONNELL ET AL., TRANSITION FROM AUTHOR-
iTARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (1986); STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR
PARDON?, Papers and Report of the Conference of Nov. 4-6, 1988 (1989); U.N.
ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, 32nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1985),
Study on amnesty laws and their role in the safeguard and promotion of human
rights, 38th sess. (preliminary report by Mr. Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur).
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Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile; and finally, similar problems
currently being faced in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa.
Part III provides an overview of the decommunization efforts that
have taken place in Eastern Europe to date, as well as those that are
likely to occur in the future. The problem in attempting to catalog
these events is that they change almost daily. Thus, more attention
will be given to overall trends rather than particular events. Finally,
Part IV takes a step back and asks what goals decommunization ought
to have as well as the proper means of achieving these objectives. The
new governments need to establish the truth about the nature of com-
munist rule. While it is important to prosecute those responsible for
past crimes, as well as to indemnify those who suffered the most under
the old order, it is even more vital for these governments to recognize
the social, moral, political and personal disintegration that was the
most devastating aspect of communist rule.' Perhaps the most impor-
tant objective that decommunization ought to work towards is first to
acknowledge and attempt to understand the past, and then to begin a
process of healing in these ravaged societies.
II. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES
A. An American Dilemma: Settling Accounts with the Confederacy
Nearly 130 years ago the United States government faced a situa-
tion with certain parallels to what Eastern European countries now
face: namely, how to deal with former officials of the overthrown Con-
federate regime. As we will see, many of the same conflicts that were
largely responsible for the war itself continued to play out through Re-
construction. In addition, the question of the appropriate policy to
follow with former Confederate officials brought about severely
strained relations between Congress and the Executive, eventually
culminating in the unsuccessful effort to impeach and remove Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson from office. Finally, and with decided parallels
with the nomenklatura in several Eastern European countries such as
Romania and Bulgaria, the Confederacy example shows just how in-
tractable the old guard can be, even after a devastating military de-
feat. A short time after the end of the Civil War, it was politics as
usual in the South as many former Confederate officials eventually
took their "rightful" place at the seat of power. Those who were victims
of the old regime, Southern blacks in particular, soon found themselves
in positions that were no better than those that had existed prior to
the war, and some which were arguably worse.
The first attempt to address the treatment of Confederate officials
after the civil conflict was over was made by President Abraham Lin-
8. For an excellent account of the relationship between political and personal
disintegration in Eastern Europe, see IvAN KLIMA, JUDGE ON TRIAL (1993).
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coln midway through the war. On December 8, 1863, Lincoln issued a
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction that, subject to the ex-
ceptions listed below, set forth a plan to pardon former Confederate
officers who would take an oath to support "the Constitution of the
United States and the Union of the States thereunder."' Those who
were ineligible for the pardon were officers in the Confederate army
and navy above the rank of colonel and lieutenant, respectively; those
who had resigned commissions in the United States and aided in the
rebellion; civil and diplomatic officers of the Confederacy; those who
had left judicial and congressional posts in the U.S. government to join
the Southern states; and those who had engaged in the mistreatment
of prisoners of war. ° The Proclamation also stated that when persons
equal in number to 1/10 of those who had voted in the presidential
election of 1860 had taken this oath and established an appropriate
government, such state government would be recognized."'
Congress was of a much different mind. The Wade-Davis bill that
made its way through both houses of Congress would have required a
majority of enrolled white citizens to take an oath to support the Con-
stitution before a convention to reconstitute the state government
could be called. 2 Moreover, in order to be a delegate or to vote for a
delegate to such a convention, one had to take what was called the
"ironclad oath" contained in the Act of July 2, 1862.1" The oath af-
firmed that the person had never voluntarily taken up arms against
the United States, given aid to persons in rebellion, or exercised the
functions of any office under the Confederacy. Moreover, under the
Wade-Davis legislation, those who in the future held office, civil or
military, except merely ministerial offices and military offices below
the grade of colonel in the Confederate army, were declared not to be
citizens of the United States." In explaining the rationale behind this
legislation, Representative Davis, one of the sponsors of this legisla-
tion, claimed that the war "has placed citizens of rebel states beyond
the protection of the Constitution, and that Congress has supreme
power over them as conquered enemies. ""
The Wade-Davis bill never became law because of a pocket veto
exercised by the President. In response to the restlessness in Congress,
on May 29, 1865, Lincoln issued a second Proclamation of Amnesty
and Reconstruction, saying that while he was unwilling to give formal
approval to the Wade-Davis legislation, he regarded the system set
9. JONATHON T. DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON
34 (1953).
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 36-37.
12. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CiviL WAR 19-20 (1961).
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forth in the bill "as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any
State choosing to adopt it.""6
Following Lincoln's assassination, the conflict on this issue be-
tween the President and the Congress only heightened. While Con-
gress was out of session, President Johnson attempted to enact a plan
that was far more lenient than that proposed by his predecessor. Rath-
er than requiring action by a majority of voters as the Wade-Davis bill
would have required, or adopting Lincoln's "ten percent" plan, Johnson
sought to re-admit a number of Southern states simply when "that
portion of the people ... who are loyal" had written a constitution.17
In addition, under a very generous pardon plan, among those now
considered "loyal" to the Union were former top officials in the Old
Confederacy. The generosity of Johnson's plan, but also the resistance
to change in the South, was exemplified by the 1865 congressional
elections. Among those elected to the 39th Congress were the Vice-
President of the Confederacy, four Confederate generals, five Confeder-
ate colonels, six Confederate cabinet officers, and fifty-eight Confeder-
ate congressmen."
Congress subsequently refused to seat these Southern delega-
tions. 9 The fight between the President and Congress continued.
Over a presidential veto, Congress passed the Act of March 2, 1867
granting freed blacks the franchise for the first time.2 ° Under this leg-
islation, the only whites allowed to vote were those who had taken the
"ironclad oath."2' Consequently, of the 1,363,000 registered voters in
the former Confederate states, 660,000 were white, and 703,400 were
black.22 For a brief period, blacks held government positions in the
South, although the extent of what has been termed "Negro rule" has
been greatly exaggerated. During his tenure in office, President
Johnson established liberal guidelines for issuing individual pardons.
In addition, Johnson proclaimed a number of general amnesties for
Confederate officials, the final one occurring on Christmas day of 1868,
that had the effect of pardoning nearly every former Confederate, in-
cluding the unrepentant Robert E. Lee.' Soon enough, the "new"
South began to resemble the old Confederacy. Federal authority over
the southern states was in large part withdrawn, and one immediate
result was greatly increased violence against freed blacks by such
"underground" organizations as the newly created Ku Klux Klan.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 30-31.
18. FRANKLIN, supra note 12, at 43.
19. Id. at 56.
20. Id. at 70.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 80.
23. Id. at 83.
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As early as 1871, only a few short years after the end of the Civil
War, reconstruction was in shambles. Blacks were now effectively
disenfranchised through intimidation and violence, despite the promis-
es of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In addition, the es-
tablishment of "black codes" actually increased the level of racial seg-
regation from what it had been previously and only worked to make
the plight of blacks that much worse.24 Finally, by the early 1870s,
former Confederates were firmly entrenched in power, politically as
well as economically. As historian John Hope Franklin has suggested,
the Civil War and the Reconstruction period actually brought about far
greater change to the North than it did to the South.'
In sum, within a short period of time after the Civil War, virtually
all efforts to prevent former Confederate officials from exercising politi-
cal power had failed. The ideal expressed in Lincoln's Second Inaugu-
ral Address, "with malice toward none, with charity for all," was never
realized. Instead, the continued influence of the rebels had been
achieved much more through intimidation, violence, and the exercise of
raw political power.
B. Post-World War II
1. Prosecuting Major German and Japanese War Criminals
The international proceedings against leading German and Japa-
nese officials after World War II also parallel the situation the Eastern
European Countries now face.2" Although the number of Axis leaders
convicted at Nuremberg and Tokyo was relatively small,27 these trials
were vital in at least two respects. The first was that these guilty
verdicts established under international law the principle that the
leaders of a nation could be held accountable to the world community
for their actions. John Appleman writes that
[tihis was the first time that those in command of a nation's desti-
nies have been called to general account. True, there have been
isolated instances where losing leaders have been exiled or slain,
but these were the price of defeat, not lawlessness. Henceforth, no
leader can initiate or wage war with impunity. It is no longer his
victory if he succeeds and the nation's loss if he loses. He may be
called to personal account in future tribunals.'
24. For a more extended treatment of this subject, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966).
25. FRANKLIN, supra note 12, at 226.
26. See generally ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATION-
AL LAW (1962); ARNOLD C. BRAcKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987).
27. There were 24 defendants at Nuremberg, 19 of whom were convicted, and 25
defendants at the Tokyo proceedings, all of whom were convicted.
28. JOHN A. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES vi.
(1954).
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A second principle established by the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) proceedings, one that was to play a central role in the subse-
quent trials of lower-ranking government and military officials, was
that the "superior orders" defense would not be upheld against the
charge of violating domestic or international law.'
Following the verdict at Nuremberg, a group of secondary leaders
was brought to trial for similar charges in what has been called the
"subsequent proceedings." 0 In addition, in both Europe and in the
Far East, the victorious Allied powers established military tribunals to
try persons charged with various war crimes. Although these military
trials were able to bring a substantial number of war criminals to
justice, vast numbers escaped prosecution. From his study of the Allied
military trials in the Far East, Philip Piccigallo concluded that over
ninety percent of those in the Japanese government and military who
could have been charged with war crimes ultimately escaped prosecu-
tion.31 Piccigallo attributes" this in large part to the inefficiency of the
prosecution and the lack of interest in such proceedings by the govern-
ing Allied powers. Moreover, attempts to prosecute war criminals soon
gave way to the political considerations of the Cold War.
Although the prosecution of Axis leaders for war crimes was an
important advance in international law, these trials are less relevant
to the present discussion than the larger, and more difficult, question
of how to treat the massive number of individuals who collaborated or
benefited from fascist rule. We turn first to denazification in the occu-
pied countries3 2 and then examine the problematic and puzzling ef-
forts in Germany and Japan.
2. Denazification in the Occupied Countries
In order to fully understand denazification in the countries that
had been occupied by the Nazis, it is first necessary to place these
events within the context in which they occurred. For the overwhelm-
ing majority of the citizens of the countries involved, occupation was a
terrifying experience. Government and social processes were totally
disrupted, property was confiscated or destroyed, thousands of inno-
cent people were killed in German reprisals, and large segments of the
29. For a further discussion of this issue, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF
'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1965).
30. There actually were 12 separate trials that went by different names: the
Medical case; the Milch case; the Justice case; the SS, Pohl case; the Flick case; the
Farben case; the Hostages case; the Rusha case; the Einsatzgruppen case; the Krupp
case; the Ministries case; and the High Command case.
31. PHILLIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES
OPERATIONS IN THE EAST 117 (1979).
32. Although the treatment of collaborationists was also an important issue in
the Pacific, particularly in the Philippines, much less is known about that phenome-
non. Thus, the focus will be on the actions of various European countries.
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native population were forced to support the Nazi war effort in one
form or another, partly perpetuated through mandatory conscription.
For various reasons, a sizable portion of the population in each of the
occupied countries collaborated with the enemy in some form or anoth-
er. Some attempted to benefit from the presence of the occupier, while
others apparently believed that collaboration was the only means of
surviving the war.
Liberation brought different responses. The most extreme form
occurred in France where members of the resistance took immediate
revenge against supporters of the Vichy government. Peter Novick
estimates that there were at least 4,500 summary executions in France
during the months after Liberation.33 Others have suggested much
higher numbers.' Such violence was rare in other European coun-
tries,35 although the desire to bring collaborators to justice was nearly
universal. One of the most extraordinary aspects of denazification was
its scope. Literally hundreds of thousands of people were imprisoned
for their actions during the war.36 For example, within two days after
being liberated from German rule, the makeshift Danish government
had arrested and interned over 22,000 suspected collaborators." Writ-
ing in 1948, Dutch law professor J.M. Van Bemmelen described the
substantial number of suspected collaborators who had been (or still
were) incarcerated for practices during the war.
In a small country such as Holland, about 100,000 people had been
put in prisons and prison camps after the liberation. A year and a
half later - in October 1946 - their number was still 50,000; in
January 1947 it was 33,000. Denmark had 10,871 political prison-
ers in April 1946 .... In France in January 1946 there were about
33. PETER NOVICK, THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF COLLABORA-
TORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE 71 (1968). This is not meant to suggest that vigilante
justice was the norm. During the course of denazification, more than 100,000 French
were brought to trial for their collaborationist activities. Id. at 153. In addition, of
the nearly one million civil servants, 11,343 received some form of sanction for their
wartime activities, and more than 5,000 were removed from office. Id. at 90. For
other accounts of denazification in France, see HERBERT R. LOTTMAN, THE PURGE
(1986); JULES Roy, THE TRIAL OF MARSHAL PETAIN (1967).
34. For example, Robert Aron has put this figure at 40,000. Roy C. Macridis,
France: From Vichy to the Fourth Republic, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY:
COPING WITH THE LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM 161, 171
(John Herz, ed. 1982) [hereinafter Herz].
35. There is an enormous amount of variation in the numbers purportedly killed
by resistance forces. For example, the office of the Italian Ministry of the Interior
has put the number at 1,732, while neo-Fascists have claimed more than 300,000
summarily executed. Giuseppe Di Palma, Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist?,
in Herz, supra note 34, at 107, 133.
36. Roy Macridis estimates that in France more than 400,000 individuals were
directly affected by denazification. Macridis, supra note 34, at 172.
37. Carl C. Givskov, The Danish 'Purge-Laws,' 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
447, 448 (1948).
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38,000 political prisoners .... In Belgium 44,000 people had been
deprived of their freedom after the liberation .... In Norway
25,000 out of 60,000 members of the Quisling-Movement (Nasjional
Samlung) had been arrested; in January 1946, 16,000 were still in-
terned. If political prisoners in Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and other countries are included, it
becomes evident that more than a million people are now in prisons
and prison camps for political offences.'
Several features of denazification should be of interest to present
efforts in Eastern Europe. One was the near-universal abandonment of
the principle nulla poena sine lege in order to be able to charge collabo-
rators after the war for actions that had not been criminal at the time
they were committed during the war. The rationale commonly em-
ployed was that the occupation itself precluded the passage of laws
against collaborating with the enemy. In addition, several countries re-
instituted the death penalty for collaborationist activities,3 9 although
relatively few individuals were executed.
Another noteworthy feature of denazification in the occupied coun-
tries was its quasi-criminal nature. For example, one of the more com-
mon charges of collaborationist activity in France was that of "national
indignity,"4 described in National Assembly debate as a "state en-
tered into" by one who "directly or indirectly, voluntarily aided Germa-
ny or her allies, or harmed the unity of the nation or the liberty and
equality of Frenchmen."41 Moreover, one's presence in this state was
to be "declared," not by a judicial body as such but by a "jury
d'honneur."42 In Denmark, a similar concept was expressed in the no-
tion of the "loss of common confidence."43 This entailed losing one's
political and civil rights and was originally done in a separate proceed-
ing following criminal prosecution. In Belgium, such individuals were
called "inciviques," and the "crime" they were accused of committing as
well as its consequences have been described in these terms:
38. Jacob Maarten van Bemmelen, The Treatment of Political Delinquents in
Some European Countries, 1 J. CRIM. SCI. 110 (1948).
39. In Norway, where the last death sentence had been carried out in 1876,
capital punishment was decreed by the Royal Ordinance of October 3, 1941. The
Dutch government-in-exile decided to re-introduce the death penalty on December 22,
1943, although this was not announced publicly until September 1944, when the first
Dutch territory was liberated. In Denmark, where there was no exile government,
capital punishment for treasonous acts going back to the beginning of the German
occupation was introduced by a law on June 1, 1945. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 210.
40. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 146.
42. Id.
43. Givskov, supra note 37, at 452.
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Both the government and the people feel that some punishment
should be given to those whose conduct during the occupation was
not what it should have been. For instance, all those who, without
being guilty, cannot be called innocent will, on a simple notification
of the public prosecutor, lose their vote, their right to engage in
certain professions, and so on. Those who feel they have been un-
justly penalized can appeal to the tribunals unless their cases have
already been examined by the commissions. Those who are thus
penalized will be able to request their rehabilitation and the recov-
ery of their rights in ten years' time."
As suggested above, collaborators were subjected to a number of
penalties. In addition to the more common form of criminal sanctions
- death, prison, fines and so forth - large numbers of individuals
also had their property confiscated and their civil and political rights
taken away.4' In addition, individuals could also be "purged" from
certain occupations, particularly those in government service, for their
wartime activities."" One of the most difficult situations involved the
judiciary. On the one hand, there was a desperate need for judicial
personnel to deal with the enormous number of collaborationist cases
and disputes engendered by the war, such as property confiscation. On
the other hand, in several countries, France and Holland in particular,
there was a deep-seated feeling that most judges had generally cooper-
ated with the Nazis. In France, for example, judges in the occupied
territories were required to take a special oath of loyalty to the "chef
d'etat."47 All but one judge in Vichy France had done so." Because of
this situation, only judges who had displayed an unusual enthusiasm
in carrying out the Nazi plans were purged from their position."
44. Pierre Vermeylen, The Punishment of Collaborators, 247 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SC. 73, 77 (Sept. 1946).
45. In Holland, those who had been members of certain German-sponsored mili-
tary and police organizations were judged to have entered the service of a foreign
power and were consequently deprived of their Dutch citizenship. NOVICK, supra note
33, at 212. In addition, the post-war Dutch government seemed most accepting of
vigilante justice aimed at the collaborators. HENRY L. MASON, THE PURGE OF THE
DUTCH QUISLINGS: EMERGENCY JUSTICE IN THE NETHERLANDS (1952).
46. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 79.
47. Id. at 84. In Holland, there was an attempt to purge judges who had either
1) shown themselves unfaithful to the Kingdom or the Crown, 2) had shown a
National Socialist state of mind by their conduct or utterances, or 3) had seriously
failed in the task during occupation, in a manner harmful to the Dutch judicature.
MASON, supra note 45, at 93. However, the purge was never completed and a settle-
ment was reached under the direction of Dr. Donner, who had resigned during the
occupation. Id. at 96-97.
48. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 84.
49. Id. at 87. On the other hand, the purge of the National Parliament was
much more complete. All those who had voted in favor of delegating all constituent
power to Marshall Petain on July 10, 1940 - 569 representatives total - were
purged from serving in this or any other political office.
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Despite the initial zeal for denazification in the formerly occupied
countries, most programs were terminated rather quickly. One reason
was the enormity of the task involved and the lack of adequate re-
sources and personnel with which to carry it out. In addition,
denazification did little to rebuild these devastated societies, and many
believed it detracted from such efforts. As a consequence, within a
relatively short period of time, nearly all of the sentences that had
been handed out were reduced, in some cases rather severely.' The
same was true for many of those who had been purged or had their po-
litical and civil rights restricted. Frederick Engelmann's description of
denazification in Austria, "uneven, formalistic, and quite brief,"5" was
essentially true in every other European country as well.
To see denazification in the occupied countries as a complete fail-
ure, however, would be a mistake. Virtually all of those who had col-
laborated with the enemy during the war were somehow called to task
for such actions. Moreover, thousands of individuals were fined, im-
prisoned, or had their property confiscated. Still others either had
their civil and political rights curtailed for a time, were removed from
their occupations, or else suffered some form of public acknowledgment
of their wartime activities. The larger significance of these efforts was
to somehow make public account of those "whose conduct during the
occupation was not what it should have been." In this respect,
denazification in the occupied countries had at least some measure of
success.
These efforts, however, failed to discern and understand some of
the larger truths about the occupation, and these facts, unfortunately,
still have not been confronted or addressed. Nowhere is this more
evident than in France. Although retribution against particular indi-
viduals was fairly common after the war,52 the French people have
never truly come to understand the nature of Vichy France. Instead,
the societal-wide conspiracy of silence that assisted in Nazi atrocities
during the war still exists today.' The recent prosecution and convic-
50. For example, Novick wrote that although nearly 40,000 persons were initially
imprisoned for collaborating with the Vichy government, this number had been
reduced to 13,000 by December 1948, 8,000 by October 1949, and under 4,000 by
early 1951. That year the first important Amnesty Law was passed. The result was
that the overwhelming majority of collaborationists only served a fraction of their
original sentence. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 187, 188. France is not the exception;
the same phenomenon occurred in the other occupied countries as well.
51. Frederick C. Engelmann, How Austria Has Coped with Two Dictatorial Leg-
acies, in Herz, supra note 34, at 135, 144.
52. See supra notes 33-36, 40-42, 49-50 and accompanying text.
53. Between 1942 and 1944, more than 76,000 French and foreign Jews were de-
ported to Germany. Most of these individuals were arrested by French police on
orders of French officials and were carried on French trains for delivery at the
German border. Alan Riding, The Painful Past Still Eludes France, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1993, at E4.
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tion of Paul Touvier may reverse this trend. As Ted Morgan reported
on the trial,
[t]he importance of the trial was that it presented the French past
as it really was, so that the nation had to face up to it, and to pass
it on to future generations. It became clearer than ever before how
the Milice [neo-Nazi police force] became a criminal enterprise and
how it conducted the roundups of Jews that were a part of the
Final Solution."
3. Denazification in Germany
Denazification in Germany occurred in two phases, each with
different aims and approaches. The first was under Allied control,
where an attempt was made to prosecute leading war criminals55 and
also to purge those in administrative positions who had most zealously
pushed the Nazi ideology. The second phase occurred under the direc-
tion and control of German authorities and attempted to pass judg-
ment on the wartime activities of the entire German population.'
Given the scope and ambiguous nature of this aspect of denazification,
its near total failure is by no means surprising. To begin to accomplish
this impossible task, questionnaires were sent to all Germans. 7 From
the answers provided, individuals were placed into one of five catego-
ries: major offender, offender, lesser offender, follower, and exonerat-
ed." After being categorized by a prosecutor, the defendant had to
deal with the local boards, or spruchkammem. If a defendant thought
that the categorization was incorrect, the burden was on the defendant
to prove it. 9 Yet, this ignores how relatively easy denazification was
for the overwhelming majority of Germans, including tens of thousands
of individuals who were in fact war criminals.
For instance, due to a lack of personnel, all individuals were auto-
matically categorized as "followers"' unless a person was actually
incriminated by himself or by someone else. This was rare, though,
due to the so-called "witnesses strike" and the recurrent claims of
"victor's justice." Even when denazification did seem to work, its effects
were short-lived."1 Amendments to the Liberation Law, as well as the
54. Ted Morgan, The Hidden Henchman, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 22, 1994, at 78.
55. See generally part II(B)(1) of this text.
56. For a discussion of these efforts, see Fritz Weinschenk, Nazis Before German
Courts: The West German War Crimes Trials, 10 INTL LAW. 515 (1976).
57. John Herz, Denaziftcation and Related Policies, in Herz, supra note 34, at
26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id.
61. The same phenomena occurred in post-war Italy. Di Palma writes that
[d]espite defascistization, the old administrative class remained in place.
Judicial applications of the purge decrees and a final amnesty adopted
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final amnesties in 1947 and 1948, allowed almost every case of major
offenders to be downgraded to the category of "follower.' 2 Moreover,
as Ingo Muller has recently shown, within a relatively short period of
time after the Germans took control over "denazification," former Nazis
actually fared better than those who had resisted the regime. Among
other things, under "Law 131" a perverse quota system was estab-
lished that actually gave preference for such things as jobs to former
Nazis and removed from office those who had resisted Nazi rule. Mul-
ler writes that
tihere was a general sense of relief at being rid of the unpopular
"de-Nazifiers." Only a minority of them found other work quickly;
two thirds remained dependent for a long time on welfare and
unemployment benefits. The exclusion of these outsiders, who could
have provided a counterweight in the government agencies of the
postwar period, accelerated the process of re-Nazification that was
to have a profound effect on the development of democracy in West
Germany. The few experienced public servants without an incrimi-
nating past, who were needed so urgently, were now considered to
have "incriminated" themselves by supporting de-Nazification; in
the early years of the Federal Republic, this was a far worse stigma
than to have been a National Socialist.'
How effective was German denazification? John Herz, perhaps the
most astute scholar of this phenomenon, has described the limited
goals and achievements of this policy as
at best barring certain persons temporarily from positions of influ-
ence rather than providing for their indefinite or long-term inel-
igibility to serve in such positions. In the economic field, the same
was true of the confiscations of property, which were restored fol-
lowing the downgrading or the exoneration of owners; confiscations
based on the verdicts of tribunals were extremely rare, notably, in
the case of industrialists or other major owners . . . .' The result
of both denazification and the prosecution (or nonprosecution) of
Nazi criminality may be summed up as follows: The top elite of the
Nazi regime, small in numbers, was eliminated (or eliminated itself
through suicide, flight abroad, and so on); most of the collaboration-
in February 1948 resulted in the fact that most of the 1,879 civil ser-
vants who had been dismissed . .. and the 671 who had been compul-
sorily retired were reinstated. Similarly, the whole process of confiscat-
ing the illicit gains of Fascist profiteers and of purging compromised
business leaders came close to naught. As to Fascist criminals, the justi-
fied restraint shown in the early legal proceedings turned, as the war
faded into the background, into a veritable travesty of prosecution ....
Guiseppe Di Palma, Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist? in Herz, supra note
34, at 122.
62. Id. at 28.
63. INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 203-4
(Deborah Lucas Schneider, trans., 1991).
64. Herz, in Herz, supra note 34, at 29.
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ist elite, in administration, justice, education, the economy, re-
mained in or reentered positions held under the Nazi regime.'
A good part of the blame for the failure of denazification rests
with the Allied forces. A short time after German authorities took con-
trol over the process, it should have been apparent that little would be
accomplished given its unsystematic nature. Although the various
military governments did urge greater efforts to bring Nazi officials to
trial," little else was done. Moreover, with the advent of the Cold
War, Allied officials, such as U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy,
actually pushed for the cessation of denazification. Notwithstanding
these shortcomings, however, a good part of the blame for the failure of
denazification rests with the Germans themselves. 7 In fact, some,
such as John Appleman, have suggested that Germany's half-hearted
attempt at denazification demonstrates that the rise of Nazism was no
accident:
It became apparent that Nazism was not a matter imposed upon a
people by the dictates of one man - but a militaristic spirit alive in
Germany at its roots and all too often affecting the men in charge
of such denazification tribunals or in positions of political power.'
4. Post-War Japan
Germany's minimal interest in removing Axis officials was mir-
rored by its wartime ally Japan. While the IMT proceedings and other
Allied Military Commission trials successfully brought some Japanese
officials and military personnel to justice, these trials touched only a
small percentage of Japanese war criminals."9 Notwithstanding this
fact, the Japanese government never undertook any investigation on
its own to uncover and punish other atrocities committed by its nation-
als during the war.7"
In addition to these military commission trials, the occupying
forces attempted to institute purges of those who had been "active
exponents of militarism and militant nationalism."7 The Allies en-
joyed very little success in this endeavor. Although screening commis-
65. Id. at 30.
66. See generally JAMES F. TRENT, MISSION ON THE RHINE: REEDUCATION AND
DENAZIFICATION IN AMERICAN-OCCUPIED GERMANY (1982).
67. It should be noted that while the Germans were far more successful in in-
demnifying those who had property destroyed, they were far less successful - or
interested - in compensating those who suffered through the horrors of the Holo-
caust. On this latter point, see BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH
FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST FOR COMPENSATION (1979).
68. APPLEMAN, supra note 28, at 358.
69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
71. Arthur E. Tiedemnan, Japan Sheds Dictatorship, in Herz, supra note 34, at
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sions examined over two million questionnaires, only one-tenth of the
respondents (202,000) were actually purged.72 Moreover, the vast ma-
jority of these individuals were provisionally purged, meaning that
they were not removed from office. Consider the fact that only 830 out
of 42,251 officials who served in the Japanese bureaucracy during the
war were ever removed from office in the period following the war.73
In addition, the few who were purged invariably were replaced by their
former proteges.74
As in Germany, the attempt to rid the society of those responsible
for the war soon came to a halt. Not only were the Japanese them-
selves apparently not interested, but with the advent of the Cold War
neither were Allied officials. In February 1949, the Japanese govern-
ment began to "depurge" certain officials.75 By 1952, when Japan had
fully regained its sovereignty, only 8710 purgees out of the original
202,000 still remained in that status."6 The remaining individuals
were eventually pardoned.77
Aside from the treatment of individuals who committed crimes
against humanity, there is also the more important question of having
the Japanese people publicly acknowledge the war crimes they collec-
tively committed. In this sense, Japan and Germany offer stark con-
trasts. While there is little doubt that the vast majority of Nazi sympa-
thizers suffered very little recrimination or punishment," there is no
question that the German people have in some way addressed the
unspeakable crimes that their nation committed. One example of this
is the reparations payments made by the German government to vic-
tims of Nazi rule.79
The same cannot be said of the Japanese government or the Japa-
nese people." In fact, there has been scant acknowledgment of any of
the atrocities committed before or during World War II."' Only very




76. Id. at 202.
77. Id.
78. See generally part II(B)(3) of this text.
79. But see FERENCZ, supra note 67 (arguing that the government and private
corporations actively resisted indemnification).
80. For a fascinating discussion comparing and contrasting German and Japanese
reactions to the war, see IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR
IN GERMANY AND JAPAN (1994).
81. An interesting case involves the legal challenge by Saburo legaga, who
brought suit nearly 30 years ago challenging the actions of the Education Ministry
in censoring his accounts of Japanese wartime atrocities. In a decision handed down
earlier in 1993, the Japanese Supreme Court sided with the government in banning
Mr. lenaga's textbooks from use in schools. David Sanger, A Stickler for History,
Even if It's Not Very Pretty, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at A4.
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recently, for example, has the Japanese government even acknowl-
edged the fact that it forced thousands of foreign women to serve as
prostitutes for Japanese forces, 2 and after facing mounting interna-
tional pressure the Japanese government finally agreed to pay repara-
tions to the countries involved (but, inexplicably, not to the victims).'
In terms of the panoply of other war crimes - the fact that 20 million
people died in the Pacific war; the attempt to eradicate the Korean
language and culture; the rapes and killings in Janjing; and the star-
vation of over two million Vietnamese civilians8 - the Japanese gov-
ernment has been silent. One of the very few admissions of Japanese
wrongdoing was made by Prime Minister Morihior Hosokawa, who
personally admitted that the war was "wrong."' Now, the larger soci-
ety should make the same acknowledgment, and the Japanese govern-
ment should begin to pay homage and reparations to those who suf-
fered from Japanese wartime atrocities.
C. Transitions in the 1970s: Spain, Portugal and Greece
We now turn our attention to democratization efforts in other
settings, and in other times and places as well. The link between the
old and the new is Spain. Although an integral part of the Fascist
movement from the period before World War II, defascistization as
such did not come to Spain until Franco's death in 1975. It would be a
mistake, however, to view this year as a watershed. Instead, Spain
was well on its way toward democracy before this time. By the same
token, elements of the old regime continued to hold political power
after this time as well. In a sense, then, defascistization in Spain was
more of a gradual process, rather than the result of concerted govern-
mental policies." In short, unlike virtually every other country that
we will examine, there were no attempts at purges, no trials of former
government officials, and no land confiscation. Instead, there was a
quiet transformation from dictatorship to democracy.
In 1974, Portugal emerged from forty-six years of authoritarian
rule. Unlike the transition to democracy in Spain, the break with the
past in Portugal was both sudden and complete.87 Although the new
82. David Sanger, Japan Admits It Ran Army Brothels During War, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1993, at Al.
83. Andrew Pollack, Japan to Offer Reparations for Wartime Brothel Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1993, at Al.
84. Japan's Other War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, at E20. There also is
the question of whether those who suffered from Japanese brutality during the war
could bring a cause of action at this time. In January 1994, eight Dutch citizens -
some prisoners of war, civilian internees, as well as a woman forced into a Japanese
brothel - brought such a suit. Eight Dutch Citizens Sue Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1994, at A4.
85. James Sterngold, Admitting Guilt for the War: An Outraged Dissent, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at A2.
86. Edward Malefakis, Spain and Its Francoist Heritage, in Herz, supra note 34.
87. Kenneth Maxwell, The Emergence of Portugese Democracy, in Herz, supra
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regime went about purging some elements of both the left and the
right, it ultimately accomplished something far greater: a social revolu-
tion." In the south, landless workers seized the great estates and
established collective and cooperative farms." Most of the large in-
dustrial enterprises and banking and insurance businesses were na-
tionalized.' Portugal also abandoned its colonial claims in Africa.91
In short, the country emerged from the democratization process a
much different country than it had been previously.
The year 1974 also marked the return to democratic rule in
Greece after the seven-year dictatorship of George Papadopoulos (1967-
73) and Demetrios Ioannides (1973-74). Like the situation in Portugal,
the transition was engineered by a coup, in this case in the wake of
the regime's disastrous policy in Cyprus. This, however, is where the
two processes diverge. In a compromise between military officers and
political officials, the decision was made to turn power over to the
exiled former premier Constantine Karamanlis.9 2 Karamanlis moved
quickly against the old regime. He immediately released all political
prisoners and amnestied all political offenses (except those relating to
the rule of the colonels).9' In addition, all general secretaries of the
ministries and all prefects who held power under the junta were dis-
missed immediately." This was soon extended to all agencies, organi-
zations, and corporations operating under public law.95 All told, some
108,000 civil servants and other officials had been dismissed, trans-
ferred, or otherwise disciplined by mid-January 1975.
Karamanlis called for parliamentary elections for November, 1974,
less than four months after the removal of the dictatorship. Embold-
ened by a strong electoral showing, Karamanlis' regime then proceeded
to move against senior military officials, selectively retiring and trans-
ferring those who had been a part of the old order.97 The new govern-
ment also started to prosecute and purge four groups: 1) those involved
in the 1967 coup, 2) those responsible for the killings during the Poly-
technic University uprising of November 1973, 3) those responsible for
committing torture, and 4) those responsible for the coup in Cyprus.
Harry Psomiades writes of the prosecution of the former dictators that
note 34.




92. Harry J. Psomiades, Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy, in Herz,
supra note 34, at 251-274.




97. Id. at 262.
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[t]he trials, which received widespread radio, television, and press
coverage, served to demystify the dictatorship. The trials made
possible the exposure of seven years of maladministration, repres-
sion, scandal, corruption, and conspiracies and depicted a regime
much worse than even the military had imagined. The details of
torture, particularly of distinguished senior military officers by
subordinates, were most offensive to the professional officer class.
The statements and the demeanor of the accused revealed to many
their pettiness and their incompetence and destroyed within sec-
onds the military image of the strong man. The trials exposed the
"supermen" without their clothes, and what the public and the
officer corps saw, they did not like."
Still, the trial that aroused the most emotion in the country was the
first Military Police torture trial. Psomiades offers this analysis. "Trial
testimony offered a detailed picture of the junta's system of torture
and conclusive evidence that torture was practiced in a systematic way
in order to perpetuate the junta's control. It dramatized the system's
degrading effects on victims and torturers.P
Democratization in Spain, Portugal, and Greece occurred in mark-
edly different ways. In Spain, the process was quite gradual, and it
eventually became difficult to determine what was from the old order
or the new. In contrast, democratization in both Portugal and Greece
began quite suddenly, and both brought about far greater societal
change. Although Portugal experienced some purging, it is noteworthy
that it was aimed at elements of both the left and the right. In addi-
tion, far more attention was given to transforming the old order than
to examining its misdeeds. In contrast, the democratization that oc-
curred in Greece was not only more concerned with removing the ves-
tiges and the personnel of the dictatorship, it also sought to create a
national catharsis by publicly exposing the horrors of the colonels' rule.
D. Democratization in Latin America
Efforts by several Latin American countries - Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina, and Chile1" - to address the horrors of the past have oc-
curred with some form of logical progression. In Brazil, the govern-
ment made every attempt to seal off the crimes of the past, but it was
ultimately unsuccessful. Still, no prosecutions or purges occurred, even
98. Id. at 264.
99. Id.
100. Other countries in this region are also experiencing various forms of democ-
ratization, and they also have been faced with the situation of addressing crimes
from the past. One unique situation has occurred in Paraguay where Martin
Almada, a Paraguayan lawyer and teacher who was repeatedly tortured by soldiers
during the reign of General Stroessner, is attempting to lead an effort to bring the
perpetrators to justice. Isabel Vincent, Terror leaves a paper trail, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), June 19, 1993, at Al.
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when the perpetrators were known publicly. In Uruguay, the question
whether to pursue the past or not was the subject of public discussion
from the onset of democracy. In Argentina, the overthrow of the mili-
tary junta was premised on the idea of bringing those responsible for
the commission of gross human rights abuses to justice. Fairly soon,
however, practical and political considerations threw these efforts
aground. Finally, despite the continued presence of former dictator
Augusto Pinochet as head of military forces in Chile, democratization
has proceeded apace with some nascent efforts to expose the practices
of the dictatorial regime.
1. Brazil
Brazil initially came under military rule in 1964, although the
worst forms of political terror did not occur until 1969 when General
Emilio Medici assumed control over the Presidency.11 During the
next five years, thousands of Brazilians were either tortured or killed
in the course of the internal war against so-called "leftist subver-
sives."' ° In 1974, Medici was replaced by General Ernesto Geisel.
Although human rights abuses were not completely eliminated, a peri-
od of relative relaxation began. 3 The country entered a new phase
in March 1979 with the inauguration of Geisel's chosen successor,
General Joao Baptista Figueiredo. One of Figueiredo's first acts in
office was to issue a blanket amnesty for any state security agents who
might otherwise become liable in the future to charges arising from
their human rights violations. M As Lawrence Weschler comments,
"[i]ndeed, his edict was drafted in such a way as to foreclose even the
possibility of any future official investigations into the behavior of the
security forces between 1964 and 1979. Bygones were to be bygones:
the book was closed."1'°
Despite the amnesty, and in spite of the government's concerted
efforts to conceal this dark period of Brazilian history, the horrors of
the military's rule have now become public knowledge. Through a
daring and clandestine effort by several human rights organizations
and segments of the Catholic Church, the trial transcripts of those who
denounced their own torture in previously secret military trials was
published in a book that was to become a national best-seller, Brasil:
Nunca Mais.1 " Although this book documented who was responsible
for ordering and carrying out the torture and killings, because of the
amnesty proclaimed by Figueiredo, no prosecutions have taken place or
101. LAWERENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 47 (1990).
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id.
106. See WESCHLER, supra note 101. This book provides an exciting tale of the
brave effort to have the transcripts published.
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are likely."°7 Instead, although the truth has become known, individ-
uals go about their daily business as if none of this terror has oc-
curred, and torturers pass their victims on the street.
2. Uruguay
Until the 1960s, perhaps the South American country least likely
to experience political terror was Uruguay, described by some as the
"Sweden of South America." All of this began to change in the 1960s
when the government first sought to repress the Movement for Na-
tional Liberation, or the Tupamaros as it came to be called. By the
early 1970s, this internal conflict affected nearly all segments of the
population,"8 and its purpose was to terrorize the entire society.
Weschler writes:
Obviously, one of its main functions, as the architects of the system
declared outright, was to break the prisoners. But an even more
important goal appears to have been to break the wider society...
Uruguay was such a small country, and the repression there so
widespread, that everyone knew someone - knew several people,
in fact - in prison or under torture. The military wanted it that
way - relied on the fear that such knowledge engendered."°
The beginning of the end of military rule occurred in 1980 when
the regime's plebiscite for a new constitution was rejected by the popu-
lation. ° Through a political compromise, Presidential and legislative
107. This is not to say that participation in the terror has not had some ramifica-
tions. Weschler writes that
[iun some places . . . some men whose names appeared on the list were
summarily fired. In other places, during the months ahead, some men
found their careers blocked: the list was occasionally consulted as pro-
motions came under consideration. But for the most part those whose
names appeared on the listed [as having committed torture] retained
their positions and, thanks to the amnesty, had little more to endure
than the public's contempt.
Id. at 76.
108. The scope of the government's repression is numbing. Weschler provides this
description:
Of Uruguay's entire 1970 population of somewhat less than 3 million
(half of whom lived in the capital, Montevideo), somewhere between
300,000 and 400,000 went into exile during the next decade and a half.
Of those remaining, according to Amnesty International, one in every
fifty was detained at one time or another for interrogation; and one in
every five hundred received a long prison sentence for political offens-
es .... The sheer scope of this emigration, detention, and incarcera-
tion, however, only begins to suggest the extent of the military's abso-
lute mastery of Uruguayan daily life during this period.
Id. at 87-88.
109. Id. at 147.
110. Id. at 151.
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elections were held on November 25, 1984."' President Sanguinetti
took office on March 1, 1985. One week later he signed a bill that
constituted an amnesty for all remaining political prisoners, although
torturers and other military violators of human rights were explicitly
excluded."'
Soon thereafter, victims of the political terror began filing law-
suits against specific individuals in the military alleging torture, kid-
napping, disappearance, extortion, rape, and murder. As these cases
made their way through the judicial system, Sanguinetti proposed a
second amnesty, one that absolved military officials of any responsibili-
ty whatsoever. The Law Declaring an Expiration of the State's Puni-
tive Authority was passed on December 22, 1986,13 the day before
the first subpoena of a military official was due.
Late in February 1987, a group of human rights organizations
under the banner of the Commission National Pro-Referendum began a
campaign to overturn the impunidad law. In order to call a referen-
dum, it was necessary to have petition signatures of at least a quarter
of the number of people who had voted in the previous national elec-
tion."" Overcoming a tremendous amount of adversity, the pro-refer-
endum forces were successful in obtaining the requisite signatures.
Although the referendum was ultimately rejected (attributable in large
part to the thinly veiled threats by the ruling government)," 5 the
process itself seemed to accomplish something. Weschler balances the
positives and negatives this way:
Certainly, the two cases I've studied in these pages - Brazil's and
Uruguay's - afford no ideal outcome. (For that matter, no country
exists where anything remotely approaching the ideal has yet been
achieved.) The transition in both countries has been mired in the
muck of forced compromise, bad faith, self-delusion, betrayed hopes,
and abandoned responsibilities. In both of these instances, the little
success that was achieved was at the best provisional (there were
no trials in either country, no expressions of justice; torturers
whose prior conduct was thoroughly documented in Brasil: Nunca
Mais didn't even necessarily lose their jobs; in Uruguay, the refer-
endum finally lost and the issue was largely set aside)."'
Still, Weschler maintains, some victories were gained in both coun-
tries:
In both cases, thanks to the herculean efforts of relatively small
sectors of the population (in the case of Brazil, of an infinitesimally
111. Id. at 158.
112. WESCHLER, supra note 101, at 159.
113. Id. at 171.
114. Id. at 176.
115. Id. at 233.
116. Id. at 245.
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small sector), the interests of truth were served. Facts were estab-




During the early 1970s, Argentina suffered from a wave of vio-
lence carried out primarily by the leftist Montoneros movement."8 In
response, security forces and a terrorist group from the extreme right,
the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, undertook a counterattack
aimed at known or suspected left-wing terrorists, as well as those
considered to be sympathizers with the left. When the violence per-
sisted, President Isabel Peron declared a state of siege in November
1974." In 1975, the Peron government concluded that police and se-
curity forces were not capable of preventing terrorist activities. The
government then issued Decree No. 2770/75, which established the
Council of Domestic Security comprised of the President, the Cabinet,
and the commanding officers of the armed forces. 20 Decree No.
2772/75, issued the same day, gave the armed forces the task of carry-
ing out the "military and security operations they deem necessary to
annihilate subversive elements throughout the country.
" 121
Despite a dramatic downturn in incidents of left-wing violence at
the beginning of 1976, in March of that year the commanders of the
armed forces staged a successful coup. 12  Soon thereafter, the mili-
tary embarked on a guerra sucia, or dirty war, against so-called left
wing subversives and sympathizers. During the course of this "war," a
minimum of 8,961 persons disappeared, 123 and tens of thousands of
117. Id. at 245.
118. Alejandro M. Garro & Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights
Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward, 8 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 283, 287 (1987).
119. Id. at 288; Decree No. 1368, Nov. 6, 1974, in BOLETIN OFICIAL (OFFICIAL
GAZETTE), Nov. 7, 1974 (Arg.).
120. Id.; Decree 2770/75, Oct. 6, 1975, in BOLETIN OFICIAL (OFFICIAL GAZETTE),
Nov. 4, 1975 (Arg.).
121. Id. at 289; Decree 2772/75, Oct. 6, 1975, in BOLETIN OFICIAL (OFFICIAL
GAZETTE), Nov. 4, 1975 (Arg.).
122. There were actually three different military juntas. The first was comprised
of General Jorge Videla, commander of the Army (Aug. 27, 1975 - July 31, 1978);
Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, commander of the Navy (1973 - Sept. 15, 1978);
and Brigadier General Orlando Agost, commander of the Air Force (Jan. 1, 1976 -
Jan. 25, 1979). Members of the second and third juntas included General Roberto
Viola, commander of the Army (July 31, 1978 - Dec. 28, 1979); Admiral Armando
Lambruschini, commander of the Navy (Sept. 15, 1978 - Sept. 11, 1981); Brigadier
General Omar Domingo Rubens Graffigna, commander of the Air Force (Jan. 25,
1979 - June 19, 1982); Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, commander of the Navy (Sept.
11, 1981 - Oct. 1, 1982); Brigadier General Basilio Arturo Lami Dozo, commander of
the Air Force (Dec. 17, 1981 - Aug. 17, 1982).
123. Nunca Mas, Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disap-
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people were detained without being charged with specific crimes. Iain
Guest comments:
Never before had the resources of a state been geared to systematic
torture and murder. The Junta turned disappearances into a gov-
ernment policy and in so doing gave new meaning to the concept of
state terror. It was as deliberate, methodical, and calculated as
collecting tax .. 124
In 1979, the ruling junta declared victory in the war against sub-
version. In the face of growing domestic and international opposition,
the military government issued a law declaring that those who had
been reported missing during the previous five years were to be consid-
ered legally dead."u By 1981, the military junta was facing growing
demands from all quarters asking for information about the
"disappeared." Also at this time, the military government was met
with greater opposition from restless trade unions and political parties.
What ultimately caused the downfall of military rule, however, was the
disastrous Falklands-Malvinas war with Great Britain in 1982.
By 1983, a transitional junta was established to set the stage for a
return to civilian rule - not, however, before attempting to exonerate
the deeds of the military. On April 28, 1983, the government published
the Final Document on the War Against Subversion.12 This report
conceded that human rights abuses had occurred but that such actions
were in the "line of duty."'27 In September 1983, the military govern-
ment enacted the Law of National Pacification, which granted immuni-
ty from prosecution to suspected terrorists and members of the armed
forces for human rights violations committed between May 25, 1973
and June 17, 1982."2 Finally, the military junta issued Decree No.
2726/83, which ordered the destruction of all documents relating to the
"dirty war." On October 29, 1983, the state of siege was lifted, and free
elections took place. Civilian President Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated
two months later.
One of Alfonsin's first official acts was to issue Decree No.
158/831"29 ordering the arrest and prosecution of the nine military
officers who comprised the three military juntas from 1976 to 1983.
The Decree provided that under new legislation that was to be sub-
peared [also known as the Sabato Commission Report] (1986) at 447.
124. LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 32 (1990).
125. Law No. 22068, Sept. 12, 1979 on "Presumption of Death Because of Disap-
pearance" [1979-C] A.L.J.A. 2845; see Garro & Dahl, supra note 118, at 300.
126. Id. at 301; App. Court Judg. Sec. 46.
127. Id.
128. Id.; Law No. 22924, Sept. 22, 1983, [1983-B] A.L.J.A. 1681.
129. Id. at 302. Decree No. 158, promulgated on December 13, 1983, [1983-B]
A.L.J.A. 1943.
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mitted to Congress, such prosecutions were to be initiated before the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.13 ° However, the Decree also
provided that any judgment by the Supreme Council was subject to
review by the federal courts of appeal.'3 1 The jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Council was reasserted by the passage of Law No. 23049,132
the impending legislation referred to in Decree No. 158/83. One of the
most noteworthy aspects of Law 23049 was a provision that authorized
federal appellate courts to take away jurisdiction from the Supreme
Council if there was unjustifiable delay in the prosecution of these cas-
es. 1
3 3
As this was going on, the government also faced the problem of
the existence of the junta's self-amnesty law. In December 1983, the
Congress passed Law No. 23040 nullifying the amnesty provisions."
The Federal Court of Appeals subsequently upheld the constitutional-
ity of Law No. 23040, at the same time declaring the self-amnesty law
unconstitutional. 135
During that same month, charges were brought against the nine
military commanders who had served in each of the three military
juntas. By June 1984, the Supreme Council had made little progress in
determining the outcome of these cases." In October, the Council
issued a report announcing its inability to estimate when the criminal
proceedings would be completed. In addition, the Council also indicated
that, in its view, military operations against subversion were "unobjec-
tionable." 137 The report pointed out that the testimony of victims and
their relatives was so biased as not to be credible. 13 In response, the
Federal Appeals Court issued a resolution taking over the proceedings
against the military commanders. 139 In early 1985, the Court issued a
130. Id. at 303.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 306; Law No. 23049, Feb. 14, 1984, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 8 (1984).
133. Garro & Dahl, supra note 118.
134. Id. at 305. Law No. 23040, December 27, 1983, [1983-B] A.L.J.A. 1813. Arti-
cles 1 and 2 read as follows:
Art. 1. De facto Law No. 22924 is hereby repealed as unconstitutional
and null and void.
Art. 2. De facto Law No. 22924 has no legal effect with regard to crimi-
nal, civil, administrative, and military responsibility that said law in-
tends to affect. Article 2 of the Criminal Code in particular is inapplica-
ble to Law No. 22924.
What has been set forth in the foregoing paragraph is not altered by final judicial
decisions that have applied de facto Law No. 22924.
135. In re Fernandez Marino Amador, Oct. 4, 1984, [19851 L.L. 521 (Arg.). For an
explanation of the response of the Alfonsin regime, see Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to
Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100
YALE L.J. 2619 (1991).
136. Id. at 310.
137. Id. at 320.
138. Id.
139. Resolution [Acordadal No. 42, Oct. 4, 1984, published in L.L., Nov. 19, 1984
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series of indictments and placed several of the former leaders under
rigorous preventive detention.
The trial of the military commanders finally began on April 22,
1985, and lasted five months, during which time more than 800 wit-
nesses testified." Judgment and sentence were handed down on De-
cember 5, 1985. The Court found five of the former commanders guilty.
Two former Presidents - Generals Jorge Videla and Roberto Viola -
were both convicted. Videla, President during the first military junta,
was given a life sentence; Viola was given 17 years. Admiral Emilio
Massera of the Navy, a member of the first junta, was given a life
sentence and his successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini, received
eight years imprisonment. Brigadier General Orlando Agosti, who was
head of the Air Force in the first junta, received a 4 1/2 year sen-
-tence."' These verdicts were upheld by the Supreme Court, which
slightly modified the sentences of Viola and Agosti."
Soon after the trial of the junta leaders, the prosecution began
pursuing charges against other military officers for their part in the
dirty war. However, in the face of growing unrest within the ranks of
the military, the Congress passed Law No. 23492, or the "Full Stop
Law."" Article 1 of the Law stated that the time had come for "the
armed forces to take part in rebuilding a democratic society."'44 Ac-
cordingly, 23492 imposed a 60-day deadline on the filing of any com-
plaints or charges against alleged torturers." Although the obvious
intent of the law was to impede, and perhaps preclude, further crimi-
nal proceedings, the prosecution was able to file over one hundred fifty
summonses before the February 22, 1986 deadline."
By March 1987, fifty-one military and police officers had been
arrested in connection with human rights cases, although only twelve
had been convicted and sentenced, including the five military generals
discussed above. 4 7 An important event that occurred at this time
was Major Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro's refusal to appear before the
Federal Appeals Court in Cordoba, seeking refuge with his army unit
instead. The commander of the unit subsequently announced that
Barreiro would not be turned over to the court and what followed was
an insurrection that came to be known as the Easter Rebellion."4
(Arg.).
140. For a description of the trials, see Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta:
Responsibilities and Realities, 18 UNIV. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.R. 491 (1987).
141. GUEST, supra note 124, at 389.
142. [1987-A] L.L. 531, 553 (1987) (Arg.).
143. Law No. 23492, Dec. 23, 1986, A.D.L.A. [XLVII-A] 193.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Garro & Dahl, supra note 118, at 336.
147. Id. at 337.
148. Id.
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In response, President Alfonsin made a dramatic trip to talk with
Colonel Aldo Rico, the leader of the insurrection. The rebellion col-
lapsed and many of its leaders were arrested. However, in the face of
this kind of military opposition, on June 4, 1987, the Congress passed
the law of "due obedience," Law No. 23521, which created an irrebutta-
ble presumption that military personnel accused of committing human
rights abuses were acting under orders and were unable to question
the legitimacy of these orders. 149 This irrebuttable presumption pro-
tected all military officers below the rank of Brigadier General. The
law even barred the judiciary from undertaking any case-by-case anal-
ysis to determine if the defendant's actions were self-motivated. As a
result, hundreds of officers were effectively immunized from prosecu-
tion. Guest writes of the due obedience law: "Alfonsin's long balancing
act aimed at healing the national trauma without humiliating the
military was finally over. It would be left to his Peronist successor,
Carlos Menem, to bring the curtain down on the final act.""s
It took a very short period of time for this to occur. In October
1989, almost immediately after assuming office, President Menem
issued a broad pardon covering nearly 280 people, some of whom had
taken part in various military rebellions against the Alfonsin govern-
ment, others who had been accused of committing criminal offenses in
carrying out the dirty war."'1 A year later the tragedy was completed:
Menem pardoned and released the military junta leaders who directed
the war including Jorge Videla, Roberto Viola, and Emilio
Massera. 52
Has Argentina's democratization been successful? On one level at
least, the answer to that question has to be no. Like many of the coun-
tries attempting denazification following World War II, the Alfonsin
government originally set forth an overly ambitious agenda that it did
not come near to accomplishing. Moreover, because of the widespread
and ambiguous nature of the prosecutions, there were numerous run-
ins with the military that, in turn, resulted in repeated retreats by the
government. In terms of what it set out to do, then, the Argentine
response was only moderately successful at best.
On another level, however, Argentina has achieved some notable
victories. Bringing former government and military leaders, at times
one and the same, to trial was a tremendous accomplishment for a
newly democratized country. Moreover, the trials themselves served
149. Law No. 23521, E.D.L.A. 260 [1987-A] (1987).
150. GUEST, supra note 124, at 390.
151. 2)0 Military Officers are Pardoned in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at
A12.
152. Shirley Christian, Argentina Frees Ex-Junta Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, December
30, 1990, at A9.
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the same kind of catharsis function as the trials had in Greece.
153
Months of testimony not only brought forth the inhumanity of the
military regime but, just as importantly, the humanity of its victims as
well. In describing the trials of the military junta, lain Guest writes
that
[giradually, over these four months, the ghosts have started to slip
into this court. Some have come vividly alive again as witnesses
have recalled seeing them in the detention centers. Now they seem
to fill the benches as if silently waiting to pass their own verdict on
Argentina's "dirty war." What did they think of in those final terri-
fying moments, as they went to their deaths? The testimony has
been so detailed that it is impossible not to speculate.
15'
Finally, most of the truth about military rule has been published
in the Sabato Commission report, Nunca Mais. Like its counterpart in
Brazil, it soon became a national best-seller. In sum, Argentina's at-
tempt to come to terms with the horrors of its past has brought about
mixed results. It never effectively prosecuted the high number of offi-
cials that the government had intended to, and those who were prose-
cuted are now free. On the other hand, most of those responsible for
the terror have been removed from office, and the specter of military
rule appears to be a phenomenon of a long-distant past.
4. Chile
Unlike the situation in the other Southern Cone countries, Chile
is still in the process of attempting to deal with those responsible for
committing past horrors. As had been the case in Uruguay, Chile had
enjoyed more than a century and a half of stable, constitutional rule.
There were, however, social tensions between the left and the right
that were greatly exacerbated by the election of Socialist President
Salvador Allende. On September 11, 1973, Allende was killed in a
military coup and his party, Popular Unity, was removed from power.
A military junta took his place and quickly moved against leftist "sub-
versives." Constable and Venezuela write that
[bJy December, at least fifteen hundred civilians were dead - shot
in confrontations, tortured to death, hunted down by vigilantes, or
executed by firing squads. Thousands of detainees had been
shipped to military prison camps, more than seven thousand had
fled into exile after receiving safe-conduct passes, and the grounds
of the Venezuelan, Swedish, Argentine, Italian and British embas-
sies were jammed with asylum seekers. A revolutionary dream had
been crushed in a spasm of military fury, and a reign of profession-
al state terror had begun 5
153. Supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
154. GUEST, supra note 124, at 2.
155. PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE
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Pinochet consolidated his power by means of a plebiscite held in
1980, where two-thirds of the electorate ostensibly supported a new
Constitution drafted by the Pinochet regime. There have been many
reports of massive corruption in this plebiscite." Under the provi-
sions of the Constitution, Pinochet was to remain in office for eight
years. In 1988, another plebiscite was called - this time to enable
Pinochet to run for re-election - but a majority of the electorate voted
against this proposal. 57 In national elections that followed, Patricio
Aylwin Azocar was elected President."8 Although Pinochet surpris-
ingly gave up the Presidency, he has maintained a firm grip on power
in his capacity as the head of the military forces.
Aylwin took office in March 1990. Within a short period of time he
had created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which began to
gather evidence from relatives of people believed to have disappeared
during the years of military rule. In July 1990, mass graves were dis-
covered for the first time, touching a raw nerve in the military and
setting off a national debate regarding the repression of the Pinochet
regime." 9 In March 1991, President Aylwin addressed the nation on
national television and issued a report describing how 2,043 people
had been killed by military personnel, with most of the violence occur-
ring before 1978."w The report described how the secret police had
systematically killed those who were viewed as politically dangerous to
Pinochet's regime. On behalf of the nation, Aylwin apologized to the
families of the victims for the horrors described in the report, and he
announced plans to assist them with pensions and health and housing
care. 1 ' He also asked the Supreme Court to ensure that cases of hu-
man rights abuses were heard as soon as possible. 62
At this point it is not clear what action, if any, will be taken
against those responsible for the documented terror between 1973-
1988. The biggest obstacle is that Pinochet remains firmly in control of
the most powerful military establishment in the Southern Cone, and
he has repeatedly stated that there will be no prosecutions of any
military personnel." Another problem is that the amnesty law pro-
UNDER PINOCHET (1991).
156. Id. at 72-3.
157. Id. at 310.
158. Id. at 316.
159. Shirley Christian, Chilean Military Defends Killings, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10,
1990, at A2.




163. Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile Human Rights Report Answered by Violence, N.Y.
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port, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at A3; Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile's Army Stands
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claimed by the Pinochet regime in 1978 has been upheld by the Chil-
ean Supreme Court as recently as 1990.2" On the other hand, the
national legislature recently defeated a bill, the "Aylwin Law," that
would have disposed of all pending cases through secret civilian
hearings. These hearings involved more than 200 military officials
accused of killings, torture, rape, and beatings.1"
In fact, democratization has proceeded alongside efforts to uncover
the horrors of the past. In September 1991, under court order, the
Chilean government began exhuming and trying to identify the re-
mains of more than 120 people found in a mass grave.' In addition,
there have been some important developments in the case of Orlando
Letelier, Chile's ambassador to the United States under the Allende
regime, who was killed in a bomb explosion in Washington, D.C. Al-
though Chile had previously agreed to pay restitution to the families of
the deceased, for years it had refused to subject the masterminds of
the operation to criminal prosecution. In a remarkable change of
events, in July 1991, Chile's Supreme Court overturned attempts to
close the case. Then, on August 26, 1991, Justice Bandons issued an
order prohibiting the two defendants, General Juan Manuel Contreras
Sepulveda and Colonel Pedro Espinoza Bravo, from leaving the coun-
try. On September 21, 1991 Bandons issued an indictment against
Contreras and Espinoza, and, in a 3-2 decision, the Chilean Supreme
Court upheld this indictment. 67 In November, 1993, sentences were
handed down with Contreras being sentenced to seven years in prison
and Espinoza to six years."
Given Pinochet's continued and very visible presence in Chilean
political life, the effort to uncover the misdeeds of his rule has actually
proceeded further than might have been expected. Obviously Aylwin
had to walk a tightrope, but he performed a noteworthy job. Most
importantly, the Chilean government has made both a public acknowl-
edgment and an apology for the horrors of the past. In addition, the
new governments have made the decision to fully investigate the hor-
rors of the past, even if no punishment results because of the amnesty
granted under the Pinochet regime.
164. Supreme Court of Chile, Recurso de inaplicabilidad de ley brought by Alfredo
Insunza Bascunan, August 24, 1990, Manuel Contreras et al., Rol No. 553-78.
165. Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile Refuses To Forget Crimes of Past, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1993 at E3.
166. Nathaniel C. Nash, Graves Without Names Yield Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1991, at A4.
167. Indictment of Chile Police Chiefs in Murder of Ex-Envoy is Upheld, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at A12.
168. Chile Sentences Two Generals for Letelier Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1993,
at A7.
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E. Other Transitions in the Present: The Painful Evolution to
Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa
Peace is slowly and painfully being achieved in El Salvador and
Nicaragua after more than a decade of slaughter and mayhem in both
of these countries. As desirable as this is, there is some question
whether the tenuous peace that exists in both countries will bring any
greater understanding about the past. In El Salvador, a United Na-
tions Truth Commission has placed much of the blame for the horrors
of the past decade squarely on right wing politicians and army officers,
but rebel forces were not spared criticism either. 9 The Truth Com-
mission also suggested that, because of gross inadequacies in the
Salvadoran judiciary, no attempt at prosecuting those responsible for
these war crimes ought to take place. The national legislature readily
enacted a blanket amnesty a few days after the publication of the
Commission's report. 70
This is not to suggest that there has not been any progress in
attempting to rectify the policies of the past. For one thing, despite
constant delays from the original timetable established by the United
Nations, the Army has now been purged of certain officers responsible
for ordering some of the worst human rights abuses."' In a related
move, the architect of many of these policies, former Defense Minister
Rene Emilio Ponce, eventually was forced to resign from office. 72 Be-
yond this, certain truths about human rights abuses during the dark-
est days, most notably the massacre at El Mozote,173 have now been
confirmed. Still, few can be pleased that thousands of brutal murders
will not be prosecuted and that the few who have been convicted for
their crimes during the war will now be set free. In essence, exonera-
tion has occurred with very little acknowledgment and understanding
of the past.174
169. Tina Golden, Can the Truth Help Salvador Outlive Hate?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1993, at El.
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The situation in Nicaragua is not even this sanguine.' The so-
cial, political, and economic inequalities that brought about war in the
first place have not changed. In addition, there has been no real effort
to understand the causes of the civil war. Instead, Nicaragua teeters
on the brink of erupting into a bloody civil war once again. At this
point, prosecutions against those who committed war crimes would
serve no purpose and would probably exacerbate an already unstable
and dangerous situation. On the other hand, some attempt to learn the
truth about the war, its causes, the way it was conducted, and its con-
sequences is desperately needed because there is little prospect for any
real peace without it.
The transition from a white-dominated government in South Afri-
ca offers another case of attempting to deal with crimes of the past,
although these efforts are still evolving under the new regime of Presi-
dent Mandela. 7 ' The most controversial piece of legislation is the In-
demnity Act, which provides the State President with the authority to
grant amnesty to those who "advised, directed, commanded, ordered or
performed" any act with a political objective.1" The Act applies to ac-
tivities that occurred prior to October 8, 1990, although it also gives
the President the authority to extend this period."' The Act pro-
scribes both civil and criminal proceedings. 7 ' Those seeking amnesty
for acts that have not been punished must apply to the National Coun-
cil on Indemnity, which conducts its proceedings in secret."M
The biggest problem inherent in the Indemnity Act is its lack of
public accountability. Although lists of those who benefit from the
provisions of the Act are to be kept, there is to be no public record of
what the indemnification was based upon. While the Indemnity Act
might assuage segments of the right wing and the military, it does
nothing to advance national understanding concerning the insidious
which hardly squares with the findings of the U.N. Truth Commission Report.
Moreover, documents later released by the State Department have shown that
American military officers in El Salvador trained Salvadorans associated with right
wing death squads. Clifford Krauss, U.S., Aware of Killings, Worked With Salvador's
Rightists, Papers Suggest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at A9; Tim Weiner, In 1990,
U.S. Was Still Training Salvador Civilians Tied to Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1993; at Al.
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N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at A5.
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the apartheid governments is the result of the Goldstone Commission. Bill Keller,
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nature of apartheid rule. The African National Congress has strongly
opposed the Act, and the amnesty itself might serve to heighten ten-
sions rather than helping to usher in a new political and social spirit.
Improbably set alongside these acts of amnesty, President
Mandela has vowed to probe into political crimes committed under the
apartheid regime. Toward that end, on his 100th day in office,
Mandela established a truth commission. 181
F. Transitions to Democracy: An Appraisal
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the transitions that we have
examined thus far is how incomplete and ineffectual they have been.
In the U.S. Confederacy example, those who had been in power in the
South prior to the Civil War quickly regained power despite efforts by
Congress to remove them. The examples following World War II seem
to teach the same lessons. Despite the military defeat and devastation
of both Germany and Japan, many of those who had previously wield-
ed power in each country continued to do so within a fairly short time
after Allied governance was removed. In fact, however, many of the
aborted purges were accomplished with the blessing of the Allied pow-
ers, as Cold War political considerations soon took precedence over the
aim of removing or punishing members of the old order. One important
lesson that does emerge rather clearly is that it is impossible and
counter-productive to attempt to hold an entire nation accountable, as
was attempted in Germany.
The more recent examples of democratization offer a mixed bag.
The transitions in countries such as Brazil and Spain took place over
such an extended period of time that it became nearly impossible to
separate the old regime from the new. One difference between these
two situations is that more of the truth is known about the situation in
Brazil than that of Franco-led Spain. In neither case were any prosecu-
tions brought or purges carried out. The transitions in Portugal,
Greece, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile were much more sudden in
terms of particular events - coups, referenda, elections, and the like.
Still, in each country it has been very difficult to remove the influence
and power of the old order. What has been achieved in several cases,
most notably, Greece, Argentina, and Chile, is some greater under-
standing of the past, and in the case of Greece and Argentina, some
measure of justice against some of the perpetrators of the worst hu-
man rights abuses.
El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa were also briefly exam-
ined, although one still cannot be certain, at the present time at least,
that these countries are truly in the process of transforming them-
selves to peaceful democracies. The best candidate for such a transition
181. Mandela to Probe Apartheid Crimes, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 19, 1994, at 2.
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appears to be El Salvador, which has not only been able to maintain
the peace after more than a decade of civil war, but through the U.N.
Truth Commission there has been an important attempt to understand
the genesis of the conflict and the manner in which it was carried out.
What is most unfortunate, however, is that no prosecutions or purges
will ensue because of an amnesty law that was passed within days of
the publication of the U.N. report.
We now turn to Eastern Europe and the decommunization efforts
that have occurred to date. In many respects, these countries are bet-
ter situated to address the crimes of the past for two reasons. One is
that there is little apparent opposition to such efforts by the military
in any of these countries. The second reason is that, unlike many of
the other countries that we have examined, the vast majority of the
population desperately wanted to see the removal of the communist
regime. Working against these efforts, however, have been two phe-
nomena. One, simply, is the poverty that afflicts so much of the East-
ern bloc and, coupled with that, the desire to move forward rather
than to examine the past. The second major obstacle involves yet an-
other aspect of communist rule, most notably the distrust and disinfor-
mation that continue to infest these societies.
III. DECOMMUNIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Once the euphoria of the fall of communism quickly passed, the
people of Eastern Europe were faced with the cold prospects of dealing
with the aftermath of decades of communist rule. Most of the new non-
communist governments seem uncertain what end they hope to accom-
plish. One of the biggest obstacles, mentioned earlier, is that the du-
plicity that marked the old order has not been removed. If anything,
the transformation has possibly added a new layer of distrust and
misinformation. What follows are some of the more noteworthy trends
of decommunization efforts to date.
A. Germany
For a variety of reasons, the most important of which has been
reunification itself, decommunization has seemingly proceeded further
in Germany than in any of the other former Eastern bloc countries.
Already, thousands of individuals in certain occupations, such as pub-
lic officials, judges, police officers, professors, and schoolteachers, have
been purged from their occupations." 2 An agreement between East
and West Germany has established a legal framework for reprivatiza-
tion to occur.1" Several former East German border guards have
182. John Tagliabue, East Europe Astir on Ex-Communist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1992, at A3.
183. Katie Hafner, The House We Lived In, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 10, 1991, at
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been tried and convicted of killing individuals who sought to es-
cape.' The secret police apparatus (Stasi) has effectively been dis-
mantled, and individual citizens have been given ownership rights over
their own files.'85 In addition, the former head of the secret police,
Erich Mielke, has been prosecuted and convicted of murder. Finally, a
Legislative Commission under the leadership of former dissident
Rainer Eppelmann is conducting a sweeping investigation into the
effects of communist rule.'
Despite this apparent progress, however, decommunization has
raised as many issues as it has answered. For one thing, there has
been a continuous charge made that decommunization has only focused
on lesser or peripheral officials of the old order, such as the young bor-
der guards, while many former leaders of the communist regime have
been immune from criminal prosecution. The most visible example of
this allegation involves Erich Honecker, the long-time leader of East
Germany who was eventually returned to Germany after an extended
stay in Russia only to be allowed to move to Chile and pardoned from
trial because of the purported nature of his health. Criticism grew
when rank and file soldiers were prosecuted before those who had
given orders, and the few convictions of former top officials that have
occurred have provided scarcely little understanding of the nature of
communist rule. l"7
A continuing problem facing decommunization in Germany, and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, relates to the volume of information and
records that have to be sifted through, as well as the number of indi-
viduals who apparently collaborated with the secret police. For
starters, it is estimated that there are more than 1.5 billion pages of
Stasi reports, the vast majority of which are mundane material of
inconsequential events."s The number of individuals who spied on
others - some tens of thousands of individuals who worked directly
with the Stasi, and upwards of 180,000 who were "unofficial collabora-
tors" - is rather astonishing, and this fact' alone will make any at-
32.
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tempt to purge or punish that much more difficult.89 Since January
1992, anyone mentioned in Stasi documents had the right to examine
any document pertaining to that individual, except for the portion
containing the name of the informant."9 However, as of mid-1993,
only 625,000 individuals had been given this opportunity.' As a re-
sult of this slow process, a proposed amnesty for East German secret
police officials who had committed "misdemeanors" that was scheduled
to go into effect on the third anniversary of German reunification,
October 3, 1993, was postponed until the end of 1995."
On the surface, decommunization in Germany has proceeded rath-
er smoothly, especially in comparison to some of the other Eastern bloc
countries, but there have been some major problems. The most note-
worthy problem has been the apparent indecision of the government
regarding prosecution of members of the old order. One such example
involves the rather bizarre proceedings against Erich Mielke, the for-
mer chief of the secret police in East Germany. Mielke headed the
Ministry of State Security from 1957 until the Berlin Wall collapsed in
1989. Still, the charges that he faced were based on events relating to
the killing of two police officers in 1931.' It is puzzling how or why
the prosecution of this particular individual would advance
decommunization. If anything, the decision to initially prosecute
Mielke for his activities that occurred over 60 years ago, rather than
for his actions as the head of Stasi, gives every indication that the gov-
ernment is hesitant to delve into the reign of terror of the communist
regime.9 4
As in each of the other Eastern bloc countries, the German repri-
vatization program has run into a number of unforeseen administra-
tive problems that have slowed such efforts considerably. Under the
German program, former owners will be able to reclaim property they
had once owned before confiscation occurred, or be compensated if this
is not possible. 9' Notwithstanding this, there are several unique
189. Id. at 21.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 19.
192. Id.
193. Stephen Kinzer, German on Trial in 1931 Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
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features to this plan. The first is that the baseline for reprivatization
is 1933, so as to include land that had been confiscated by the Nazis.
However, property that had been confiscated between 1945 and 1949,
the period of Soviet occupation, has been exempted as part of the deal
originally struck with the Soviets to allow reunification to occur. In
addition, the Bundestag subsequently made a number of changes to
the law, attempting to favor the interests of investors over those of
former owners, to the point where the law is now referred to by some
as the "Law on the Abolition of Restitution."1" As a final point, per-
haps the sheer scope of reprivatization remains the biggest obstacle of
all as more than one million claims for the return of property have
already been made.197
Decommunization in Germany has raised a number of thorny
issues. One is whether East German officials should be held to a high-
er, or different, standard than their (former) West German counter-
parts. This question has been raised repeatedly in the case involving
Markus Wolf, a former East German spy, who claims that his "crimes"
were nothing more than what was also done by West German and
American officials." 8 A related issue is whether it is hypocritical to
purge those who cooperated with the East German regime when that
was the stated policy of the West German government's Ostpolitik.',
Finally, things have come full-circle when some (former) East German
politicians have asked how it is that Western politicians who were so
resistant to denazification are suddenly pushing decommunization.
B. The Former Czechoslovakia
Clearly the most controversial aspect of decommunization in the
former Czechoslovakia was the "lustration" law passed by what was
then the Czech and Slovak National Assembly on October 4, 1991.2"
Under its terms, individuals associated with the communist regime
were placed into three broad categories. The first consisted of those
who were former secret police agents and their collaborators or former
members of the communist party who held positions of authority from
the district level up. These individuals are banned from certain high
German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527 (1991).
196. Ulrich K Preuss, Restitution vs. Investment, 1 E. EUR. CoNST. REV. 22, 24
(Summer 1992).
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E. EUR. (No. 43), Oct. 25, 1991, at 4.
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level administrative positions for a period of five years.2 ' They are
deemed guilty if their names appeared in the files of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.2 2 The second category are those who have been
termed "conscious collaborators." A third class of individuals were
those who fell into what has been termed Category C, "potential candi-
dates for collaboration." In February 1992, an Independent Appeals
Commission was created, and one of its major purposes was to hear
appeals by those who claim to have been wrongly accused of conscious
collaboration. However, it soon became apparent that the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases before the Commission consisted of so-called Cat-
egory C cases. Moreover, in many of these cases, individuals had been
"talked to" by the authorities but had refused to cooperate, yet they
were still listed as "potential candidates for collaboration." In response,
the chairperson of the Commission then brought a suit before the new-
ly created Constitutional Court challenging the legality of the
lustration law in its entirety. In November 1992, the Court ruled that
Category C was illegal but that the remaining paragraphs of the law
were within the bounds of the Constitution.2 3
Although the legality of lustration apparently has been settled,
the law has a number of critics. For example, human rights scholar
Jiri Pehe has argued that
[t]he chief flaw of the... legislation is that it is partially based on
a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence; that is, the burden
is on people in certain government positions to prove they did not
work for the secret police or were not communist officials. More-
over, by barring entire categories of people, such as former com-
munist officials, from holding certain positions, the law espouses
the principle of collective guilt. Impractical as it might have been,
the government's original draft sought to avoid enshrining that
principle by stipulating the necessity of proving a particular
official's participating in the suppression of human rights under the
communist regime. Finally, the law does not distinguish between
various degrees of guilt. Former secret police officials will be treat-
ed no more severely than people who were coerced into collaborat-
ing with or informing for the secret police.'
One of the biggest problems lustration has faced in practice is the
inability to verify the information in the secret police files. Instead,
names of "informants" and "collaborators" of the old regime have ap-
peared and disappeared, depending on who has been able to obtain
201. Ross Larsen, Thousands on Leaked StB List, But Is it Legitimate?, PRAGUE
POST, June 9-15, 1992, at 1.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 19.
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and circulate such lists.2 5 In a recent review of the lustration law,
Paulina Bren concludes that
[diespite the initial high hopes, lustration does not seem to have
fulfilled all of its stated aims. On the one hand, it has prevented
some former communist officials and StB collaborators from acquir-
ing positions of current political and economic influence. On the
other hand, it has also fostered an atmosphere of political instabili-
ty in which scandals often took precedence over more important
legislation. Nor, it seems, has lustration necessarily allayed the
public's suspicions that former communist officials and StB collabo-
rators continue to exert political and economic influence and to
reap the same benefits as were afforded them under the communist
regime.'
More recently, the Czech Parliament adopted the "Law on the
Illegitimacy of and Resistance to the Communist Regime," which,
among other things, lifts the statute of limitations for ideologically
motivated crimes committed between February 25, 1948, and Decem-
ber 1989.2"7 Proponents of the law have argued that the number of
prosecutions will be quite limited.0 s The more important question is
whether such trials will serve to illuminate the true essence of commu-
nist rule.
The new government already has prosecuted several high level
officials of the communist regime.2' However, it is not clear what the
government hopes to accomplish through these trials. There already is
the puzzling situation involving Miroslav Stepan, a former member of
the Central Committee Presidium, who was originally sentenced to a
four-year prison term on charges of abuse of power for ordering that
force be used against anticommunist demonstrators in 1988 and 1989.
205. Paulina Bren, Lustration in the Czech and Slovak Republics, RFE/RL RES.
REP. 16, July 16, 1993, at 16.
206. Id.
207. Jan Obrman, Czech Parliament Declares Former Communist Regime Illegal,
RFE/RL RES. REP., Aug. 13, 1993, at 6. The law reads as follows:
The CPCS, its leadership, and its members are responsible for the man-
ner in which our country was administered in the years 1948 to 1989;
[they are responsible) for the systematic destruction of the traditional
values of European civilization; for the intentional violation of human
rights and freedoms; for the moral and economic decay that was accom-
panied by judicial crimes and terror against those who held views differ-
ing [from those of the state]; for the replacement of a functioning mar-
ket economy by a command economy [and] by the de*struction of tradi-
tional principles of ownership; for the abuse of education, science, and
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Stepan appealed and his sentence was reduced to two years. He was
released in October 1991, having served less than half of his sen-
tence.21°
President Havel has been ambivalent about decommunization.
While decrying a "witch hunt," he has agreed that some measures
against communist officials need to be taken,2" particularly when so
many are currently among the economic elite of the country. Havel
opposed the lustration law primarily because of its presumption of
guilt and the fact that it will only affect the "small fry." Havel has also
expressed reservations about the vetting of officials, but he ultimately
supported proposals by the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slo-
vak National Councils that required the vetting of officials in the
country's legislative and executive bodies.212 Finally, while supporting
the prosecution of former communist officials in theory, Havel has
opposed such proceedings for charges that allege only that the individ-
ual was a part of the old regime. One of the major concerns of the new
government is to create an independent judiciary. Toward that end,
the National Parliament has established a Constitutional Court to
concern itself with determining the constitutionality of laws passed by
the government of the new Czech Republic.
Finally, there has been a concerted effort to make restitution to
the victims of communist rule. One measure has been the passage of
the Law on Legal Rehabilitations that nullifies verdicts handed down
by the communist courts.213 In addition, the former Czechoslovakian
government passed a series of reprivatization laws that seek to provide
for the return of property confiscated by communist officials to the
previous owners. Although the Czech Republic has been successful in
returning a substantial number of businesses and properties that had
been confiscated by the communists back to their previous owners, it
now appears as if further restitution efforts will be halted.214
It is quite unfortunate that the lustration law has come to domi-
nate decommunization in the Czech Republic."5 The same kinds of
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ends could be achieved by more subtle and fair means. As it stands
now, decommunization is unlikely to meet many of its objectives be-
cause of the sharp resistance to the lustration law, both by those asso-
ciated with the old order and those who were the harshest critics of
communist rule. Prosecutions of former top communist officials should
continue, but such trials need to focus on exposing the truth about the
nature of communist rule. These are not, nor should they be, treated
as the routine criminal proceedings brought to date.
C. The Other Eastern Bloc Countries
The other Eastern bloc countries have attempted various forms of
decommunization, and some have had more success in this regard than
others. In Romania,"' decommunization began with the summary
trial and execution of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife.217 Immediately
following, four of Ceausescu's henchmen" 8 were convicted on charges
of genocide and sentenced to life imprisonment."9 For the first time
in the nation's history, a public trial was broadcast live in its entirety.
In addition, several relatives of the Ceausescus have also been prose-
cuted. One of Ceausescu's brothers was found guilty of murder,22
and the dictator's son was found guilty of shooting at demonstrators
without warning, leading to a twenty year prison sentence."
Despite these efforts, there is a very real question of whether-
decommunization in Romania really is a change from the old order.
Most notably, there is every indication that the brutal secret police
apparatus - formerly named the Securitate - has changed in form
but not in its method of operation. 2 Finally, decommunization will
further in the Czech Republic than in the Slovak Republic. Thus, the comments here
are restricted to the former.
216. See generally Truth and Justice: The Question of Accountability for Stalinist
Crimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 9 N.Y. L. SCH. J HUM. RTS. 599
(1992)(remarks of Adrian Nitoiu, General Justice, Military Section of the Supreme
Court of Justice).
217. Ceausescus' Last Request: "We Want to Die Together ... We Want No Mer-
cy"; 3 Lottery Winners Get to Kill Them, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1989, at P1.
218. Tudor Postelnicu, Minister of the Interior, Emil Bobu, Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Ion Dinca, Vice Prime Minis-
ter, and Manea Manescu, Vice President of the State Council. See Steve Pagani, Top
Ceausescu Aides Face Trial for Genocide, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 1990.
219. Charles T. Powers, Ex-Romania Aides Get Life for 'Genocide' Role, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at A16.
220. Alec Russell, Dictator's Brother Jailed for 15 Years, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June
22, 1990, at 8.
221. Nicu Ceausescu Sentenced to 20 Years in Jail for Murder, REUTERS, Sep-
tember 21, 1990. On appeal the sentence was reduced to 16 years. Around the
World, WASH. POST, June 4, 1991, at A19.
222. Dan Ionescu, Romania's Public War over Secret Police Files, REF/RL RES.
REP., July 17, 1992, at 9.
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only take on some real meaning to the population when the country's
abject poverty is alleviated.
In Bulgaria, the continuing influence of communist rule continues
to plague decommunization efforts. Revelations of the existence of
concentration camps and the atrocities committed there during the
past few decades have now been made public, but there has been very
little action in prosecuting those responsible. The halting effort to pros-
ecute former party and state leader Todor Zhivkov finally has been
completed and the unrepentant Zhivkov has been sentenced to seven
years in prison.' One of the more puzzling aspects of this particular
case is why, given the atrocities committed under Zhivkov's rule,
charges of embezzlement were brought in lieu of crimes committed
during the forced assimilation campaign of ethnic Turks or other ex-
amples of gross human rights abuses.
Criminal proceedings have also been brought against Petar
Mladenov, the former longtime minister of foreign affairs who replaced
Zhivkov after a coup in 1989; four former prime ministers, Stoyan
Todorov, Grisha Filipov, Georgi Atanasov, and Andrey Lukanov; and a
host of lesser communist officials. It is questionable whether any con-
victions will ensue. One major obstacle is the continuing influence of
former communists and members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(BSP), the successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party.' Another is
that the prosecutions will be barred by the statute of limitations.'
Finally, the people in this impoverished country exhibit little interest
in continued rounds of seemingly endless litigation, particularly when
members of the old order still seem to be firmly in control.' 5
Poland presents an interesting study because, until the elections
in the fall of 1993, decommunization seemed to be gradually occurring
without any kind of lustration law227 or trials of any note.2" In-
stead, certain occupations, such as the judiciary, have slowly been
purged during the course of the past decade.' Now that former com-
munists have made substantial gains in the governing apparatus, it is
223. Kjell Engelbrekt and Duncan M. Perry, The Conviction of Bulgaria's Former
Leader, RFEIRL RES. REP., Oct. 23, 1992, at 6.
224. Kjell Engelbrekt, Bulgaria's Communist Legacy: Settling Old Scores, RFE/RL
RES. REP., July 10, 1992, at 6.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. In the summer of 1992, the Polish Parliament passed a resolution that
would have made public the names of communist informers, but this law was struck
down a month later by the Constitutional Court. Alan Riding, Polish Panel Rules
Police-File Disclosures Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, at A12.
228. An attempt to prosecute long-time President Jaruzelski was made in 1981
but with little apparent result. Stephan Engelberg, Jaruzelski Facing Accusers, Or Is
it Other Way Around?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at A23.
229. Supra note 3.
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questionable whether decommunization efforts will continue.' Cer-
tainly there is no doubt of this, particularly with the rather stunning
acquittals of General Wladyslaw Ciaston and General Zenon
Platek. 1 These two individuals had been charged with ordering the
1984 murder of Reverend Jerzy Popieluszko, an associate of the Soli-
darity movement. Despite the overwhelming testimony that led the
presiding judge to remark that the generals "were probably responsible
for the murder," 2 the acquittal was based on the fact that no cor-
roborating evidence could be obtained. The secret police had destroyed
the evidence in 1984.
In Hungary, Parliament's first attempt to remove the statute of
limitations on crimes committed during the communists' reign was
overturned by the country's newly created Constitutional Court.' In
response, the Hungarian Parliament passed a new law in February
1993 that retroactively extended the statute of limitations for crimes
committed during the 1956 uprising.' In October 1993, the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court upheld the main part of the Act.'
In addition to these legislative efforts, the Hungarian prosecutor's
office has initiated several "fact-finding" investigations into the crimes
committed under the old regime.2 36 Finally, in February 1993, the
government submitted a draft law to the parliament that would permit
action to be taken against informers and agents of the communist
regime." 7 Under this law, those who served in the intelligence de-
partment (known as 3/3), and those who served on squads that assist-
ed Soviet troops to quash the 1956 and 1957 rebellions, would not be
allowed to occupy senior public positions."
Like the other East European countries, Hungary has initiated a
reprivatization program, but with limited success.!3 Their program
230. Jane Perlez, Ex-Communists Get Crucial New Role in Polish Election, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al.
231. 2 Polish Generals Acquitted in Killing of Solidarity Priest, N.Y. TIMIS, Aug.
21, 1994, at A6.
232. Id.
233. Alajos Dornback, Retroactivity Law Overturned in Hungary, 1 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 7 (Spring 1992). The Court also has been active in the area of reprivatization,
having struck down Parliament's first Compensation Law on the grounds that land
could not be treated differently than other forms of property.
234. Dr. Krisztina Morvai, Retroactive Justice based on International Law: A Re-
cent Decision by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 2 E. EUR. CONsT. REV. 32 (Fall
1993/Winter 1994).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 8.
237. Id. at 9.
238. Id.
239. Karoly Okolicsanyi, Hungarian Compensation Programs Off to a Slow Start,
RFE/RL RES. REP., Mar. 12, 1993, at 49.
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to indemnify former political prisoners has been more successful, but
the $15 per month compensation is essentially symbolic in nature."
Two issues will dominate decommunization efforts in Hungary.
The first involves the arrests in the spring of 1994 of some of those
responsible - including Andras Hegedus, the former Hungarian Prime
Minister - for reprisal murders following the Soviet invasion in
1956.241 Juxtaposed alongside these efforts is the fact that former
communists now comprise a legislative majority.'2
Although there continues to be very little information emanating
from Albania, its Constitutional Court has struck down in its entirety
a "lustration law" that was aimed directly at advocates or private law-
yers.2 3 Whether this ruling is evidence of continued communist influ-
ence or whether the court was relying on more noteworthy judicial
principles remains to be seen. In addition, former Albanian President
Ramiz Alia and nine of his ranking officials were charged and convict-
ed of misappropriating state property and violating the rights and
freedoms of Albanian citizens,2"' despite little evidence of public in-
terest or enlightenment from the trial.2 "6
IV. EVALUATING DECOMMUNIZATION
Decommunization should have five major objectives: 1) to estab-
lish the truth about communist rule; 2) to in some way punish those
responsible for the most egregious crimes; 3) to create institutions that
will assist the process of democratization in the present and serve to
guard against the re-emergence of repression in the future; 4) to ac-
knowledge and compensate former victims; and 5) to begin the desper-
ately needed healing process in these societies.
A. Establishing the Truth
A foremost objective of decommunization should be to establish
the truth about the nature of communist rule publicly. The citizenry
needs to be made aware of the crimes of communist rule, the ideologi-
cal fixations that such regimes had, the means employed by communist
240. Celestine Bohlen, Victims of Hungary's Past Press for an Accounting, but
With Little Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at A3.
241. Jane Perlez, Hungarian Arrests Setting Off Debate: Should Oppressors of
1956 Be Punished?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at A6.
242. Jane Perlez, Communists in Hungary Win Majority, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
1994, at A3. See generally Istvan Deak, Post-post-Communist Hungary, N.Y. REV. OF
BooKs, Aug. 11, 1994, at 33.
243. Kathleen Imholz, A Landmark Constitutional Court Decision in Albania, 2 E.
EUR. CONST. REV. 23 (Summer 1993).
244. Louis Zanga, Albania's Former President Remains Unrepentant, RFEI/RL RES.
REP., July 22, 1994.
245. Id.
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governments to achieve their ends, and finally, who the masterminds
and key operatives behind the repression were.
Uncovering the truths of the nature of communist rule should not,
however, stop here. In addition, the new governments need to expose
the larger truths about the kind of "society" that communist rule creat-
ed. These were societies that made every citizen a victim and any
opposition was considered an enemy. Finally, these were societies in
which duplicity became a way of life.
How can this be achieved? The first step is to create a Truth Com-
mission representing the left and the right, the old order and the new.
The premium here is on public testimony provided by victims of the
old regime. As its name indicates, the purpose of a Truth Commission
would not be to prosecute but instead to attempt to distill the truth
and to present it to the public. Although it is important to look at the
actions of individuals, it is far more important to understand the inner
workings of the larger communist system of governance. As suggested
below, public trials also should have these objectives. In many re-
spects, however, this end will be easier to achieve through the vehicle
of a Truth Commission.
B. Punishing Masterminds and Egregious Human Rights Abusers
Along with the public acknowledgment that communist rule cor-
rupted virtually all aspects of society, the new governments also need
to prosecute individuals who bear the most responsibility for the atroc-
ities of the past. There are several things to note about such trials.
One of the stark lessons that emerges from the Argentine example is
that only the masterminds and the worst offenders should be brought
to trial.246 In addition, the period during which prosecutions are to be
brought should be limited. The new governments should also try to
establish at the outset who will be subject to prosecution, and who will
not be. Finally, no charges should be brought against subordinate
officials unless and until the masterminds of these same crimes have
been charged and convicted.
The new governments must also be aware of the symbolic nature
and truth-telling functions of these trials. While on one level these are
prosecutions against particular individuals for specific crimes, they
really are indictments against the communist system itself. Moreover,
such public trials should serve to bring about a greater understanding
of communist rule and of how society reacted to it. The trials to date
have been disappointing on all of these scores. Rather than using these
trials to illuminate the nature of communist rule and of the society it-
self, all too often the prosecution of former communist officials has
246. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537 (1991).
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degenerated into common and petty proceedings.2 7 In this respect
the model that could be followed are the trials of junta leaders in Ar-
gentina2 and Greece,"5 as well as the recent trial against former
Nazi collaborator Paul Touvier.250 In these cases, public trials of for-
mer national leaders served to greatly inform the public about the
crimes of the junta. Unfortunately, none of the trials that have oc-
curred in Eastern Europe to date has served either of these purposes.
Rather than prosecuting a wide range of communist officials, the
new governments should instead purge those whose behavior during
communist rule was "not what it should have been," to use the rough
standard employed by several countries that had been occupied by the
Nazis during World War II." This could occur in a variety of ways,
either through demotion or the loss of one's job, or the removal of cer-
tain civil, political, and economic rights, depending upon :.he circum-
stances. Because the questionable reports in secret police files will be
heavily relied upon, individuals should be given any benefit of the
doubt. In this process, it also is important to differentiate between
varying levels of complicity. As objectionable as collaboration with the
secret police is, it is different from being a member of the secret police.
It is vital to maintain this distinction. As a final point, the period for
which individuals are to be purged should not be onerously long. In-
stead, it should be long enough to make its point but not so long that
it serves as a festering wound that prevents all citizens from working
toward a better and more decent future.
C. Creating Institutions to Assist the Move to Democracy
Each country must implement measures to prevent a dictatorship
from coming to power again. The institutionalization of a parliamenta-
ry form of government is only one step in that direction. Another is the
creation of a truly independent judiciary and a Constitutional Court. It
is also vital that the former secret police apparatus be dismantled as
quickly and as thoroughly as possible.
Institution building in form is one thing; creating institutions that
function properly is a different matter. The mere "appearance" of de-
mocracy will not suffice. In this regard, lawyers, journalists, and politi-
cians have spent considerable time and energy providing assistance to
East European countries in terms of drafting constitutions and the
247. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
248. For a discussion of this, see supra note 153-54 and accompanying text.
249. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of this, see supra note 54. One of the most noteworthy
aspects of the Touvier trial was how it provided for a "day in court" for the victims
of French collaboration.
251. Vermeylen, supra note 44, at 77.
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like, giving far less time and attention to the actual functioning of
these newly created institutions and/or laws.
D. Acknowledging and Compensating Victims of the Old Older
Thus far, we have only been looking at punishing communist
officials and some collaborators. It is equally important for the new
governments to assist the victims of the old regime in whatever way
possible. One means of accomplishing this has been mentioned above:
to make a concerted effort to give voice to the victims' suffering, either
through the proceedings of a Truth Commission and/or in the course of
public trials. In addition, the new governments should make every
effort to enable the families of the victims to learn about the fate of
their loved ones, no matter when the events in question occurred. Tens
of thousands of individuals died at the hands of communist authorities,
yet far too little is known about the circumstances surrounding most of
these murders. Finally, each of the new governments ought to provide
some form of compensation or indemnification to those who suffered
the most from the old order. Given the poverty of the East European
countries, this will not be an easy task. On the other hand, there is no
reason why international lending institutions and foreign governments
could not assist in this process. 2 Furthermore, the new governments
have not been particularly aggressive in pursuing those who benefitted
economically under communist rule, an important source of funding for
restitution programs.
E. Understanding and Healing
The most essential task facing the new governments in Eastern
Europe is to assist the populations in these countries to understand
the insidious nature of communist rule. People must come to under-
stand how the former dictatorship was able to set person against per-
son and the state against all, under the guise of a new and more uni-
fied social order.
In closing, it would be well to heed the views of Czech author
Milan Kundera: "It seems to me that all over the world people nowa-
days prefer to judge rather than to understand, to answer rather than
to ask . . . ."2 What is needed in Eastern Europe, then, is much less
judgment and far fewer answers, and in their place, far more questions
and a much greater capacity for understanding.
252. For a further discussion of this, see Gibney, supra note 5.
253. Interview with Philip Roth, in MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER




Challenges to Monetary Unification in the
European Union: Sovereignty Reigning
Supreme?
BRIAN K. KURZMANN"
The effort to unify the currencies of Europe and establish a single
European Central Bank has advanced for nearly twenty years. The
most recent push toward monetary union,' embodied in the European
Economic Community's Maastricht Treaty,2 met unexpectedly acute
opposition, both in European courts and from European voters. The
focus of this opposition centered around concerns that currency unifi-
cation and the establishment of a European Central Bank would seri-
ously undermine the sovereignty of individual countries. Although the
Maastricht Treaty has now been ratified,3 its provisions concerning
* J.D., Ohio State University, 1994. The author is grateful to Professor Joanne
Wharton Murphy of the Ohio State University College of Law for making this article
possible.
1. Generally, a "monetary union" is a system of money common to two or more
independent countries. Such a union is characterized by a single currency issued by
a single central bank. The currency is legal tender in all the countries of the union.
See Joseph Gold, International Monetary Fund, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 403, 405 (1988).
2. Treaty on European Union, together with the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). The twelve member
States of the European Union are France, Germany, Britain, Ireland, Italy, Belgium,
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
The Maastricht Treaty, agreed to in December 1991, originally provided that
by 1996, member countries would determine which economies have met the criteria
for unification (inflation, interest rates, deficits, and currency stability), and that on
January 1, 1997, the complying countries would establish a single currency subject
to a two-thirds majority vote. Nancy Louise Kessler, Banking on Europe: 1992 and
EMU, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S395, S424-25 (1992). A single currency would be im-
plemented for those complying countries without a vote on Jan. 1, 1999 (the manda-
tory nature of Treaty). Further, it contained an opt-out clause for Britain. Id. at
S425.
3. The Maastricht Treaty went into effect on November 1, 1993, almost a year
late. National electorates and parliaments delayed ratifying the Treaty, with Germa-
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monetary union remain stalled and may never be implemented as
originally planned. Is monetary union in the European Union (E.U.)
viewed as an undesirable threat to the sovereignty of member coun-
tries or as a necessary step to help bolster that region's economy
against increasing global competition?4
This article examines the current monetary regime in the Europe-
an Union and analyzes the effect of recent legal and political challeng-
es to the attempt to bring about monetary union there. Part I briefly
examines the state of worldwide monetary arrangements and then
considers the forces that have led European nations to seek a union of
their currencies and central banks. Part II explores some basic as-
sumptions, as a matter of national and international law, underlying
worldwide monetary arrangements, and reviews the recent sover-
eignty-centered challenges to these assumptions in Europe. Finally,
Part III analyzes the effect of these challenges on Europe's effort to
bring about monetary union and considers the European experience as
a possible example for other monetary systems.
I. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND MONETARY INTEGRATION
A. National Sovereignty in Worldwide Monetary Arrangments
Every country is the sovereign of its own money.5 There is no
ny being the last country to accept it. Craig R. Whitney, With European Union's
Arrival, Fears on Economy Cast a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at Al.
4. Tremors of this new, fierce economy have unsettled some very stable curren-
cies. In the summer of 1993, Britain and Italy felt compelled, due to speculative
pressures on their currencies, to take the pound sterling and the lira out of the
European Monetary System. "[A] new, brutally competitive world economic order is
emerging with the demise of the cold war. The forces that are propelling this new
order will persist for years and promise to make life toughter for almost every-
one . . . ." Christopher Farrell, et al., What's Wrong? Why the Industrialized Nations
Are Stalled, Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 55. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
Global currency exchange arrangements play a central role. As early as 1981,
French President Francois Mitterand observed that "[t]here is a currency war ....
Today, it is every man for himself. [Maintenance of high interest rates] exacerbates
already dangerous movements of capital .... Since each nation is undergoing a
crisis, they all tend toward egotism. Each country first wants to rescue itself, where-
as they will only be rescued together." Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft Interna-
tional Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INTL L. 443, 478 n. 98 (1981),
quoting TIME, Oct. 19, 1981, at 57.
5. The Permanent Court of International Justice has stated that "it is indeed a
generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency."
Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20, 21, at 44. Furthermore,
the United Nations Charter considers the governance of money to be a matter of
domestic, not international, law. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 461
(5th ed. 1992). Thus, international law recognizes that it is within the sovereign
power of a country to take actions such as defining its own currency, deciding
whether to peg the currency to gold or some other commodity, depreciating or appre-
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central authority that regulates all exchanges of currencies or imposes
uniform monetary policy on all countries.' Yet the international com-
munity has a vital interest in maintaining a smoothly functioning
currency exchange regime,7 and in keeping stable the value of one
currency against another. Thus, there is tension, inherent in the sheer
multiplicity of currencies, between national sovereignty over money
and international interests.8 As B.J. Cohen said,
[slo long as there are politically sovereign states and formally inde-
pendent national currencies, there will be international monetary
problems.9
Over the years, various treaty arrangements have sought to re-
lieve some of these problems. The Bretton Woods System, established
in 1945, pegged currencies to one another by requiring the central
banks of member countries to keep the values of their currencies with-
in a prescribed range.10 This system called for a voluntary transfer of
a certain degree of monetary policy-making and currency exchange au-
thority to the International Monetary Fund, the principal organization
regulating exchange arrangements.1
In the years following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in
1971, member countries of the International Monetary Fund were free
to choose, loosely speaking, whatever exchange arrangements they
ciating the currency's value, imposing exchange controls, and entering into treaties
with other States regarding any of these questions. Id.
Despite "obsolete and extravagant" attempts to limit sovereignty over money,
it is a firmly established principle. Id. at 463. One such attempt was a refusal in
1688 by the Chief Judge of England to give effect to the depreciation of the
Portugese currency, on the view that the Portugese king could not diminish the
value of the property of an English subject. Another attempt was a letter of protest
sent in 1800 by John Marshall, then American Secretary of State, to the
governement of Spain, complaining of Spain's devaluation of its currency. See Id. at
462.
6. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, JOHN A. SPANOGLE, Jr.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS NUTSHELL 118 (1992) [hereinafter FOLSOM].
7. See J.R. Artus & A.D. Crockett, National Sovereignty and International Coop-
eration over Exchange Arrangements, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 327, 328 (1980).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 327, quoting B.J. COHEN, ORGANIZING THE WORLD'S MONEY: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS 273 (1977).
10. The Bretton Woods system was introduced after World War II. See KENNETH
W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 71, 175 (1982). Under the Articles of Agreement to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), member countries ceded a basic power to the IMF: the
requirement that the IMF concur with their individual currency devaluations. Id. at
92. However, the IMF was limited by national sovereignty from interfering with the
economic policies of member countries. Id. at 169.
11. The International Monetary Fund is the organization most lawyers and
economists think of as the world's currency regulator. It is an international organi-
zation created by a treaty, the Articles of Agreement to the IMF. Id. at 71.
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liked. 2 A system of free-floating exchange rates, in which the foreign
exchange market was allowed to set the rates, came to predominate. 3
An important rule that continued to bind national monetary policy-
making in this looser regime, however, was that members could not
intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to "manipulate" the
international value of their currencies.
14
Despite this arrangement, which continues today, the sources of
conflict between national monetary sovereignty and the interests of the
international community persist. It is an axiom of economics that the
goals of capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and national monetary
sovereignty are mutually unachievable. 5 Flexible exchange rate sys-
tems inevitably lead to the risk of volatility in exchange rates and the
existence of persistent misalignments of currency values. This in-
creases the pressure on central banks to intervene in the market to
manipulate currency values for national interests.
Seeking to minimize even these problems, economic and political
leaders have argued for the implementation of a monetary system in-
volving policy coordination among the chief industrialized nations,
combined with exchange rate management "of a degree that has until
now proved elusive." 6 The European Union has taken steps to make
this elusive goal a reality. Part II of this article further explores these
steps. The following section identifies several common assumptions
underlying monetary integration efforts.
12. Id.
13. There are three predominant exchange rate regimes among convertible cur-
rencies: 1) pegged or quasi-pegged arrangements; 2) managed flexibility; and 3) full
flexibility. Dominick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: A Transatlantic
View, ITAL. J. 29, 29 (1990). Managed or fully-flexible systems predominate in four-
fifths of the world. Id. at 29-30.
14. Artus & Crockett, supra note 7, at 332. See generally, Stephen Zamora, Sir
Joseph Gold and the Development of International Monetary Law, 23 INT'L LAW.
1009, 1014-1019 (1989) (tracing the development of international monetary law after
the collapse of the Bretton Woods System).
15. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Efficiency, Stability, and Equity: A Strategy for the
Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community, 1987 (report of
committe chaired by the author), cited in JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGN-
TY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE 202 (1992). This obser-
vation has elsewhere been expressed as "the incompatibility of free trade, full capital
mobility, fixed exchange rates, and national autonomy." Maxwell J. Fry, Monetary
Policy Implementation During Europe's Transition to a Single Currency, in EUROPEAN
BANKING 44, 48 (Andy Mullineux, ed., 1992) [hereinafter Mullineux], quoting H.
Ungerer et al., The European Monetary System: Developments and Perspectives, in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER 73 (1990).
16. Salvatore, supra note 13, at 29.
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B. Legal and Political Assumptions Underlying Monetary Integration
The process of monetary integration can involve either policy
coordination among sovereign nations, on the one hand, or total con-
solidation of central banks and currencies, on the other. Whatever
level of integration is sought, certain assumptions that relate to the
principle of national monetary sovereignty can be identified. These pre-
mises are as follows: 1) that the setting of monetary policy should
remain as independent as possible from political influences; 2) that
monetary sovereignty should yield over time to centralized authority
as economies become more interdependent; and 3) that there is popular
support for monetary integration.
The leaders of the European Union seek to bring about total mon-
etary union by the year 1999 through the implementation of the con-
troversial Maastricht Treaty. The three assumptions underlying mone-
tary union have, consequently, seen legal and political challenges in
the E.U., startling many observers and perhaps even stonewalling the
idea of a single European currency and central bank.
1. The Need to Keep Politics Divorced from Monetary Policy-
Making
Most countries have a hierarchy of organizations that determine
and implement national monetary policy. The top level is a govern-
ment entity, usually a ministry of finance or treasury department,
which sets the outlines of monetary policy based on political consider-
ations. At a lower level is a central bank, usually owned and operated
by the national government, that is responsible for filling in the details
of monetary policy. 7 It is generally agreed that the decisions made by
a central bank should be as independent as possible from political
oversight." The more independent the central bank, the less political
factors - such as the timing of elections, the identity of the party in
control of government, and pressure from interest groups - influence
monetary policy. 9
One common example of how politics influences monetary policy
may be observed around election time.20 Politicians seeking reelection
may want to have interest rates lowered to please voters. To achieve
this, the politicians would require their subservient central bank to
17. FoLsoM, supra note 6, at 124.
18. Scholars have postulated that "economic conditions affect electoral outcomes
and, therefore, that governments attempt to manipulate the economy in order to win
elections. Voters are assumed to be myopic. [This gives] governments an incentive to
stimulate the economy prior to an election." GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 212.
19. Id. at 3-5.
20. Aside from reelection concerns, variations in the level of influence over
central bankers held by different political parties and labor militancy may also
influence monetary policy-making. Id. at 213-14.
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expand the supply of money. The voting public would enjoy the lower
interest rates right up to the election. Thereafter, however, inflation,
the nemesis of any central bank,21 would set in.'
[Ploliticians tend to be far less willing than central bankers to
subordinate other goals, such as growth and employment, to the
fight against inflation."
Practical limitations are also at work. The type of currency ex-
change system in effect largely determines the importance of the inde-
pendence of monetary policy-setting. If a country's currency is part of a
pegged exchange regime, monetary policy cannot have a great impact
because the exchange rate is determined by external controls, making
the degree of political independence of the central bank largely irrele-
vant. Very generally, this was the case under the Bretton Woods Sys-
tem. On the other hand, if a country's currency is part of a flexible ex-
change regime, such as the one that currently predominates, the inde-
pendence of monetary policy-making is relevant, and political indepen-
dence is considered much more important.24 Under flexible rates, cen-
tral bank intervention is discretionary.' Thus, a flexible system plac-
es a premium on the avoidance of political entanglements.
Monetary policy-setting is never totally detached from politics,26
and a measure of political control may even be desirable.27 One of the
best illustrations of advantageous political involvement in monetery
policy-setting is the German unification. In 1989, West Germany's
overriding political objective was unification with East Germany, and
the first step to achieve this was the agreement allowing all East Ger-
mans to exchange their GDR marks for FRG marks, thereby establish-
ing a common currency.' West (and East) German monetary policy
was set by politicians. Political control is also considered desirable in
21. Charles Goodhart, A European Central Bank, in EUROPEAN BANKING 12, 24-
25 (Andy Mullineux ed., 1992).
22. This example is often cited as the most common way that the money supply
is manipulated for political gain. See, e.g., WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEM-
PLE 67 (1987) (describing the Federal Reserve's "pump priming" of the U.S. economy
just prior to the re-election of President Nixon in 1972).
23. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 7.
24. It is generally agreed among the two predominant schools of economics,
Monetarism and Keynesianism, that monetary policy is ineffective in the long run.
However, it is also agreed that it can make a difference in the short run. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 16.
26. See id. at 4.
27. The prominent economist Milton Friedman has explained that a politically
independent central bank, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, is incapable of learning
from its own mistakes. Deepak Lal, Alternative Roads to Economic Integration: The
Case for Currency Competition in European Integration, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
299, 306 (1990).
28. Daniel J. Meandor, Transition in the German Legal Order: East Back to
West, 1990-91, 15 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REv. 283, 285 (1992).
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wartime, when immediate concerns over financing the victory effort by
expanding the money supply take precedence over long-term inflation-
ary concerns.'
While central bank independence therefore appears to be a gener-
ally desirable objective, it is largely irrelevant for countries whose
currencies are pegged. Independence is also curtailed when important
short-term goals must be placed ahead of long-term ones. Absent such
immediate concerns, however, independence currently remains the aim
among nations in the floating exchange regime.
2. The Inevitability of Diluted Monetary Sovereignty
While the politically independent policy-making is still valued, it
is thought to be losing its relevance amidst an increasingly complex
global economy.
The integration of the world's capital markets, driven by a combi-
nation of technological change and financial innovation, has in-
creasingly constrained the ability of central banks to set and imple-
ment their own monetary policies.'
Some observers have concluded that a critical balance has already
been reached between "national sovereignty and international legal
regulation" in currency exchange arrangements.31 After the collapse of
the Bretton Woods System, the United States and several other coun-
tries successfully argued that the soundness of domestic economic
policies should be the main concern of governments,32 and thus "ex-
change rates should be allowed to change freely to accord with changes
in the international position of a country."' Free-floating exchange
rates would provide greater opportunity for autonomous decision-mak-
ing in the sphere of domestic monetary policy.3'
As greater economic integration sweeps the world, the concern
that a proliferation of currencies can lead to economic crisis has led
other observers to conclude that a greater level of monetary integration
is necessary." As trade between economies grows, so does competition
29. See GREIDER, supra note 22, at 98-104.
30. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 5.
31. Gold, supra note 4, at 444. The author of this work is a former General
Counsel of the International Monetary Fund.
32. Id. at 450.
33. Id. at 451.
34. Id. at 451. The current Articles of the International Monetary Fund contain
many provisions that are not firmly binding on its members, and therefore do not
demand wholesale transfers of monetary sovereignty. Id. at 454.
35. For example, after the American Revolution, a devaluation of state bills of
credit occurred. This led to Shays' Rebellion in Massachussetts, in which debtors and
farmers demanded that the state legislature print and issue more paper money than
could be used to pay their existing debts. The Rebellion focused attention on the
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and the desire for predictability in the value of money. To preserve
stability in currency values, closer coordination between monetary
policy-makers is thought necessary.3" It is this closer coordination
between countries that is seen as leading toward an inevitable depri-
vation of national sovereignty over money. "The transfer of functions to
a monetary union involves the corresponding decline of the powers of
the [countries] who become its consituent members."37
In other words, while the status quo may be regarded as preserv-
ing an equilibrium between monetary sovereignty and international
interests, economic interdependence is increasing. An unavoidable
companion of this quickening change is the weakening of national
autonomy over decisions about currency exchange rates and monetary
policy.
3. The Perception of Popular Support for Monetary Integration
It is sometimes claimed by political leaders that no matter what
type of monetary arrangement a country utilizes, it is an arrangement
that was democratically determined and enjoys broad popular support.
Although this claim does not necessarily relate to monetary sovereign-
ty per se, it does express an assumption of democratic values when
fundamental changes in monetary arrangements, such as currency
unification, are considered.
While popular support for monetary integration is impossible to
quantify precisely, a rough estimate can be gained through looking at
a variety of indicators: 1) electoral evidence of the level of support for
monetary integration; 2) skepticism about the democratic basis of the
integration efforts; and 3) current downturns in the local economy and
the reemergence of nationalism. These indicators bear relevance in
examining the current European effort to achieve monetary union, and
will be explored below.
II. THE EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE
Before exploring how the three assumptions of monetary union
have come under attack in Europe, it is useful to examine the path
that the European Union has taken in seeking monetary union, and to
need for monetary uniformity in the new American republic. State Attempts to Tax
Sales of Gold Coin and Bullion in the United States: The Constitutional Implications,
5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 297, 302 (1982). In Federalist 44, Madison argued that
without a prohibition on the issuance of state currencies, competition between state
currencies would have a disuniting effect, and the new nation would lose foreign
credibility. See id. at 304.
36. Salvatore, supra note 13, at 29. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the importance of currency stability in a common market such as
the European Union.
37. MANN, supra note 5, at 508-09.
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look at where the E.U. is headed with the Maastricht Treaty.
A. The European Monetary System
Part and parcel of the European Union's establishment of a single
common market' is its interest in maintaining currency stability
among its members." The European Monetary System is the institu-
tion that was designed to achieve this.40 It is the second of three
phases of monetary cooperation that have existed in Europe since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods System.4' The third and final phase,
European Monetary Union, remains to be implemented pursuant to
the Maastricht Treaty.
The current phase, the European Monetary System, can be techni-
cally described as "an agreement among central banks to manage
intracommunity exchange rates and to finance exchange market inter-
ventions."42 It has two independent mechanisms for maintaining cur-
rency stability: the parity grid and the divergence indicator. The parity
grid measures the behavior of one member country's currency against
another's. To do this, the desired exchange rate of each currency is set
against every other currency by agreement. These bilateral rates serve
as reference points for fluctuating daily market rates, establishing the
upper and lower limits within which market rates are allowed to move.
Member countries' central banks are required to intervene to keep
their currencies within these pre-set bands,4" and the countries have
38. By the mid-1980's, the member countries of the European Union considered
the establishment of a new, more sweeping monetary regime essential to their na-
tional economic objectives. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 182.
39. "Establishment of a common market involves removal of obstacles to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital." DAVID M. BARNARD, The Evolving
Pace of Regulation of the Financial Services Industry in the European Community,
Jan. 14-15, 1993, § 2.1(b), INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKET 1993: CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES (1993).
Exchange-rate instability has adverse effects on intra-European capital
movements and monetary integration. If foreign exchange rates fluctuate
by more than 20% or 30%, investment becomes uncertain and uncompet-
itive, with the adverse result of reduced output and fewer jobs in affect-
ed industries. Pressure could grow for protectionism, which would jeop-
ardize the liberalization of trade in goods and services. Currency stabili-
ty, on the other hand, fosters price stability.
John H. Works, Jr., The European Currency Unit: The Increasing Significance of the
European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail, 41 BUS. LAW. 483 n.4 (1986).
40. See GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 183.
41. The first phase, the European Exchange Rate Agreement, existed from 1972
to 1979. Id. at 182.
42. Id. at 192.
43. To do this, the central bank whose currency is near the top of its range
against another currency must sell its overvalued currency and buy the undervalued
one, in order to decrease the value of its own money. The opposite is true for the
central bank whose currency is near the bottom of its range; it must buy its own
currency and sell the other. Works, supra note 39, at 493-94.
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a duty to see that the parities between their currencies remain rela-
tively fixed. The system is thus a type of pegged exchange arrange-
ment.
The divergence indicator, on the other hand, is designed to pro-
vide a measure of the behavior of one country's currency against the
weighted average of all the other currencies. This weighted average is
the well-known European Currency Unit (ECU)," which itself is
sometimes inaccurately portrayed as a currency. In fact, it is not legal
tender; it is merely a unit of account "containing a specific amount of
[each ofi the ... European currencies."45 If an exchange rate imbal-
ance shows up under the divergence indicator,
[r]ather than two currencies being at fault, as in the grid system,
one country only is to blame for the ECU divergence, and the re-
sponsibility of adjustment is place entirely on it."
Participation in both the parity grid and the divergence indicator is
ultimately voluntary.47
It is apparent that when currencies in this system are not exces-
sively strained by market pressures, the parity grid and the divergence
indicator keep monetary policies in line with E.U. goals. Yet these two
devices have proven to be inadequate when overpowering market
forces put the integrity of one country's currency at stake. In 1992,
Britain and Italy felt compelled to remove their currencies from the
European Monetary System entirely." Because of the voluntariness of
the current exchange regime, and the instability that it has brought,
E.U. leaders have wanted to make the requirements of harmonious
monetary policy-making and exchange rate stability firmly binding on
all member countries.
EMS rules allow the central banks to buy or sell other European Union
member currencies before the limits of their bilateral bands have been reached (al-
though this action must first receive the approval of the central bank whose currecy
is so affected), and intervention in non-EC currencies is always allowed without prior
approval. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 193.
44. "The ECU ... is used as a benchmark against which official exchange-rate
parities are set, as a measure of the overall strength or weakness of a currency
against the average of the rest, and as the unit of account for interventtion, credit
support, and settlement between the monetary authorities of the member states."
Works, supra note 39, at 484.
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id. at 495.
47. So ruled the European Court of Justice in Schlfiter v. Hauptzollamt lAbrrach,
[1973] E.C.R. 1135, 1161.




B. The Maastricht Treaty and the Leap Toward Monetary Union
The treaties that created the European Union did not originally
envisage a common monetary institution.49 Yet the leaders of the
E.U., in an effort to eliminate remaining transactional frictions, have
sought in recent years to achieve a full unification of currencies, called
European Monetary Union (EMU).' The last step toward this union
is the monetary integration provided for in the Maastricht Treaty.
Maastricht sets three goals for the establishment of a new monetary
regime: 1) creation of a single European Central Bank; 2) implementa-
tion of uniform foreign exchange policies; and 3) creation of a single
currency.5 EMU would be mandatory for all E.U. members.
The single European Central Bank (ECB) called for in Maastricht
would set monetary policy for the entire E.U., and "would be empow-
ered to enforce binding rules on national budgets."52 The Bank would
be independent of national governments and even E.U. authorities."
Individual central banks would continue to exist in a European System
of Central Banks, which would be comprised of the main ECB and the
national central banks together.5' Individual countries' central banks
would not be eliminated, but would become subordinate to, and func-
49. The Treaty of Rome, which established the E.U., did not create or envision a
supranational monetary institution. Articles 104 and 107 of that treaty laid down
the general requirement that member countries should maintain equilibrium in
balance of payments and should give due regard to each others' exchange rates.
Additions to the Treaty, such as the Single Euorpean Act, still did no more than set
forth general policy statements to be followed. See MANN, supra note 5, at 501.
50. The stages leading to EMU are as follows: 1) Close coordination of economic
policies of member states; 2) Beginning January 1, 1994, the prohibition of any
restriction on the movement of capital and payments, not only among member states
but also between states and third-party states, restrictions on government deficits,
the gradual establishment of the independence of each state's central bank (Arts.
109b and 108 of the EC Treaty), and treatment of exchange rate policy by each
state as a matter of common interest (Art. 109m, para. 1); 3) Beginning January 1,
1999, at the latest, adoption of a single monetary policy and a single exchange rate
policy. See GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 202-08.
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at 203. Fiscal controls are thought to be a necessary part of EMU's
integrated scheme because of the ripple effect that deficit spending in one country
could have on the other countries. In general, a government that over-borrows to
finance a budget deficit faces higher interest rates and a fall in the value of its
currency. But under EMU, E.U. countries will have none of their own currencies to
support. Consequently, an over-borrowing government would have no concern over
the possibility of a rise in domestic interest rates. Instead, any interest rate in-
creases from unilateral deficit spending will be spread out over the whole E.U. See
Shades of Sovereignty, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 1990, at 69.
53. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 204.
54. David Folkerts-Landau & Peter M. Garber, The ECB: A Bank or a Monetary
Policy Rule?, in ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL BANK: ISSUES IN EUROPE AND LESSONS
FROM THE U.S., 103 n.1 (Matthew B. Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli & Paul R. Masson
eds. 1992).
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tionaries of, the central bank of the E.U.
Maastricht's single currency would be the ECU, which would
evolve from its present form as a unit of account to having the full
status of legal tender. The E.U.'s Council of Ministers, acting pursuant
to the unanimous vote of the member countries, would be empowered
to take all necessary steps to introduce the ECU as the sole currency,
and would have the power to establish ECU exchange rate arrange-
ments with other currencies.55 At least one non-member of the Euro-
pean Union, Sweden, has expressed its confidence in the ECU as legal
tender by pegging its currency to it.5
EMU is thus intended to have the practical characteristics of a
single currency, brought on and maintained by common monetary and
exchange rate policies set by the ECB. With national central banks
giving up "their right to formulate independent national monetary poli-
cies,"57 however, serious concerns have arisen over the priority of na-
tional economic interests and the loss of national sovereignty.' These
concerns pattern the assumptions of monetary integration examined
above.
III. LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN MONETARY
INTEGRATION
A. Questioning the Need to Keep Politics Divorced From Monetary
Policy-Making
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the particular
objective of each central bank of the European Union depended not on
the goals of the E.U. but on "the relationship between the central bank
and the [individual] government."5" Some central banks are almost
totally independent, while others are far more controlled. Notwith-
standing the E.U.'s aim of creating a single central bank unbridled by
political influences, the reality is that central bank independence has
remained a contentious issue. Although the cost on a E.U. member of
pursuing monetary policies divergent from those of the E.U. has ris-
en, pressures against separating politics from monetary policy have
also emerged. The real question is, should the ECB remain as politi-
cally independent from the E.U. and the currencies of the member
countries as the central banks of the member countries are now?
55. Art. 9; see 826-27.
56. Robert Taylor, Sweden and the EC; Sweden Comes in from the Cold, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 1991, § 1, at 21.
57. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 204, quoting Karl Otto Pohl, Two Monetary Un-
ions-the Bundesbank's View, Speech to the Institute for Economic Affairs, London,
July 2, 1990.
58. See id. at 219.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 183.
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A paradigm for the political independence of the ECB has been
the German central bank, the Bundesbank. One of the most indepen-
dent central banks in the world," it wields more control over its own
domestic monetary policy than any other central bank in Europe. 2
The Bundesbank also exerts enormous influence on the central banks
of other E.U. members.' With the example of the Bundesbank in
mind, some central bankers have accepted that the future ECB should
also be politically independent." Independence from political influenc-
es has been built into the proposed statutes of the ECB," and now
that Frankfurt, home of the Bundesbank, has also been chosen for the
home of the ECB, political independence in European monetary policy-
making is virtually assured.'
Yet the hope for a politically independent ECB has done little to
divert the attention of the existing central banks from their chief con-
cern: their domestic economies. A recent refusal by the Bundesbank "to
lower its discount rate one more time ... underscores the unwilling-
ness of European countries to sacrifice national economic interests for
the good of all Europe." 7 When the Bundesbank has considered the
monetary policy of the E.U., "it has done so largely to investigate the
impact of external economic factors on German inflation.' 8 The
Bundesbank is not a friend of European Monetary Union:
[It] has played the role of leading dissident over the establishment
of a single European currency .... The Bundesbank stands to lose
everything if Maastricht is implemented as planned .... It man-
aged to set the admission criteria for nations wanting to join a
single currency so high as to be almost impossible to fulfill.'
61. See generally id.
62. Other important European central banks enjoy far less independence. The
Banque de France, for example, is fully dependent on the government; it is effective-
ly an agent of the French Finance Ministry. Id. at 104. This dependence in France
prevented the emergence of a powerful internal opponent to the government's
growth-oriented strategy. Id. at 139.
63. One economist has observed that the current European Monetary System is
essentially "'an agreement by France and Italy to accept German leadership in
monetary policy, imposing constraints on [their] domestic monetary and fiscal pol-
icies.'- Id. at 195-96.
64. See, e.g., Lamont Says UK Accepts Independent EC Central Bank, REUTERS,
Nov. 21, 1991.
65. Nieck Ammerlaan, Frankfurt.Based EMI to Inherit Bundesbank Policies,
REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., Oct. 29, 1993.
66. Id.
67. Lawrence Ingrassia & Peter Gumbel, Changing the Rules: Europe's Money
Move May Pave Way to Rise in the Global Economy, WALL ST. J., August 2, 1993,
at Al.
68. Peter Gumbel, Germany's Neighbors Are Bridling At Its Apparent Inward
Turning, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1993, at A10. German inflation, brought on by the
high costs of German unification, has repeatedly been cited as the single biggest
factor in causing the ERM to buckle.
69. Id.
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Top central bank officials in Europe have criticized the Maastricht
Treaty on the grounds that it should do more to bring about political
union in the E.U., ostensibly to ensure that the ECB remains indepen-
dent from member country politics.70 But political union would mean
the loss of all national control over monetary policy. Many politicians
resist giving up control over their monetary policy, because that would
leave them powerless to use monetary policy to achieve domestic
goals." There is evidence that some politicians are happy with the
status quo, or are at least retreating from full-fledged support for ced-
ing further political controls over monetary policy to the E.U.72 Since
the choice of the currency exchange regime has great influence on
whether independent monetary policy-making can have effectiveness
domestically, and offers political gains, politicians have wanted to
retain that choice. Politicians worry that once a single currency is es-
tablished, they will lose their power to devalue their own currencies,
power which has often been used to increase exports and curb trade
deficits.7 3
The operation of market forces has called the value of ECB inde-
pendence into question. In the wake of turmoil in the European cur-
rency markets during the summer of 1993,74 there are renewed
doubts about the effectiveness of politically independent monetary poli-
cy-making. In the 1993 devaluations, small changes in perceived ex-
change rate risk caused massive currency shifts, and the market re-
sponse overwhelmed the ability of the central banks to intervene as
required.76 Two governments felt compelled to withdraw their curren-
cies from the European Monetary System in an effort to reduce the
strain on their central banks, which had been required to repurchase
vast quantities of their own money. The biggest threat to effective ECB
policy-making appears, somewhat ironically, to be the demonstrated
fragility of fixed exchange rates.
70. Id.
71. For a discussion of how monetary policy is ineffective in a system of fixed
exchange rates, see supra note 24; see also, Goodhart, supra note 21, at 24-27.
72. See infra note 102. As to capitalizing on favorable economic conditions,
European politicians do not, on one view, have a direct interest in shaping monetary
policy. The "dates of elections in many European countries are not fixed, govern-
ments are able to call early elections so as to take advantage of existing economic
expansions." Thus, while politicians may not care about creating monetary expan-
sions themselves, there is still an incentive for using expansions for political gain.
GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 212.
73. Frederick Painton, Cold Feet on the Dance Floor: With Britain Joining
Europe's Monetary Club, the Partners may Squabble even Louder about how closely
to Embrace one Another, TIME, Oct. 22, 1990, at 55.
74. The predetermined bands in which currencies were allowed to fluctuate had
to be widened as a result of massive devaluations. See Michael Sesit, Currency
Markets Cool Despite Loosened ERM, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 993, at C1.
75. Fry, supra note 15, at 48.
VOL. 23:1
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION
While the proposed independence of the ECB is generally en-
dorsed by central banks, the same central banks do not have a vested
interest in implementing that independence. Central banks, politicians,
and even the marketplace remain focused on the performance and
well-being of domestic affairs. This will make it difficult to divorce
national concerns from monetary policy-making throughout the E.U. as
planned under Maastricht.
B. Legal Challenges to the Dilution of National Monetary Sovereignty
While the issue of central bank independence at the national level
centers around the question of who should control the formation of
monetary policy, the same issue at the European level centers around
the effort to preserve national monetary sovereignty.76 Maastricht
calls for an unprecedented shift of sovereignty in monetary affairs
away from national central banks and even from governments.77 How
realistic is the concern that monetary union threatens the integrity of
national sovereignty, and what has been the effect of this concern?
Unquestionably, members of the European Union have gradually
lost their autonomy over monetary policy as the Union has grown, 8
but, as seen above, "each government has still wished to keep for itself
some margin of policy flexibility."7" Current discussions of EMU often
do not characterize it as a union of money at all. EMU is described as
a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates involving a common mone-
tary policy. The proposed common currency is said, under this
characterization, not to be essential to this system, but is instead
merely a natural and desirable further development. This latter expla-
nation does not bypass concerns about the surrender of monetary sov-
ereignty; it merely rephrases the issue.' The principal architect of
European economic and political integration, European Union Presi-
dent Jacques Delors, makes no secret of his view that "[a] high degree
of supra-nationality, or transfer of sovereignty to the [Union], is essen-
tial."8 '
As a consequence of the concern surrounding sovereignty loss,
legal challenges have been mounted against further unification of
Europe's currencies. In Germany, twenty separate lawsuits were
brought to the German high court82 by right and left wing elements of
76. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 207-08.
77. Id. at 182-83.
78. Penny-Marie Kartos, Note, Sweden-Application for European Community
Membership-Sweden Fears Loss of Political Neutrality with Community Membership,
22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 673 (1992).
79. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 183; see Salvatore, supra note 13, at 32.
80. MANN, supra note 5, at 16, n.69.
81. Quoted in John Ardagh, Will the New Europe Please Sit Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1991, at A42.
82. German Supreme Court Approves Maastricht Treaty, THE REUTER EUROPEAN
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German politics. These suits claimed that Germany's constitution,
which declares that all of the country's power emanates from the peo-
ple, prevents the government from transferring a significant amount of
monetary authority to the E.U." In its decision, the court approved
the German ratification of Maastrichts' but with important reserva-
tions. According to the court, each further step toward EMU must be
monitored and approved by the German government, with the court re-
serving for itself the right to review each step to ensure that the demo-
cratic guidelines of the German constitution are observed.' Most sig-
nificantly, the court's decision affirmed the principle of sovereignty
over the process of monetary integration, up to and including the right
to withdraw from the EMU at any time.
The judgment of the German high court cuts the heart out of the
effort to make monetary integration "irreversible."8 As one prominent
observer professor concluded from this decision,
I doubt whether many of us will ever live to see the [Deutschmark]
replaced by the ECU. After this decision, Europe will never become
a super-state. The constitutional court will always remain our final
guardian in what has turned out to be a preventive ruling. 7
At the least, the decision places a cloud over further steps to bring
Maastricht into force. At worst, it will lead to a permanent judicial
veto over German accession to EMU.
Similar constitutional challenges were brought in France and
Denmark. The French constitutional court decided its case by ruling
that Maastricht's monetary unification provisions are contrary to the
French constitution." It analyzed the objective of EMU 9 and con-
cluded that
COMMUNITY REPORT, Oct. 12, 1993.
83. Christopher Wolf & Klaus Kohler, Currency Crisis Means New Ills for
Maastricht, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 6, 1993, at S14. The conservatives essentially argued
that Maastricht would undermine German sovereignty, while the liberals claimed
that the Treaty did not establish enough control over the unelected branches of the
European Union, the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Id. For a discussion
of the Democracy Deficit in the European Union, see infra note 115.
84. The decision was handed down on Tuesday, October 12, 1993.
85. The thrust of the argument advanced in the lawsuits was that Maastricht
violated the provision in the German constitution stating that "[aill state power
emanates from the people." Wolf & Kohler, supra note 83.
86. Timothy Garton Ash, Foreign Focus: Today Even the Germans are Euro-
skeptical, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 24, 1993, at 22.
87. Id.
88. See Juliane B. Kokott, Treaty on European Union is contrary to French
Consitution- amendments to Constitution-national sovereignty, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 824
(1992) (noting Decision No. 92-308 DC. 1992 Journal Officiel de la Republique
Francaise 5354, Conseil constitutionnel, April 9, 1992).
89. Embodied in art. B and G of Maastricht and art. 2 of the EC Treaty.
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it follows from the provisions applicable from the start of the third
stage of the economic and monetary union that the accomplishment
of such an objective shall be brought about by a single monetary
and a single exchange rate policy under circumstances such as to
deprive a Member State of its powers in an area where the essen-
tial conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty are in-
volved.'
After this decision, the French National Assembly adopted the neces-
sary amendments to the French Constitution to remove this flaw, and
ratification of Maastricht was narrowly approved." A suit was filed in
Denmark as well,' despite Danish approval of Maastricht in a second
referendum after Denmark was exempted from monetary unification.
This shows that the same constitutional concerns cross many borders.
Finally, Britain nearly saw its own constitutional challenge. Lord
Rees-Mogg, a prominent actor in financial circles, had considered
bringing a challenge against Maastricht in the Appeal Court, again on
the grounds of its inconsistency with national sovereignty. He changed
his mind only after the fierce currency speculation in the summer of
1993 caused the ERM to lose stability, diluting the sovereignty threats
he saw.93 The Bank of England has expressed similar doubts about
the validity under the English constitution of the transfer of ownership
of foreign reserve assets to the European Central Bank. The Bank of
England believes it is sufficient if each central bank agrees to make
available a predetermined amount of its own reserves for the disposal
of the ECB, but that no further decision-making authority be trans-
ferred.'
Despite such challenges within their own jurisdictions, E.U. law
obligates member countries to facilitate the achievement of E.U. objec-
90. Kokott, supra note 88, at 827 (noting Decision No. 92-308 DC. 1992 Journal
Officiel de la Republique Francaise 5354, Conseil constitutionnel, April 9, 1992). Spe-
cifically, the French court held the following provisions to be contrary to the French
Constitution: Art. B of Maastricht (insofar as it provides for the establishment of an
economic and monetary union); Art. G of the EC Treaty (insofar as the requirement
of irrevocably fixed exchange rates is inserted into it); Arts. 105 para. 2, 105a, 107,
109 (referring to the European Central Bank and to the European Central Bank
System); and Arts. 109g, 1091 para. 4 (establishing an irrevocably fixed value of the
ECU and irrevocably fixing exchange rates between member countries). See id.
91. Id. at 828.
92. See Maastricht Sail On, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 15.
93. Britain OK's European Union Treaty, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 1993, at 13. For a
description of the dynamics of recent speculative attacks on the weaker currencies in
the ERM, see John S. Suits, To Save the European Union, Create New ERM, Minus
Mark, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 6, 1993, at A18. In 1992, Britain and Italy
pulled out of the EMS, also due to speculative pressures. This resulted in the mar-
gin of fluctuation in the divergence indicator being raised from 2.25 percent to 15
percent, meaning that currencies could lose as much as 15 percent of their previous
value relative to the strongest currencies in the system.
94. Goodhart, supra note 21, at 17.
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tives, including the implementation of EMU.95 For now, the members
remain free to alter their exchange rates." Given the serious legal
impediments to Maastricht now in place in Germany, a country that is
an indispensible player in European monetary integration, it is quite
likely that the .legal challenges against Maastricht's monetary union
provisions have put off monetary union indefinitely.
C. Challenges to the Perception of a Popular Support for Monetary
Integration
The legal challenges to currency unification question whether
there are constitutional limits on the transfer of sovereign powers of
monetary decision-making. Concurrent challenges posed by shifting
political attitudes question whether sovereignty should be relinquished
for reasons of national pride, apprehension, or skepticism, and whether
Maastricht actually represents the wishes of Europeans.
1. Electoral Evidence of the Level of Support for Monetary
Union.
While the governments of most members of the European Union
have officially supported the creation of a single currency,97 many
mainstream leaders, notably former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher," Jacques Chirac in France, and the Social Democrats in
Germany, have taken positions opposed to further monetary integra-
tion.99 Even parties that previously gave their full support to mone-
95. Article. 5, e.g. , emphasizes loyalty and solidarity among member states.
96. Cases before the European Court of Justice confirm this view. In Compagnie
d'Appprovisionnement de Transport et de Credit S.A. v. Commission, Joined Cases 9
and 11/71, 1972 E.C.R. 391, 406, C.M.L.R. 529, the court held that "Jilt is clear from
Article 107 that it is for each Member State to decide upon any alteration in the
rate of exchange of its currency under the conditions laid down by that provision."
1972 E.C.R. at 406. See Works, supra note 39.
97. Stephen George, European Community, in THE OXFORD COMPANION To
POLITICS OF THE WORLD 285, 287 (1993).
98. Before leaving office, Thatcher denounced the "specter of a 'European super-
state, exercising a new dominance from Brussels." GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 207
n.59
99. Kevin Muehring, EMU's Bitter Medicine - Tough Rules May Discourage Mem-
bership, INST'L INVESTOR, April 30, 1992, at 37. The Social Democrats in Germany
later softened their position into an insistence for an opt-out provision similar to
Britain's. Former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Poehl agreed in principle with
Margaret Thatcher about the loss of sovereignty, but he did think that monetary
union should be implemented when all member States in the E.U. were capable of
fixing their exchange rates. Randall Mikkelsen, Poehl Says Thatcher was Right on
Monetary Union, REUTER LIBRARY REP., Nov. 30, 1990.
Concerns of politicians about sovereignty loss in monetary policy-making have
been expressed before. During negotiations of amendments to the articles of the
International Monetary Fund, spokesmen for the U.S. administration said that they
did not want "supranational government" running the U.S. economy, and that there
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tary union have significantly toned down their enthusiasm."° Voters
are of the opinion that if they put a different political party in office,
the successor government will, at least initially, seek as much autono-
my from international constraints as possible.'"
European electorates have shown a consistent level of opposition
to further monetary union. In Denmark, Maastricht was originally
rejected in a referendum, a rejection viewed as the embodiment of
fears over the loss of national self-determination. 2 Only after Den-
mark successfully negotiated exemptions from some of Maastricht's
provisions, including the currency unification requirement, did Danish
voters accept the Treaty in a second referendum.' 3 The Danish expe-
rience brought the debate about the efficacy of monetary union to the
forefront of European politics, where it has remained. Not long thereaf-
ter, French voters similarly came close to rejecting the Maastricht
Treaty.'O'
To Germans, the loss of their beloved Deutschmark to the ECU
implies higher inflation."° This feeling is a "common culture in the
general orientation of the economy," said Hans Tietmeyer, now
Bundesbank President, who is warmer to the idea of EMU than his
predecessor Helmut Schlesinger, but who is not likely to sacrifice the
stability of the mark for it."° The Social Democratic Party could, ac-
cording to one German politician, lead the rallying cry for anti-EMU,
pro-Deutschmark in the 1994 federal elections."° A recent poll
showed that only 50% of Germans supported Maastricht, and that 70%
believed that the Deutschmark cannot be replaced with the ECU.'"
The political risks of Maastricht at the hands of voters are best
exemplified in Britain. There, voters have expressed sustained criti-
cism, even outrage, over the behavior of their political leaders toward
should be no "substantial limitation on the sovereign right of nations to determine
their policies." Gold, supra note 4, at 459.
100. See, e.g., Tyler Marshall, In Germany, One of Unity's Biggest Backers Backs
Off, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A3 (describing the German Christian Democratic
Party's toning down of support for European integration, but adding that the party
still fully supports monetary integration in principle).
101. Gold, supra note 4, at 478.
102. Hilary Barnes, The Edinburgh Summit: Danish "No" Voters Start to Wobble,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at 3.
103. See Alan Riding, Unity for Europe Survives Key Test as the Danes Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1993, at Al.
104. See id.
105. Muehring, supra note 99, at 37. A social psychologist even speculated that
abandonment of the Deutschmark might deprive Germans of their identity to the
degree that it would affect their behavior unpredictably. Id.
106. Watcher on the Main, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 80.
107. See Ash, supra note 86.
108. Marcus Kabel, German Court Approves Maastricht, Bonn Pleased, REUrTER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Oct. 12, 1993.
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monetary union. Prime Minister John Major gambled his political
career when he supported Maastricht. Continued opposition in Parlia-
ment, echoing the original concerns of Margaret Thatcher, nearly cost
Major his position. More recently, the Prime Minister has significantly
changed his stance on monetary union. He now believes that "the
[E.U.] will remain a union of sovereign states. That is what its people
want: To take decisions through their own parliaments.""°
In France, polls show that a clear majority would now vote to
reject Maastricht, and only a third of the people now believe that
France can benefit further from continued European integration. °
Insistence on monetary union is also giving pause to countries that
have been considering entry into the European Union and have other-
wise shown confidence in the E.U.'s goals. Austria, Sweden, Finland,
and Norway began negotiating their entry into the E.U. in 1993."'
Swedish opposition to their country's membership has grown since
then. Swedes share a concern that E.U. membership will endanger
their unique welfare state."2
The short-term political future paints an uncertain picture for the
Maastricht Treaty. Voters in Europe, especially in this recession, are
increasingly electing political fringes that share a resentment for fur-
ther European integration. A French observer foresees an unholy alli-
ance between the extremes of the right and left, united to oppose
EMU-induced policies. "The National Front accuses the French elite of
sacrificing French identity for the sake of European integration, while
on the left the. . . Communists" also oppose EMU. " 3 In Italy, a vir-
tual prerequisite to EMU is massive spending cuts and privatizations
of large chunks of the public sector. The government would, in doing
so, quite literally be putting itself out of a job, all in the name of
Maastricht and monetary union.""
2. Skepticism About the Democratic Basis of Maastricht
If the potential political fallout from a perceived loss of monetary
sovereignty does not bode well for monetary union under Maastricht,
then concerns that the Treaty lacks a democratic basis may spell cer-
tain doom for it. Students of European Union law are aware of the
"Democracy Deficit" that plagues E.U. institutions.' With the ad-
109. European Union: Crisis Revives Controversy Between Federalists and Union-
ists, EUR. REP., Oct. 2, 1993, No. 1890.
110. Germany, France and the Merry-Go-Round, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1993, at
49.
111. Riding, supra note 103.
112. Kartos, supra note 78, at 673. Possibly 45 percent of Swedes now oppose full
E.U. membership, while only 14 percent opposed entry at the time Sweden's mem-
bership application was submitted. Id.
113. Muehring, supra note 99, at 37.
114. Id.
115. For a description of the Democracy Deficit, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Transfor-
VOL. 23:1
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION
vance of a politically independent ECB, this Deficit may also come to
plague the ideal of E.U. level monetary policy-making."' Further-
more, Europeans increasingly see politicians and bureaucrats as oper-
ating on a double standard, telling their constituencies that they will
not pursue monetary union if it is not in the national best interest,
while pressing relentlessly for further union behind closed doors.
A stinging criticism of Maastricht is that it will add an unbear-
able burden to the regulations and costs of the E.U., at a time when
competitiveness is declining and unemployment is rising. The Treaty
does not, according to Lord Rees-Mogg, "square well with the real
Europe." 1 7 Similar anti-EMU cries were heard from business leaders,
most strikingly from ones who were pro-EMU not long ago.'
An even sharper criticism is that the public feels that it has been
mislead over the years by politicians who made clear promises not to
relinquish national monetary sovereignty, even as they were "system-
atically undermining it."" 9 Although the process of European inte-
gration is often described as enjoying broad popular support,"2 recent
mation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2466-74 (1991). This article describes the
Democracy Deficit as the ability of the unelected branches of the E.U., the Commis-
sion and the Council, to pass legislation usurping laws passed by national parlia-
ments, as well as the comparative lack of political power in the only elected E.U.
body, the European Parliament. See also EUROPEAN BANKING, supra note 15, at 1-9;
John Ardagh, Will the New Europe Please Sit Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at
42 (describing the power of Jacques Delors, the unelected President of the European
Commission, as "equal" to that of the twelve heads of Europe who appointed him).
116. See Mullineux, supra note 15, at 1-9. A second Inter-Governmental Confer-
ence was convened in December 1990 to discuss this issue, i.e., who should appoint
the board of the independent ESCB and to whom it should be accountable.
117. William Rees-Mogg, At the Unhealthy Heart of Europe, THE TIMES (London),
Monday June 14, 1993, at 16.
118. Muehring, supra note 99, at 37.
119. Margot Norman, We Are Good Europeans After All, THE TIMES (London),
Sept. 21, 1993, at Features section. In Europe, there has not been any serious
defense of economic nationalism since the collapse of Bretton Woods. Instead, gov-
ernments, at least in Britain, have pushed constantly for integration. Bill Jamieson,
Economic Agenda: Britain: The Lesson of our History, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, May 23,
1993, at 40.
120. Newspapers report that at the start of 1993 there was a growing feeling
that monetary union was well on course. See, e.g., John Palmer, Advocates of EMU
Take Heart From Germany's Economic Problems, GUARDIAN CITY PAGE, Jan. 28,
1993, at 13. These accounts describe statements by politicians that imply solid
support for EMU. For example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany was reported as
saying that an accelerated schedule for EMU "was needed in part to prevent 'any
slowing down in the timetable for EMU.' Id.
Commentators also described Maastricht as being well on course politically.
For example, "[i]f a member state withdraws from the EMS, [it suggests] a step
back from the process of European integration - a process that, by the 1980's, had
acquired broad popular appeal." GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 200. Two economists
observed that "membership in the EMS has been invested with enormous political
importance at the very highest levels of government." Id., quoting Jeffrey Sachs &
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events cast serious doubt upon this view. The E.U. is now realizing
that politicians have taken voter support for Maastricht for grant-
ed."' In Germany, for example, polls indicate that "[miost ordinary
Germans... are furious at not being consulted about Maastricht in a
referendum similar to the ones held in France, Denmark and Ireland.
Faced with the choice, as they see it, of keeping the German economy
afloat or keeping European idealism afloat, German interests clearly
win out."'22
At the extreme, this sentiment has given rise to the notion that
officials and ministers in both national governments and in the E.U.
actively conspired to say one thing to their people and another thing to
each other."2 "Governments in Europe are paying the price of a lack
of open government and democratic debate on their European poli-
cies, "24 seen by some as a fatal defect in Maastricht. Lord Rees-Mogg
stated that "[tihe strange thing about the Maastricht treaty - and one
of its greatest weaknesses - is that it will remove the control of Euro-
pean economic policy from the European national parliaments and
transfer power to non-elected European bodies, particularly the Euro-
pean central bank."'25 The German high court, in allowing Germany
to sign Maastricht, observed that
[iut is of decisive importance that the democratic basis of union
should keep pace with integration and that a vital democracy
should be maintained as the integration ... continues.126
3. Current Downturns in the European Economy and the
Reemergence of Nationalism.
European politicians and intellectuals who favor EMU suggest
that the long period of relative prosperity during the Cold War has
made Europeans unwilling to pull together and face the challenges of
the future.'27 Europeans place their own well-being ahead of utopian
Charles Wyplosz, The Economic Consequences of President Mitterand, in ECONOMIC
POLICY 2, 294-95 (1986). Such descriptions cannot be viewed as embodying the senti-
ment of most European voters today.
121. The theme of a recent international conference held by an organization called
the "Europeaum" was that "[wlith the exception of Britain, governments and admin-
istrators of the member states, spurred on by the Commission in Brussels, have
acted alone, taking for granted the commitment to Europe of their peoples." Norman,
supra note 119 (quoting Professor Jean Chariot).
122. Gumbel, supra note 68, at A10.
123. "[The conspiracy among officials and ministers to say one thing to each oth-
er and another to their national publics was so close to second nature that the
problem of public consent was taken for granted." Norman, supra note 119 (quoting
William Wallace).
124. Id. (quoting Professor Jean Chariot).
125. Rees-Mogg, supra note 117.
126. Kabel, supra note 108 (emphasis added).
127. See Craig R. Whitney, Western Europe's Dreams Turning to Nightmares, N.Y.
VOL. 23:1
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION
aims, especially in this worldwide recession.
[P]rosperity-a basic underpinning of the European [Union] since
its founding in 1957 and, some believe now, the main one-is
threatened in Western Europe.'
EMU is a receding goal, as people worry more and more about unem-
ployment and economic uncertainty."
More ominous has been the reemergence of violent extremism in
Europe. Resentment against refugees pouring into Western Europe,
mostly into Germany, has been part of this problem.1 " The war in
the Balkans, although not directly involving the members of the E.U.,
has been another part. A recurring sentiment is that "Europe is dying
in Sarajevo."131 Increasingly violent nationalism in Europe is slowly
dashing the dreams of a "United States of Europe" once articulated by
Winston Churchill. One of the dreams, whose embers are fading fast
and may never be reignited, is monetary union.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that as European governments and E.U. leaders contin-
ue to push for monetary union,132 they are meeting increasing, per-
haps overwhelming, resistance from their courts and constituencies.
Ideas about the degree of central bank independence in such a union
remain controversial. Whether motivated by economic woes or nation-
alistic urges, Europeans do not have unification and integration on
their minds. Their leaders have been slow in getting this message and
astonished by the prevailing animosity to further union."m These
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al.
128. Id.
129. Ray Moseley, Dream of European Unity Fractured by Tough Times, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 15, 1993, at Cl.
130. See, e.g., Whitney, supra note 127. This is perhaps best exemplified by neo-
Nazi violence in Germany.
131. See, e.g., id. (reporting that these words appeared on a poster in Bonn's
market square); Thousands Demonstrate in Barcelona for Peace in Bosnia, AGENCE
FR. PRESSE, Nov. 28, 1993 (reporting that these words were on a banner carried
among a group of some 14,000 protesters).
132. The European Commission last year was enthusiastic of a "fast track to
EMU" idea, which was supported by the governments of Germany, Italy, Spain,
Ireland, and the Benelux countries. Palmer, supra note 120.
133. "Former French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet calls the decision [in
late summer 19931 to allow wider currency fluctuations a 'devastating' political
setback to European leaders. The two men who invented the exchange-rate system
back in 1979, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and former West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, assailed the decision as "a de facto suspension"
of the monetary system that 'is evidently in contradiction' with the European
Union's goal of a single European currency by the end of the decade." Lawrence
Ingrassia & Peter Gumbel, Changing the Rules: Europe's Money Move May Pave Way
to Rise in the Global Economy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1993, at Al.
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leaders are, accordingly, changing their expectations about the future
of Maastricht. 34
Economists and commentators had predicted a smooth ride for
monetary integration. Grand ideas of a single European currency, the
ECU, were popular."3 Just prior to the current challenges to
Maastricht, however, one observer ironically cautioned that "an eco-
nomic recession of serious magnitude could provoke a resurgence of
nationalism and, with it, a reimposition of capital and trade con-
trols.""' What had been forgotten or taken for granted in all of these
expectations was the strain that monetary unification efforts would
put on the assumptions that unification makes about national sover-
eignty.
There is an optimistic view that Maastricht's provisions on mone-
tary union can be saved through revisions. One American financier
sees hope in reconstituting the ERM by letting the Deutschmark float,
while pegging the rest of the currencies to the franc. This would allow
Germany time to bring its deficit under control and thereby control its
inflation.137 Former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Poehl said, "I
continue to believe that the way to deal with actual or potential in-
stability of exchange rates is through close co-operation between cen-
tral banks." " The current pessimism toward monetary union could
well be "the child of recession," and evaporate when times get bet-
ter.
139
Any revision to the Treaty in order to preserve its viability, how-
ever, would have to be a protocol instead of an outright amendment.
"Such a protocol is now the only means of closing the gap between
European elites and popular opinion." 4°Even the European Commis-
sion, whose President Jacques Delors has fervently sought monetary
union, has conceded that the Maastricht timetable for EMU will be de-
layed.""
The prevailing view is not optimistic; it is instead that
134. "British Prime Minister John Major, a critic of the exchange-rate mechanism,
said the timetable for economic and monetary union now looks 'totally unrealistic."
Id.
135. This attitude was captured in expressions such as this: "The ECU may soon
become an international reserve currency to rival the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen."
Works, supra note 39, at 484.
136. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 222.
137. See Suits, supra note 93.
138. Speech to the Conference Board of Europe, London (Oct. 20, 1981).
139. Wilbur G. Landrey, Maastricht Treaty May be Nothing More than a Dead
Horse, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at 2A.
140. Graham Mather, Protocol for Survival - The Maastricht Treaty, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 24, 1992, at 17.
141. Sarah Lambert, EMS Crisis May Delay Maastricht, THE INDEPENDENT, Thurs-
day, Feb. 4, 1993, at 24.
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"Maastricht is dead."142 Britain and other Union members want a
common market and little else.'" One observer has even stated that
"[tihe idea of a United States of Europe is dead, at least in this genera-
tion, and maybe forever. " 144 With legal and political obstacles to
Maastricht having been set, it is not clear what sort of monetary re-
gime will emerge in Europe. It is unlikely, given its strong desire to
maintain the common market, the European Union will revert back to
floating exchange rates.'" It is just as unlikely the E.U. will move
beyond mere policy coordination soon, despite Maastricht.
The primacy of national monetary sovereignty, in any event, has
been reaffirmed for the time being. British Chancellor of the Exche-
quer Kenneth Clarke said recently, "[Charles] de Gaulle has been
proved right about the importance of sovereignty."14 The idea that
nations are sovereign over their money, which has until now been
taken as a descriptive statement subject to revision, has taken on a
distinctly normative quality in Europe's Maastricht experience. 47
If the road toward monetary union in Europe is viewed
paradigmatically, then monetary sovereignty will become, contrary to
expectations, an even more important variable as the world economy
continues to integrate. Other countries, even those that do not consider
EMU to be an appropriate model, will not be able to ignore the events
that have unfolded in the European Union.
14
142. See Kabel, note 109; see also, Alex Brummer, George to Voice Doubts on
European Monetary Union, GUARDIAN CITY PAGE, Feb. 10, 1993, at 11 (reporting
that Eddie George, the Governor-designate of the Bank of England, had doubts
about the prospect of EMU at a speech in Germany).
"If there was anyone present at that [Europeaum] Conference who believed
there was the faintest breath left in the Maastricht Treaty, I didn't hear him ... 
Norman, supra note 119.
143. Charles Bremner, Kohl Attacks Britain on Monetary Union, THE TIMES (Lon-
don), Oct. 14, 1993.
144. Landrey, supra note 139.
145. Lal, supra note 27, at 303-04.
146. The Moral of the Story is that Clarke Should Win, THE TIMES (London),
Sept. 15, 1993.
147. Cf Pete du Pont, Federalism in the Twenty.First Century: Will States Exist?
16 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (1993). The author discusses how slow, deliberate
monetary integration in the early United States achieved success without grave
political costs. The U.S. experience can be compared to the current unification pro-
cess in Europe.
148. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 223.
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The "Triangular Case" in the New
U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty:
Mechanisms and Tax Planning
YVES BONNARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, a new income tax treaty between the United
States and the Netherlands entered into force. The protocol amending
the original version of the treaty provides special rules for a specific
type of income: U.S.-source interest and royalties earned by a branch
of a Dutch corporation located in a low-tax third country.2 This situa-
tion is called the triangular case.3
Assume that a multinational corporation ("Dutch Co.") has its
headquarters in the Netherlands and that its financial branch handles
its investments in foreign subsidiaries. The financial branch is a per-
manent establishment4 located in Zug, a low-tax canton (state) in Swit-
zerland. This branch is also responsible for the licensing of patent
rights owned by Dutch Co. to manufacturing divisions. All interest and
royalty income of Dutch Co. is centralized in its financial branch. A
subsidiary of Dutch Co., Ameri Co., is a U.S. corporation that pays
interest and royalties to the Swiss financial branch.
* Associate with Baker & McKenzie in Geneva, admitted in Switzerland; LL.M.
in Taxation, University of Denver, 1994. The author gratefully acknowledges the
review of earlier drafts of this article by John R. Wilson, adjunct Professor of Taxa-
tion at the Graduate Tax Program of the University of Denver College of Law.
1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., 32 I.L.M. 457 [hereinafter Convention].
Taxpayers may elect to remain covered by the prior convention for calendar year
1994. Convention, art. 37, para. 2, at 504; I.R.S. Notice 94-1, 1994-2 I.R.B. 1.
2. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Oct. 13, 1993, U.S.-Neth., 33 I.L.M. 160 [herein-
after Protocol]. The diplomatic notes for the Protocol were exchanged on December
30, 1993, and it became effective on January 1, 1994. The provisions related to the
interest and royalty articles became effective on January 29, 1994.
3. The term triangular case involves different problems. This study is limited to
the U.S. concerns about tax avoidance in triangular cases as recently developed in
the Protocol to the U.S. - Netherlands Income Tax Treaty. See generally OECD
Commentary on Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 24, notes 51-54; ORGANIZATION FOR
EcONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, MODEL TAX CONVENTION: FOUR RELATED
STUDIES (Paris 1992)(on file with author); PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CON-
VENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAw 396 (2d ed. 1994).
4. For a definition of permanent establishment, see OECD Model Income Tax
Treaty, art. 5, reprinted in BAKER, supra note 3, at 140-42 [hereinafter OECD Mod-
el].
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Without any tax treaty or internal law provision, the interest and
royalties paid by Ameri Co. and earned by Dutch Co. could incur tax
liability in three countries: (1) The United States, where the interest
and royalties are paid, could impose its 30% withholding tax;5 (2) The
Netherlands, where Dutch Co. is incorporated, could tax this income as
a part of Dutch Co.'s world-wide taxable income; and (3) Switzerland,
where the interest and royalties are actually earned, could tax the
income of Dutch Co.'s branch as a Swiss permanent establishment.6
As a relief from double taxation, the Netherlands applies the
exemption method.7 Under this method, foreign income is tax free in
the taxpayer's Country of Residence, or home country, whether the
foreign country (the Country of Source8 ) taxes the income or not. Ap-
plying the exemption method, the Netherlands does not tax the income
earned by Dutch Co. in Zug through its Swiss branch.
The Convention reduces the U.S. withholding tax on interest to 5
or 15 percent and eliminates the tax on royalties.9 By definition, a
branch does not constitute a separate entity, so the financial branch of
Dutch Co. can take advantage of the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty even
though it is located in Switzerland, a third country. Finally, the branch
pays few taxes in Zug, which is a low-tax state.
As a result, instead of incuring taxes in three different countries,
the interest and royalties paid by Ameri Co. to the Swiss branch of
Dutch Co. are actually subject to very little tax: a reduced withholding
tax on interest in the United States and a low income tax in Zug.
In order to prevent such tax avoidance, the Protocol provides for a
flat 15 percent U.S. withholding tax on interest and royalties earned
by a foreign branch of a Dutch corporation from sources within the
U.S. if the aggregate tax rate imposed on such earnings in the Nether-
5. I.R.C. § 881(a)(1) (1994).
6. OECD Model, supra note 4.
7. The United States uses the tax credit method, which consists of subtracting
the tax paid in the Country of Source from the home country tax liability.
8. Under its Decree for the Prevention of Double Taxation, the Netherlands
applies a method called proportional tax exemption. See generally Kees van Raad,
Business Operations in The Netherlands, 150 TAX MGMT. 150-5th (1989) (describing
the proportional tax exemption method). Relief from double taxation occurs when the
taxpayer qualifies for the proportional tax exemption.
In order to qualify for the proportional tax exemption, the foreign in-
come must be subject to an income tax in the country from which the
income is derived .... Furthermore, it is required only that the income
is taxable under the foreign income tax law; not that foreign tax is
imposed and paid. Consequently, if no foreign income tax is paid as a
result of, e.g., loss compensation and tax fraud, this does not affect the
application of the exemption.
Id. at A-47.
9. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12 (for interest), art. 13 (for royalties), at 472-
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lands and in the third country does not equal at least 50 percent (60
percent after January 1, 1998) of the regular Dutch corporation tax
rate."0
The international tax policy of the United States will not allow a
Dutch corporation the benefit of the Convention if the interest and
royalties from U.S. sources are either tax free or subject to low tax
rates. The United States will probably extend this policy to other U.S.
treaty partners that use the exemption method as a relief from double
taxation. In 1992, the House of Representatives discussed, though
never adopted, provisions similar to the Protocol." As shown below,
these provisions would have superseded all existing U.S. treaties
signed with "exemption-tradition" treaty partners. The underlying
cause of this new policy is clear: the United States is concerned that
the execution of a treaty with an "exemption-tradition" country may
create too many tax havens for interest and royalties.
The provisions of the Protocol generate as many problems as they
solve. This article begins by describing the distinction between the ex-
emption and the tax credit methods and the mechanics of the Protocol
itself. The article then addresses the following questions: (1) If the
Country of Residence applies the "exemption with progression" method
in order to avoid double taxation, should the increased tax liability in
this country be taken into account in determining the minimum re-
quired aggregate rate of tax?; (2) What are the repercussions of an
income tax treaty between the U.S. and a third country on the flat 15
percent withholding tax?; (3) Will the U.S. impose this kind of provi-
sion on other treaty countries, such as Switzerland, that also apply the
exemption method as a relief from double taxation?; (4) If so, will this
change occur through treaty negotiations or by enactment of internal
provisions that would override existing treaties?; (5) Do these provi-
sions represent an invasion of the treaty country's internal law beyond
the scope of an income tax treaty?; and finally, (6) What are the conse-
quences for such treaty countries and for their corporations?
II. EXEMPTION: RELIEF FROM DOUBLE TAXATION
A. Relief From Double Taxation
International double taxation typically occurs when the same
person is liable for tax in two different jurisdictions on the same item
of income.12 The Country of Source, also called the host country, taxes
10. Protocol, supra note 2.
11. H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
12. See generally Yoseph Edrey & Adrienne Jeffrey, Taxation Of International
Activity: Over Relief From Double Taxation Under The U.S. Tax System, 9 INT'L TAX
& Bus. LAW. 101 (1991); JEAN-MARC RIVIER, INTRODUCTION. A LA FISCALIT2 DE
L'ENTREPRISE, ch. 39 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing further developments on the exemption
method and comparing with the credit method).
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the income generated within its boundaries based on a territorial con-
nection with the source of the income. The Country of Residence, based
on a personal connection with the recipient, taxes its residents on their
world-wide income.
In order to alleviate the burden of double taxation, one of the
countries must renounce taxing the income. It is generally recognized
that the Country of Residence must provide relief from double taxation
and, consequently, the Country of Source has the taxing priority, a
principle that Edrey and Jeffrey call "first bite to the host country."13
Whether by internal law provisions or by treaty, relief from dou-
ble taxation occurs in one of two methods: (1) the exemption method,
or (2) the tax credit method. The latter, introduced in the United
States in 1918, consists of subtracting from the tax liability in the
Country of Residence all or part of the taxes paid abroad. The full
credit method credits all taxes paid in a foreign country against the
tax due in the Country of Residence. The ordinary credit method limits
the tax liability reduction by the amount of tax that would have been
paid in the Country of Residence. Most traditional tax credit countries,
including the United States, use this method.14
Under the exemption method, the income earned in the Country of
Source is tax free in the Country of Residence. Like the tax credit
method, the exemption method may actually provide tax relief in two
different ways: (1) full exemption, and (2) exemption with progression.
The latter does not completely disregard the income earned in the
Country of Source because the taxpayer's overall income determines
the applicable tax rate in the Country of Residence.
The following example compares both methods of exemption with
the ordinary tax credit method: Assume a taxpayer has a total income
of $200,000, one half earned in the Country of Residence and the other
half in the Country of Source. The tax rate in the Country of Residence
is 30% for an income of $100,000 and 40% for an income of $200,000.
Regardless of which tax rate the Country of Source applies, three in-
ferences may be drawn on the tax liability incurred in the Country of
Residence depending upon the method used to avoid double taxation.
First, if the Country of Residence applies the ordinary credit method,
the maximum amount of credit against the taxpayer's tax liability in
the Country of Residence equals the tax that would have been paid in
that country, 40% x $100,000 = $40,000 (example 3.1 below). If the
applicable tax rate is 50% in the Country of Source, the $50,000 tax
paid in the Country of Source cannot be used in full against the tax
liability incurred in the Country of Residence. Second, if the Country
of Residence applies the exemption with progression method, the tax-
13. Edrey & Jeffrey, supra note 12, at 104.
14. I.R.C. § 901-908 (1994).
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payer computes it's liability in the Country of Residence with the tax
rate corresponding to a $200,000 income even though only the Country
of Residence on taxes $100,000 earned in that country, 40% x $100,000
= 40,000 (parts 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 below). Third, if the Country of Resi-
dence applies the full exemption method, the taxpayer's liability in the
Country of Residence equals 30% x $100,000 = $30,000 (parts 1.3, 2.3,
and 3.3 below). Assuming, in succession, the applicable tax rate in the
Country of Source equals 0%, 10%, and 50%, the effect on the
taxpayer's total tax liability (tax paid in the Country of Source (CS))
and tax paid in the Country of Residence(CR)) is computed as follows:
1. Country of Source tax rate equals 0%
1.1 CR applies the ordinary credit method
Tentative tax liability in CR 200,000
Less tax paid in CS
Tax liability in CR
Total tax liability ..................




1.2 CR applies the exemption with progression method
CR tax liability
Plus CS tax liability
T otal tax liability ..........................
1.3 CR applies the full exemption method
CR tax liability
Plus CS tax liability







2. CS tax rate equals 10%
2.1 CR applies the ordinary credit method
Tentative tax liability in CR 20,000 x 40% = 80,000
Less tax paid in CS <I0,000>
Tax liability in CR 70,000
Total tax liability ......... 10,000 + 70,000 = 80,000
2.2 CR applies the exemption with progression method
CR tax liability 40,000
Plus CS tax liability 10,000
Total tax liability ........................... 50,000
2.3 CR applies the full exemption method
CR tax liability 30,000
Plus CS tax liability 10,000
Total tax liability ........................... 40,000
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3. CS tax rate equals 50%
3.1 CR applies the ordinary credit method
Tentative tax liablity in CR 200,000 x 40% = 80,000
Less tax paid in CS 50,000 but limited to <40,000>
Tax liability in CR 40,000
Total tax liability 50,000 + 40,000 = 90,000
3.2 CR applies the exemption with progression method
CR tax liability 40,000
Plus CS tax liability 50,000
Total tax liability ........................... 90,000
3.3 CR applies the full exemption method
CR tax liability 30,000
Plus CS tax liability 50,000
Total tax liability ........................... 80,000
As demonstrated in parts 1 and 2 of this example, the taxpayer's total
tax liability is lower if the Country of Residence applies one of the
exemption methods rather than the ordinary tax credit method. The
exemption method provides an incentive for foreign investments in
low-tax rate countries."6 These examples will be discussed in greater
15. As one observer has stated,
[tihe foreign tax credit limitation can be considered to detract from
economic efficiency, because the inability to credit excess foreign taxes
against U.S. tax on U.S. source income can result in a greater overall
tax burden for foreign than for domestic investment (where foreign taxes
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detail below.
B. Use Of The Exemption Method In Developed Countries
Under the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, member states have
the choice between the exemption with progression method and the
ordinary credit method. 6 Neither the full exemption method nor the
full credit method is available.
In the European Union (EU), most member-states use a combina-
tion of both methods. "[States use] the exemption method for some
types of foreign-source income such as dividends from a substantially
owned subsidiary, or branch profits, and the credit method for some
other types of foreign-source of income such as interest and royal-
ties."17
Switzerland is not a member of the EU but also uses a combina-
tion of both methods. Even absent any international convention, Swit-
zerland applies the exemption with progression method for income
earned by a resident through a foreign permanent establishment. 8
III. MECHANISM OF THE NEW U.S.-NETHERLANDS PROTOCOL AND
RELATED PROBLEMS
A. Premise
The Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act Of
1992,19 introduced before the Congress but never seriously considered
for passage, included a section on treaty abuse. The bill would have
amended I.R.C. §894 as follows:
paid exceed the U.S. tax). Restrictions on cross-crediting are often con-
sidered to impair competitiveness by subjecting U.S. investors to a
greater overall tax burden than their foreign competitors that benefit
from an exemption of their source income or from greater cross-crediting
opportunities.
Alan Wilensky, US Treasury Department, Treasury Report On International Tax Re-
form (1993), reprinted in 93 TAX NOTES 15-30 (Jan. 15, 1993).
16. OECD Model, art. 23A (permitting the exemption with progression method)
and 23B (permitting the ordinary credit method), supra note 4, at 364-65; ORGANIZA-
TION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Modhle de Convention Fiscale:
Attribution de Revenus aux Etablissements Stables, reprinted in QUESTIONS DE
FISCALITP, INTERNATIONALE NO.5, at 10 (1994) (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland are some of the OECD members using the exemp-
tion method).
17. Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europa: The Evolving European Corpora-
tion Statute, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. 695, 756 n. 364 (1993) (citing Commission of the
European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Compa-
ny Taxation 31 (1992)).
18. Art. 55 (1) AIFD (Arr~t6 du 9 d6cembre 1940 concernant limp6t fddral
direct, RS 642.1).
19. H.R. 5270, supra note 11.
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(c) Limitation On Treaty Benefits.
(2) Tax Favored Income. No person shall be entitled to any benefits
granted by the United States under any treaty between the United
States and a foreign country with respect to any income of such
person if such income bears a significantly lower tax under the
laws of such foreign country than similar income arising from
sources within such foreign country derived by residents of such
foreign country.'
The proposed I.R.C. §894(c)(2) stated that notwithstanding any
treaty provision under which the U.S. had agreed to exempt U.S.
source income, such as interest, from withholding tax, the U.S. could
still impose a tax if the treaty partner (the Country of Residence),
Switzerland for example, did not tax this interest or taxed it at a sub-
stantially lower rate. In order to determine whether the rate applicable
to U.S. source interest is "significantly lower," it must be compared
with the regular Swiss rate applicable to interest from sources within
Switzerland.
Practically speaking, as long as a taxpayer of the Country of Resi-
dence earns the interest income, there is no reason the foreign source
interest income should be taxed at a lower rate than domestic source
interest income. If the Country of Residence, like Switzerland, uses the
exemption method to avoid double taxation, foreign source interest
income may be subject to a lower tax rate than domestic source foreign
income.
Hence, House Bill 5270 focuses on the triangular case and at-
tempts to eliminate this result. The technical explanation of the bill
confirms this.2 ' The explanation provides that if a corporation is a
resident of a U.S. treaty partner and has a branch in a tax haven
(hereinafter Third Country), and the Country of Residence uses the
exemption method to avoid double taxation, then any income from
sources within the U.S. earned by the branch may incur a low tax
liability or may not incur any tax liability. For example, the branch
would not have any tax liability in the U.S. because the branch is not
a separate entity and is a resident of the treaty partner and a benefi-
ciary of the income tax treaty between the U.S. and the Country of
Residence. In addition, there would be no tax liability in the Country
of Residence because this country, using the exemption method, disre-
gards foreign earnings of its residents. Finally, the Third Country may
impose a low tax rate or not impose a tax rate on the corporation. In
such a situation, H.R. 5270 would have reserved the right of the U.S.
to withhold the regular tax on such income as if there was no treaty in
place. The scope of this provision was broad. It did not relate to a spe-
20. H.R. 5270, supra note 11, § 302; I.R.C. § 894(c) (1994).
21. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., EXPLA-
NATION OF H.R. 5270 (Joint Comm. Print 1992).
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cific type of income from sources within the U.S., it did not recognize
an exemption if a tax had to be paid in the Third Country by the
branch, and it did not consider the possibility of an income tax treaty
between the U.S. and the Third Country.
B. The Protocol
The Protocol signed in October 1993 with the Netherlands is an
improvement over the rigid H.R. 5270. Article 24, paragraph 4 of the
Convention provided that if the Netherlands had not enacted internal
anti-tax-haven rules prior to the Convention's introduction before the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then rules serving the same
goal would be added to the treaty through bilateral provisions to be
signed by both countries. In July 1993, the Netherlands Finance Min-
istry released an anti-tax-haven draft bill that was still subject to
debate in Fall 1993.22 In order to accelerate the ratification of the
treaty, negotiators from both countries signed the Protocol on October
13, 1993.
The Protocol adds two similar paragraphs to Articles 12 and 13 of
the Convention relating to interest and royalties respectively. 3 The
Protocol creates an exception to the general rule, found in Articles 12
and 13, giving exclusive competence of taxation to the Country of Resi-
dence. The Country of Source can withhold a 15% tax if the following
conditions are met: (1) Interest and royalties arising in the Country of
Source are not directly attributable to the enterprise in the Country of
Residence; (2) The interest and royalties are attributable to a perma-
nent establishment of that enterprise located in a Third Country; and
(3) The "aggregate rate of tax" imposed in both the Country of Resi-
dence and the Third Country is less than 50% of the income tax rate
applicable to an enterprise in the Country of Residence (60% for inter-
est and royalties due after January 1, 1998).
Nevertheless, no tax may be withheld for interest earned by the
permanent establishment in connection with, or incidental to, the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business.24 Banking and insurance activities
can benefit from the active trade or business exception, even if the
income derives from related party financing or portfolio investment.
25
22. See generally John Turro, Netherlands Debates Controversial Anti-tax-haven
Rules, 93 TAX NOTES INrL 224-2 (Nov. 22, 1993) (providing more details about the
draft bill). The Netherlands Finance Ministry withdrew this controversial legislation
on December 15, 1993.
23. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, para. 6, at 473 (relating to interest); art.
13, para. 5, at 474 (relating to royalties).
24. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, para. 3, at 472.
25. STAFF OF U.S. TREASURY, EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF NETHERLANDS FOR THE
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH
RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 1992, AND
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Also, taxes may not be withheld for royalties received as a compensa-
tion for the use of, or the right to use, intangible property produced or
developed by the permanent establishment itself in the Third Country
(i.e. sharing the costs of development that are not undertaken in the
Third Country does not prevent withholding tax by the Country of
Source).
26
A parallel may clearly be drawn between these provisions and
general U.S. tax policy. Under I.R.C. § 871(h) and § 881(c), portfolio
interest usually is exempt from withholding tax unless the payment
occurs between related parties.27 Financing arrangements between re-
lated parties are also the target of I.R.C. § 163(j), which is an "earn-
ings stripping" provision that limits the deduction of interest paid to a
related person.'
C. Liminal Comment: The Definite Parameters
There are numerous defined parameters to the triangular case.
First, the fact that the Dutch resident corporation qualifies under the
Limitation on Benefits, stated at Article 26 of the Convention, is an
axiom in this triangular case. Second, because the United States does
not use the exemption method in order to avoid double taxation, the
provisions introduced by the Protocol, even if they seem reciprocal,
apply only to permanent establishments of Dutch corporations and not
to permanent establishments of U.S. corporations. Third, the base of
taxation of the income that may be subject to U.S. withholding tax is
the global interest and royalties from sources within the U.S. even if
the Netherlands taxes part of this income in applying a partial exemp-
tion rather than a total exemption. The example used by the Trea-
sury29 to illustrate this rule is the Netherlands-Swiss income tax
treaty under which 10% of a Dutch branch's income in Switzerland is
usually "attributed" to the Dutch corporation and included in its gross
income." In such a case, it is not only the 10% of Swiss interest and
PROTOCOL SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 13, 1993, art. 12, reprinted in 93
TAX NOTES INT'L 212-11 (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Treasury Explanation].
26. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 13 para. 3, at 473-74; Treasury Explana-
tion, supra note 25; STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN COMMITTEE, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY (AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL)
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS (Joint Comm.
Print 1993), [hereinafter Senate Committee Report].
27. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, para. 66.2.2 (1991) (discussing "portfolio interest").
28. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, para. 4.04-7 (5th ed. 1987 & Supp.
1992) (discussing "earnings stripping" rules).
29. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25, art. 12, at 212-11.
30. See Convention entre la Confederation suisse et le Royaume des Pays-Bas en
vue d'6viter les doubles impositions dans le domaine des imp6ts sur le revenu et sur
Ia fortune, Jan. 9, 1952, Switz.-Neth., art. 4, para. 6 (Swiss reference RS
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royalties income taxed in the Netherlands may be subject to the U.S:
flat 15% tax as well as the full branch interest and royalties income
from sources within the U.S. Fourth, the U.S. withholding tax has a
flat 15% rate, no matter how close the taxpayer is with its "aggregate
rate of tax" from the 50% (respectively 60% from 1998) of the "general"
Dutch tax rate.
D. The Undefined Parameters
U.S. withholding may occur if the profits of that permanent estab-
lishment are subject to an aggregate rate of tax less than 50% of the
general rate of the company tax applicable in the other State [Nether-
lands]. Three elements need to be determined: (1) the profits of the
permanent establishment; (2) the aggregate rate of tax; and (3) the
general Dutch tax rate applicable to the company.
E. The "Profits" of the Permanent Establishment
Our guideline in the present analysis is the Protocol's underlying
anti-tax haven goal. The U.S. reserved the right to tax the branch's
income if the tax rate in the Third Country is low in comparison with
the Dutch rate. A tax rate may be low for a "political" or "objective"
reason, because the jurisdiction does not want to tax a specific type of
income, no matter how important this income is, or for an "economical"
or "subjective" reason, because the taxpayer has a low taxable income.
The Protocol purpose is to tax income that is subject to an "objective"
low tax rate.
In order to gauge the tax rate, the income taken into consider-
ation cannot be lowered by deductions or losses unrelated to business
activities. If all types of income earned by the permanent establish-
ment had to be taken into account in order to meet the definition of
"business profit," as described in the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty,
31
the determination of the applicable tax rate would be necessarily "sub-
jective" because it is influenced by the economic results of the other
activities of the permanent establishment. The term "profit" of the
permanent establishment must be understood as the profit resulting
from interest and royalties from sources within the U.S.
F. The "Aggregate Rate of Tax"
Under the Treasury Explanation, the aggregate tax rate must be
computed by adding the tax paid in the Third Country to the tax paid
in the Netherlands.32 The aggregate rate is the ratio of the taxes paid
0.672.963.61).
31. OECD Model, supra note 4, art. 7, at 188-89.
32. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25, at 212-11,
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in both countries over the profits of the permanent establishment.'
The tax paid is typically a subjective criterion to gauge a tax rate
and does not serve the goal of the new U.S. policy. A literal application
of the Treasury Explanation is possible only if the branch has no extra
activities. If it does have other activities, then the Explanation must be
interpreted and "tax paid" on branch profits must be understood as
"tax payable" on the branch profits limited to U.S. interest and royal-
ties without external activity deductions.
In the Netherlands, or any country applying the exemption with
progression method,3' another question arises in determining the tax
payable on the branch's profits. The following analysis assumes the
branch has no income other than U.S. interest and royalties, but the
same question arises if the permanent establishment has other sources
of income.
As shown in the comparison between the tax exemption and tax
credit methods, if the Country of Residence applies the exemption with
progression method, the taxpayer's income in the Country of Source is
not completely disregarded because it increases the tax rate in the
Country of Residence. In example 1, had the taxpayer earned only
$100,000 entirely sourced in the Country of Residence, the applicable
tax rate would be 30%, and its tax liability would be $30,000; but,
because he also earned $100,000 in the Country of Source and has a
world-wide income of $200,000, the applicable rate is 40%, and his tax
liability equals $40,000 (example 1.2). The exemption with progression
method creates an increase in tax liability of $10,000.
In a full exemption context, the taxpayer's liability would remain
$30,000 (example 1.3). On the other hand, in a tax credit context, the
increase in tax liability would be $50,000 (tax liability in the Country
of Residence (example 1.1) less $30,000). The exemption with progres-
sion intentionally has a "side effect" on the taxpayer's liability. The
$100,000 income earned in the Country of Source is objectively tax
free, but subjectively it generated a $10,000 tax increment out of
$200,000 taxable income, corresponding to a 5% tax rate.
The Protocol does not seem to include this increase in tax liability
in the computation of the "aggregate tax rate," and the Treasury Ex-
planation is clear: The "aggregate tax rate" is the sum of the tax paid
in the third jurisdiction plus "any Netherlands tax paid by the profits"
of the permanent establishment;35 it does not say "any Netherlands
tax paid as a result of the profits." The tax paid in the Country of
Residence as a "side effect" of the exemption method with progression
33. See also Senate Committee Report, supra note 26, art. 12.
34. OECD Model, supra note 4, art. 23A, at 364-65 (stating all State Members
using the exemption method should apply the exemption with progression).
35. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25.
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must be ignored in the computation. This can be fatal to a taxpayer
who might still qualify for the U.S. withholding in some situations,
such as where the tax rate in the Country of Source is almost 50% of
the one applicable in the Country of Residence.
If the U.S. position is intransigent, its consequences must be ap-
preciated in different contexts. The "side effect" of exemption with
progression does not occur in two situations: first, if the taxpayer is
already subject to the maximum taxable rate in the Country of Resi-
dence before taking into account the income earned through the branch
in the Country of Source; second, if the taxpayer has no income in the
Country of Residence, and there is no tax base to be taxed, even at a
higher tax rate.
Finally, it is surprising that the "aggregate rate" of tax does not
seem to take into account any potential U.S. tax, even though such tax
may be imposed when the Dutch corporation is a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC).3" This question arose in a letter sent on November
10, 1993 by practitioners to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy.37
G. The "General" Dutch Rate of the Company Tax
The question arises whether the income earned by the branch has
to be taken into account in determining the applicable Dutch tax rate.
The temptation would be to deny the inclusion in order to lower the
corporation's income and, consequently, the applicable rate in the
Netherlands. However, the analysis must be consistent, and because
the Netherlands applies the exemption with progression method, the
applicable Dutch tax rate takes into account the income earned in the
Third Country.
H. Repercussions of a Tax Treaty Between the U.S. and the Third
Country
The Treasury Explanation illustrates the U.S. withholding tax
mechanism assuming that the Swiss branch of a Dutch corporation
lends funds to related parties in the U.S., and the aggregate Dutch
and Swiss rate is below the applicable threshold. The Treasury con-
cludes that "the U.S. source interest generated by those loans will be
subject to a withholding tax of 15%, instead of the exemption provided
in paragraph 1 .... "' However, Article VII of the Swiss-U.S. income
tax treaty limits the withholding tax rate to 5%, and Article VIII
36. I.R.C. §§951-964 (1994).
37. Letter from Margie Rollinson & Marie Frances Pearson to Les Samuels,
reprinted in TAX CORRESPONDENCE 3614, 3614 (Dec. 3, 1993).
38. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25, art. 12.
39. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, U.S.-Switz.,
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gives a full exemption for royalties in the Country of Source.
Under which principle could the U.S.-Netherlands Convention
influence the Swiss one? The new Dutch Convention is res inter alios
acta, and the relationship between the U.S. and its treaty partners
cannot be influenced by subsequent U.S. treaties. Furthermore, there
is no treaty override principle between U.S. treaties. Only U.S. domes-
tic legislation can override U.S. international commitments.' Finally,
the I.R.S. has ruled that in a case where two treaties would apply, the
taxpayer may choose the more favorable.4
The new Dutch Convention does not allow the United States to
disregard any prior conventions. In the aforementioned Treasury ex-
ample, if interest income from an United States source earned by a
Swiss branch qualifies for U.S. withholding under the Dutch Conven-
tion, then the withholding rate is limited to 5%. Had the Swiss branch
earned royalties, U.S. withholding would be prohibited.
It should be emphasized that this conflict between U.S. tax trea-
ties will arise quite rarely because the U.S. does not sign tax treaties
with low-tax countries. The Swiss case is peculiar because only some of
the 26 Swiss Cantons (States) have low corporation tax rates.
I. Final Comments on the Mechanism
For Dutch corporations trading with the U.S. through a branch in
a third country, the Protocol is an improvement over H.R. 5270. First,
an "aggregate tax rate" is considered - as opposed to H.R. 5270,
which only considered the Dutch rate - so Dutch corporations face
U.S. withholding tax only if their branch is a tax-haven resident. Fur-
thermore, only interest and royalties from U.S. sources are affected by
the Protocol.
The U.S. may intend to extend this new treaty policy to other
treaty partners. These countries, in negotiations with the U.S., should
take the possibility of enactment of legislation similar to H.R. 5270
into account. Such legislation would override the present treaty and
could be worse than negotiated provisions similar to the Dutch Proto-
col.
art. 7 & art. 8, 2 U.S.T. 1751, 1757.
40. See generally Harry G. Gourevitch, CRS Report Favors Treaty Override Arti-
cles in Future Conventions 93 TAX NoTEs 184-32 (Sept. 3, 1993) (analyzing the
constitutional basis for legislative overrides of tax treaties).
41. Rev. Rul. 73-354, 1973-2 C.B. 435.
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IV. POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE NEW U.S. TAX TREATY POLICY:
TREATY OVERRIDE V. BILATERAL PROVISIONS
"A treaty override occurs when an act of Congress overturns or
modifies a tax benefit granted to foreign investors by a tax treaty."'
Two different authorities share the competence of enacting internation-
al tax provisions: (1) Congress may modify the Internal Revenue Code,
and (2) the Department of the Treasury and the Senate may enter into
an international treaty. Under the interpretation of the Constitution
by the Supreme Court, when conflicts between the two different sourc-
es of law arise, the later provision in time prevails.3
Relying on this rule, Congress may be tempted to unilaterally
enact a provision in the Code that would have effects similar to the
recent Dutch Protocol, rather than enter into difficult negotiations
with U.S. treaty partners. This was actually one of the purposes of
H.R. 5270."
The advantage of a treaty override procedure, from the United
States point of view, is the efficiency and the rapidity of enactment.
For example, a new U.S.-Switzerland income tax treaty has been in
negotiation for fourteen years and is not yet enacted, but only seven
months were necessary to prepare and enact the Revenue Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993.
This procedure, however, places the United States in a delicate
position with its treaty partners regarding its obligations under in-
ternational law. 5 In the H.R. 5270 case, the reaction was immediate.
Barely two months after the introduction of the bill before the Con-
gress, the ambassadors of eighteen OECD member countries protested
and claimed that such a provision "would be likely to lead to strong
pressures on their [our] governments to introduce retaliatory mea-
sures."
46
42. See generally Gourevitch, supra note 40 (discussing treaty overrides).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §115(1)(a) (1986) states that
[ain Act of the Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law
or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States
if the purpose of the Act is to supersede the earlier rule or provision is
clear or if the Act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled.
44. " . . . In 1992 a bill (H.R. 5270) to reform the international tax rules was
introduced for discussion purposes. The bill, which was not brought to a vote in
either chamber, contained provisions that would have overridden tax treaties."
Gourevitch, supra note 40, at 184-32.
45. Id.
46. Letter addressed on July 20, 1992 to House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Dan Rotenkowski, reprinted in 92 TAx NOTES 155-5 (Aug. 3, 1992).
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Today, it seems that the Treasury would rather see the U.S. nego-
tiate new treaties or protocols than enact internal law provisions to
pursue its goal of taxing income earned in triangular cases. On Octo-
ber 25, 1993, Leslie B. Samuel, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
referring to the new Dutch treaty, said "[tihis treaty and protocol dem-
onstrate that the treaty shopping problem can be addressed bilaterally
and that unilateral action is unnecessary." 7 This statement is partic-
ularly interesting for treaty countries, like Switzerland, that use the
exemption method and whose tax treaty with the U.S. is currently
being renegotiated.
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. TREATY PARTNERS USING THE EXEMPTION
AS A RELIEF FROM DOUBLE TAXATION AND FOR THEIR DOMESTIC
CORPORATIONS
A. For The Treaty Partners
In a triangular case such as described in the Dutch Protocol, the
United States simply retains the ability to tax specific U.S. source
income if this income is not sufficiently taxed abroad. The immediate
conclusion for the treaty partner, or Country of Residence, is that it
should tax for two reasons. First, whether the treaty partner likes it or
not, a new tax base has appeared. The only question is which country
will tax it. Altruism has no place in this field and the treaty partner
will obviously tax rather than letting this source of revenue benefit the
United States. Second, when a domestic corporation of the treaty part-
ner approaches the 50% or 60% threshold, it is more favorable to pay
the difference to the home country, rather than a flat 15% to the Unit-
ed States.
In order to limit the repercussions of the new U.S. policy on its
domestic corporation, the treaty partner should make sure that the
minimum tax required is met. The Country of Residence has two solu-
tions in order to make sure that the threshold is met. First, it could
apply a "conditional exemption" method, the condition for an exemp-
tion being a minimum aggregate tax rate corresponding to the mini-
mum required by the United States. In example 2.2 above, assuming
all income earned in the Country of Source is interest and royalties
from U.S. sources, the Country of Residence would have to tax an
extra 10,000 in order to reach the minimum tax required, and the tax-
payer will incur a total tax liability of 60,000:
47. Excerpt from remarks of the honorable Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secre-
tary (tax policy), U.S. Department of the Treasury, Oct. 25, 1993, to the Tax Execu-
tive Institute, Orlando, FL, reprinted in TAX NOTES IN'L, Oct. 27, 1993.
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a. Tax rate in CR for a 200,000 income
b. Minimum aggregate tax rate on the 100,000
earned in CS
c. Minimum amount of tax to be paid on branch's
income
d. Less tax paid in CS (rate 10%)
e. Extra tax to be paid in the CR
f. Total tax liability (10,000 in CS + 40,000 in CR
+ 10,000 "extra" in the CR)=
g. Aggregate tax rate on income earned in CS








The second solution for the Country of Residence is to give up, at
least partially, its exemption method and to adopt a "limited tax cred-
it" method. The method would limit the credit to the U.S. source inter-
est and royalties income earned by the branch. The coexistence of both
tax credit and exemption methods is not unusual in itself. It is neces-
sary, in fact, for countries that use the exemption method and sign an
income tax treaty including an exemption of interest and royalties in
the Country of Source." Without a tax credit method limited to such
types of income, interest and royalties would be tax free in both the
Country of Source, because of the treaty, and the Country of Resi-
dence, because of its exemption method. In this case, the tax credit is
an alternative method of relief from double taxation when the taxpayer
in the Country of Residence directly earns the interest and royalties
from the Country of Source. In the triangular case, the U.S. policy
imposes on its treaty partner a switch from one method to another
when the taxpayer earns these types of income through a branch in a
third jurisdiction.
By applying a "limited tax credit" method, as in example 2.2, the
Country of Residence would tax the total income earned by the branch
at a regular tax rate because we assumed it would be entirely U.S.
source interest and royalties. The taxpayer would incur a total tax lia-
bility of 80,000:
a. Taxable income in CR
b. Tentative tax liability in CR (40% tax rate)
c. Less tax paid in CS
d. Total liability in CR
e. Total tax liability is 10,000 in CS + 70,000 in
CR=







48. OECD Model, supra note 4, art. 23A para. 2, at 346-65; see generally RMER,
supra note 12, chapter 41.6 (describing the Swiss tax credit method as applied to
interest and royalties).
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For the domestic corporation, the "limited tax credit" method is
worse because it generates taxation of U.S. source interest and roy-
alties at the full corporate tax rate in the Country of Residence. On the
other hand, the "conditional exemption" method in all cases limits the
taxation of the U.S. interest and royalties to the rate necessary to
avoid U.S. withholding.
The comparison of the tax burden on the branch's income can be
drawn whether the treaty partner adopts one of the above mentioned
methods or does nothing. A tax burden of 25,000, or 25%, is due on the
branch's income if the treaty country does not tax (10,000 paid in the
Country of Residence and 15,000 withheld in the United States). A
20% tax burden is due under the "conditional exemption" method, and
40% is due under the limited tax credit method. Consequently, if the
source country is a "no-tax" country, the U.S. 15% withholding tax is
always preferable for the corporation if the tax rate applicable in its
home country is higher than 30%.
What happens if the treaty partner is bound by a tax treaty with
the Third Country? No definite answer may be given because it de-
pends upon the relevant provision of the treaty, concerning treaty
renegotiation. Usually, without a treaty overriding practice in the
Country of Residence, the treaty must be renegotiated.
B. For Their Domestic Corporations
In the following analysis, we will assume that U.S. source interest
and royalties qualify for U.S. withholding under provisions similar to
the present Dutch Protocol. We will then consider the effect of this
framework on a corporation resident of the U.S. treaty partner in two
financial situations. In the first scenario, the corporation has no tax-
able income in the Country of Residence.49 In the second scenario, the
corporation is in the highest tax bracket in its Country of Residence.
In both situations, we will consider whether the corporation should let
the U.S. interest and royalties be earned by the branch in the Third
Country, repatriate this type of income in the Country of Residence, or
even transfer it to a Fourth Country. The answer depends upon the
tax policy adopted in the Country of Residence after having signed a
treaty or a protocol including a triangular case provision with the
49. This does not mean, for the purpose of the triangular case mechanism, that
the applicable corporation tax rate equals zero. In fact, the applicable tax rate is de-
termined not only by the income earned in the Country of Residence but also by the
income earned in the Third Country, whether the Country of Residence applies the
exemption method or the tax credit method.
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United States.
1. The Country of Residence Keeps the Exemption Method with
Progression as a Relief from Double Taxation
If the corporation has no taxable income in the Country of Resi-
dence, it has no tax liability even though the applicable tax rate is
more than zero because of the income earned in the Third Country. In
this case, the corporation should keep this source of income in the
Third Country as long as the sum of the tax rate applicable in this
country plus the 15% U.S. withholding is below the applicable tax rate
in the Country of Residence; the same applies if the corporation is in
the highest tax bracket in its home country.
If the aggregate U.S. and Third Country tax rate exceeds the
applicable tax rate in the Country of Residence, then the corporation
should consider repatriation to the Country of Residence. Repatriation
must be examined carefully because it may have strong repercussions
on the tax status of the corporation. Depending on the internal law of
the Country of Residence, the corporation may lose a privileged "pure
holding corporation" tax treatment because, for example, it would earn
another type of income than just dividends. The corporation should
also consider transferring the U.S. source income of the branch to a
Fourth Country that has an income tax treaty with the U.S. limiting
or suppressing the U.S. withholding tax rate.
2. The Country Of Residence Adopts the "Conditional Exemption"
Method
This method guarantees to the corporation that its branch's U.S.
income will not be taxed at a rate higher than one-half of the applica-
ble tax rate in the Country of Residence. Whether the corporation has
any taxable income in the County of Residence or is in the highest tax
bracket, it is always advantageous to keep this income in the Third
Country. Again, the corporation should consider tranferring the income
to a Fourth Country that has a tax treaty with the U.S.
3. The Country of Residence Adopts the "Limited Tax Credit"
Method
The Limited Tax Credit Method suppresses the U.S. 15% with-
holding tax and taxes the U.S. interest and royalties at the full appli-
cable rate in the Country of Residence. This solution is clearly the
worst for the corporation unless the applicable tax rate in the Country
of Residence is less than 15%. This might happen if the corporation
has no taxable income in the Country of Residence before the inclusion
of the branch's income and if this income is not too high according to
the scale applicable in the home country.
Because this method is based on the tax credit method, there is no
1994
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reason to move the U.S. source income from one country to another.
Wherever such income is earned, it will be taxed in the Country of
Residence unless it can be stripped out.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Triangular Case is a major new concern of the United States
international tax policy. After an attempt in 1992 to introduce some
internal law provisions unilaterally denying the benefit of tax treaties
in such triangular cases, and disregarding the fact that the U.S. source
income may be taxed in the Third Country, the United States negotiat-
ed a less extreme provision in the Dutch treaty.
There is no doubt that this policy will be expanded, either through
a treaty-overriding provision in the Internal Revenue Code or through
new treaties. Among all U.S. treaty partners, the next country that
will have to negotiate a triangular case provision is certainly Switzer-
land. A new tax treaty between the United States and Switzerland is
now being negotiated, and Switzerland, like the Netherlands, applies
the exemption method as a relief from double taxation.
In a November 9, 1993 letter sent to the U.S. Treasury's interna-
tional tax counsel,' the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce em-
phasized the importance of the business relationship between the two
countries. Switzerland is the fourth largest recipient of U.S. direct
investments abroad and ranks seventh among foreign direct investors
in the United States. The Chamber of Commerce further emphasized
the important tax matters that must be negotiated. In particular, re-
ferring to anti-treaty-shopping provisions, the Chamber of Commerce
wrote the following:
We believe for treaty abuse provisions to effectively work in an in-
creasingly complex business environment, it would be quite inap-
propriate if not presumptuous to seek to catch all situations which,
from a purely formal viewpoint, may have a vague connotation of
treaty abuse. Effective anti-abuse provisions must be simple and
deal with the obvious.
The Triangular Case is not exactly a treaty shopping structure,
but, from the point of view of the United States, it is nevertheless an
abusive use of a treaty. Does it therefore deserve a special treatment
as prescribed in the Dutch Protocol, or rather should the Triangular
Case be ignored as having only "a vague connotation of treaty abuse"?
We will let the negotiators answer this political question and content
ourselves with tax planning recommendations to the foreign corpora-
50. Letter from Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce to Cynthia G. Beerbower
(Nov. 9, 1993), reprinted in 93 TAX NOTES INTL 228-10 (Nov. 29, 1993).
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Economic theory suggests that when the benefits of breaching an
agreement exceed the costs of complying with an agreement, the sys-
tem governing the agreement should allow a party to breach the agree-
ment. On the other hand, when the costs of breach outweigh the bene-
fits of breach, the governance mechanisms should create an incentive
for a party to comply with the agreement. The theory of efficient
breach predicts that parties will attempt to forge mechanisms that
allow efficient breaches and deter inefficient breaches. In the domestic
arena, the breaching party itself can determine if the breach is effi-
cient: The breach is efficient if the party can afford to pay damages.
In the international arena, there is little chance that a state will be
forced to pay damages for breaching an agreement. International law
must provide specifically whether a breach is legal or illegal.
In bilateral agreements, parties attempt to achieve efficiency
through the use of informal governance mechanisms such as economic
hostages and collateral. In multilateral agreements such as the Gener-
al Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), breach is allowed when
compliance would be politically untenable. Other breaches are pun-
ished with retaliatory trade measures. In minilateral agreements such
as the EEC, breaches are not countenanced. As minilateral agreements
take on federal characteristics, states are expected to comply with all
undertakings.
This article tests the theory of efficient breach in international
agreements under three of the four governance structures outlined by
Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough.
I. INTRODUCTION: EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT BREACHES OF
DOMESTIC CONTRACTS
One of the central tenets of domestic contract law is the compen-
sation principle: a party that breaches a contract should pay only the
* Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, IL; Former Law Clerk, Judge Jerry
E. Smith, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1993-94; Ford Fellow in
International Law, University of Chicago, 1992-93; M.A. 1994, J.D. 1993, University
of Chicago; B.A. 1989, B.S. 1989, University of Kansas. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of Charles Lipson, Alan Sykes,
and the participants in the Master's Paper Workshop of the University of Chicago
Committee on International Relations.
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resulting damages caused by the breach. The compensation principle
has been justified by the theory that some breaches of contracts are
efficient; i.e. the aggregate benefits of breach outweigh the aggregate
costs. The theory of efficient breach is rooted deeply in Anglo-American
law. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said,
[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it - and nothing
else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum. If you [enter] a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the
nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics
into the law as they can ....
In a domestic setting, an agreement that binds two parties is a
contract. 2 In an apartment lease, for example, a landlord grants per-
mission to a tenant to live in the apartment. In exchange, the tenant
agrees to pay rent. If either party fails to perform its obligations under
the lease, the non-breaching party may bring suit in a court of law.
The court can order the breaching party to pay money damages to the
non-breaching party in the amount equal to the loss to the non-
breaching party.
With some exceptions, the law of contract damages adheres to the
compensation principle. There are four major ways of awarding damag-
es in Anglo-American law. Expectation damages represent the amount
of money that would put the non-breaching party in the position in
which it would have been if the contract had been performed, i.e. if the
non-breaching party's expectations had been fulfilled. Reliance damag-
es represent the amount of damages sufficient to place the non-breach-
ing party in its pre-contract position. Courts order specific performance
of a contract obligation if the subject matter of the contract is unique
or the benefits of performance are idiosyncratic, such as where the
seller of a home breaches his agreement to sell. Finally, courts order
restitution of money that has been transferred to the breaching party.
In this case, the non-breaching party may choose the measure of dam-
ages.3
Despite the threat of lawsuit, contracts are often broken. In deter-
mining whether a party will comply with a contract, a common as-
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
Other jurists believe that a contract is a moral obligation that should never be
broken.
2. The party that breaches the contract, or that may potentially breach the con-
tract, is called the "breaching party." The other party is the "non-breaching party."
3. Another method is to award damages or penalties specified in the contract
(liquidated damages and penalty clauses). Some laws also allow criminal sanctions.
Non-legal sanctions exist as well. See infra section III.
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sumption is that the non-breaching party will act rationally. A party
will break the contract if the cost of breaching the contract is less than
the cost of compliance with the contract; conversely, a party will com-
ply with the contract if the cost of breaching the contract exceeds the
cost of compliance. The legal remedy for breach affects a party's deci-
sion to breach. If the penalty is high, few breaches will occur; if the
penalty is low, breaches will occur more frequently. Thus, the legal
system can achieve an optimal rate of contract breach by awarding the
appropriate measure of damages.
There are two legal avenues that permit efficient breach. First,
there are a number of domestic legal doctrines, such as impossibility,
that completely forgive contractual performance. Second, a party can
breach a contract if it is willing to pay the cost of breach, including
paying a judgment or a settlement fee. In an efficient breach, the costs
of breach will not exceed its benefits, and the party will choose to
breach the contract.4
In addition to encouraging efficient breach, the domestic legal
system also deters inefficient breach. First, damages are imposed on
the breaching party in the amount of the harm that falls on the non-
breaching party. Second, the non-breaching party may make a side
payment to the potential breaching party to induce it not to breach the
contract. A side payment will prevent a breach if the harm to the non-
breaching party (and thus the amount of money it is willing to pay)
exceeds the benefit to the potential breaching party.
In the domestic context, major debates have developed regarding
the encouragement of efficient breaches. The first debate concerns
whether courts should enforce penalty clauses and as to whether
courts should impose specific performance. Courts generally refuse to
enforce penalty clauses if the remedy specified in the contract exceeds
the actual damage to the non-breaching party. An argument against
enforcing penalty clauses is that awarding a penalty greater than the
actual damages forces a party to comply with a contract even when
breach would be efficient.5
4. For example, suppose that a manufacturer (the "seller") agrees to sell a ma-
chine for $100. Assume that the machine costs $80 to make. Suppose further that
the seller finds another buyer who is willing to pay $130 for the machine. If the
seller breaks his contract with the original buyer and sells to the second buyer, the
seller will earn a profit of $50 instead of a profit of $20. The benefit to the seller
for breaching the contract is the incremental increase in profit of $30. Assume that
the original buyer could have earned $110 from the machine. Breach will cause the
original buyer to lose the $110 benefit of owning the machine. But because the origi-
nal buyer will not have to pay the $100 purchase price, the original buyer's net loss
resulting from the breach is $10. Under contract law, the seller would pay $10 to
the original buyer in damages (assuming a replacement machine cannot be found at
the contract price). Because the seller can gain $30, the seller will breach the con-
tract and pay the $10 in damages and still be $20 better off. No party is worse off.
5. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
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An argument in favor of enforcing penalty clauses is that the
amount of damages specified in a contract may indicate the idiosyn-
cratic value of performance, which would otherwise be underestimated
by a court. Under this argument, the parties themselves are better
able to determine the value of the contract and the necessary damages
than a court.6 Other commentators rely on the general idea that all
clauses in a contract are efficient.7
In response, critics of penalty clauses claim that penalty clauses
may result in attempts to induce breach.' The party for whose benefit
the penalty clause operates may induce the other party to breach in
order to collect the penalty; for example, the party might withhold
certain crucial information from the other party.9 If penalty clauses
were enforced, parties would engage in a wasteful use of resources to
detect and punish inducement of breach. In the domestic context, the
induced breach argument is dubious because it presumes that parties
would inject an overcompensatory penalty clause in the contract. The
most recent attack on penalty clauses rests upon the argument that
"penalties [may] induce social inefficiency by preventing potential
actors from competing with the parties to the contract."0
Although courts are reluctant to enforce overcompensatory penalty
clauses, they typically enforce penalty clauses that undercompensate
the non-breaching party. In defense of this rule, Stole argues that it is
often rational for parties to set undercompensatory penalty clauses.
Such clauses, Stole contends, communicate valuable pre-bargain infor-
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 567-68 (1977). Another argument against
overcompensation is that the purpose of contract law is not to punish but to com-
pensate. Id.
6. Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damages Clauses in Contractual
Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 582, 583 (1992).
7. Id. at 582 ("Economists have long recognized that agreements freely entered
into by all affected parties with full information and cognizance of the terms of
trade necessarily improve social welfare in the traditional Pareto sense."). For de-
fenses of penalty clauses on efficiency grounds, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at
558-77; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J.
LEG. STUD. 277, 286-87 (1972); Alvin C. Brightman, Liquidated Damages, 25 COLUM.
L. REV. 277, 279-81, 302 (1925); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Perfor-
mance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 356
(1984); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law
of Contract, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 105, 137 (1989).
8. Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger L. Miller & Timothy J. Muris, Liquidated
Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351 (1978).
9. Id.
10. Tai-Yeong Chung, On The Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses:
An Economic Analysis, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 280, 281 (1992); see also Phillippe
Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 338
(1987); Peter Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and
Breach of Contract. I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 283 (1979).
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mation and should be upheld by courts."
The second debate is whether courts should award monetary dam-
age or specific performance."2 For instance, if a seller fails to deliver a
unique product, such as land, courts may award specific performance
because money damages would not adequately compensate the injured
party for its losses. If the product is not unique, however, courts award
monetary damages."
One major analytical insight recognizes that negotiation costs are
higher if the breaching party can rely on specific performance rather
than damages. 4 Under a money damage system, the only information
the parties need to negotiate a solution is the amount of damages suf-
fered by the non-breaching party. 5 Once this figure is determined,
the breaching party pays the other the agreed upon amount and subse-
quently breaches the contract.
Under a specific performance regime, however, where the non-
breaching party has the power to deny the breaching party the bene-
fits of breaching the contract, both parties require more information
during negotiation. For example, if the buyer can demand specific per-
formance, but the seller wants to sell to a different buyer, the original
buyer may attempt to force the seller to pay all the benefits of the
breach. In order to extract the benefits of the breach, the original buy-
er must assess the exact amount of the potential benefits to the seller.
The benefits of breach are typically the benefits arising under the con-
tract with the second buyer, less the benefits the breaching party
would have received had it complied with the terms of the original con-
tract. Thus, the first buyer must seek two pieces of information: the
benefits to the breaching party from the first agreement and from
breaching the contract.
Specific performance also creates a bilateral monopoly cost. The
greater the range of negotiation, the more likely the parties will resort
11. See Stole, supra note 6.
12. See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 351
(1978) (favoring traditional distinction between unique and nonunique goods); Alan
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (advocating
specific performance); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for
Breach, 99 Q.J. EcON. 121 (1984) (advocating specific performance for contracts "to
give" and damages for contracts "to do"); William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for
Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEG. STuD. 299 (1985) (arguing against Schwartz and
specific performance); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of
Contract, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 1365 (1982).
13. One author contends, however, that these two categories can be broken down
into about twenty categories. See William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach
of Contract, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 299 (1985).
14. See id. at 311-14. See also Timothy J. Muris, Comment, The Costs of Freely
Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DuKE L.J. 1053 (1982).
15. Bishop, supra note 13, at 312.
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to strategic bargaining techniques that can kill a mutually beneficial
agreement. Specific performance widens the range of bargaining, and
thus increases the probability of breakdown. In comparison, an optimal
court system would penalize all breaches of contract by imposing a fine
on the breaching party equal to the damage done. Such an ideal sys-
tem would allow efficient breach and deter inefficient breach.
It should be noted that an optimal system of contract enforcement
does not exist, even in domestic law. For example, it is not necessarily
true that the domestic court system punishes a breach of contract by
the amount of damage done. The costs of litigation, both time and
money, may deter a plaintiff with a good chance of success from litigat-
ing to recover damages. Thus, potential plaintiffs have designed a
number of self-help remedies to punish breaching parties without re-
sorting to litigation. Returning to the earlier example, a landlord may
avoid litigation costs by seizing a tenant's security deposit, evicting the
tenant summarily, or damaging the tenant's reputation. Extra-legal
sanctions such as these are sometimes more important than the legal
sanctions.16
II. EXTENDING EFFICIENT BREACH TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The differences between domestic and international agreements
are reflected in the normative and positive aspects of the theory of
efficient breach. This section examines certain general properties of
international agreements that affect efficient breach.
A. Reasons for Breaching Treaties
The assumption of rationalism is as valid in the international
arena as in the domestic arena: it is reasonable to assume that nations
weigh the costs and benefits before violating an agreement. Louis
Henkin argues that "usually a nation deliberately violates a norm or
agreement because it expects that the advantages of violation will
outweigh its costs. Faced with the temptation to act in disregard of law
or obligation, the government will know what it hopes to gain .... "',
There are three broad reasons that nations break treaties, all of
which mirror domestic contracts. The first is temporal opportunism. If
the benefits of a treaty accrue early, a state may be tempted to violate
the treaty to avoid obligations that it must perform later. 8 Thus, de-
spite the fact that ex ante the agreement would have been beneficial, a
party may be tempted to breach it once the benefits have accrued in
16. See infra section III.
17. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAvE 69 (2d ed. 1979).
18. THOMAS HOBBES, LEViATHAN 68 (The Scholar Press Limited, 1969) (1651)
("For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe af-
ter .... ").
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favor of that party.19 A good example is a bilateral investment trea-
ty.20 The guest country performs first by, for instance, investing in the
host country's copper mine. The host country performs its main obli-
gation last by refraining from expropriating the investment. However,
the temptation to expropriate in violation of the agreement often
proves too strong. A common remedy for temporal opportunism rests in
the design of a contract specifying that each party is to perform its
obligations simultaneously.2
Second, a state might threaten to breach in order to extract con-
cessions from the other side. This prospect underlies Yarbrough &
Yarbrough's theory of strategic organization.2
Third, the costs and benefits of adhering to a treaty may change
during the course of performance, causing one state to breach even -
though ex ante the state would have adhered to the treaty. For exam-
ple, suppose that the gross benefit of a treaty was $10 billion at the
time a state signed it, but the benefit then falls to $5 billion before the
country has performed its obligations. If the cost of the obligation is $7
billion, the country would breach the treaty (assuming it does not
suffer any legal or extra-legal punishment).
B. Uncompensated Injury
One objection to the theory of efficient breach in the domestic
sphere is that breach of a contract prejudices the interests of the non-
breaching party. However, the non-breaching party can be fully com-
pensated, at least in theory, if a court awards damages equal to the
damage caused by the breach. Even if damages are not awarded, the
non-breaching party will be compensated ex ante for the risk of breach
if there are no transaction costs. Suppose, for example, that during
19. Many domestic agreements require a party to perform its duties at a dif-
ferent time than its counterpart. For example, a grocery store that sells on credit
performs its part of the agreement first because it supplies the goods. The consumer
pays later. The party that performs last is tempted to breach its obligation to per-
form.
20. See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985).
21. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 5, 10 (1985).
22. Yarbrough & Yarbrough write:
The strategic organizational perspective ... would lead us to expect
unilateral liberalization only by countries with good alternatives to their
current trade arrangements, that is, by countries facing little or no
threat of opportunism by trading partners. This is the case whenever
the country has little investment in relation-specific assets for trade that
can be held up by an opportunistic trading partner.
BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 56 (1992)
[hereinafter Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992)].
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negotiations both parties know that there is a fifty percent probability
that, under a change of circumstances, the breaching party would
benefit one hundred dollars by breaching the contract. Suppose further
that the cost of breach to the non-breaching party would be forty dol-
lars. Breach would be efficient because the benefits of breaching (one
hundred dollars) exceed the costs to the other party (forty dollars). The
non-breaching party will protect itself from the chance of breach by
demanding compensation ex ante. It will be exposed to an expected loss
of twenty dollars (fifty percent of forty dollars) if it signs the agree-
ment. It can, therefore, demand compensation from the potential
breaching party in the form of a higher price if the non-breaching
party is the seller or in the form of a higher interest rate if the non-
breaching party is a lender. As a result, even if there are no damages,
the risk of efficient breach does not injure the non-breaching party in a
world without cost.
Ex ante compensation does not usually occur in international
agreements. Typically, international agreements involve transfers of
legal obligations, not transfers of money. Such transfers are discrete
rather than continuous. For example, it would be difficult for Germany
to pay Russia $25 billion to compensate Russia for the risk that Ger-
many might breach a trade agreement. Thus, we are left with a situa-
tion in which even an efficient breach would result in an uncompensat-
ed risk to the non-breaching party.
Nonetheless, international relations succeed reasonably well in
deterring inefficient breach through informal sanctions. The mere fact
that injured parties are not compensated does not mean that nations
decline to enter into international agreements in the future. The bene-
fits of an agreement will often outweigh its costs, even if the costs
include the risk of uncompensated breach. The failure to compensate
injuries resulting from efficient acts does not make a system untena-
ble. As an illustration, consider the common law of negligence. A plain-
tiff cannot recover for a defendant's action if the benefits of the action
outweigh the risk to the plaintiff since such action is reasonable and,
therefore, not actionable in a court of law.
As for ex post compensation, few examples can be found in inter-
national law. Among them are the measures authorized by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in response to subsidies or
dumping. A domestic industry can lobby its government to raise tariffs
on products imported from a country that engages in subsidies or
dumping. The resulting increase in the domestic price level compen-
sates the domestic producers.
C. The Morality of Breaking a Treaty
One objection to efficient breach is that a party has a moral obli-
gation to keep an agreement. This objection has often been rejected in
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domestic law on the grounds that the purpose of law is to increase
aggregate welfare, not to enforce obedience to an agreement if such
obedience has no practical utility.'
D. Goals of Treaty Policy: Interest Groups and Relative Gains
Maximization
A treaty does not necessarily improve a nation's welfare. In do-
mestic law, theorists assume that any contract willingly entered into
by an individual is in that person's best interest. As Hobbes wrote,
[wihensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is
either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to
himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a
voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is
some Good to himselfe.24
Nations, however, are controlled by interest groups that seek to maxi-
mize their own wealth rather than that of the country.' Thus, in-
ternational agreements may increase the welfare of a particular inter-
est group but not the citizenry as a whole. The negotiation of free
trade agreements is an exception, at least as an initial matter, to the
theory that treaties are instruments of wealth-seeking. Once a free
trade agreement is in effect, however, interest groups exert a heavy
influence on nations' compliance and sanctioning behavior.6
Nations also may not maximize welfare because they sometimes
pursue relative, rather than absolute, gains. In domestic situations, it
is assumed that a party will attempt to maximize its absolute gains;
furthermore, if there are no transaction costs, parties in a contractual
relationship maximize their joint gains. In international relations,
however, Joseph Grieco contends that states sometimes maximize
relative gains, not absolute gains.2 7 Thus, even if there were a net
cost to the breach of an agreement, a party might nonetheless breach
its treaty in order to impose costs on its treaty partners. As a result of
relative gains maximization, states may not sign an agreement at all.
Recently, the relative gains thesis has been challenged. Robert
Keohane contends that relative gains are maximized only when states
23. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 1.
24. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 65-66.
25. According to public choice theory, laws are enacted to increase the welfare of
interest groups at the expense of the rest of society. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
26. See JAMES BOvARD, FAIR TRADE FRAuD (1991) (discussing U.S. trade behav-
ior).
27. Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INTL ORG. 485, 487 (1988) ("[A] state that
is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless
exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains.").
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pursue "positional goods," such as status.2" Charles Lipson contends
that relative gains matter only in security relationships.' Further-
more, Duncan Snidal has shown that relative gains will bar cooper-
ation only if few states are involved.3"
E. General Legal Differences
There are three major legal differences between domestic con-
tracts and international agreements. First, the parties to international
agreements are states, not individual actors; all the state's domestic
actors - individuals, politicians, interest groups, and political parties
- are compressed into one negotiating unit. Second, unlike domestic
agreements, international agreements vary widely in formality and in
enforceability. Some international agreements are meant to be non-
binding.3 ' Some international agreements are subject to strict third
party enforceability (e.g. by the European Union), while some interna-
tional agreements are enforceable only through reputation and self-
help. Enforceability is the most notorious difference between interna-
tional law and domestic law: domestic law has a body with the power
to enforce judgments against parties; international law does not.32
The methods for enforcing international agreements are considered in
section III below.
28. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 54 (1984).
29. Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,
37 WORLD POL. 1 (1984).
30. As Snidal summarizes,
[rielative gains considerations are shown to matter only for issues in-
volving small numbers of states. The impact of relative gains drops off
quickly with more than two states and is virtually irrelevant for issues
involving a large number of actors. In addition, the transition to cooper-
ation is not appreciably more difficult under relative gains than under
absolute gains.
Duncan Snidal, International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers, 35 INTL
STUD. Q. 387, 388 (1991).
31. Lipson identifies six reasons why nations choose informal agreements over
treaties. First, informal agreements can be amended more easily than treaties.
Second, informal agreements are less costly to negotiate because they do not require
that parties foresee all types of contingencies. Third, informal agreements can be
implemented quickly. Fourth, informal agreements escape oversight by democratic or-
gans because they do not have to be ratified. Fifth, informal agreements made by
one bureaucracy can escape oversight by other bureaucracies. Sixth, informal agree-
ments do not constitute as much of a commitment as do treaties. The cost of using
informal agreements rests in their lesser reliability. Charles Lipson, Why Are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INTL ORG. 495, 500-501 (1991).
32. Within international law, I include the law governing what Yarbrough &
Yarbrough call unilateralism, multilateralism, and bilateralism. See Yarbrough &
Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 17-19. Minilateral regimes, such as the EEC,
have often been distinguished from international law.
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F. Criticism of International Law as Unenforceable
The rule of pacta sunt servanda holds that states must honor
their treaty obligations.3 It has often been argued, however, that in-
ternational law is "unenforceable" because it provides for no effective
court-ordered remedy. The power of an international tribunal to assess
monetary damages is limited. First, the parties must agree to place
their disputes before the tribunal in the first place.34 Second, interna-
tional treaty law has no real central enforcement mechanism." Under
the U.N. Charter, a judgment by the International Court of Justice
against a member of the United Nations can be enforced by the Securi-
ty Council.3" However, this enforcement power has never been used.
33. Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and is also
contained in the Vieena Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 26 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."). Thus, pacta sunt servanda is doubly binding on
the signatories to the Vienna Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados,
Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Republic
of Korean, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nauru,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda,
Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugosla-
via, and Zaire. LouIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 12
(2d ed. Supp. 1987).
34. Two parties can agree to submit their disputes to the International Court of
Justice by compromis. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 art. 36. There is an obligation to submit any disputes to
arbitration if the dispute might threaten international security. Article 2, paragraph
3, of the U.N. Charter states that
[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered.
Article 33, paragraph 33, of the U.N. Charter states that
[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endan-
ger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their own choice.
Countries may submit their disputes to the tribunal at any time. Moreover, parties
may sign a treaty in which they submit all future disputes to the compulsory juris-
diction of the arbitral body. However, parties are not required to make such sub-
missions and only approximately 80 disputes have been submitted to the I.C.J.
35. An exception to the formal nonenforcement of international law is the Euro-
pean Union, which imposes effective sanctions for noncompliance. However, the EU
may be exceptional. Many scholars characterize the EU as supranational law, not
international law. For a discussion of the EU, see infra section IV(D).
36. U.N. Charter, art. 94, states as follows:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is
a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may
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The violations of the laws of war during World War I led to wide-
spread cynicism about international law. Many scholars abandoned
international law for new disciplines such as international relations.37
Yet, the failure to prevent war and wartime atrocities is not convincing
evidence of the breakdown of international law. War, with its high
stakes and its short shadow of the future, is precisely where we would
expect informal enforcement mechanisms to be least effective. Informal
mechanisms remain effective in enforcing long-term commercial ar-
rangements.
International lawyers would argue that it is a mistake to assume
that international law is unenforceable merely because there is no
central authority to punish violators.' For example, the United
States Supreme Court does not have any enforcement mechanism to
require the Congress and the President to abide by its decisions. The
Court's decisions are obeyed because the other branches of government
have a respect for its legal authority. The difference between inter-
national law and domestic law (or, at least, national constitutional
law) is only in the degree of respect accorded to the law.
States find it in their interests to comply with treaties for a num-
ber of reasons, including future gains, reputation, and retaliation.39
Recent scholarship suggests that these reasons for treaty compliance
are also important in enforcing domestic contracts, thus undercutting
those who criticize international law as unenforceable.
Several factors indicate that domestic economic relations are con-
trolled not so much by legal sanctions as by non-legal sanctions. First,
litigation costs often preclude litigation as an effective enforcement
mechanism. 0 Second, a favorable judgment cannot be collected if the
defendant cannot pay. Third, we observe that parties often use extra-
legal sanctions: collateral for loans, security deposits in leases, and the
threat of damage to one's reputation."' As an empirical matter,
have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give
effect to the judgment.
While the Security Council's recommendations are nonbinding, its decisions may give
rise to enforcement measures. The Security Council must vote unanimously to pass
such an enforcement measure.
37. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 134 (1988).
38. See HENKIN, supra note 17.
39. See e.g., L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27
(1980) (discussing future gains). See infra section III.
40. In small lawsuits (say, for instance, a dispute between a dry cleaner and a
customer), the cost of litigation may exceed the possible damages claimed by the
plaintiff. David Charny argues that litigation costs mean that parties are
undercompensated under domestic law. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Com-
mercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 407 (1990) (litigation costs result in
under-compensation). See also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract,
1985 WIS. L. REv. 465, 469-70 (1985).
41. Consumer loans are repaid largely because consumers wish to maintain a
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Macauley notes that merchants rarely sue when sales contracts are
breached. 2
III. INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
COMPLIANCE AND SANCTIONING BEHAVIOR
It is in the interests of parties to deter breaches of agreements by
punishing breach. In addition to enforcement by the courts, there are
also informal methods of punishing breach. Although private parties
rely on both formal and informal sanctions, nations must rely exclu-
sively on informal mechanisms. Court-enforced judgments for damages
practically do not exist in the international arena."3
Anthony Kronman has outlined the types of informal sanctions
that are used to enforce agreements."" Although his explanation is
oriented toward private arrangements, it can easily be extended to
international agreements. For Kronman, informal sanctions would
operate in "the state of nature," a situation characterized by two as-
sumptions: first, where there is no third party enforcement;45 second,
where the parties cannot compel one another to perform an agreement
or to pay damages." The second assumption is particularly relevant
good credit rating. Charny, supra note 40, at 395. See also PATRICK ATIYAH, THE
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 715 (1979) ("Even between private com-
mercial organizations, the fact that business relationships are so often continuous
means that the desire to maintain the goodwill of other contracting parties is often
more important than the letter of the contract.").
42. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60-62 (1963). Although parties engage in resolution
without lawsuits, Lipson rightly points out that merely because domestic actors
engage in pretrial settlement of disputes does not mean that domestic actors are
engaging in actions without the need for formal adjudication. He argues that "[wihen
parties discuss compliance after agreements have been signed, they bargain in the
shadow of law and judicial enforcement." Lipson, supra note 32, at 503.
43. Another major difference between private contracts and treaties is that some
treaties, e.g. the EEC treaty, are enforced more like federal constitutions than
agreements. Nations comply with these treaties out of respect for the federal institu-
tion behind the treaty. See infra Section Part IVD.
44. See Kronman, supra note 21, at 8. Kronman uses the term "state of nature"
to refer to the absence of third party enforcement.
45. Kronman summarizes as follows:
[Mly concept of the state of nature is a broad one, broad enough to
include any situation in which individuals and groups must arrange
their transactions (if they are to transact at all) without the aid of an
independent enforcement mechanism whose powers are significantly
greater than their own.
Id. at 9. As Kronman points out, the lack of third party adjudication is a problem
not only for enforcing transactions but also for preventing the imposition of
externalities upon other parties. Id. at 6. Thus, without third party enforcement, we
would expect to have more breaches of contract, as well as more thefts of property.
Kronman considers the first problem of transactional insecurity a more difficult prob-
lem than the second problem of possessory insecurity. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 7 ("When two individuals (or groups) exchange promises and neither
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because it matches the standard assumption of "anarchy" in interna-
tional relations. Although Kronman considers only one motivation for
breach of an agreement, nonsimultaneous performance,47 his analysis
can be applied to other reasons for breach." Kronman outlines four
different ways of enforcing agreements through self-help: hostages, col-
lateral, hand-tying, and union.
A. Hostages: Discretionary Sanctions of No Value to the Non-breaching
Party
A discretionary sanction is the ability of one party to harm the
other party.49 Assets of the breaching party that can be destroyed by
the non-breaching party are called "hostages."' The hostage must
have value to the breaching party but need not have any value to the
non-breaching party."' If the non-breaching party convinces the
breaching party that breach will result in the destruction of the asset,
then the breaching party will not breach the agreement.
Hostages have two disadvantages. First, it may be difficult for the
non-breaching party to convince the breaching party that it will indeed
destroy the vulnerable asset.52 The non-breaching party is typically
better off if it negotiates an agreement for a payment of even a small
value than if it destroys the asset. Second, the sanction may be carried
out by the non-breaching party, and the asset will be destroyed.' The
has the power to compel the other to perform, and there is also no third party
powerful enough to enforce the agreement on their behalf, I shall speak of them as
being in a state of nature vis-&-vis one another, even where both parties are able to
protect whatever they presently possess from attack or expropriation by the other.").
47. Id. at 10.
48. For the sake of convention, I will refer to Kronman's "the earlier performing
party" as the non-breaching party and the later performing party as the breaching
party.
49. One example of a discretionary sanction is loss of reputation. Often, the non-
breaching party has the discretion to destroy the reputation of a potential violator.
For example, suppose that a developing nation has decided to default on its debts to
banks in the United States. Faced with such a possibility, the United States could
either refuse to negotiate, or it could forgive at least part of the debt. If the United
States refuses to negotiate, the debtor country must unilaterally repudiate its debt,
thus suffering a severe loss of reputation. If the debtor country negotiates with the
United States, then the debt is not repudiated but renegotiated. A country that
renegotiates its debt, e.g. Mexico, suffers less of a reputational loss than a country
that repudiates its debt, e.g. Peru. Because some reputational effects are beyond the
control of the non-breaching party, reputations can also be considered an example of
"hand-tying."
50. Some later theorists use the term "hostage" to refer to sanctions that occur
automatically in case of breach. I prefer Kronman's convention of referring to such
situations as "hand-tying." See infra Part III(A)(3).
51. Daniel K Benjamin, The Use of Collateral to Enforce Debt Contracts, 16
ECON. INQUIRY 333, 354 (1978). ("[Elven assets that are worthless to a creditor in
the event of default can be valuable as a form of collateral.").
52. See Kronman, supra note 21, at 14-15.
53. Yarbrough and Yarbrough contend that such retaliation only occurs if "under-
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destruction of the asset is inefficient because it does not achieve any-
thing.' Such a problem also exists with retaliatory trade practices,
which may disintegrate into unproductive sanctioning behavior."
In general, discretionary sanctions have two disadvantages. First,
the potential breaching party will understate the real value of the vul-
nerable asset.5" If the breaching party can convince the non-breaching
party that the value of the asset is very low, then the non-breaching
party will not believe it has enough leverage to force the breaching
party to perform the rest of the agreement.
Second, discretionary sanctions may discourage efficient breach if
the value of the asset to the potential breaching party exceeds the
benefit from treaty violation. Faced with the possibility of risking dam-
age to the vulnerable asset, a party might choose to comply with an
agreement even though the benefits of violating the agreement exceed
the costs that would be imposed by violation.57
B. Collateral: Discretionary Sanctions Available to the Non-breaching
Party
The second method of self-enforcement of agreements is for one
party to provide "collateral" to the other party. Collateral is an asset
the non-breaching party can seize in case of breach.' Unlike hostag-
es, collateral has value to the non-breaching party.5"
lying conditions change unexpectedly." Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22,
at 76.
54. Unless the asset in question is the breaching party's reputation, in which
case destruction of the reputation represents information that is valuable to the
breaching party's future trading partners.
55. Kronman, supra note 21, at 93.
56. See id. at 14.
57. The same problem may occur with collateral if the value of the collateral
exceeds the benefit of violation.
58. Yarbrough and Yarbrough claim that an antidumping bond is an example of
collateral. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and
Economic 'Hostages. Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade, 30 INT'L STUD.
Q. 7, 17-18 (1986) [hereinafter Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986)]. An antidumping
bond is posted by a company about to face trade litigation in the United States
before certain tribunals. If the company loses, the plaintiff can recover against the
bond insurer rather than the company itself. The antidumping bond is posted by a
company when an antidumping proceeding begins, too late to ensure compliance.
Thus, an antidumping bond is really not a hostage, "a payment that changes hands
contingent on compliance with the agreement." Id. at 17. The bond merely ensures
that the antidumping duty will be collected if levied.
Benjamin Klein gives an example of collateral as the capital investments
made by a franchisee. The franchisor typically owns the land on which the franchi-
see does business. Any capital investments made by the franchisee are worthless in
the case of termination. Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629 n. 14 (1981).
59. Kronman, supra note 21, at 30 n. 15.
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The advantage of collateral is that the non-breaching party need
not engage in negotiations with the breaching party to protect itself
from breach.' Furthermore, a threat to foreclose on the collateral is
more credible than a threat to destroy a hostage because the non-
breaching party would acquire the value of the collateral. If the value
of the collateral is greater than the value of performance, then the
non-breaching party will be fully protected from breach. A disadvan-
tage is that the non-breaching party may be tempted to seize the col-
lateral without provocation and forego further contractual perfor-
mance.6 1 Another problem is that if the value of the collateral is less
than the value of continued performance, then the non-breaching party
is underesecured. It must rely on its ability to threaten to deprive the
non-breaching party of the value of the collateral. 2
An example of collateral in international relations is the ability of
a GATT signatory to raise its tariffs in response to a violation of the
GATT by another country. Such an action harms the offending country
by hurting its export industry.' The action simultaneously benefits
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. Kronman analyzes the problem of opportunistic seizure using three sce-
narios. In the first, the value of the collateral is worth more to the non-breaching
party than the benefits of continued performance of the contract, so the non-breach-
ing party is completely secured. Kronman uses the following example:
Suppose that you have now given me a golden goblet as collateral to
secure your promise to deliver [a] calf once it is born. The goblet, let us
assume, is worth as much to me as the calf - it is, therefore, a perfect
form of collateral.
Id.
In the second scenario, the collateral is worth more to the breaching party
than it is to the non-breaching party. This assumption is realistic because if the
collateral was worth less to the breaching party, then the breaching party would
have already sold the collateral to the non-breaching party: "We can also assume
that the goblet is worth at least as much to you (it may be worth more), since oth-
erwise you would already have sold or traded it to me." Id. at 16-17.
In the third, performance is worth more to the non-breaching party than the
cost of performing. Otherwise, the non-breaching party would not have agreed to the
contract:
[Aissume that you value the goblet more than the calf. [This] as-
sumption follows from two premises: first, that the goblet is worth as
much to me as the calf (that it is a complete substitute for the calf and
hence a perfect form of collateral), and second, that the calf is worth
more to me than to you, as it must be, or we would not have agreed to
our original exchange.
Id. at 17. Because the collateral is worth more to the non-breaching party than the
benefits of continued performance of the contract (first scenario), and because perfor-
mance is worth more to the non-breaching party than the cost of performing (third
scenario), the collateral is worth more to the non-breaching party than the cost of
performing is to the breaching party.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Some authors have claimed, however, that an increase in tariffs sometimes
helps the exporting industry of the offending country by raising the price of its
products.
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the retaliating country by boosting the domestic price of imported
products, thus increasing profits in those industries that compete with
imports.64 Another example of the use of collateral occurred when the
United States froze Iranian assets in response to the Iranian capture
of U.S. hostages in 1979. The United States could have converted the
bank accounts to its own use.6 Instead, the U.S. released the assets
after Iran released the Americans held hostage in Iran.
C. Hand-Tying: Mandatory Penalties
Hand-tying is defined as "actions that make a promise more credi-
ble by putting it out of the promisor's power to breach without incur-
ring costs he could otherwise have avoided."" According to Kronman,
hand-tying occurs when the destruction of an asset would be automat-
iC67ic.
6
The literature on hand-tying falls into two categories. The first,
encompassing the works of Kronman" and Telser,6 holds that some
agreements are self-enforcing because parties wish to retain the future
benefits of performance by the other party.7° The second set of theo-
64. This is a political benefit since it helps producers at the expense of consum-
ers. Classical economic theory teaches that the costs to consumers of tariffs often
outweigh the benefits to consumers.
65. For example, in 1963, the United States seized all Cuban assets in the
United States. The United States sold the assets in order to pay for the expenses of
determining the losses suffered by American companies during Cuba's nationalization
decrees. See HENKIN, supra note 17, at 346. See also 28 Fed. Reg. 6974-85 (1963);
78 Stat. 1110, 22 U.S.C. § 1643(0) (1964), amended, 79 Stat. 988, 22 U.S.C. § 1643(j)
(1976).
66. Kronman, supra note 21, at 18.
67. Kronman differs in terminology from Yarbrough & Yarbrough, who use the
term "hostage" to refer to all losses to a breaching party automatically resulting
from breach. For example, the future benefits of an agreement are a "hostage."
Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 11 ("A more general form of
hostage is the future benefits expected from the continuation of a trading relation-
ship."). Since Yarbrough & Yarbrough assume that any future benefits are lost
automatically upon breach, such future benefits would fall under Kronman's rubric of
"hand-tying." But again, the difference is merely in terminology. Another difference
in terminology results from the fact that if one party would incur costs from ter-
minating the contract (ties its hands), the same costs could be imposed by the other
party's termination. Thus, an asset that is a hand-tying commitment is also an
economic hostage: The asset can be destroyed at the discretion of the other party.
Because hand-tying and hostages are different sides of the same coin, one under-
stands Yarbrough & Yarbrough's reference to both as "economic hostages."
68. See Kronman, supra note 21.
69. See Telser, supra note 39, at 1.
70. One may wonder why a breaching state would automatically lose the benefits
of the treaty. Indeed, a non-breaching state might continue to comply with the trea-
ty, thus continuing to confer benefits on the breaching state, even though the non-
breaching state has the discretion to abrogate the treaty by invoking the doctrine of
retaliatory breach. The answer lies in the behavioral assumption that all states
unilaterally pursue policies that are in their best interest. If a state modifies its
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ries, advanced by Klein & Leffler 7 and Williamson,72 and applied to
international agreements by Yarbrough & Yarbrough,73 holds that
parties will comply with agreements in order to avoid losing the value
of assets that are not useful outside the agreement. Qualitatively,
these two sets of theories are convergent because the benefit of pre-
serving a transaction-specific asset is also a benefit of complying with
the agreement.
Telser introduced the theory that an agreement might be self-
enforcing if the threat of loss of future benefits of the treaty is a suffi-
cient incentive for states to comply with a treaty.74 In Yarbrough &
Yarbrough's terminology, E(c) is the discounted present value of the
stream of benefits to the breaching part if both parties comply, E(n) is
the discounted present value of the stream of benefits to the breaching
party if both parties do not comply, and E(v) is the discounted present
value of the amount that the breaching party expects to gain from the
violation. Parties will comply with an agreement if E(c) - E(n) >
E(v).75 A party would adhere to such an agreement even if there were
no courts or third party enforcement mechanisms because if "one party
violates the terms then the only recourse of the other is to terminate
the agreement."7"
Klein & Leffler argue that the prospect of repeat business and
future profits deters firms from breaching contracts.7 7 In sales of
optimal unilateral policy through a treaty, such a concession was probably traded for
some reciprocal concession by the other state. If the other state violates the treaty,
then the quid pro quo is dissolved. There is no reason for the non-breaching state to
continue complying with the agreement. The non-breaching state reverts back to its
unilateral policies, which, by definition, are different from its treaty obligations.
71. See Klein & Leffler, supra note 58.
72. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985).
73. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22.
74. See Telser, supra note 39.
75. Kronman, supra note 21, at 20. More generally, hand-tying works only if the
costs of breaching the agreement outweigh the benefits of the breach.
76. Telser, supra note 39, at 27.
77. In Klein & Leffler's model, there is no governmental mechanism to enforce a
manufacturer's implied warranties. The only reason a manufacturer would produce
high-quality goods is the prospect of repeat business:
Contracts are not enforceable by the government or any third party.
Transactors are assumed to rely solely on the threat of termination of
the business relationship for the enforcement of contractual promises.
Klein & Leffler, supra note 58, at 616. Potential purchasers are assumed to be un-
able to determine the specific level of product quality before the purchase. Id. at
620. Klein & Leffler assume that if a seller loses its reputation as a result of selling
a product of less-than-contracted-for quality, it will lose both the benefits under the
immediate contract in question and the opportunity to make future contracts. Id.
("[11f quality is less than contracted for, all consumers cease to purchase from the
particular sampled "cheating firm."). Presumably, the seller will keep the profits it
made from the low-quality products themselves.
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goods, the seller will reduce quality only if "the one-time wealth in-
crease obtained from low quality production" exceeds the "continual
stream of rental income that will be lost if low quality output is decep-
tively produced."78 Knowing this, consumers buy only from firms that
charge a high price, or more specifically, a price above salvageable
cost.79
This "quality-assuring price" is the price at which firms produce
high quality goods. Klein & Leffler point out that if the quality-assur-
ing price were greater than total costs," other firms would enter the
market, causing the price to fall.81 However, consumers demand that
price be at least equal to the quality-assuring price." The result is
that firms make firm-specific capital investments in the form of either
(1) brand name capital investments or (2) nonsalvageable productive
assets.'
While Klein & Leffler explain why parties invest in firm-specific
capital, Oliver Williamson uses transactional economics to explain how
the presence of firm-specific capital affects the type of governance
structure controlling the relationship.' For Williamson, transactional
economics makes two fundamental assumptions about human behav-
ior: rationality and self-interest.'
78. Id. at 620. One crucial, but reasonable, assumption in product markets is
that consumers can identify the supplier of each product.
79. Price must be above salvageable costs. Id. at 618. Otherwise, the firm would
have nothing to lose from producing lower quality goods. See ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 105 (Edwin
Cannan, ed., 1937) (1776).
80. Klein & Leffler distinguish between sunk and salvageable costs. Klein &
Leffler, supra note 58, at 619.
81. Id. at 625 ("Thus, if price assures quality, the firms producing quality great-
er than q(min) appear to earn positive economic profits. However, this cannot de-
scribe a full market equilibrium. When the price is high enough to assure a particu-
lar high level of quality, additional firms have an incentive to enter the industry.").
82. Id. ("Consumers know that any price below P(*) for its associated quality
results in the supply of q(min). They therefore will not purchase from a firm promis-
ing that quality at a lower than P(*).").
83. Id. at 626-29.
84. See Williamson, supra note 72. Transactional economics has been referred to
alternatively as "transaction costs economics" or "neoinstitutional economics," al-
though Williamson refers to transaction cost economics as a subset of, not a syn-
onym of, new institutional economics. Id. at 16. See also Ronald Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 16 ECONOMICA 386 (1960); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (Coase is credited with founding transactional economics);
Thriiinn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990) (surveying
neoinstitutional economics).
85. Regarding rationality, Williamson uses a semistrong form, called "bounded
rationality," in which economic actors are assumed to be "intendedly rational, but
only limitly so." Williamson, supra note 72, at 45 (citations omitted). Bounded ratio-
nality differs from "maximizing" rationality, the strong form assumption prevalent in
microeconomics. Unlike maximizing rationality, bounded rationality assumes that
there are limits on the human ability to plan for the future and anticipate contin-
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Williamson identifies three important dimensions that affect, and
may ultimately transform, the economic relationship between two
parties. The first dimension is the degree of "asset specificity."" Asset
specificity refers to the creation of an asset that has increased value
only when used in a certain way. Williamson explains that
parties to a transaction commonly have a choice between special
purpose and general purpose investment. Assuming that contracts
go to completion as intended, the former will often permit cost
savings to be realized. But such investments also are risky, in that
specialized assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of produc-
tive value if contracts should be interrupted or prematurely termi-
nated. General purpose investments do not pose the same difficul-
ties. "Problems" that arise during contract execution can be solved
in a general purpose asset regime by each party going his
way .... 87
A transaction-specific asset is not the same as a fixed asset. Many
gencies. Id. at 46. Williamson argues that limits on people's competence is different
than the neoclassical assumption of information costs:
There is . . . a fundamental difference between a situation in which a
decision maker is uncertain about the state X and a situation in which
the decision has not given any thought to whether X matters or not,
between a situation in which a prethought event judged of low probabili-
ty occurs and a situation in which something occurs that never has
been thought about .... Most complex models of maximizing choice do
not come to grips with the problem of bounded rationality. Only meta-
phorically can a limited information model be regarded as a model of
decision with limited cognitive abilities.
RICHARD R. NELSON AND S.G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 66-67 (1982), quoted in Williamson, supra note 72, at 46 n. 6. Bounded
rationality is also distinguished from "organic rationality," the assumption that peo-
ple maximize welfare indirectly through trial and error. Id. 46-47.
Secondly, Williamson assumes that people are "opportunistic." Opportunistic
parties are willing to break the rules to increase their welfare. Id. at 47-49. They
are also willing to lie, steal, cheat, and refuse to disclose information. The assump-
tion that actors behave without regard to rules is appropriate in international af-
fairs. It accommodates the realist critique that international law is unenforceable. By
contrast, neoclassical economics employs the semistrong form of "simple self-interest
seeking," which holds that individuals play within the rules. Id. at 49. It treats
"individuals as playing a game with fixed rules that they obey. They do not buy
more than they can pay for, they do not embezzle funds, they do not rob banks."
Williamson rejects the weak form of self-interest that assumes that people obey all
rules. Id. at 49. This "obedience" assumption has been summarized as follows:
One can imagine the limiting case of a monolithic collectivism in which
the prescriptions of the central plan are carried out by functionaries
who fully identify with the imposed macrogoals. In such a system the
economically relevant processes reduce almost completely to technical
manipulations.
ADOLPH LOWE, ON ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: TOWARD A SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECO-
NOMICS 142 (1965), quoted in Williamson, supra note 72, at 49.
86. Williamson, supra note 72, at 52-56.
87. Id. at 54.
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assets that are regarded as fixed can be redeployed to another use,
such as general purpose buildings." One example of transaction-spec-
ific asset is where a tailor promises to make a suit of clothes for a buy-
er.89 If the tailor initially cuts the fabric to fit the dimensions of the
suit, the tailor has dedicated a certain amount of investment (the val-
ue of the cloth for the suit) towards performing the contract. If he does
not make the suit for the buyer, the cloth becomes worthless." Anoth-
er example of an transaction-specific investment is the investment
created when an importing country requires imported goods to meet
peculiar standards.9" "Such standards are ideal for the provision of
hostages because the standards involve investment in specialized capi-
tal equipment or production procedures which are non-salvageable if
the market for which they are designed are lost."92 An electronics firm
that builds a factory necessary to produce an electric plug meeting an
importing country's regulations is providing a transaction-specific as-
set.93
Williamson's second dimension is uncertainty, defined as the in-
ability of parties to predict the behavior of others, either because op-
portunistic behavior is difficult to predict or because of communication
failures. Williamson's third dimension is frequency.
Williamson coined the term "fundamental transformation" to de-
scribe the change from a party's prebargain situation in which the
company has many potential business partners to the post-bargain
situation in which an agreement has been reached with one partner
and asset-specificity has been developed. The presence of asset-specific-
ity deters breach by the asset owner.95 As a result, the other party is
more likely to enter into the contract. Although asset-specificity en-
courages the asset holder to comply, it also encourages the other party
to breach. The party who owns the specific asset is subject to the op-
portunistic behavior of the other party." For example, a buyer may be
willing to pay $10 for a product that requires the manufacturer of the
product to build a factory at the cost of $5. Before the factory is built,
88. Id.
89. Kronman, supra note 21, at 19.
90. Id.
91. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 10-11.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 92. Another example are
the Canadian regulations that require that imports of canned goods meet container-
size requirement. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 11.
94. WILLIAMSON, supra note 72, at 54.
95. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1986), supra note 58, at 11. ("The fact that the
exporting country stands to lose the hostage (the value of ... equipment) as pun-
ishment for any opportunistic behavior against the U.S. may serve as a mechanism
for enforcing existing agreements.").
96. Paradoxically, the same factor that gives rise to the need for an enforcement
mechanism provides the enforcement mechanism itself.
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the parties would'agree to any price between $5 (the lowest price the
manufacturer would pay) and $10 (the highest price the buyer would
accept). But after the factory is built, the manufacturer would be will-
ing to accept any price, even $1, because the alternative - non-produc-
tion - would not result in any profit at all.97 Although the buyer
would be willing to pay $10, it is likely that the buyer will negotiate a
lower price ex post because of the seller's vulnerability.
One example of pre-commitment through hand-tying is reputation.
If a person violates an agreement, that person's reputation is damaged
automatically. On its face, reputation sounds like an ephemeral and
non-economic idea, but reputation represents a useful asset. A busi-
ness with a good reputation will receive future sales. Therefore, a
court, when deciding the amount of damages to award to a business,
would not award damages for lost reputation and lost sales. The two
are synonymous. A problem with reputation as a commitment is that it
is difficult to calibrate the value of the commitment to the seriousness
of breach. Thus, the damage to a state's reputation may differ from the
cost of breach. If the damage to reputation is greater than the cost of
breach, then some efficient breaches may be overdeterred. If the dam-
age to reputation is less than the benefit of breach, then some ineffi-
cient breaches may remain underdeterred.
E. Union
The fourth method of reducing opportunism is union. As William-
son states, "[tiransactions that are supported by investments in dura-
ble, transaction-specific assets experience 'lock in' effects, on which
account autonomous trading will commonly be supplanted by unified
ownership (vertical integration)."" The interests of two parties be-
come aligned. In domestic agreements, union is typified by a manufac-
turer who merges with its distributor. The European Union is a so-
phisticated governance structure that illustrates the principle of un-
ion."
Union concludes Kronman's taxonomy of non-legal sanctions.
Charney proposes another taxonomy of nonlegal sanctions, divided into
three major categories." The first category is "relation-specific pro-
spective advantage," which he explains as follows: "The committing
party places a particular asset under the control of another party; that
party will confiscate or destroy the asset if the promisor breaches."'5 '
97. Note that, under the assumption that the manufacturer possesses specific
assets, the manufacturer can sell to only one buyer.
98. Williamson, supra note 74, at 53.
99. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22. These governance structures
are examined infra in section IV(D).
100. Charny, supra note 40, at 392-97.
101. Id. at 392.
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Examples of "relation-specific prospective advantage" are the ability of
a bank to destroy a small business by calling a note payable on de-
mand and a franchisor's ability to revoke the right to use a trademark.
Both of these examples are probably "hostages" in Kronman's terminol-
ogy. Another example is the opportunity to deal again with the same
party (the "repeat deal"). 2 By comparison, Kronman's terminology
would treat the benefit of future dealings as a hand-tying arrange-
ment.
Charney's second category of non-legal sanctions is reputation. His
third category is the psychic and social costs of breach, including guilt
and loss of self-esteem. 3
F. Side Payments
Under any scheme in which the sanctions for breach are over-
effective - the sanctions for breach exceed the damage of the breach
- efficient breach might still occur if the breaching party bribes the
non-breaching party. Two problems arise in international relations
that create a barrier to side payments. First, it is difficult to express
many treaty obligations in monetary terms. If a state refuses to adhere
to a security treaty, it would be difficult to determine the amount of
money that would compensate the non-breaching state. However, some
non-monetary favors, such as a vote in the U.N., can be exchanged.
Second, even if the damage could be expressed in monetary terms,
there may be a psychological barrier that prevents states from making
cash payments to each other, with the exception of extreme cases, such
as reparations extracted from the loser of a war."
The ineffectiveness of side payments also contributes to
overcompliance. In domestic law, a hostage-taker can be paid off if the
benefits of violation to the breaching part exceed the costs of violation
102. Id. at 393.
103. Id. at 447-48. Beyond mere taxonomy, Charny suggests some changes to do-
mestic law in light of the presence of informal sanctions. He contends that an action
for promissory estoppel should not be available in all instances where a party rea-
sonably relies on a promise. If the reliance is based upon a belief that noncompli-
ance will be punished by nonlegal sanctions, the plaintiff should not recover unless
it was unfeasible to draft a contract incorporating the obligation in question. See
also id. at 447-48, 450. A promisee should be able to recover under promissory
estoppel only if "he can show that his transactional behavior would have been
different had he correctly assessed the probability -of breach." Id. at 455. Thus, it is
not enough that the promisee take actions in purported reliance. Charny suggests
that when parties take formal means of memorializing an agreement, but do not
actually sign a contract, the courts should be reluctant to enforce the promise be-
cause the parties likely considered, but rejected, the alternative of legal enforcement.
Id.
104. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE
(1919). In the Treaty of Versailles, the victorious allies extracted reparations from
Germany. Keynes criticized these reparations. Id.
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to the hostage-taker; then, the violation can occur. No retaliatory ac-
tion will be taken because of the transfer payment. As noted above,
however, transfer payments are difficult to make in the international
arena.
IV. BEHAVIOR UNDER VARIOUS STRUCTURAL
CONDITIONS
Armed with an array of non-legal sanctions, a few predictions
about breach and compliance behavior are possible. We have seen how
a court system imposing damages equal to damage done can achieve
an efficient result. However, the penalty for breach is often greater or
less than the actual amount of damage done, and sometimes these is
no penalty at all. An efficient system must impose costs or benefits on
the breaching party with the objective that the breaching party be-
haves efficiently (i.e. efficient breaches occur but no inefficient breach-
es occur). This section outlines the structural details that will result in
efficient compliance behavior by parties to an agreement.
There are a number of elements that affect the compliance and
sanctioning behavior of parties. First, the breaching party benefits
from breaching the contract. Second, breach imposes losses on the non-
breaching party. Third, the breaching party may suffer losses in form
of penalty if it breaches the contract. Penalties can be either discre-
tionary (collateral, or a hostage, using Kronman's terminology) or auto-
matic (hand-tying)."'0 A non-breaching party can choose to waive a
discretionary penalty (for instance, a lawsuit). An automatic penalty
(for instance, the loss of transaction-specific assets) automatically oper-
ates if a party breaches the contract. Fourth, there is the ability of the
non-breaching party to make a side payment to the breaching party to
induce the breaching party not to breach the contract. Fifth, there is
the ability of the breaching party to make a side payment to the non-
breaching party to induce the non-breaching party to forego retaliatory
measures. These five factors determine whether a party may breach a
contract. A few examples will suffice to explain how these factors
would affect the decision to breach or not to breach.
Case 1: No penalties. Examining factors one and two alone, sup-
pose that the non-breaching party cannot impose any type of penalty
and cannot bribe the breaching party not to breach. In this case, the
agreement will be breached if there is any benefit at all to breach,
even if breach is inefficient. This is the simple case of
105. Furthermore, damages can be split along another dimension. Damages can be
pictured as imposed by the judicial system, or as extra-legal damages (damages that
occur from, say, retaliation). We could further distinguish between retaliatory acts
that benefit the retaliating party. If a bank seized the collateral, the bank derives
benefit at the same time the defaulting borrower is harmed. Other retaliatory acts
are purely harmful, such as loss of reputation.
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undercompliance, the cause cdl~bre of the realists' attack on interna-
tional law. An example would be North Korea's refusal to turn over
South Korean prisoners of war in compliance with the armistice ending
the Korean War. South Korea had delivered its prisoners earlier than
North Korea had, and, therefore, it possessed no bargaining power to
hold North Korea to the agreement. °8
Case 2: Exact compensation. Considering the case in which the
non-breaching party can enforce a discretionary penalty equal to the
cost of breach (in effect, if the non-breaching party can sue for damag-
es), breach will occur if the benefits to the breaching party will exceed
the penalty. In the case of inefficient breach, breach will not occur. The
benefits do not exceed the costs, so the benefits do not exceed the dis-
cretionary penalty. Thus, the ability to impose a discretionary penalty
leads to efficient results. It has often been pointed out that the exis-
tence of a discretionary penalty equal to the cost of breach is an unre-
alistic assumption in the international sphere.
Case 3: Mandatory penalty. Considering the case of a mandatory
penalty instead of a discretionary penalty, breach will occur if the
benefits exceed the mandatory penalty. If the penalty is greater than
the cost, an efficient breach will be deterred. If the penalty is less than
cost, an inefficient breach will be allowed to occur. However, if the
penalty is equal to cost, only efficient breach occurs.
Case 4: Opportunistic breach. The discretionary penalty can be
used to extort the other party, even if it has not breached the
agreement. For example, suppose a manufacturer of custom-made
merchandise builds a plant to fulfill its production obligations under a
single contract. Once the plant is established, the buyer has an incen-
tive to threaten to breach the contract unless the manufacturer reduc-
es his price. In Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico,0 7 a boat owner
agreed to hire seamen for a fishing voyage. During the voyage, the sea-
men refused to work unless the boat owner paid them wages at a rate
higher than that originally agreed to.
Given opportunity for negotiations, side payments, and flexibility
in the amount of the non-legal sanctions, an efficient result can be
achieved. Because these factors are almost always absent to some
extent, efficient behavior is obstructed.
V. BREACH UNDER VARIOUS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS
Yarbrough & Yarbrough have analyzed the factors that determine
the type of institution that will be used to govern free trade agree-
ments. Yarbrough & Yarbrough refer to their analysis as "the strategic
106. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 78.
107. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
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organizational approach" to international trade policy. The analysis
consists of identifying which of four possible institutional structures
will be chosen by nations that wish to agree to reduce tariffs. Under
each institutional form, parties attempt to create an incentive for effi-
cient compliance behavior.
According to Yarbrough & Yarbrough, institutional forms are de-
signed to prevent opportunism. Opportunism is only present when
there is a relation-specific investment"° (in Williamson's lexicon, "as-
set-specificity"). Yarbrough & Yarbrough supply some useful examples
of asset-specificity in the area of free trade, including
1. Locationally specialized trade facilities (for example, the Soviet-
European gas pipeline);
2. specialized vertical production linkages across national bound-
aries (for example, Canadian-U.S. links in the North American
automobile industry);
3. dedicated assets in the form of export capacity (for example,
Japanese automobile capacity designed to service the U.S. mar-
ket).1°9
An exporting country's economic hostage is its export industry. If the
exporting country violates a free trade agreement, the country risks
that it will lose the value of its specific assets if the other party with-
draws from the agreement.
Generally, the type of institutional framework depends upon three
factors: first, whether there is relation-specific investment; second,
whether there is effective third party enforcement in the form of a
hegemon; and third, whether there is effective third party enforcement
in the form of a regional trade treaty. If there is no relation-specific
investment, unilateral free trade develops. If there is relation-specific
investment, the institutional form depends upon the type of enforce-
ment structure available. Multilateralism prevails if there is a hege-
mon. "Minilateralism" prevails if there is the possibility of negotiating
a regional treaty with third party enforcement. If there is no effective
third party enforcement and no possibility of a regional treaty, bilater-
alism with self-help as a remedy prevails.
A. Unilateralism
The first institutional form is unilateral trade liberalization, de-
fined as a single country's unilateral adoption of a trade policy without
negotiations or agreements with others. For example, if a powerful
country determines that its best policy is free trade, regardless of the
reciprocal trade policies of other countries, the country is relatively
invulnerable to the trade policies of other countries. The country pur-
108. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 34-35.
109. Id. at 25.
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sues open trade but does not attempt to persuade other countries to
adopt liberal policies.110
Under the strict assumption that countries are not affected by
each other's trade policies, there would be no need for cooperation. As
Axelrod and Keohane note, cooperation is defined as "when actors
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of oth-
ers."' A party has no need to attempt to change another's actions
through negotiations if it does not care about the other's actions.
With unilateralism, there is no need for any enforcement mecha-
nism at all."2 Yarbrough & Yarbrough argue that unilateral trade
liberalism is pursued by countries that do not have relation-specific
assets."3 A country without relation-specific assets cannot be a target
for opportunism. Asset-specificity is a characteristic not only of the
physical nature of an asset but of a nation's trading opportunities.
Thus, if a country has only one trading partner, all its export indus-
tries are relation-specific. If a country has several trading partners, its
export industry is no longer relation-specific.
The foremost example of unilateralism is Great Britain's trade
liberalization in the 19th century. Britain did not face the threat of op-
portunism because its export markets were substitutable. As inter-firm
manufacturing trade increased, there was an accompanying increase in
asset-specificity and the resulting potential for opportunism, and
unilateralism declined as an effective trade policy.
B. Bilateral treaties
The second institutional form is bilateral trade. Bilateralism oc-
curs if there is no hegemon, there is a threat of opportunism, and there
is no possibility of third party enforcement.
If a country violates international law, other countries often retal-
iate. The actions and reactions of states throughout history have devel-
oped a body of practice that has coalesced into internatibnal law. The
international law that has developed relating to treaty breach is more
lenient than the law governing breach of domestic agreements. A pos-
sible reason is that international law lacks a "compensation principle"
that induces the parties themselves to determine what breaches are
efficient and inefficient.
Bilateral parties often punish breach of international law for the
110. Id. at 55.
111. ROBERT AXELROD & ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 226
(1985).
112. Thus, it is confusing that Yarbrough & Yarbrough characterize unilateralism
as having an enforcement mechanism of self-help. See Yarbrough & Yarbrough
(1992), supra note 22, at 17, Fig. 1.3.
113. Id. at 56.
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sake of deterrence. If a government arrests another government's dip-
lomats, its own diplomats may be arrested. Confiscations of property
by one nation will often be met by retaliatory confiscations by the
other."4 Such retaliation gives teeth to international law.
The retaliatory actions of countries may eventually develop into
rules of customary international law. In international law, state
practice attains the status of customary international law if two re-
quirements are met."' The first requirement is that states follow the
practice. The second requirement, opinio juris, 16 holds that states
engaging in the practice possess the belief that doing so is required by
international law."7 Thus, the mere fact that a certain practice is
prevalent among states is an insufficient basis for international law.
Often a state will follow a rule merely out of fear of retaliation from
other states. Such acquiescence out of fear does not create customary
international law.
Customary rules that have developed through an informal sanc-
tioning process are often efficient. A recent literature has developed on
114. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 54.
115. For general discussions of customary international law, see ANTHONY
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971); Michael
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1974-
75); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); Myres S.
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM.
J. INTVL L. 356 (1955); Oscar Schacter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300 (1968); Sir Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public
International Law, 106 Receuil des Cours d'Academie de Droit International
[R.C.A.D.I.1 1 (1962).
116. The full Latin phrase is opinio juris sive necessitatis.
117. The second source of international law listed in the Statute of the I.C.J. is
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Statute of
the International Court of Justice, supra note 34, art. 38(1)(b). See also S.S. Lotus
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950
I.C.J. 266 (customary international law is not a practice adopted "merely for reasons
of political expedience."); In the Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (holding that a practice was customary
international law because it "was accepted by law by the parties and [had] given
rise to a right and correlative obligation."); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 ("Not only must the acts concerned amount to a
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to
be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal
obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the act, is not in itself
enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremony and proto-
col, that are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated by considerations
of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty."); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Revised) § 102(2) ("Customary international
law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of -legal obligation.").
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the effectiveness of informal sanctions. Professor Richard Epstein ar-
gues that, with respect to domestic tort law regarding negligence, an
informal sanctioning process can create efficient rules.'18 Epstein's
conclusion recognizes that in consensual cases, in which negligence is
the appropriate standard of liability, "custom should be regarded as
conclusive evidence of due care."1"9
In Epstein's view, three factors determine whether legally useful
customs develop. The first factor, "reciprocity," determines whether the
parties occupy symmetrical roles. 20 If a party would be adversely af-
fected by a custom in one transaction and benefitted by the custom in
another transaction, the party is more likely to pick a custom that
would maximize the joint benefits of each party. The concept that par-
ties will attempt to adhere to a rule, rather than to spasmodic practice,
is implicit. Presumably, parties wish to rely on a common history of
analysis rather than recreate a cost-benefit analysis for each occur-
rence.
The second factor is frequency. Custom is more likely to develop
out of frequent transactions, such as purchases or sales, 2 ' than out
of infrequent ones, such as employer liability, medical malpractice, and
product liability cases."2 The third factor is severity. The more se-
vere the harm, the more likely that parties will ignore long-term conse-
quences in order to win the dispute."2
Epstein contends that the last two factors, frequency and severity,
predict when custom may develop. Thus, custom is most likely to de-
velop in cases of high frequency and low severity.2 4 It is less likely in
cases of high frequency transactions with high severity."2 No custom
is likely to develop in low-frequency/low-severity transactions or low
frequency/high-severity transactions."
As Epstein demonstrates, customary rules can be efficient in a
world of informal sanctions among parties. Thus, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that customary international law related to treaty breach will
tend to allow efficient breach and deter inefficient breach.
118. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992).
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id. at 11-12.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 14. ("The immediate players may be so preoccupied by the size of the
stakes in their own transactions (which in the limit could be a rule or ruin situa-
tion) that they will not possess the long time horizon that allows relational gains to
soften the desire for immediate success.").
124. Id. at 13-14.
125. Epstein, supra note 118, at 14-15.
126. Id. at 15-16.
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Most bilateral international agreements have no meaningful third
party determination of when a treaty is broken. 27 Although interna-
tional law requires that a state engage in negotiation before breaching
a treaty,2' many states in practice violate treaties without notice or
negotiation. For example, the United States denounced the Interna-
tional Load-Line Convention in 1939;1"9 France denounced the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1966; and Russia denounced the Trea-
ty of London in 1856. Under international law, there are ample legal
justifications for abrogating a treaty. Many of these doctrines are
vague, however, and can be easily invoked. For instance, a state may
withdraw from a treaty with the consent of all parties to the trea-
ty.-' 3 A state may also withdraw from the terms of a treaty if the
treaty provides for termination, denunciation, or withdrawal.
31
If a treaty does not provide for termination, denunciation, or with-
drawal, a party may withdraw from the treaty if either "it is estab-
lished that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunci-
ation or withdrawal" or "a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be
implied by the nature of the treaty."'32 Brownlie notes that "[wihen a
treaty contains no provisions regarding its termination, the existence
of a right to denunciation depends on the intention of the parties,
which can be inferred from the terms of the treaty and its subject-
matter."'33  Brierly," Fitzmaurice,' 3 ' and Hall" claim that com-
127. For example, multilateral treaties that have some sort of determination are
the GATT, which authorizes a Panel to adjudicate disputes, and the European
Union, which authorizes the European Court of Justice to adjudicate disputes.
128. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified the customary
international law relating to treaties, requires in most instances that a breaching
state give 12 months notice of breach and that the breaching party negotiate before
breaching a treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 56.
129. International Load-Line Convention, July 5, 1930, 47 Stat. 2228. The Con-
vention outlaws the overloading of cargo ships.
130. I use the term "withdrawal" synonymously with "terminate" or "denounce."
131. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 54. ("The termination of a treaty or
the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) [iun conformity with the provisions of
the treaty; or (b) [alt any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States.").
132. Id. art 56(1)(b).
133. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 496-97 (1966).
134. Brierly notes that commercial treaties and treaties of alliance are probably
subject to denunciation "even though they contain no express provision to that
effect." J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 331 (6th ed. 1963).
135. Fitzmaurice cites commercial or trading arrangements as examples of "certain
sorts of treaties which, unless entered into for a fixed and stated period or ex-
pressed to be in perpetuity, are in their nature such that any of the parties to them
have an implied right to bring them to an end or to withdraw from them." Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties 72, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41107 (1957).
136. Hall states that
[a] treaty becomes void . . . [bly denunciation . . . when the treaty, as
in the case of treaties of alliance or commerce, postal conventions and
the like, is voidable at the will of one of the parties, the nature of its
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mercial treaties imply this right. As a result, a party to a commercial
treaty with no provision for termination may denounce it at any time.
According to the Vienna Convention, however, the party must provide
not less than one year's notice before terminating the treaty.137
Under certain circumstances, a party may breach a treaty in re-
taliation for breach by another party. The provoking breach, however,
must be material: it must consist of either a repudiation of the treaty
not sanctioned by international law or "the violation of a provision
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the trea-
ty .138
Once a material breach has been committed, the non-breaching
parties to the treaty have three possible responses. First, the parties
can by unanimous agreement suspend the treaty in whole or in
part.139 Second, "a party specially affected by the breach" may raise
the breach "as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in
whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting
[sltate."4 ° Third, a party may suspend "the treaty in whole or in part
with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material
breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of
every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations
under the treaty."4 '
A party may terminate a treaty if performance becomes impossi-
ble. Impossibility has been interpreted both broadly and narrowly.
Under the broad view, a party may abrogate a treaty if it becomes
physically or morally impossible for the party to perform its obligations
under the treaty.42 Under the narrow view, exemplified by the Vien-
na Convention, "the impossibility [must result] from the permanent
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the exe-
cution of the treaty." 14 3 It is agreed that the impossibility cannot be
caused by the party's breach of either the agreement or of some other
international legal obligation "owed to any other party to the trea-
contents being such that it is evidently not intended to set up a perma-
nent state of things ....
WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 116, at 405 (A. Pearce
Higgins, ed., 8th ed. 1924).
137. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 56(2).
138. Id. art. 60(3)(b).
139. Id. art. 60(2)(a).
140. Id. art. 60(2)(b).
141. Id. art. 60(2)(c).
142. CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 452 (3d ed. 1948) ("[T]he arising
of conditions physically or morally incompatible with the fulfillment of the treaty
would either render it void or at least suspend its operation until the conditions had
changed."); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 191
(2d ed. 1984) (referring to Capotorti's view that "impossibility of performance, as an
objective fact, paralyses the treaty in all cases, whatever the cause.").
143. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 61(1).
DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ty."144
A fundamental change of circumstances (the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus) may be used to excuse non-performance' but only if (1)
the fundamental change of circumstances "occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty,' 46 (2) the
change of circumstances "was not foreseen by the parties,"147 (3) "the
existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty,"148 and (4) the
change in circumstances radically transformed "the extent of obliga-
tions still to be performed under the treaty. 4 9
Rebus sic stantibus was relied upon to terminate treaties of colo-
nization after World War II. The colonial powers, faced with imminent
loss of their territories, were forced to admit that the treaties support-
ing their empires were no longer valid."5 These terminations illus-
trate the way in which the realities of international relations shaped
international law.
Some observers argue that a state cannot be forced or be expected
to "sacrifice its very existence to uphold its treaty obligations"'51 and
that no nation would consent to its own annihilation. 5 2 Thus, there
may be a self-defense, or national security defense, to treaty perfor-
mance. As evinced by state practice 53 and enunciated by Derek
Bowett,'54 a state has a right to act in self-defense if the aggressor
poses an immediate danger to the security or independence of the
defending state, if the aggrieved state has no alternate means of pro-
tection, and if the state responds proportionately to the danger,
Under the doctrine of reprisal, a state may commit an otherwise
illegal act if the act is committed in retaliation for an international
144. Id. art. 61(2).
145. Id. art. 62 (assuming existence of doctrine by placing restrictions on it); see
also Free Zones (Fr. v. Switz.) 1932 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 46, at 156-58 (June 7)
(assuming that principle existed but not deciding exact scope of principle).
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 62(1).
147. Id.
148. Id. art. 62(1)(a).
149. Id. art. 62(1)(b).
150. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 84.
151. HALL, supra note 136, at 415. ("A treaty therefore becomes voidable so soon
as it is dangerous to the life or incompatible with the independence of a state,
provided that its injurious effects were not intended by the two contracting parties
at the time of its conclusion."); GYORGY HARSZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
THE LAW OF TREATIES 378 (1973); FENWICK, supra note 142, at 454.
152. FENWICK, supra note 142, at 454.
153. See, e.g., SPANISH RED BOOK ON GIBRALTAR 133 (1965) (describing Spanish
suspension of ferry service to Gibraltar); Derek W. Bowett, Economic Coercion and
Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1972) (describing Indonesian nationaliza-
tion of Dutch private property in 1958).
154. Bowett, supra note 153, at 10.
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delinquency." States have traditionally used asset freezes and block-
ades - such as the blockade of Cuba by the United States in October
1962 - to achieve political goals.
Some other excuses for treaty non-performance are necessity and
force majeure. One doctrine that deters opportunistic retaliation is the
principle of economic coercion, which may prevent opportunistic rene-
gotiation of treaties. United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2625 evinces what some claim to be a general principle of international
law.' 5 It states that "[n]o state may use or encourage the use of eco-
nomic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sover-
eign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind."57 Thus, if
a party threatens to breach a treaty, unless the other state makes a
concession or renegotiates the treaty, such a threat might be deemed
economic coercion.
If a party wishes to terminate, withdraw from, or suspend a
treaty,15 it must comply with the notice requirements of the Vienna
Convention. The notice requirements presumably affect the exercise of
rights under the doctrines of termination under a treaty's provisions
(Article 54(a)), termination by consent of the parties (Article 54(b)),
unilateral withdrawal (Article 56), retaliatory breach (Article 60), im-
possibility of performance (Article 61), fundamental change of circum-
stances (Article 62) discussed above, as well as other provisions. The
breaching party must notify the other parties to the treaty of its claim
and must indicate the "the measure proposed to be taken with respect
to the treaty and the reasons therefor."5 ' If no party objects after at
least three months, or a lesser amount of time in cases of "special
urgency," the party may carry out such termination, withdrawal, or
suspension." Some authorities suggest that in cases of special ur-
gency, the notification requirement can be waived altogether. 6 ' For
155. Id. at 7. See also J.G. STARKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (1989).
156. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I.
185-86 (1982-V). ("2625's prohibition against coercion applies to a state discontinuing
trade with an offending country and imposing as a condition for the resumption of
trade a change in the internal or foreign policy of the offending state.").
157. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/8082
(1970).
158. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, art. 65(1) (If the party "invokes either a
defect in its consent to be bound by a treaty or a ground for impeaching the validi-
ty of a treaty, terminating it, withdrawing from it or suspending its operation.").
159. Id.
160. Id. art. 65(2).
161. Jimndz de Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third Century, 159
R.C.A.D.I. 80 (1978) (suggesting that breach enables the aggrieved party to provi-
sionally suspend its own performance notwithstanding the Vienna Convention).
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example, in 1940, the President of the U.S. suspended the operation of
the International Load Line Convention of 193062 on the grounds of
changed shipping conditions brought about by the war in Europe."s
The United States did not give prior notice; rather, it argued that the
notice requirement was inoperable in the "swiftly changing conditions
inherent in the world situation."' If a party objects to breach, the
parties must seek a negotiated solution under Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter."6 If no solution has been reached within one year
after the date on which the objection was raised, any one of the parties
to the dispute may submit the dispute to the Conciliation Commis-
sion.'" The Conciliation Commission reports to the parties its conclu-
sions of facts and laws, but the report "shall not be binding upon the
parties and it shall have no other character than that of recommenda-
tions submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to facili-
tate an amicable settlement of the dispute. 67
Thus, under the Vienna Convention, a party may prevent another
party from withdrawing, terminating, or suspending a treaty by re-
fraining to give consent. Although the rest of the Vienna Convention is
generally accepted as declaratory of international law, the procedural
provisions contained in Articles 65 and Articles 68 may not represent
international law because they do not conform to the practice of states.
For example, the United States, in withdrawing from the International
Load-Line Convention on the basis of a fundamental change of circum-
stances, did not attempt to negotiate its withdrawal.
Despite the multiplicity of doctrines and treatises related to non-
performance of treaties," international relations theorists have ex-
pressed disappointment in the sophistication of the law of treaty non-
162. International Load-Line Convention, supra note 129.
163. Herbert W. Briggs, Editorial Comment, The Attorney-General Invoked Rebus
Sic Stantibus, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1942); see also Letter from Acting Attorney
General Francis Biddle to President Franklin D. Roosevelt of July 28, 1941, 40
OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ArTTs GEN. OF THE U.S. 119 (1949).
164. Letter of Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle, supra note 163, at 123.
165. The United Nations Charter, article 33, provides that
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to en-
danger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the
parties to settle their dispute by such means.
166. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, art. 66, Annex.
167. Id. Annex(6).
168. See, e.g. ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL
BREACHES AND RETALIATIONS (1975); Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of
Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 51 (1974).
VOL. 23:1
1994 EFFICIENT BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 217
performance. Yet these doctrines, however undeveloped when com-
pared with domestic law, seem to allow broad room for non-compliance
with treaty obligations.
Excusing breach is conducive to efficient breach only if the legal
doctrines that allow a state to abrogate a treaty are coextensive with
efficient breach; i.e., non-performance is allowed only if breach would
be efficient. One way to test this hypothesis might be to compare ex-
cuses for treaty performance with actual clauses in treaties that pro-
vide for repudiation. If a treaty specified the conditions for breach,169
one would expect that the treaty allows efficient breach and forbids
inefficient breaches. A treaty that did not allow for an efficient breach
would unnecessarily impose costs upon the breaching party. Because
parties to a contract will not impose an inefficient term upon a party,
efficient breach will be allowed.170
C. Multilateralism and GATT
Another institutional form is multilateralism. Multilateralism
arises when a hegemon creates an entire governance system for free
trade; the hegemon may do so in two different ways. First, it may
bribe countries to sign a multilateral agreement. For example, the
United States bribed other countries to join GATT by (1) allowing the
preference system among commonwealth countries, (2) permitting
discrimination against its imports during the early years of GATT, and
(3) providing foreign aid to Europe.'71 Second, the hegemon may pun-
ish those who breach the agreement. Both unilateralism and
multilateralism involve a hegemon. In multilateralism, however, the
hegemon actively punishes other countries for defecting (as well as
offering them incentives to comply), whereas in unilateralism the hege-
mon does not care about, and is not affected by, the policies of other
nations.
Countries abided by the GATT, according to Yarbrough &
Yarbrough, because of the implicit threat that the United States would
retaliate against defectors. In particular, the escape clause allowed the
United States to retaliate legally."' In recent years, the credibility of
the U.S. threat of retaliation has declined because the position of the
U.S. as a hegemon has eroded. The importance of the GATT has de-
clined, too, as international trade outside the GATT has grown and as
169. A treaty might not specify conditions for breach, in which case the custom-
ary international law regarding breach applies.
170. The GATT signatories have freely adopted a broad excuse provision. For a
discussion of GATT, see Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive
Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 255 (1991).
171. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 62-63.
172. Id. at 64.
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countries have erected non-tariff barriers to trade.17 As a result,
"[a]greements must become more self-contained and rely on internal
mechanisms for enforcement instead of a third party in the form of a
hegemon."174 Because the United States is no longer a hegemon in
the world trade community, the GATT today has perhaps moved closer
to Yarbrough & Yarbrough's model of bilateralism.
One primary GATT enforcement mechanism is retaliation by in-
jured countries in the form of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
By and large, this governance mechanism appears to conform with the
efficient breach notion that an injured party should be awarded the
amount of damage done. Import duties result in higher prices, which
compensate producer groups. Although economic theory suggests that
anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties are inefficient from an
aggregative welfare standpoint, international actors are not motivated
by aggregate efficiency but rather by the power of special interest
groups.
175
Thus, Sykes argues that certain actions will be inefficient from
the economic standpoint but efficient from the political standpoint. One
interpretation is that the GATT escape clause, Article XIX, prevents
countries from enacting more drastic protectionist measures. 7 " Arti-
cle XIX easily dispenses protectionism without the necessity of violat-
ing an international agreement.
The escape clause was included in GATT at the insistence of the
U.S. negotiator. 177 U.S. policy, according to public choice theory, is
driven primarily by producers, who have a more concentrated interest
in trade policy than do consumers. As a result, although free trade is
efficient, it may not always prevail. Sykes argues that the GATT es-
cape clause reduces the possibility of adverse political consequences to
the GATT negotiators by allowing them to escape their GATT obliga-
173. Id. at 67.
174. Id.
175. That interest groups control trade policy is perhaps an oversimplification.
There are many theories that seek to explain free trade. See RONALD RoGOwsKI,
COMMERCE AND COALITIONS (1989). One theory holds that the scarce factor of pro-
duction will oppose free trade and the abundant factor will favor free trade. Id. See
also James Cassing, Timothy J. McKeown & Jack Ochs, The Political Economy of
the Tariff Cycle, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843-62 (1986). According to business cycle
theory, free trade will occur during booms; protection will occur during busts. Id. See
also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). According to hege-
monic stability theory, free trade occurs when one nation has a large market share
of international trade. The most relevant theory for these purposes is the public
choice theory or "rent seeking" theory, which postulates that there will be free trade
only if it is favored by the politically powerful economic groups in society. The most
powerful group is the producer group, not the consumer group, because the benefits
to the producer group are more concentrated than the costs to consumers. Id.
176. Sykes, supra note 170, at 273-74.
177. Id. at 274.
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tions when there was domestic political pressure to protect certain
industries.178 Like Yarbrough & Yarbrough, Sykes views the GATT
as a self-enforcing agreement.
Another breach provision in GATT is Article XXVIII, which allows
a country to renegotiate a tariff binding. Sykes argues that such ex
post negotiation is allowed in order to avoid deciding, ex ante, all types
of contingencies that would allow breach. 79 If negotiations fail, then
the GATT allows a country to breach, but only at the risk that other
countries may withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions." This,
too, is a way of punishing the offender for damage done. Interestingly,
the enforcement measure is discretionary, not automatic.
D. Minilateralism and the European Community
The fourth institutional form is minilateralism, which crosses the
boundary from anarchy to organized government. The conditions under
which minilateralism arises are (1) the presence of specific trade-relat-
ed investment and (2) the creation of effective third-party enforce-
ment."18
Yarbrough & Yarbrough's example of minilateralism is the Euro-
pean Community (and Union) from 1986 forward. Before 1986,
Yarbrough & Yarbrough contend, the EEC was characterized by anar-
chic types of enforcement. Many countries actually refused to comply
with Community directives:
The French defied an injunction of the Community Court by forbid-
ding imports of British lamb. The British and West German gov-
ernments threatened to withhold their legally required financial
contributions to the Community in response to a budget increase.
The British refused to comply with their Community obligations
without a reduction in their budgetary contribution. French subsi-
dies to turkey farmers, alleged by Britain to be illegal under Com-
munity policy, caused Britain to suspend vaccinating birds against
pests - to justify a policy of keeping out French turkeys to protect
the newly disease-vulnerable British birds.'
The turning point was the Single European Act in 1985, when voting
by the Council of Ministers was changed from unanimous voting to
qualified majority voting. Yarbrough & Yarbrough contend that before
this turning point, enforcement of EEC law was impossible because the
necessary unanimous vote could never be reached.
International institutions such as GATT and the European Union
provide a middle ground between treaty law and federalism. One func-
178. Id. at 278-80.
179. Id. at 283.
180. Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1992), supra note 22, at 90, Fig. 5.1.
181. Id. at 94.
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tion of such institutions is to lend precision to the circumstances under
which a country should be punished by its trade partners. Axelrod and
Keohane summarize this function as follows:
Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defec-
tion and thereby make it more costly. Insofar as they specify pre-
cisely what reciprocity means in the relevant issue-area, they make
it easier to establish a reputation for practicing precisely because
others will be more willing to make agreements with governments
that can be expected to respond to cooperation with cooperation.182
Axelrod and Xeohane identify a theoretical gap that exists when
discussing the effect of institutions." 3 "Upward looking" theories fo-
cus on the behavior of individual actors. "Downward-looking" theories
examine the implications for actors of the way in which the entire
institution is organized. Such downward-looking theories are public
goods and market failure.
One theory, neo-functionalism, appears to have bridged the gap
between actor-oriented theories and state-oriented theories. Neo-
functionalism attempts to explain how national actors begin to shift
their loyalties towards a regional government."' Actors are assumed
to be self-interested groups and political parties that favor integration
to accomplish their own goals. These groups influence the supra-state
political actors, namely the European Council and the European Com-
mission. Neo-functionalism postulates that there is an economic and
political spillover effect whereby "any integrative action in one sector
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by
taking further actions in related sectors."1"
For neo-functionalists, the processes of integration created "an
integrated and enforceable body of community law. " " The increased
enforceability of this law can be traced through a series of landmark
opinions of the European Court of Justice. In van Gend & Loos, the
Court held that a private company could directly invoke certain provi-
sions of the Treaty of Rome against the Dutch government."8 7 In Cos-
ta v. Enel, the Court held that Community law was supreme above na-
tional law.1" In other decisions, the Court has held that certain trea-
ty provisions and community legislation have direct application with-
182. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 111, at 252.
183. Id. at 252.
184. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political
Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41, 53 (1993) (quoting Ernst Haas, Inter-
national Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INT'L ORG. 315,
366 (1961)).
185. Burley & Mattli, supra note 184, at 55.
186. Id. at 57.
187. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport & Expeditie Onderneming van Gend &
Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
188. Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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out the necessity of national enabling legislation.
There is very little room in the European Union treaties for
breach. The Treaty of Rome contains no escape clauses. Furthermore,
there are no provisions for termination of the treaty. Although termi-
nation of the treaty might be allowed under the customary interna-
tional law related to treaty termination, a country's withdrawal would
result in its loss of the reciprocal benefits of Union membership, a
cataclysmic fallout.189
Minor violations of treaty provisions have been shut down by
heightened enforcement since 1986; nations seeking to evade their
treaty obligations find little solace in the text of the Treaty of Rome or
in community legislation. There are no countervailing duties or anti-
dumping duties to be used or abused.
We are left with a question of why unification reduces the oppor-
tunities for parties to breach the agreement. The answer is that great-
er unification leads to reciprocal recognition of the welfare of other
countries' interest groups. Suppose, for instance, that low-cost Italian
steel manufacturers begin to gain market share from British steel
manufacturers. Ordinarily, British steel companies would put pressure
on the legislature for protective tariffs on subsidies. Possibly, the steel
companies would succeed in overrunning the diffused interests of the
steel consumers."g But with integration, the Italian steel companies
would register their political preferences for free trade, perhaps coun-
terbalancing the British producer interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that nations seek to maximize the welfare of
interest groups, they also seek to generate efficient compliance behav-
ior in the same way as private parties do. In anarchy, the sanctions
available to punish non-compliance with agreements are often too
clumsy to perfectly generate efficient behavior. Because informal sanc-
tions are not as precise as court-ordered damages, parties to interna-
tional agreements face high negotiating costs. If negotiations fail to
reach the efficient result, there will be overcompliance and
undercompliance with agreements. As institutions become more sophis-
ticated, remedies for breach become more precise and the idea of effi-
cient breach becomes correspondingly more robust. After a certain
189. The reduction in trade barriers has led European industries to make in-
vestments that hinge upon continued participation in the European Union. One such
type of investment is the building of plants that capitalize on Union-wide economies
of scale.
190. Under GATT, the British steel companies could convince the British govern-
ment to levy anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties on Italian imports,
assuming that the Italians engaged in dumping or subsidies. See Bovard, supra note
26 (collecting instances of American retaliatory action).
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point, centralization requires the disposal of the domestic contract law
analogy entirely.
In light of the infrequency of treaty breach, and given the decen-
tralized nature of international law, international law contains a sur-
prisingly complex set of rules governing termination. The explanation
for this may be the lack of compensation in international relations. In
domestic law, private actors are forced to compensate each other for
breach, thereby determining for themselves when it is efficient to
breach a contract. In international law, however, this selection must be
done through a legal mechanism, through custom, or both.
International agreements are not motivated by a state's total
economic welfare but by the welfare of powerful interest groups. As a
result, we would expect that doctrines forgiving treaty termination
would hinge upon variations on the welfare of the powerful political
groups. This expectation is borne out in the GATT, which calibrates
the escape clause and the ability to levy retaliatory duties on the mis-
fortunes of producer groups. In the European Union, integrationist ten-
dencies eliminate some barriers to trade and also eliminate most ex-
cuses for treaty breach. Changed circumstances that adversely affect
one politically powerful producer group usually improve the lot of an-
other producer group in the Union. As economic welfare is aggregated
across economic groups, fewer breaches of treaty obligations are politi-
cally efficient from a Union perspective. It is perhaps more expeditious
to eliminate any recourse to breach.
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REVIEWED BY ACHIM KODDERMANN"
WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION, STRUCTURAL AD-
JUSTMENT AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT; Edited by Ved
P. Nanda, George W. Shepherd, Jr., and Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds;
Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut (1994); ($55.00); ISBN 0-313-
28531-4; 249 pp. (hardcover).
The theme of this book is the moral imperative to foster the hu-
man condition by means of structural adjustment, grounded in the
right to development. In four sections, this book organizes papers origi-
nally presented at the University of Denver in 1990. Yet, it transcends
by far ordinary conference proceedings. Although the varied chapters
explicitly present diverse viewpoints, the implicit common thesis envi-
sions the possible improvement of current conditions. The authors link
concerns -of poverty reduction and the right to development with the
debt crisis. The threat of further deterioration to the abject living con-
ditions for millions of people in developing countries and debtor na-
tions forges an uncommon coalition. Recognizing the necessity to for-
mulate commonly acceptable solutions for imminent problems, the
editors have united scholars from different ideological and theoretical
backgrounds toward a common goal. Represented are Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations (NGOs), lawyers, legal scholars, economists, political
scientists, theologians, and World Bank representatives. Although a
synthesis is not easily achieved, the essays cumulatively characterize
the world debt crisis as a human rights issue.
Scholarly papers, such as these, that address the challenges of
global development are regarded as conveyors of responsibility from
one generation to the next. Such "activism" could appear to violate the
true spirit of scholarly inquiry, but it merely transcends it. Using pre-
dominantly African cases, different adjustment programs are developed
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, State University of New York, College at
Oneonta; Ph.D., M.A. (philosophy, law, and comparative literature), Johannes
Gutenberg-Universittit, Mainz, Germany.
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against a common theoretical background. The essays are bound to-
gether by their attempt to advance the solution of urgent social prob-
lems by theoretical inquiry. Beyond discrepancies inherent to divergent
political and philosophical positions, the manifest problems of the
world debt crisis demand a common solution. Debates about the validi-
ty of natural law or divine revelation shrink in comparison to the ac-
knowledged need for improvement of the human condition, so the dis-
cussion of the foundation of human rights could be omitted. Yet, realis-
tic solutions are advanced. While some of the articles suggest that a
disaster must be averted, others respond with ways to accomplish that.
The exceptional quality of this volume is to temper idealistic humani-
tarian efforts with appropriate financial and economic suggestions.
Beyond Western scholarship, it leaves room for the cooperative partici-
pation of affected people.
Ved Nanda's opening remarks are followed by Joan Nelson's iden-
tification of emerging compromises between North and South. She
associates the worldwide trend toward political reform - an optimism
somewhat tempered by recent developments - with an anticipated
universal consciousness regarding poverty and fundamental human
rights. The essay provides an overview of an emerging consensus on
macroeconomic stabilization. K.N.M. Sonko's contribution blames the
debt recovery project for the human costs in sub-Saharan Africa. This
case study exemplifies the vicious circle of interdependence, responsi-
ble for the current crisis, and advocates debt-forgiveness. Sonko's nar-
rower focus aptly illustrates concerns that may be missed by address-
ing the debt crisis from a global perspective.
The second section illuminates the importance of human rights in
the context of the particular right to development. Ved Nanda apprais-
es the right to development from a legal perspective, linking theory
and practice. Besides the necessary theoretical discussion of the under-
pinnings, it shows the likely road towards implementation of rights
that currently only exist in theory. He rejects all endeavors to limit
international law to "realpolitik." This key article develops the philo-
sophical, legal, and historical perspective of the "right to development."
Nanda proves a valuable guide through often unclear and imprecise
definitions of the "ideals" subsumed under this right. He defines the
solidarity (group) right to development as a complex combination of the
generally accepted concept of the human person, on the one hand, and
the participation principle on the other hand. The latter - controver-
sial - principle unites individual human rights with peoples interests
(at 46). In keeping with the tenor of the book, this contribution de-
clines to indulge in the debate between individual and collective hu-
man rights, concentrating on a readily accepted tenet: a human cen-
tered concept of development. Nanda evaluates NGO recommendations
recognizing that the proposals by the Global Consultation will lack
implementation if the "will for the establishment of a just world order"
(at 58) remains a mere lip service. Nanda combines the theoretical
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approach with an appeal for action at the regional and grassroots lev-
el, and, of course, in international forums.
In "The African Right to Development and Adjustment: World
Policy and the Debt Crisis," George W. Shepherd speaks about the
correlation between the right to development and the development of
democratic structures. Shepherd concludes that the World Bank projec-
tions are too general. He recommends alternative policies developed
from the grassroots through the international level (at 91).
Part three groups articles with a primarily economical focus.
World Bank and IMF activities are analyzed with poverty reduction
considered the primary objective. Haider Ali Khan studies the impact
of the economic modeling of structural adjustment on the human con-
dition. Khan suggests that both the World Bank and IMF are satisfac-
tory for addressing the mere monetary-financial aspects of structural
adjustment, yet they "lack adequate integration of the real and finan-
cial sectors" (at 104). After an empirical analysis of the IMF financial
programming and dubious macroeconomic effects of IMF prescriptions,
Khan discusses the division of labor with the World Bank. Negligence
on the part of the World Bank and IMF regarding distributional issues
limits the application of the classical structural adjustment process
(SAP). Khan further explains why new multisectoral models based on
social accounting matrices (SAMs) are preferable (at 101). To be effec-
tive, forms of bilateral aid have to be replaced by multilateral financial
efforts that reflect the global dimension of the crisis. Anticipating the
GATT debate, Khan emphasizes that this endeavor is promising only if
financial efforts to help are not made vain by protectionism, especially
by developed countries. All other attempts to improve the current situ-
ation by using SAPs indiscriminately can only be achieved at the ex-
pense of the poor.
Following this analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the
link between a deteriorating human condition and the debt crisis, F. L.
Osunsade addresses the necessity to replace anonymous, international
efforts by targeted actions "focusing on identified needs of well-defined
population groups" (at 110), which should be integrated by internation-
al organizational cooperation. The succeeding essay by Will H. More
and James R. Scarritt offers "an explanatory analysis" of IMF policy in
Black Africa. Data presented on twenty eight African nations support
the criticisms of IMF imposed monetary strategies and their
destabilizing and autocracy-promoting effects.
From an NGO perspective, the fourth section of the volume at-
tempts to highlight the contributions that international law has made
toward facilitating participation of affected peoples into the develop-
ment process. The first paper, written by Paula Rhodes and Eileen
McCarthy-Arnolds, oscillates between the attempt to salvage the - in-
herently negative - term "NGO" and the effort to combine an empiri-
cal study of NGOs with normative statements about their prospective
1994*
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role in international law. The problem arises because they link a ques-
tionable description of what is, with what ought to be.
More apocalyptic is the analysis of discriminating policies in the
international debt crisis by John Cavanagh. Before the ethical dilem-
ma about, "who should pay?" is solved, a solution cannot be formulat-
ed. Therefore, it is only logical that the concluding essay by George W.
Shepherd, Jr. associates the right to development with ethics - i.e., a
convergence of the aims of traditional ethical approaches, from Hindu-
ism to Christianity. For Shepherd, justice, not efficiency, is the criteri-
on to judge. His appeal for the declaration of a "jubilee year of debt
forgiveness," however, will probably fall on deaf ears. Yet, his belief
that only reciprocal worldwide efforts will solve the problems, as enu-
merated in this volume, will probably be heard. The integrative aim to
implement the right to development brings opposites together. Ved
Nanda's introduction and George Shepherd's conclusion bind together
what would otherwise be a patchwork of ideas. From different perspec-
tives, both advocate a vision incorporating legal, ethical, and financial
principles. This diverse but focused volume will help to ensure that the
progress of development in the 1990's will achieve the prescribed goals.
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Freer Trade, Protected Environment:
Balancing Trade Liberalization and
Environmental Interests
REVIEWED BY GEORGE W. PRING* AND GEOFFREY SWEITZER "°
RUNGE, C. FORD, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT:
BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERESTS; Council On Foreign Relations Books, New York (1994);
($17.95); ISBN 0-87609-154-0; 146 pp. (pbk.).
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
Garret Hardin1
Freer Trade, Protected Environment is the latest book on the "hot"
international law topic of the 1990s - the interrelation of trade and
the environment. Does expanded free trade spell ruin or rescue for the
global environment? Are economy and ecology incompatible? Is "sus-
tainable trade" an oxymoron?
While much has already been written on this important debate,2
given its very formative stage, this slim volume is a valuable contri-
bution. It is the outgrowth of the "Study Group on Trade and the Envi-
ronment" convened by the Council on Foreign Relations3 and com-
prised of "a wide cross section of interested professionals from both the
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; J.D., University of
Michigan; B.A., Harvard College.
** J.D. Candidate, 1995, University of Denver College of Law; B.S., University
of Vermont.
1. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (Dec.
13, 1968), reprinted in ZYGMUNT PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & WILLIAM GOLDFARB,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 35 (1992).
2. Good examples cited by the author include the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment, World Bank, and University of Michigan studies. C. FORD RUNGE,
FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS xii (1994) [hereinafter FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVI-
RONMENT]. Others include Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment,
and Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INTL & COMp. L. REV. 535
(1992); Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Envi-
ronment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 185 (1994); Symposium:
The Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law
Reform, 1 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 273 (1994).
3. Self-described on the flyleaf as "a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization
devoted to promoting improved understanding of international affairs . . . [which]
does not take any position on questions of foreign policy and has no affiliation with,
and receives no funding from, the United States government."
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environment and trade communities."4 However, as its author,
codirector of the Council study and a University of Minnesota professor
of agricultural and applied economics, makes clear at the outset, the
book is "the author's alone" - not a report or consensus document of
the obviously highly conflicted participants.5
The goal of the book is to provide a "general analysis" of the in-
sights of the year-long Council study and bridge the gap between the
environmental and trade disciplines.' The book is expressly aimed "for
an audience of interested but nonexpert readers,"7 and succeeds in
meeting that goal, unfortunately at some expense to its promised aim
of writing at a "layperson" level.
Free traders or environmental advocates looking for a book sup-
porting one side of the debate over the other will not find it here. Pro-
fessor Runge refrains from taking sides on the value of free trade ver-
sus the environment or vice versa. Instead, he adopts the position that
free trade and the environment are equally important and that a "doc-
trine of balance" is required.8 As with much other writing of this type,
the book asks more questions than it answers.
The layout of Freer Trade, Protected Environment is simple and
well suited for its aim of educating the layperson. Unfortunately, as
will be discussed below, it assumes a fair amount of expertise, succeed-
ing better at its goal of bridging the gap between two disciplines than
its goal of providing a "general analysis."
The book is divided into three broad sections. The first of these
sections establishes a framework useful for those unfamiliar with the
topic. Chapter 1 discusses why environmentalists and free trade ex-
perts are at odds; how and when this conflict arose; and how the
camps are currently divided, not only between environmentalists and
free-traders but also along "North-South" geopolitical lines. Chapter 2
discusses the various perspectives - legal, economic, and environmen-
tal - from which the debate can be analyzed.
In the second section, specific cases and models are examined to
highlight some of the critical issues in the sustainable trade debate.
Chapter 3 examines the fundamental question whether trade liberal-
4. FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at xi. The over 140
listed participants come from U.S. environmental groups, academia, U.S. government
agencies, the World Bank, media, corporations, and the legal profession. Id. at 118-
122.
5. Id. at xi; Professor Runge does credit his research assistants, Frangois
Ortalo-Magnd and Philip Vande Kamp, with co-authorship. A further disclaimer is
contained in a remarkably tepid and arms-length "Foreword" contributed by Michael
S. Smith, Chairman of the study. Id. at vii-ix.
6. Id. at xii, 1-7.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id.
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ization will lead to increased damage to the environment. Using the
European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) as models, Professor Runge illustrates how the question
defies broad generalization. As the EU experience shows, trade liberal-
ization can not only harm the environment (e.g. the European trans-
portation sector) but also enhance it (e.g. European agriculture).
Chapter 4 examines two classic trade-environment clashes, the
Tuna-Dolphin Dispute' and the U.S.-Canada Fisheries Landing Dis-
pute." These two cases are used to illustrate the key issues in sus-
tainable trade: extraterritorial application of domestic environmental
laws, preemption of domestic laws by the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT);" "product" vs. "process" distinctions in GATT
exceptions; and trade protectionism disguised as environmental protec-
tion. Chapter 5 explores the conflict between international environ-
mental instruments and international trade instruments, focusing on
the Montreal Protocol 2 and its potentially serious conflicts with the
GATT.
Chapter Six is the third section and heart of the book. Based on
the lessons learned from the cases examined in section two, Professor
Runge proposes possible solutions. This chapter is devoted almost
exclusively to the merits of creating a World Environmental Organi-
zation (WEO) to act as a counterweight to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) of the GATT.
Ironically, Freer Trade, Protected Environment attempts to harmo-
nize environment and free trade by proposing impossible principles,
followed by a remedy for their inevitable failure. Central to Professor
Runge's thesis is the arguable proposition that environmental prob-
lems are not likely to be solved by trade measures alone and that a
better solution involves a combination of both trade and environmental
policies. 3 To this end Professor Runge lays out "[flour principles of
9. In 1991, Mexico successfully challenged the United States Marine Mammal
Protection Act. See "United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna." GAF Doc.
No. DS2l/R Sept. 3, 1991. Although the GATT Council rendered a decision regarding
the challenge, commonly referred to as Tuna-Dolphin I, the decision has no direct
legal effect as neither Mexico nor the United States asked the GATT Council to
adopt it. For an extensive analysis of the Tuna-Dolphin I case, see Robert Housman
& Durwood Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GATT Tu-
na/Dolphin Decision, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10268 (1992).
10. See U.S.-Canada Binational Panel Final Report, 12 I.T.R.D. 1026-44 (Oct. 16,
1989).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
12. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted
and opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987Xentered
into force Jan. 1, 1989).
13. For a provocative, opposing viewpoint, urging the U.S. to "violate" GATT to
protect the environment, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Using Trade to Enforce Interna.
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balanced trade and environmental policies."14 The four principles are
as follows: (1) perceived trade problems should be addressed using
trade policies, and environmental problems with environmental poli-
cies; (2) trade policies should aim to lower trade barriers while remain-
ing environmentally neutral; (3) environmental policies should focus on
environmental concerns while remaining trade neutral; and (4) nation-
al governments should be encouraged to harmonize their trade and
environmental policies. Failure to adhere to these principles, in
Runge's analysis, is the reason for the conflicts in the cases profiled in
chapters 4 and 5.
Up to this point, Professor Runge appears to be widening the gap
between trade and the environment, calling for their separation rather
than attempting to draw them together. However, in chapter 6 he
meets this concern and remains true to the book's stated goal by con-
ceding that in reality observing the Four Principles is often impossi-
ble.'5 While not always the case, trade or environmental policies and
instruments will often impact each other intentionally or unintention-
ally.
Because of this, the author advocates an authoritative, new inter-
national institution to work beside the GATT's World Trade Organiza-
tion, operating across national governments to ensure that policies
imposing either type of burden are sufficiently tailored to minimize
potential challenges, if not remove them entirely. This idea is suffi-
ciently undeveloped in previous writings on this topic to make Profes-
sor Runge's fairly detailed analysis quite interesting and valuable.
Where previous writings speak generally about amending the GATT"s
or expanding the GATT waivers, 7 Freer Trade, Protected Environ-
ment proposes an unusually detailed and noteworthy institutional fix.
How realistic it is, given the resistance of the U.S. and other nations to
international authorities, is a serious question, but not one that should
deter us from considering its numerous advantages. Professor Runge's
"WEO" should be particularly attractive to environmentalists, among
others, as it completely rebuts the image that environmental concerns
are secondary to economic ones, a problem with other proposed solu-
tions based on tinkering within the GATT.
His cure, however, is not without its price. By focusing on his
"four principles" of balanced trade and environmental policies, much of
the current relationship between international trade law and interna-
tional Environmental Law: Implications for United States Law, 1 IND. J. OF GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 273 (1994).
14. FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at 29.
15. Runge calls their failure "unavoidable." Id. at 98.
16. Kennedy, supra note 2; Eliza Patterson, International Trade and the Environ.
ment: Institutional Solutions, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10599 (1991).
17. Id.
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tional environment law is left out. By boldly attempting to bridge the
gap, the author fails to give the reader much sense of the nature of the
gap itself. Unlike international trade law, which has been melded
together over the years under comprehensive authorities like the
GATT and NAFTA, international environmental law remains a loose
patchwork of unrelated instruments and institutions."8 Certainly, few
would argue the international environmental regime has the binding
authority and international respect commanded by the GATT.
Further, Runge makes little mention of the historically secondary
role that environmental problems have taken to economic concerns.
Economic instruments, like the GATT, make little reference to environ-
mental concerns; in contrast, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations and
other environmental instruments focus quite centrally on economic
concerns, to the extent that "environmental protection" is now sub-
sumed into "sustainable development." What makes omitting this rela-
tionship all the more surprising is that Professor Runge's very propos-
al would give international environmental law unprecedented parity
with the other, economic fields of international law.
Another criticism of the book is its omission of other valuable case
studies. While the Tuna-Dolphin Dispute, the U.S.-Canada Fisheries
Landing case, and the Montreal Protocol illustrate some of the current
problems in the sustainable trade debate, other cases would provide
depth and avenues for further investigation. For example, the German
Packaging case19 and the Danish Bottle case' could provide valuable
additional insights on extrajurisdictional application of domestic laws
and the product-process distinction. Also, in addition to the Montreal
Protocol, both CITIES21 and the Basel Convention2 harbor potential-
ly unique conflicts with the GATT.
None of this is intended to say that Freer Trade, Protected Envi-
ronment is not a valuable learning tool. However, it is perhaps better
suited for a more knowledgeable audience than for the "interested but
18. For a glimpse of the volume and diversity of international environmental
instruments, see George W. Pring & David L. Joeris, Book Review: Four Internation-
al Environmental Law Collections, 4 COLO. J. OF INT'L ENVTL L. & POL. 422 (1993);
for the latest of such collections, see LAXSHMAN GURuswAMY, GOEFFREY PALMER &
BURNS H. WESTON, SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENT AND WORLD ORDER (1994).
19. For a discussion of the German Packaging Ordinance, see Ray V. Hartwell &
Lucas Bergkamp, Environmental Trade Barriers and International Competitiveness,
24 ENvTL. L. REP. 10109 (1994).
20. Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. 4607 (Judgement of Sept.
20, 1988).
21. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
22. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 27, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/I.G. 80/3 (1989), reprint-
ed in 28 I.L.M. 657 (entered into force May 21, 1992)..
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nonexpert reader." Certainly, a layperson would come away with a
basic understanding of the important issues in the debate. However,
without an understanding of international environmental law, such a
reader could miss the bigger picture and be misled into thinking it has
developed further than in truth it has. But, for those already fortified
with at least the basics of international environmental law, Freer
Trade, Protected Environment makes a valuable contribution to under-
standing and harmonizing the economic-environmental commons that
we all must protect or ruin.
Human Rights in the Private Sphere
REVIEWED BY CELIA R. TAYLOR'
CLAPHAM, ANDREW, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE
SPHERE, OUP Publishers. New York (1994); ($68.00); ISBN 0-19-
825799-6; 388 pp. (hardcover).
Those seeking to expand human rights protections have two pri-
mary avenues of attack. One is to argue that the definition of "human
rights" should be interpreted broadly to include a wide spectrum of
economic, cultural, and social rights as well as political and civil
rights. Another is to argue that firmly established rights should be
protected in more contexts that the current position of international
law now deems appropriate. Andrew Clapham's Human Rights in the
Private Sphere focuses on the second of these approaches to broadening
human rights protection. In this work (part of a series designed for
lawyers but intended to have impact on the actual conduct of interna-
tional relations), Dr. Clapham challenges the traditional notion that
human rights only protect citizens from abuses of power by states. He
argues that the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are applicable in the
private sphere and should be enforced and protected against action by
non-state, as well as state, actors.
Human Rights in the Private Sphere attempts to present both a
practical and theoretical approach to the question of how international
human rights norms could be applied to actions against non-state
actors, using as a model an examination of how the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights might be relevant in the courts of the United
Kingdom. The "practical" portion of the analysis is based in part on a
detailed examination of case law generated by the European Commis-
sion and the Court of Human Rights interpreting and applying the
ECHR and on an analysis of the European Community legal order and
the case law of the European Court of Justice dealing with human
rights issues. Another chapter in the "practical" section considers the
approach taken by the United States and Canada when confronted by
similar issues concerning the protection of "fundamental rights" and
"state action".
The "theory" portion of the analysis considers traditional ap-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M.,
Columbia University; J.D., New York University School of Law; B.A., George Wash-
ington University.
1. A complete list of these rights and freedoms is not provided by Dr. Clapham;
nor is the European Convention on Human Rights reproduced in the work. Instead,
certain rights and freedoms are discussed in the context of case law and European
Court and Commission actions.
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proaches to the protection of human rights in the private sphere in
various fields of international law. Clapham traces recent changes in
this arena, and argues that in light of these trends towards expanded
protection, the ECHR must be considered applicable in the private
sphere. Once the premise of protection is accepted, the issues left to
resolve are which of the rights recognized by the Convention apply in
the private sphere and to what extent. The analysis addresses these
questions in the framework of the current state of theory application.
Caution is a fundamental theme underlying both the practical and
theoretical discussions in the work. Caution is evident in the careful
and in-depth analysis given to the relevant case law, an analysis that
will make the book of particular interest to lawyers conversant with
United Kingdom, European Court of Justice, and Court of Human
Rights practice. It would have helped readers not trained in European
Community law and legal systems if the book provided an overview of
the various legal entities and their relation to each other. In the ab-
sence of such a guide, the reader must struggle through this complex
web alone, a difficult but not impossible task. Despite the lack of a "big
picture" overview however, the close analysis of individual
jurisdictions' actions in the area of human rights is useful to all.
The cautious approach is also apparent in the author's fundamen-
tal argument that the ECHR should apply to non-state action despite
the fact that only states party to the ECHR can be accused of viola-
tions under the current legal structure. Dr. Clapham presents two ap-
proaches to surmount this hurdle. First, he argues that the state of
international law has progressed to a point where it is no longer possi-
ble to "cling to the traditional view that the Convention only covers
human rights violations by states" (at 93). He then argues that the
distinction between "public" and "private" (i.e. between "state" and
"non-state") action is impossible and dangerous to draw.
Dr. Clapham begins his argument with the proposition that a
"contextual interpretation" of the European Convention on Human
Rights requires that it include violations committed by individuals or
private bodies, because international law recognizes that such bodies
are capable of committing human rights violations and there currently
exist entities competent to prevent, punish or compensate these viola-
tions. In support of the argument that the current state of internation-
al law sanctions the application of human rights norms to private
actors, a detailed analysis of numerous international agreements is
provided, focusing on those documents that impose inter-state respon-
sibility,2 on international procedures granting individuals the right to
2. Including, among others, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Con-
vention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are considered as support for the
extension of human rights protection to the private sphere.
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complain under existing human rights instruments,3 and on human-
itarian law applicable to non-governmental forces under the law of in-
ternal armed conflict. The level of detail in the analysis of the current
position of international law with respect to the protection of human
rights is useful in establishing that state actors may be found responsi-
ble for failing to protect individuals against rights committed by pri-
vate actors. However, there is substantially less support provided for
the proposition that private individuals can bring actions for human
rights violations under current international law practices. Some ex-
amples of mechanisms permitting claims against individuals are pro-
vided, but the data seems insubstantial in light of the weight of mate-
rial supporting state responsibility. Given that enforcement by and
against private actors is the theme of the book, the absence of either
direct case law support, or strong theoretical arguments as to why the
current state of the law does in fact warrant such support, leaves the
reader feeling that an essential point is somewhat glossed over.
After attempting to establish that private actors can be held re-
sponsible for human rights violations, Dr. Clapham considers how to
define what rights should be granted such protection, recognizing that
some rights will not rise to the level of warranting protection from all
actors. In contrast with the prevailing cautionary theme of the book,
Dr. Clapham begins with a seemingly bold statement that "[uin prac-
tice it is impossible to differentiate the private from the public sphere.
Even if we feel we can distinguish between the two, such difficult dis-
tinctions leave a lacuna in the protection of human rights, and can in
themselves be particularly dangerous" (at 94). The proposed solution to
this problem is not to abolish all distinctions between public and pri-
vate; rather, the terms should be avoided as only "dispositive" labels
and kept as "explanatory" tools in order to establish when a right has
been violated (at 135). After examining briefly the rights and duties
analysis of such legal theoreticians as John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin, Dr. Clapham suggests that when determining whether a
right is to be protected, the relevant inquiry should be whether the
right in question is justified by the goal of democracy or dignity. Where
the right is justified by the goal of democracy, there must be a public
element in order to justify protection; where the right is aimed at pro-
tecting dignity it must always be protected even absent any public ele-
ment.
The differentiation between "democracy" aimed rights and "digni-
ty" aimed rights is presented as a vehicle to avoid "the intractable
riddle of conflicting human rights" (at 146). Unfortunately, while rec-
ognizing that human rights can not be categorized neatly into "democ-
3. This analysis includes a useful overview of the work of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee and the operations of the United Nations Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
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racy" rights and "dignity" rights and that rights often have dual pur-
poses, the author makes no cogent attempt to explain how the distinc-
tion should be drawn when ascertaining whether protection should be
extended. Further, he avoids any discussion of how the determination
of whether a "public" element is present differs from distinctions
drawn between the public and private sphere. These omissions weaken
the ultimate conclusion of the section, but it still serves as a useful
springboard for consideration of these vexing definitional problems.
After outlining a mechanism for determining what rights should
be afforded protection in the private sphere, Dr. Clapham turns to an
in-depth analysis of the current state of rights protection in the United
States and Canada, the application of the ECHR to the acts of non-
state actors under the law of the European Convention and the Court
of Human Rights and under the law of the European Community and
the Court of Justice. He then considers how developments in these
jurisdictions could affect human rights law in the United Kingdom,
returning to the theme expressed early in the work. Dr. Clapham ar-
gues that a more explicit recognition of the impact of Community law
and Court of Human Rights interpretation of the ECHR on the analy-
sis conducted by UK jurists would justify an expansion of protection in
the private sphere. He also addresses the possibility of an outright
incorporation of the ECHR into United Kingdom law so that the Con-
vention would be relevant in the sphere of relations between non-state
bodies. On the latter point, in keeping with the cautious approach of
the work as a whole, the author suggests that any proposed Bill of
Rights for the United Kingdom (such legislation is currently under
consideration) should require incorporation of the ECHR, but should
remain silent on the issue of the application of Convention rights in
private actions. While not deviating from the general proposition that
rights should be protected against private actors, Dr. Clapham sug-
gests that many situations will be covered by domestic legislation so
that the Convention, once incorporated into domestic law, could be
used for interpretation. In cases where plaintiffs could not get their
complaints before the courts in the absence of an explicit recognition of
protection against private actors, a remedy might still be available if
the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights found that
the denial constitutes a violation of the "right to a remedy" under Arti-
cle 13 of the ECHR.
The book concludes by briefly revisiting the arguments made in
the main text, stressing that the goal is to consider how existing legal
systems and norms serve as the basis for interpreting the ECHR as a
vehicle to protect all victims of human rights abuses, not just those
who suffer at the hands of state actors. As an exposition of the current
state of the law in this area as interpreted by the Court of Human
Rights and the European Court of Justice and as applied in the United
Kingdom, the book meets this goal admirably, due in large part to
thoughtful, meticulous case-law analysis. On the theoretical front, the
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arguments and analysis of how and why to protect individuals against
private actors, while not ultimately convincing to this reader, serve as
a useful starting point for discussion of this very important topic.

Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes
REVIEWED BY L.C. GREEN*
LEVIE, HOWARD S., TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR
CRIMES; Oceana, Dobbs Ferry (1993); ($65.00); ISBN 0-379-20148-8;
721 pp. (hardcover).
Those interested in the law of war crimes have often been hin-
dered in their research by the lack of anything in the nature of a sin-
gle volume compendium. Researchers have had to rely on the very
lengthy Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, the reports of the subsidiary
trials held by the United States at Nuremberg, the thirteen volumes
published by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, together
with isolated issues of the Annual Digest or the International Law
Reports. The need for a more readily available guide to the actual
practice in this field of the law of armed conflict has become of major
significance with the establishment of the tribunal to try offenses com-
mitted in the former Yugoslavia, especially as it is so difficult to pro-
duce a comprehensive statement as to what amounts to a war crime or
even a crime against humanity. In fact, "[iun view of the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, it is probably preferable not to attempt to list war
crimes as each conflict will produce new types of offenses, new types of
violations of the law of war, which should be punished" (at 2 n. 8).
One must also bear in mind the differences between an "accused" and
a "war criminal," with the latter term reserved for one who has been
found guilty by a properly appointed tribunal (at iii), something that
the news media seem constantly to overlook.
To some extent this lacuna has been filled by Howard Levie with
the publication of his Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes. Here
will be found the most extensive summary of the jurisprudence pro-
duced in this field, together with a classification of the various trials
according to the nature of the offenses charged. In addition to fascinat-
ing chapters on the history of the treatment of war crimes from earli-
est times to date, classified under such headings as procedural mat-
ters; conventional war crimes; other offenses, including crimes against
peace and humanity, conspiracy, criminal organizations and command
responsibility; the accused, their victims, and their defenses. There are
further subclassificati ns enabling the reader, with the assistance of a
fairly comprehensive index and table of cases, to find his way about in
what might otherwise be a frightening morass of material. Because of
the historical approach adopted it is possible to give the lie to those
who maintain that trials of offenders against the laws and customs of
* C.M., LLB., LL.D., F.R.S.C., University Professor Emeritus, Honorary Profes-
sor of Law, University of Alberta, Canada; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Denver College of Law.
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war are a modem creation established to satisfy the demands for ven-
geance of the victors. In this connection it may be interesting to refer
to the 1966 trial in the German Democratic Republic of Heissmeyer for
conducting medical experiments on Jewish children and then arrang-
ing with the local SS commander, Strippel, to have them hanged "to
prevent their prior treatment from being discovered." Heissmeyer was
sentenced to life imprisonment, while Strippel, who had relocated to
the Federal Republic, was not tried for this offense, although he was
convicted for aiding in the murder of forty one Russian prisoners of
war and sentenced to a mere three and one-half years, which he never
served (at 441-42).
In the preface, the author states that
[alpart from battlefield war crimes, and to a certain extent even
there (denial of quarter and shooting of recently captured prisoners
of war and wounded soldiers), many categories of war crimes com-
mitted by the Nazis during World War II were intended to estab-
lish a reign of terror among various elements of the enemy. The
inmates of the concentration camps were terrorized... ; the civil-
ian inhabitants of occupied territories were terrorized... ; mem-
bers of resistance movements were terrorized ... ; attempts were
made to terrorize merchant seamen by a program of slaughtering
the members of shipwrecked crews in order to encourage experi-
enced personnel from making the Atlantic crossing; etc.; etc. (at i-
ii).
What Levie says is perfectly true, but it is probably equally true
to state that every member of the armed forces experienced some sense
of terror when in action and under fire, and many a bombardment has
been directed with the intention of terrorizing the enemy. For this
reason, this reviewer considers it a little unfortunate that this major
work on war crimes has been issued as a volume in the series entitled
Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control (3rd Vol., 2nd
Series). This is particularly so in view of the fact that, apart from rela-
tively brief extracts from some twenty five instruments, there are no
documents in the volume. Moreover, it is a little difficult to find these
extracts since there is no table of appendices. Further, in view of the
current usage of the term "terrorism" both in national and internation-
al law, the issue of war crimes is sufficiently significant to stand on its
own, with Levie's book as one of the most important in the literature
on this subject.
In a work of this character it is only possible to draw attention to
some of the inclusions, exclusions, and comments. It is always interest-
ing to find references to the trial and execution of Captain Fryatt by
the Germans in 1916 (at 20-21), considered by the British as judicial
murder. But there is no discussion of the trial of Edith Cavell, whose
execution caused even more emotional reaction in both Britain and the
United States, even though it could well be argued that there was
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some justification for trying her since it is beyond the limits of a nurs-
ing sister's claim to immunity to assist escaping personnel to rejoin
their lines.1 Commenting on the paucity of war crimes decisions relat-
ing to naval warfare, Levie criticizes the Nuremberg findings against
Doenitz (at 63-8) and tends to agree that the sentences imposed by
United States tribunals were "too lenient" (at 98). Perhaps the most
well-known maritime decision after World War II was that arising
from the Peleus sinking. Here, Levie fails to mention that one of the
accused was a medical officer. Contrary to the statement at p. 106,
one of the officers, in fact the one who willingly took part in the shoot-
ing of the shipwrecked crew, was not executed but received a life sen-
tence, only to be reprieved later as a result of debates instituted by
senior naval officers in the British House of Lords. While Levie is
critical of the dissents by Pal and Roling at Tokyo (at 149, etc.), he
overlooks the fact that Webb, the presiding judge, ordered one of the
defense counsel from the court for refusing to confine his examination
in chief solely to issues referred to by the prosecution.2 Regrettably,
when discussing the Gozawa case (at 174) he does not comment upon
the heiho defense and the contention therein that a prisoner of war
can have his status changed either by his own decision or that of his
captor while the conflict continues.
It has been suggested that the use of the term "grave breaches" in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 has meant that
other breaches of the law might not amount to punishable war crimes.
It is pleasant to find Levie agreeing with those who have no doubt that
"grave breaches" are still "war crimes" governed by the same system of
law (at 190). In this connection it is interesting to note that he is criti-
cal of the lack of adequate United States legislation to try American
personnel for "grave breaches" (at 237-38), although they would, as
was Calley, be liable to trial under United States military and criminal
law. He does not think that the "United States Senate would give its
advice and consent" to ratification of a convention establishing an
international criminal court (at 225 n. 16), although he does not state
why he has this feeling. He also suggests that, in view of the require-
ment in the 1949 Prisoners of War Convention that prisoners of war
must be tried in the same manner as one's own forces, it might not be
possible to establish such an international tribunal to try non-nation-
als in one's control unless the Geneva Convention is amended (at 257-
59; see also 511). However, in the course of a two-page Epilogue he
mentions the Security Council decision, reached with the active sup-
port of the United States, to establish an ad hoc international tribunal
"for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of
1. See, e.g., GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR, Vol. II at 97-
105 (1920).
2. THE TIMES (London), March 6, 1947; for similar 'strange' decisions by the
tribunal, see id., June 21, 1947 and September 26, 1947.
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international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia since 1991" (at 528). This may well indicate that the
United States may now be willing to accept an international criminal
court, in line with his overall conclusion:
There were undoubtedly defects in many of the post-World War II
war crimes programs. However, on the whole these programs were
successful in their objectives of weeding out the guilty from the
innocent, in providing appropriate punishment for the guilty, and
in establishing precedents which, hopefully, will have their impact
on future international relations by making the leaders of nations
more reluctant to embark upon adventurous wars of aggression and
by making individuals more reluctant to commit violations of the
law of war should they become involved in armed conflict. If this
hope is fulfilled, then the war crimes conducted [sic] after World
War II will have served the dual purpose of punishing the guilty
and of giving effective warning to members of subsequent genera-
tions that "war crimes do not pay"! (at 526).
On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that events in the
Gulf after the invasion of Kuwait as well as during the conflict in
Bosnia suggest that we still live in a world in which political leaders
will resort to aggression, and their troops, either spontaneously or by
command, will continue to commit atrocities comparable with many of
those perpetrated in the past. However, we must still be cautious be-
fore accepting the horror stories produced by propagandists or careless
organs of the media. Thus, in the Report on Iraqi War Crimes prepared
by the United States Secretary of the Army, it is stated that "[tihe
[civilian] deaths included 120 babies left to die after being removed
from incubators that were taken to Iraq" (at 527), although it has long
been accepted that this "atrocity" never occurred.
Should there be any war crimes trials held in response to the
conflict in Bosnia we may be sure that superior orders will be pleaded
by way of defence. Should this be so, Levie's warning that we must
distinguish between "duress" and "superior orders" (at 478) becomes
important. It is equally necessary to remember that, with the possible
exception of General Blaustein, who was relieved of his command, and
General Thoen, who was dismissed from the service, there is no evi-
dence that anyone in Nazi Germany suffered for refusing to obey an
atrocity order (at 485). However, Levie implies that with the adoption
of Article 102 of the 1949 Prisoners of War Convention he is no longer
convinced that this may not constitute a defense (at 520). But we must
also not overlook the fact that most national systems of law only re-
quire compliance with a lawful order, that is to say one that is not
manifestly unlawful in the eyes of a reasonable soldier. Even more
significant is the requirement in Protocol I of 1977 that the legal ad-
visers be attached to the armed forces. This should mean that superi-
ors warned by their advisers that their orders may be illegal will carry
a clear responsibility for such orders, while if the adviser indicates
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that the order was lawful the ordinary soldier whose knowledge of the
law will be minimal should have every right to plead superior orders
in his defense and perhaps not only by way of mitigation of punish-
ment.
Perhaps, in conclusion, attention may be drawn to a couple of er-
rors that have been overlooked in proofreading. At p. 204 and again in
the Index at p. 714 Earl Russell's name appears as "Bertram" instead
of "Bertrand"; and we read:
It is interesting to note that an Englishman who had taught in a
German law school has expressed the opinion that during the inter-
war period the majority of German law students had been brought
up to believe that during World War I the Allies had completely
ignored the law of war (at 18 n. 76).
The author in question is Ernst J. Cohn who was a refugee German
law teacher living in England. More important is another footnote that
refers to the invasion by the Pakistan Army of East Pakistan, the war
with India, and the creation of Bangladesh:
For the alleged maltreatment of Bengali civilians (Hindus) by the
Pakistani Army (Moslems) in what was then East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh), from the Indian point of view (genocide), see Mehrish,
passim; for the alleged maltreatment of non-Bengali civilians (Mos-
lems) by the Bengali Awami League (Hindu) in what was then East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), from the Pakistani point of view (geno-
cide), see Aziz, passim. (at 208 n. 89).
In fact, the majority of the East Bengali civilians were Moslems, which
is why that part of Bengal was given to Pakistan, while the Awami
League is a Moslem organization.
Regardless of whether one agrees with every comment made by
Professor Levie in this study of Terrorism in War: The Law of War
Crimes, one cannot help but admire the learning and energy that have
gone into preparing this work, which will undoubtedly stand for many
years as one of the most important contributions to the study of this
subject that has been produced since the issue became one of debate
and consideration at the end of World War I.
1994

China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a
Rising Power
REVIEWED BY THOMAS MAXWELL*
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Times Books, a division of Random House (1994); ($25.00); ISBN 0-
8129-2252-2; 488 pp. (pbk.).
The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe began
about five years ago, a period of time in geo-political terms rather
comparable to the period after a major volcanic eruption, during which
we expect to see the dust settle and "things" begin to stabilize. Sunsets
clarify, weather patterns return to typical expectations, and we see
what ballast there is to stand up to the winds of the ordinary, which
we geo-politically interpret to be self-interest-driven open markets and
free elections. So far so good, western diplomacy analysts conclude; no
madman with a following has come forward with a mandate to re-com-
mand the nuclear threat that used to dictate our policy, and no exist-
ing balances among western nations have been thrown out of kilter by
the new free-lance nations that are jockeying to join the western mix.
Part of the non-event for the west arises from the perception that
courting formerly communist interests commercially has proved to be
unattractive: a lot of confused and dispirited people with very little
money burdened with an inherited commercial infrastructure that
redefines hopeless disaster in every way there is. They must heal, the
way someone who's broken every bone in his body in a car wreck must
heal, before prospects for improvement can be discussed.
Western investment is not rushing in to fill the vacuum. Rather,
it is being coaxed to come forward on humanitarian grounds or to
create a presence that might later prove useful. There is also the stra-
tegic initiative that cautions that desperation among our former ene-
mies, due to their uncertainty whether they can even meet the basic
requirements of simple existence, could torque into something ugly. So
we watch and wait with a good deal of pity for these people coloring
our optimism for their emergence-to-be, and also with amazement that
the communist regimes could have maintained the illusion of vitality
for as long as they did.
The massacre at Tiananmen Square occurred at roughly the same
time as the fall of the Berlin Wall. The course of China since that time
tends to be analyzed in the west under the same eurocentric lamp: the
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upheavals in central and eastern Europe succeeded, while the one in
China did not. The Europeans can look forward to a light of freedom
and prosperity at the end of their torturous tunnel, the Chinese to
more bleak communist repression. On top of that, China's victory in its
struggle against the United States over MFN status seems to have
sent a clear message that the Chinese communists will do what they
want, and we can't stop them. North Korea, Viet Nam, and Burma,
Asia's other communist locks, seem to feel no anti-communist reform
pressure either, as a consequence of China's stone-wall. So, we watch
China and wait, pity coloring our pessimism.
Of course those who look closer know that this interpretation by
no means tells the whole story about China during the last five years;
it is perhaps not even the most important part of the story. The salient
fact of the situation is that China has accomplished far more extensive,
and far more successful, "free" market reform without an overthrow of
communism, than all but a few areas of formerly communist Europe
have. Making this even more remarkable is the equally well-estab-
lished fact that China's human rights and personal freedom record is
improving very rapidly, adamant communist rhetoric and all. In this
area, it certainly has not reached the level of European reform, espe-
cially when evaluated in traditional western terms, but it is also true
that there is no struggle ongoing in China equal in intensity or savage-
ry to the civil war in Bosnia.
China Wakes is an eye-opening, up-to-the-minute account of China
as seen over the last five years by husband and wife Nicholas Kristoff
and Sheryl WuDunn, until recently American correspondents for the
New York Times. Working out of Beijing, the two became the first
husband and wife team to win a Pulitzer Prize for journalism in 1989
for their coverage of Tiananmen Square. As this book shows, however,
they also spent a tremendous amount of time in the countryside, away
from the capital, often with what they describe as an unusual degree
of freedom from "handling." They believe, moreover, that the knowl-
edge gained from these visits is more telling in describing modern
China than what goes on in the city. Ms. WuDunn is Chinese-
American (speaking somewhat weak Chinese), and her ability to blend
in often gained her extraordinary access, and more than once saved
her backside when she was caught going too far. Beyond that, the
search for the meaning and message of her ancestral roots allows her
further access to peasants and villagers. These interactions give them
the sense that they have cracked another bit of the code of communica-
tion, a self-assurance that on the odd occasion they truly see down to
the level of the actual, where the official charades meet the flow of
reality.
The collaboration is achieved by interweaving alternate chapters
by each author rather than by an undifferentiated pastiche. Primarily,
the two authors differ, to the small extent that they do, in personality,
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rather than in writing style, focus, or intelligence. They make no ex-
cuse or apology for their blatant western outrage at the horrendous
disregard for human rights and decency that is common in Chinese
life, nor for their rather firm belief that nothing short of full democracy
deserves to be called political freedom. But despite these
conventionalities, Kristoff and WuDunn effortlessly convey a sense of
otherness about China that many more mystically dazzled observers
never have. And they succeed also at breathing new life into the not
very original conclusion that China is Confucian, clannish, and dynas-
tic, that it always has been and always will be, and that the commu-
nist dynasty is just another blip on the Chinese time-line. Arriving at
this conclusion independently of prior indoctrination is the thing that
makes their work fresh. Sometimes the wheel of scholarship reinvent-
ed is just the wheel you want to have.
Nevertheless, the lack of secondary scholarship in general is this
book's weakest aspect. Depending on the reader's need to make connec-
tions between this new understanding of and appreciation for China
and relations with China of a more technical nature - finance, com-
merce, politics, the law, and so forth - China Wakes will seem either
more or less comprehensive. We are told China's economy is growing,
for instance, but this news is not interconnected with the kinds of hard
statistics that articulate market dynamics. The authors state that
inflation-control in China is good for a developing country, but it's
hardly analyzed at all in specific terms, and likewise for currency ex-
change rates. That China has signed certain intellectual property con-
ventions is reported to us, but not which ones or how the government
plans to enforce them. How Chinese corruption works internally is
wonderfully, distressingly detailed in chapter after chapter, but very
little is told about the sort of corruption foreign commercial and legal
interests will encounter if they explore opportunities in China. Related
to this is the problematical issue of refugees and their legal defense,
made especially complicated by the current inclination of sinophone
countries not to antagonize each other by sheltering refugees, no mat-
ter how valid their reasons for fleeing. China Wakes presents a few
cases of this problem quite vividly, but the technical details of how the
cases are structured legally are not described. It's possible the authors
do not follow technical fields very closely - although Kristoff was
trained in law at Oxford - and don't wish to embark on analyses they
can't see through to their ends, or possibly their purpose is so clearly
tied to their autobiographical moments that they assume they're ad-
dressing an audience similarly disposed to casual and personally felt
perceptions. Even granting the validity of this approach, however, the
least the other sort of reader could expect is the rudiments of a tie-in
pointing the way to certain technical reference points, and these are
few in China Wakes.
Be that as it may, this book portrays an emerging China. It is
clarifying and demystifying, and it acts as a potentially valuable guide
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for understanding the present and probable future of legal relation-
ships between China and the west and with other Asian countries.
Foremost in the picture is the observation that in China, gradualism is
working, whereas in Europe a total break from central control has
seemed a grim, unavoidable necessity. Indeed, the European experi-
ence has seemed to bear this out, and attempts at finding a middle
way appearing gallingly pathetic.
European people in formerly communist controlled countries,
however, strike one as very much abandoned and stranded by compari-
son with the Chinese. Kristoff and WuDunn speak of a deep, ages-old
collective consciousness among the hundreds and hundreds of millions
of Chinese that the communists have demonstrated they are unfit to
oversee, a conclusion that most people have drawn but in whose fabric
they must remain entwined until a new dynastic network has formed
to take its place. The authors find a new use for the distinction be-
tween authoritarian and totalitarian state structures, used previously
in State Department explanations for US policy in Central America
during the early eighties, presenting it as the single most cogent de-
scription of social and political change in China. If the totalitarian-
authoritarian generality is a valid model to describe China, it could be
of great value to persons pursuing practical international relations
with that vast land: the new authoritarian China allows considerable
freedom of action and private ownership for its citizens, so long as the
enterprising souls who try it do not openly criticize the government;
the old totalitarian China disallowed both. The suggestion is that an
outside partner or consultant should recognize that this process of
variant imagery is part of the transition game and not get too alarmed.
When Chinese communism wore Chairman Mao's face, gradualism
was decried as the most fearful of western tactics: the slow infiltration
of values and seduction of the masses. Ironically, western influence is
doing just this, a conclusion that both authors arrive at time and time
again, and there is so official party rhetoric condemning it. Their con-
tinual reference to Deng Xiaoping as the emperor, at first in quotation
marks but later without, suggests that it is respect for the traditional
role of royal leadership, rather than that of explainer and educator,
that Chinese communism is falling into demanding. As for Confucian-
ism, which communism pledged to eradicate along with capitalism, the
last forty-five years have touched it and transformed it so that it still
serves at some subliminal level as the social bonding agent of the cul-
ture, but many of its most severe precepts have been truncated. The
traditions that have kept China's peasants poor, sick, starving, and
uneducated, have especially been challenged resolutely and with con-
siderable success. Literacy, infant mortality, childhood education, and
life-expectancy are now expressed in numbers quite comparable to
those of America. For instance, a prohibition against satellite dishes is
quite openly flouted throughout the country - and, for a price, ignored
by the authorities - and the whole TV wasteland is beamed down just
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like it is everywhere else, bringing exposure to the same consumer-con-
formist culture.
As one reads China Wakes, the steady reciprocation between dis-
couragement and encouragement, ultimately leaning toward encour-
agement, creates an emotional flow for the book that is a bit too pat,
too predictable. The fact that this flow is so heartfelt and so strongly
based on fact - the authors are fine reporters - basically saves it
from the usual fate of the too-predictable: death by tedium. It's when
the reader finally realizes that it doesn't matter in the least whether
the authors feel encouraged or discouraged about China, that one gives
into it, or at least accepts it. It's an achievement to have acquired the
perspective through sheer emotional will of viewing a nation of 1.2 bil-
lion people as family, about whose members one feels a right and an
obligation to worry. In the final analysis, Kristofls and WuDunn's
intuitive, anecdotal, occasionally picaresque narrative proves well-
suited for their task.
Troubling, however, is the thin treatment given the questions of
the expense of the Chinese economic miracle and who will pay. The
book describes a few of the most alarming environmental trouble-ar-
eas, such as having an ozone depleting refrigerator in every hut or
burning coal from one corner of the country to the other, yet discussion
of these issues is fleeting. Desertification is not even mentioned. An-
other potential cost is human, measured in social and cultural dis-
placement. It's quite possible for an ancient culture to meet its demise
in the human prosperity it helps makes possible; four thousand years
old or not, there's nothing in China's longevity that guarantees its
future, nor is there any assurance that continued communist presence,
with its constant power to strike out and suppress whenever it choos-
es, would be able to stop a slide of Chinese society into formations
more characteristic of the west. Whether western journalists should
feel they have the perspicacity to comment on what is and what is not
"Chinese" is beside the point. More directly, we must ask if it isn't
possible that China could change so much that, so far as the miracle
goes, all bets would be off, and Kristoff and WuDunn do not venture
very far toward supplying an answer.
This question must be addressed by any outside interest seeking
to form a relationship with China. If we can assume that over the next
few decades China - and the rest of Asia, for that matter - will exist
in a state of active flux as a miasma of chaotic contradictions, then one
must hedge opportunities against one another, putting together a
broad enough exposure-base to assure picking up on the general trend.
But broad exposure is, well, broad exposure, and aside from picking up
on the general trend, we need assurances as well that the general
trend itself has some legs.
Does China Wakes provide these assurances? Does it supply us
with the keys to negotiating the local chaos of China's nearly eleven
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per cent annual GNP growth rate, and indeed to knowing whether the
trend will continue? By itself, no. The professional and technical press
must be researched as well. But as a clear-eyed look at what is truly
important in the lives of the Chinese people, China Wakes is in a class
by itself. In fact, the book creates another sensation in the reader quite
apart from the nominal subject at hand. Because of the book's unique
perspectives, and because of the type of tight, journalistic analysis
each anecdote and each issue is given, there arises a distinct shock of
recognition that there we are, too: the self-censorship, the resourceful-
ness of government to preserve itself, the fascism of imposed "tradi-
tional" values, the wide disparity of wealth, the brazen truth about
what privileges and concessions money can buy. All are characteristic
of both cultures in differing degrees. Though we often say it, we usual-
ly don't mean it when we say our country is universally corrupt; what
we mean is that a few people are corrupt but they're to be found just
about anywhere. Our institutions, in theory at least, are essentially
clean. China wakes, however, gives pause to that thought. Perhaps
arousing this sensation is the farthest thing from the authors' minds,
but their portrait of authoritarianism in China has broad application
around the globe.
The disturbing trend emerging in some minds that competitive-
ness and public order are best achieved where personal freedom is
guided by the cool hand of central control has begun to reach the level
of public policy in some places, the United States being an example.
While Kristoff and WuDunn make it quite clear they do not share this
interpretation of how things ought to be, they express little confidence
that the trend will be easy to reverse.
That might be the book's most important message, that as China
emerges we must avoid partially submerging ourselves in order to
meet them half-way. We must accept our occasional inefficiencies and
sentimentalities as part of the tableau of freedom and hope that China




DE KLEMM, CYRILLE, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CONSERVA-
TION, AND THE LAW; IUCN, Gland, Switzerland (1993); ($17.00)
ISBN 2-8317-0192-9; 292 pp. (pbk).
Biological Diversity, Conservation, and the Law is a comprehen-
sive analysis of evolving international environmental regulation, from
a historical perspective toward the purpose of identifying future
legislative trends aimed at protecting the environment. This book
analyzes two dominant conservation policies, attempting to address
both and draw from each the most effective way to protect biological
diversity.
Part I examines past and present species-based environmental
legislation. Such laws traditionally focus on the individual species
without considering the ecosystems in which they live. Even though
this is the most prevalent form of conservation legislation today, there
are many problems with this approach. First, it is limited to narrowly
defined categories of species. For instance, very few treaties protect
plants, and the animals that are protected are either already endan-
gered or are game and marine animals protected from over-exploita-
tion. This approach leads to many legislative gaps that expose non-
protected species to possible extinction. Second, jurisdictional conflicts
have plagued past attempts at species-based protection. Many mi-
gratory and marine animals are neither claimed as natural resources
by any country nor protected by any country's domestic laws. For these
species, international conventions are needed, but are beneficial only
when all participating countries conscientiously enforce these treaties
against other states. Finally, species-based legislation is flawed by the
prejudice of only protecting species beneficial or convenient to
humanity, while failing to protect species for the sake of biological
diversity in and of itself. This is illustrated by the constant conflict be-
tween environmental legislation and the promotion of economic
interests, a conflict which is consistently settled in favor of moneyed
interest.
The first section of this book also analyzes the procedure of
categorizing and listing endangered species and its effect on environ-
mental legislation. Most national and international conventions use
positive lists, which are amended when an animal or plant species is
determined to need protection. This process is inefficient and causes
time gaps when the list is not amended fast enough to protect newly
endangered species. By utilizing negative lists, which simply list the
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animals that are not protected, it is possible to make a shorter list
that, in cases where new species are discovered or formed by taxonom-
ic reclassification, will protect endangered animals automatically.
Part II of Biological Diversity demonstrates the emerging legal
trends in protecting the environment. Rather than placing the
emphasis on species conservation, the author asserts the need for an
ecosystem-based approach that preserves the habitat as well as the
endangered species living within it. This new emphasis represents the
change in the perceived danger to the environment over the last one
hundred years. Many species today are not threatened by over-hunting
and exploitation but rather by the destruction of habitats, such as the
rain forests of Brazil and the Florida Everglades. Emphasis needs to
be placed on area-based and activity-based planning instruments. This
is illustrated in the new Convention on Biological Diversity, which
seeks to identify and regulate activities that destroy biological
diversity in specific ecosystems. The Convention's approach, so long as
it is adopted by participating national legislatures, will be the most
beneficial conservation method for the future. By combining both
species-based and ecosystem-based protection, it is not only possible to
protect already endangered species but also to prevent other species
from joining this already crowded list.
In conclusion, the author also explores ways of enforcing environ-
mental legislation through public and private liability; e.g., the duty of
developed countries to assist developing countries in complying with
international regulations and the need for active support and coopera-
tion from all people and countries to abide by these national and
international laws. This book indicates the strengths and weaknesses
of past attempts at regulation and illustrates new strategies and
procedures to continue the protection of biological diversity into the
future.
Thomas Muther
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994: IN-
FRASTRUCTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT, Oxford University Press,
New York (1994); ($37.95); ISBN 0-19-520991-5; 244 pp. (pbk.)
All too often the conveniences of everyday life in the United States
are taken for granted by those who have access to them. During the
past fifteen years, developing countries have invested several billions
of their national output every year on developing new infrastructure
and services, such as clean water and telephone lines, but there
remains a large population that has not felt the effect of these
changes. Inefficiency and waste in both investments and services, fail
to respond effectively to user demand.
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The World Bank has put out World Development Report 1994:
Infrastructure for Development to analyze new ways in which infra-
structure may be developed in order to meet the public need. The
proposed infrastructure development is more efficient, more responsive
to user demand, better for the environment, and utilizes both the
public and private sectors. In furtherance of these proposals, two broad
conclusions are set forth: (1) Because past investments in infrastruc-
ture have not had the development impact expected, it is essential to
improve the effectiveness of investments and the efficiency of service
provision; and (2) Innovations in the means of delivering infrastructure
services, along with new technologies, point to solutions that can
improve performance.
Infrastructure is directly related to the economic development of a
country. The availability of telecommunications, power, paved roads,
and access to clean water has a direct effect on a nation's Gross
Domestic Product. Additionally, economic growth has an effect on the
demand for services provided by infrastructure. Effective infrastruc-
ture investment relies not only upon its quantity but also upon the
quality and reliability of services provided. Further, the services must
be provided efficiently while matching the supply with the nation's
demand.
As identified in World Development Report: 1990, providing
adequate infrastructure services should reduce poverty by bringing in
needed goods and services as well as by providing opportunities
outside of their immediate community. The World Development Report:
1994 identifies the additional environmental benefits that result from
providing clean water, sanitary conditions, clean power sources, safe
waste disposal, and better management of traffic in urban areas.
Infrastructure must expand with the growing population, however, in
order to prevent environmental deterioration.
Governments have begun to support infrastructure for several
reasons: (1) the recognition of the importance of infrastructure to a
nation's political and economic activity, (2) a belief that governments
must take an active role in solving problems that arise when obtaining
technology, and (3) a belief that governments will succeed where
markets may fail. Although initially public sector monopoly of
infrastructure created impressive improvements, recent history has
demonstrated a misallocation of resources as well as a failure to
respond properly to user demand. Although each nation's needs differ,
common problems need to be addressed in future development to
ensure success.
Inefficient infrastructure in developing countries has resulted in
economic loss due to the loss of output, such as water and power,
through poor distribution methods. Inefficient use of labor has also
resulted in exorbitant costs due to problems such as overstaffing.
Another problem is the inadequate maintenance of infrastructure
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services. When the services are incapacitated, output declines resulting
in additional investment necessary to merely maintain existing
services. Often, the need for high maintenance stems from a poor
initial construction or design of an infrastructure service.
Due to lower income levels and a lack of access to services, poor
populations often are neglected. Governments have failed to identify
the need to provide infrastructure to the poor and have allowed
providers to constrain expansion due to the likelihood of inadequate
compensation for services.
The Report recognizes that in order to change these existing
problems, incentives must be built into the foundation of infrastructure
services. The providing of infrastructure must change to become a
business oriented service industry, in which goods are offered to meet
customers' demands. Competition must be introduced in order to
promote efficiency by offering users with options, while making
providers more accountable for their product.
According to the Report, successful private providers of infrastruc-
ture have three characteristics the public sector must adopt. First,
they have clear goals set on providing services. Second, managers and
employees are accountable for results under a management that is
autonomous. Third, the providers are financially independent. Since
current government dominance in infrastructure will likely continue
into the future, cooperation between the private and public sectors is
necessary.
In order to ensure efficient operation, the enterprises should be
subject to commercial market principles, such as commercial and tax
law, competition, accounting procedures, and labor laws with minimal
government interference. The problem is that much of infrastructure is
currently in the public sector because of the limit on profit maximiza-
tion. Also, because service providers will have a monopoly, prices must
be regulated outside of the provider.
In order to make the transition from the public sector to the
private sector smooth, regulation, although necessary, must be kept to
a minimum. Regulation needs to be able to grow with changing
conditions. This requires that the regulating force have detailed
knowledge of the activity, autonomy required, and sufficient resources.
Where price regulation is necessary, fair pricing must be maintained
while ensuring adequate profits for providers. Price regulation can
achieve its goal by either implementing permitted increases in a
service price or by measuring a fair price in relation to other, similar
markets.
The Report recognizes these problems and offers three solutions.
One option suggests that governments develop information and eval-
uation systems in order to monitor performance. The second option is
the offering of management contracts by governments. These contracts
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would transfer the responsibility for running a service over to a private
provider to increase the autonomy of the provider and reduce the risk
of government interference in the service operations. The final option
involves offering service contracts through which private providers
obtain the responsibility of providing a particular service at a lower
cost.
Alongside the transfer of power is the need to establish financial
independence by creating reliable revenue sources that allow providers
financial autonomy. Encouraging private providers to be responsible
for services and profit may force them to lower costs in order to
maximize gain. Once the cost is controlled, price principles can be
established in order to give the provider complete financial autonomy.
The Report outlines the steps that should be taken toward
streamlining infrastructure. The first policy initiative is to decentralize
government responsibility and place it in the control of several
subnational governments, ensuring that the infrastructure is located
closer to the community that is being serviced. Once the infrastructure
service is controlled within the community, the local population must
participate to ensure proper maintenance and delivery of the service.
This will serve to involve the .beneficiaries of the service directly,
obtain local consensus on projects, and promote financial assistance
from the community. The second initiative is to allocate the budget in
consideration of a nation's underlying goals. Governments must
establish what their priorities are concerning infrastructure, such as
deciding between urban or rural development, and distribute funds
appropriately. A third initiative is to subsidize infrastructure in order
to redistribute resources from high income communities to poor
communities.
Because of the broad effects of infrastructure, planning should
involve not only the investors and donors, but it should consider the
consultation of users or their elected representatives. Projects should
be analyzed and appraised properly before construction or financing is
agreed upon. Once a project is begun, coordinated planning helps to
maintain coherence between all of the providers of a service. Early
planning also helps to minimize any adverse impact on the environ-
ment.
Today, a large amount of a nation's budget is dedicated to
infrastructure. Although a government is allowed to borrow funds at
low rates, making otherwise financially infeasible projects possible, its'
ability to spend on infrastructure is strained by low budgets and poor
performance. In recent years, private providers have been working
with local companies generating investments and revealing rapid
growth. The long term goal of financing is to broaden capital markets
so that in the future they can serve as the financial source for infra-
structure. The new role of governments in building infrastructure is to
encourage private financing by ensuring the private provider against
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policy risks. The other option is a limited recourse financing in which
lenders have limited access to the assets of a company sponsoring a
project. The hope is that these options will provide a pattern of
repayment that will serve to comfort future investors.
Further concerns to project financing are the size of the project,
the country in which it is located, and the degree to which the gov-
ernment is involved. The larger a project is, the more inherent risk is
involved. Investors should begin with smaller projects in order to gain
experience before moving to larger ones. In addition, contractual agree-
ments must be effective in resolving any possible dispute that may
arise. International arbitration in a neutral location should be
considered.
Efficient risk allocation is central to project financing. Countries
should take steps to ensure providers against local currency devaluat-
ing foreign capital. Private providers may also want to consider
insuring themselves against the uncertainty in the cost of production
and demand for services. The World Bank as well as the Asian
Development Bank offer guarantees to private investors in developing
countries in which a government guarantee is insufficient to the
lender. The Report identifies several countries that have established
development banks in order to act as an intermediary to promote
private financing.
Finally, development of domestic capital markets should increase
financing. Privatization of infrastructure markets adds to the local
stock market. Bonds attract long term investors to the infrastructure
market. Contractual savings institutions, such as pension funds and
life insurance companies, are excellent resources for long term
investments. Securities such as pension funds protect the investor
since they are guaranteed by the government.
The final chapter of this Report outlines the possibility for future
reform in infrastructure. Four options for infrastructure are presented.
The first, and most common, option for a country is public ownership
and operation at the national, regional, or local level. The second
option is public ownership and private operation that allows the
government to maintain control while shifting responsibility to the
private sector through either leases or concessions as described previ-
ously. The third option is private ownership and operation, most
appealing to the private sector when commercial and political risk are
low and profit potential from user charges are high. The final option is
community and user provisions providing for local control and
community involvement in small scale infrastructure.
Ultimately, the goal for each nation is to determine its specific
needs and goals. The potential for advancement depends on a country's
technical and managerial capacity, a positive environment for private
investment, and the private sector's capacity to generate and maintain
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adequate resources.
World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development is
a text for any person desiring to learn more of the importance of
advancements in infrastructure to the development of a nation. It is a
scholarly analysis of the potential for the future of the relationship
between a nation and its economic and social reliance on infrastruc-
ture.
The text of this Report is accompanied by several diagrams,
charts and specific references to situations in which the proposals have
been utilized in various countries. Because this Report was written
from a multitude of sources, sections on bibliographical notes,
infrastructure data, and technical data are presented at the end in
order to track the information located within the main text.
Matthew Borrillo

